vuln-osv update 2026-11-17T00:44:50Z

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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-24mq-4vc6-2prf","published":"2026-11-16T22:12:51Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:30:03.917752741Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-129299"],"summary":"mail-parser: Uncaught exceptions and silent header loss in mail-parser on attacker-controlled input","details":"### Impact\n\nTwo effects, sharing the root cause of Advisory 1 — header names chosen by the sender were\nresolved through Python attribute lookup and rewritten before lookup.\n\n**Uncaught exceptions.** A crafted message raises an exception that is *outside* the\n`MailParser*` hierarchy, so a caller catching only mail-parser exceptions does not catch it\nand the worker dies.\n\n*Header named after a method* (CWE-248, reported by @iam-niranjan). Python resolves real\nclass attributes before `__getattr__`, so a header named after a method put a bound method\nobject into the parsed mail dict. A 12-byte email is sufficient. Nine colliding names were\nconfirmed: `Parse`, `Message`, `Write_Attachments`, `From_File`, `From_File_Obj`,\n`From_File_Msg`, `From_String`, `From_Bytes`, `Get_Server_Ipaddress`. Also reproducible from\nthe CLI (`mail-parser -f evil.eml -j`).\n\n```python\nimport mailparser\nmailparser.parse_from_string(\"Parse: x\\r\\n\\r\\n\").mail_json\n# 4.6.1 -> TypeError: Object of type method is not JSON serializable\n# 4.6.2 -> {\"parse\": \"x\", \"has_defects\": false}\n```\n\n*Header carrying 8-bit bytes* (CWE-248). For a header containing raw 8-bit bytes, Python's\n`compat32` policy returns an `email.header.Header` rather than a `str`, which the `_raw`\naccessor passed straight to `json.dumps`. This fires on entirely benign non-ASCII mail via\n`parse_from_bytes()`, the normal entry point for mail off the wire.\n\n```python\nimport mailparser\nmailparser.parse_from_bytes(b\"Subject: caf\\xe9\\r\\n\\r\\nbody\\r\\n\").subject_raw\n# 4.6.1 -> TypeError: Object of type Header is not JSON serializable\n# 4.6.2 -> '[\"caf�\"]'\n```\n\n**Silent loss of message content** (CWE-436). A sender can make a header's value vanish from\nevery output surface, or be replaced by a different header's value, with `has_defects`\nremaining `false`. This is an evasion primitive: the tool's output diverges from the bytes\nactually in the message, and a pipeline scanning parsed output for indicators sees nothing\nand no failure signal.\n\nHeader names were normalised before lookup — underscores folded to dashes, and `_json` /\n`_raw` suffixes interpreted — so a header genuinely named `Subject_json` was reported with\nthe value of `Subject` and its own value discarded, and any header whose name contains an\nunderscore resolved to nothing.\n\n```python\nimport mailparser\n\nraw = (\"From: Real Sender <real@good.example>\\r\\n\"\n \"Subject: innocuous\\r\\n\"\n \"Subject_json: MALWARE-C2 http://evil.example/payload.exe\\r\\n\"\n \"X_Spam_Flag: YES\\r\\n\\r\\nbody\\r\\n\")\nmail = mailparser.parse_from_string(raw)\nprint(mail.mail[\"subject_json\"]) # 4.6.1 -> '\"innocuous\"' 4.6.2 -> the real value\nprint(mail.headers[\"X_Spam_Flag\"]) # 4.6.1 -> '' 4.6.2 -> 'YES'\nprint(\"MALWARE-C2\" in mail.mail_json) # 4.6.1 -> False 4.6.2 -> True\nprint(mail.has_defects) # both -> False\n```\n\nA related case: `email.message.Message.__len__` returns the header count, so a message with\n**no headers** is falsy. `parse()` returned before initialising state, and the unset\nattributes were then absorbed by `__getattr__` and answered as absent headers. Every\nproperty returned `''` — including `mail` and `attachments`, which are documented to return\na `dict` and a `list` — with no error and no defect flag.\n\n```python\nimport mailparser\nmail = mailparser.parse_from_string(\"Click http://evil.example/pay.exe now\\r\\n\")\nprint(repr(mail.body)) # 4.6.1 -> '' 4.6.2 -> the text\nprint(repr(mail.attachments)) # 4.6.1 -> '' 4.6.2 -> []\nprint(mail.has_defects) # 4.6.1 -> '' 4.6.2 -> True\n```\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **4.6.2**. Upgrade with `pip install --upgrade mail-parser`.\n\nHeader names taken from a message are now looked up literally — no attribute access, no\ncase or separator folding, no suffix interpretation — so no header name can collide with a\nmethod or property, and no value can be substituted or dropped. 8-bit values are coerced to\n`str` before serialisation. Parser state is initialised before the message check, which now\ntests `is None`, and attribute names beginning with `_` raise `AttributeError` instead of\nbeing answered as headers.\n\n**Behaviour changes.** Header names now appear in `mail` and `headers` exactly as sent, so a\nheader named `X_Spam_Flag` keeps that name and its own value. `X_raw` always returns a JSON\narray — an absent header yields `[]` where 4.6.1 returned `null`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone for the data loss. For the uncaught exceptions, callers who cannot upgrade should wrap\n`mail_json`, `mail_partial_jsonLine truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-259w-wmqg-fp76","published":"2026-11-16T22:09:24Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:15:05.672101115Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-86046"],"summary":"termux-sync: Arbitrary file write during restore via attacker-controlled manifest source path","details":"termux-sync restore trusts fields inside an untrusted backup manifest and uses them as the extraction destination without validation.\n\nDuring restore, each archive entry is handled as:\n\n src_dir = Path(info.get(\"source\", ...)).parent\n extract_archive(archive, src_dir, ...)\n\nextract_archive opens the archive and runs tarfile.extract for every member with no path jail and no filter:\n\n with tarfile.open(archive_path, \"r:*\") as tf:\n for member in tf.getmembers():\n tf.extract(member, dest_path, set_attrs=True)\n\nThere is no check that manifest \"source\" stays under an expected restore root, that tar members stay inside dest_path, or that backup_name used in temporary paths cannot contain \"..\" or separators.\n\nImpact:\nA victim who restores a malicious backup (local, shared, or from a compromised GitHub/Google Drive storage backend) can have arbitrary files written anywhere the Termux user can write. Overwriting shell startup files or executable scripts leads to local code execution on later use.\n\nReproduction (benign markers only):\n\n1. Build a backup directory with home.tar.gz (members: proof filename + optional config names) and manifest.json.\n2. Set files.home.source to any path whose parent is the desired write directory (e.g. $HOME/dummy_for_parent so parent is $HOME).\n3. Run the same extract path the tool uses: src_dir = Path(source).parent; tarfile.extract each member into src_dir.\n4. Observe attacker-controlled files created under $HOME and under other chosen roots (config / shell-rc style overwrite).\n\nExpected: restore only writes under fixed, validated roots; reject unsafe source values and members that resolve outside dest.\nActual: write destination is fully controlled by manifest.source; proof files and overwrites appear outside any intended jail.\n\nFix direction:\n- Do not trust manifest \"source\" for extract roots; use fixed app-defined destinations\n- Sanitize backup_name (basename; reject \"..\" and separators)\n- Extract with tarfile filter=\"data\" (or equivalent boundary checks) and refuse escape\n- Treat backups as untrusted input\n\nActual result (local marker-only reproduction):\n\nPROOF path: /data/data/com.termux/files/home/PWNED_BY_TERMUX_SYNC_RESTORE.txt\nPROOF exists? True\nPROOF content:\nPWNED\nThis file was written by a malicious termux-sync backup restore path.\nRoot cause: manifest files.*.source controls extract destination.\n\n*** VULN CONFIRMED: arbitrary write to $HOME ***\n\nimportant.conf => secret=ATTACKER_CONTROLLED\n*** VULN CONFIRMED: overwrite under attacker-chosen root ***\n\n.bashrc_sim shows injected:\nexport ATTACKER=1\n*** VULN CONFIRMED: startup-file style overwrite ***\n\nExtract roots used:\n home -> parent($HOME/dummy_for_parent) = $HOME\n config -> parent(.../victim_sim/nested_dummy) = .../victim_sim\n\nReported and credited to Niranj R Mahaswar ( GitHub: @NiranjMahaswar )","affected":[{"package":{"name":"termux-sync","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/termux-sync"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.2.4"}]}],"versions":["1.1.0","1.1.1","1.1.2","1.2.0","1.2.1","1.2.2","1.2.3"],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"<= 1.2.3","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-259w-wmqg-fp76/GHSA-259w-wmqg-fp76.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/djunekz/termux-sync/security/advisories/GHSA-259w-wmqg-fp76"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86046"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/djunekz/termux-sync/commit/9c8637b280ee3e126885def5ff5b326c289ee7cf"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/djunekz/termux-sync"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/djunekz/termux-sync/releases/tag/v1.2.4"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-22"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-16T22:09:24Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-16T17:17:35Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-72px-j8gh-p79x","published":"2026-11-16T22:11:54Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:15:05.618811010Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-129297"],"summary":"mail-parser: Sender IP address spoofing in get_server_ipaddress()","details":"### Patches\n\nFixed in **4.6.2**. Upgrade with `pip install --upgrade mail-parser`.\n\nCandidate addresses are now selected by position, not by appearance — a bracketed address\nthe sender wrote is byte-identical to one the MTA wrote, so no amount of pattern matching\ncan tell them apart:\n\n- the first token of the `from` clause is the HELO name, whatever its shape, and is never a\n candidate;\n- an explicit HELO marker inside a comment group is sender text and is excluded;\n- a candidate must sit inside a `(` / `[` group;\n- IPv4 and IPv6 matches are merged positionally, never family-first;\n- the walk stops at the first trusted hop naming no address, rather than continuing into\n sender-written headers.\n\nThe IPv6 pattern was corrected to skip the `IPv6:` tag and to prefer the longest valid form.\n\n**Behaviour change.** `get_server_ipaddress()` now returns `None` rather than an unreliable\nvalue in two cases that previously returned an address: a `from` clause consisting of a bare\naddress with no HELO marker (indistinguishable from `EHLO <that address>`), and a trusted hop\nnaming no address at all. Callers must handle `None`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone within mail-parser. Callers who cannot upgrade should not treat the return value of\n`get_server_ipaddress()` as trustworthy, and should derive sender attribution from an\nauthenticated signal instead — the MTA's own logs, or SPF/DKIM/DMARC results computed\noutside this library.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"mail-parser","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/mail-parser"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.6.2"}]}],"versions":["0.5.0","1.0.0","1.0.0rc1","1.1.0","1.1.1","1.1.10","1.1.2","1.1.3","1.1.4","1.1.5","1.1.6","1.1.7","1.1.8","1.1.9","1.2.0","1.2.1","1.2.2","1.2.4","1.2.5","1.2.6","2.0.0","2.0.1","2.1.0","3.0.0","3.1.0","3.10.0","3.11.0","3.12.0","3.13.0","3.14.0","3.15.0","3.2.0","3.2.1","3.2.2","3.2.3","3.2.4","3.2.5","3.2.6","3.2.7","3.3.0","3.3.1","3.3.2","3.3.3","3.4.0","3.4.1","3.5.0","3.5.1","3.6.0","3.6.1","3.7.0","3.7.1","3.8.0","3.8.1","3.9.0","3.9.1","3.9.2","3.9.3","4.0.0","4.1.0","4.1.2","4.1.3","4.1.4","4.2.0","4.2.1","4.3.0","4.4.0","4.5.0","4.6.0","4.6.1"],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"<= 4.6.1","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-72px-j8gh-p79x/GHSA-72px-j8gh-p79x.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-72px-j8gh-p79x"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129297"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/pull/167"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/ce3cf3559db1ff806bda598b378de9f8c2a5be96"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/releases/tag/4.6.2"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-20","CWE-345"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-16T22:11:54Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-16T18:17:30Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-7mxv-7h3q-9324","published":"2026-11-16T18:45:51Z","modified":"2026-11-16T19:15:07.281117215Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-128134"],"summary":"NLTK dot2img runs Graphviz 'dot' without the trusted-exec chokepoint, enabling local code execution via a writable PATH element","details":"## Summary\n\n`nltk.parse.dependencygraph.dot2img` invokes the Graphviz `dot` executable without the trusted-execution guarantees that NLTK applies to its other native-tool wrappers. The function resolves `dot` by bare name and then runs the resolved absolute path with a raw `subprocess.run`, omitting the ownership/writability check and the loader-environment scrub that `nltk.pathsec.spawn_trusted` provides. On a POSIX host, a local, unprivileged actor who can write to any group/world-writable directory that appears on the victim's `PATH` can plant a trojan `dot`; when the victim later renders a `DependencyGraph` (for example in a Jupyter notebook, which auto-invokes `_repr_svg_`) or calls `dot2img` directly, the planted binary executes as the victim. The advisory GHSA-6hwm-xvph-95vm (CVE-2026-78680) addressed the same untrusted-search-path class for the Graphviz `dot` invoker in `nltk/translate/api.py`, but `dot2img` received only part of that remediation and remains exploitable.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nNLTK's native-tool security model layers four defenses (documented in `nltk/EXTERNAL_TOOL_SECURITY.md`): (1) `find_binary` refuses a current-working-directory-relative match; (2) `resolve_trusted_executable` verifies the resolved file is a regular file that no other unprivileged user can replace (private parent directories, owner is the user or root, no group/world write bit); (3) shell execution is refused; (4) `safe_env` scrubs loader and interpreter environment variables before exec. Layers 2, 3, and 4 are reached only through `nltk.pathsec.spawn_trusted`. `dot2img` calls `find_binary(\"dot\")` (layer 1 only), then executes the result with `subprocess.run([dot_binary, ...])` and no `env=` argument. Layer 1 rejects only non-absolute matches, so an absolute path returned by the `which` search stage survives even when the file lives in a writable directory. Because `dot2img` never calls `spawn_trusted`, the ownership check and environment scrub never run.\n\n```text\nnltk/parse/dependencygraph.py:626 dot_binary = find_binary(\"dot\") # layer 1 only\nnltk/parse/dependencygraph.py:631 subprocess.run([dot_binary, \"-T%s\" % t], ...) # no trust check, no env=\nnltk/parse/dependencygraph.py:638 subprocess.run([dot_binary, \"-T%s\" % t], ...) # binary-format branch, same gap\nnltk/internals.py:1034 if searching_bare_name and not os.path.isabs(path): continue # skips only relative matches\nnltk/translate/api.py:145 process = spawn_trusted(dot_binary, [f\"-T{output_format}\"], ...) # hardened sibling\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nPrerequisites: a POSIX host on which the attacker is a local, unprivileged user (or code) able to write to a group/world-writable directory that appears on the victim's `PATH`. This includes the commonly cited case of a Homebrew `/usr/local/bin` with `drwxrwxr-x` permissions, or a writable directory placed early on `PATH`. The attacker plants a trojan `dot` there. When the victim renders a `DependencyGraph` (notebook `_repr_svg_` auto-invocation) or calls `dot2img` directly, the trojan executes as the victim, yielding arbitrary local code execution in the victim's account: a local privilege-escalation and lateral-movement primitive. Because the child environment is not scrubbed, loader-injection variables (for example `LD_PRELOAD`, `DYLD_*`, `GCONV_PATH`) also reach the child, providing an additional execution surface. No control over NLTK inputs is required.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n`Requires: POSIX host, an importable NLTK build from the affected tree, and Python 3. No third-party dependencies.`\n\n1. Create a world-writable directory and write an executable `dot` script into it that drops a marker and emits fake SVG.\n2. Prepend that directory to `PATH` and run from a neutral working directory (so this is not the current-working-directory vector).\n3. Show that `resolve_trusted_executable` refuses the planted binary (so the hardened path would raise) while `dot2img` executes it.\n\n```python\nimport os, stat, tempfile, subprocess, sys\nd = tempfile.mkdtemp()\ndot = os.path.join(d, \"dot\")\nwith open(dot, \"w\") as f:\n f.write(\"#!/bin/sh\\ntouch \" + os.path.join(d, \"MARKER\") + \"\\necho '<svg><!-- planted dot ran --></svg>'\\n\")\nos.chmod(dot, 0o777)\nos.chmod(d, 0o777)\nos.environ[\"PATH\"] = d + os.pathsep + os.environ[\"PATH\"]\nos.chdir(\"/\")\nfrom nltk.pathsec import resolve_trusted_executable\nfrom nltk.parse.dependencygraph import dot2img\nprint(\"resolve_trusted_executable(planted dot):\", resolve_trusted_executable(os.path.join(d, \"dot\")))\nout = dot2img(\"digraph G { a -> b }\")\nprint(\"dot2img stdout:\", repr(out))\nprint(\Line truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-8cgq-x343-p74c","published":"2026-11-16T22:22:13Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:30:03.936821461Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-129301"],"summary":"mail-parser: One hostile attachment aborts `write_attachments()` and silently drops the rest of the batch","details":"### Impact\n\n`write_attachments()` called `_safe_attachment_filename()` and `write_sample()` inside its loop\nwith no guard, so a single crafted attachment raised out of the whole save. Every attachment\n**after** the malicious one was silently never written, with no error surfaced to a caller that\ncatches only `MailParserError`.\n\nThat is an evasion primitive as much as an availability bug: a sender puts one poisoned part\nfirst and the real payload second, and the payload never reaches the extraction directory that\na downstream scanner or sandbox reads — while it still reaches the recipient's mail client\nintact. The tool's output diverges from the bytes actually in the message, which is the same\nfailure mode as the filename-sanitizing bypass in\n[GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496](https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496).\n\nThree shapes were reachable, all from attacker-controlled MIME metadata:\n\n- **NUL smuggled through RFC 2231** — `filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bin` decodes to a NUL in the\n filename during parsing and raised `ValueError` out of the name check;\n- **overlong basename** — a filename longer than `NAME_MAX` (e.g. 300 characters) raised\n `OSError: File name too long` from `open()`, *after* creating a zero-byte stub on disk;\n- **undecodable payload** — a body that is not valid base64 raised `binascii.Error` (a\n `ValueError` subclass) from the decode performed inside the `open()` block.\n\n```python\nimport tempfile, mailparser\n\nraw = (\"Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=b\\r\\n\\r\\n\"\n \"--b\\r\\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\\r\\n\"\n \"Content-Disposition: attachment; filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bin\\r\\n\\r\\nxx\\r\\n\"\n \"--b\\r\\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\\r\\n\"\n \"Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=good.bin\\r\\n\\r\\nyy\\r\\n\"\n \"--b--\\r\\n\")\n\nmp = mailparser.parse_from_string(raw) # parse itself is fine; safe_filename is None\nmp.write_attachments(tempfile.mkdtemp())\n# 4.6.0 - 4.6.2 -> ValueError, and good.bin is never written\n# 4.6.3 -> logs \"Skipped attachment with invalid filename: 'evil\\x00.bin'\";\n# good.bin is written\n```\n\n`parse()` itself was never affected — it catches the `ValueError` — so only the write path was\nunguarded. The reject-paths that made this reachable were introduced with the filename\nsanitizing in 4.6.0 (PR #165).\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **4.6.3**. `write_attachments()` now logs and skips a single unusable attachment\ninstead of aborting the batch:\n\n- an invalid filename is caught and skipped;\n- overlong basenames are truncated to 240 UTF-8 bytes, preserving the extension, rather than\n reaching `open()`;\n- the base64 decode moved *before* `open()`, so a failure leaves no zero-byte stub, and it now\n repairs padding and alphabet errors the way mail clients do (matching `MIME::Base64` on 2008\n cases) — rejecting them let a sender append one character to make an attachment vanish from\n the extraction directory while it still reached the recipient;\n- `MailParserPathError` is deliberately **not** caught by the per-attachment handler: a\n containment failure is not a per-attachment problem, and path-containment checks now raise\n `MailParserPathError` instead of `ValueError` so the broader catch cannot swallow them.\n\nDeduplication was hardened in the same change: it reserves room for its own suffix marker\n(`write_sample()` sanitizes again, and the clamp there used to cut the marker back off,\ncollapsing distinct attachments onto one file), resumes from the last used suffix per stem\ninstead of rescanning from 1 (quadratic before — 16000 same-named attachments took 14 s, now\nmilliseconds), and folds case, because APFS, exFAT and SMB collapse `Invoice.pdf` and\n`invoice.pdf`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to 4.6.3. If you cannot upgrade, do not call `write_attachments()` on untrusted mail;\niterate `parser.attachments` yourself and write each attachment inside its own\n`try`/`except Exception`, skipping the ones whose `safe_filename` is `None`.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"mail-parser","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/mail-parser"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"4.6.0"},{"fixed":"4.6.3"}]}],"versions":["4.6.0","4.6.1","4.6.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-8cgq-x343-p74c/GHSA-8cgq-x343-p74c.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-8cgq-x343-p74c"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/Line truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496","published":"2026-11-16T22:10:55Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:15:05.622867463Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-129296"],"summary":"mail-parser: Path Traversal vulnerability in attachment extraction","details":"A path traversal vulnerability was identified in mail-parser when extracting email attachments using the write_attachments() and write_sample() APIs.\n\nA specially crafted email containing malicious attachment filenames (for example, using directory traversal sequences such as \"../\" or absolute filesystem paths) could cause files to be written outside the intended output directory. Depending on how the library was used and the permissions of the executing process, this could result in arbitrary file overwrite.\n\nThe vulnerability affects mail-parser versions 3.8.0 through 4.5.0.\n\nThe issue has been addressed by introducing comprehensive filename sanitization and path validation before any file is written to disk. The fix includes:\n\n- Sanitization of attachment filenames before writing.\n- Validation that all output paths remain within the intended destination directory.\n- Rejection of symbolic link targets.\n- Normalization of Windows and POSIX path separators.\n- Validation and rejection of invalid or unsafe filenames.\n- Protection applied consistently in both write_attachments() and write_sample() APIs.\n\nUsers are strongly encouraged to upgrade to the patched release.\n\n## Credits\n\nThe vulnerability was responsibly reported by **Niranjan Ganesan** (Security Insights, https://securityinsights.io/, GitHub: @iam-niranjan).\n\nThe vulnerability was analyzed, remediated, and the security fix was implemented by **Fedele Mantuano**, maintainer of mail-parser (LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/fmantuano/).\n\nmail-parser would like to thank Niranjan Ganesan for following a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process and for collaborating throughout the remediation and verification of the fix.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"mail-parser","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/mail-parser"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.8.0"},{"fixed":"4.6.0"}]}],"versions":["3.10.0","3.11.0","3.12.0","3.13.0","3.14.0","3.15.0","3.8.0","3.8.1","3.9.0","3.9.1","3.9.2","3.9.3","4.0.0","4.1.0","4.1.2","4.1.3","4.1.4","4.2.0","4.2.1","4.3.0","4.4.0","4.5.0"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496/GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129296"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/pull/165"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/3d6cb7a51f2ad7ea57e529121dbd5d56f29fefe8"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/b0a2e968815f3ed9e129efb0f5f7e935a9dacd1d"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/releases/tag/4.6.0"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-22","CWE-73"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-16T22:10:55Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-16T18:17:30Z","severity":"MODERATE"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-gm79-2pvc-wc75","published":"2026-01-20T00:30:28Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:55:50.099245928Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-22218","PYSEC-2026-598"],"summary":"chainlit : Chainlit allows authenticated arbitrary file reads through custom element updates","details":"Chainlit versions prior to 2.9.4 contain an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the /project/element update flow. An authenticated client can send a custom Element with a user-controlled path value, causing the server to copy the referenced file into the attacker’s session. The resulting element identifier (chainlitKey) can then be used to retrieve the file contents via /project/file/<chainlitKey>, allowing disclosure of any file readable by the Chainlit service.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"chainlit","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/chainlit"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.9.4"}]}],"versions":["0.1.0","0.1.1","0.1.101","0.1.102","0.1.103","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.101","0.2.102","0.2.103","0.2.104","0.2.105","0.2.106","0.2.107","0.2.108","0.2.109","0.2.110","0.2.111","0.3.0","0.4.0","0.4.1","0.4.101","0.4.2","0.4.3","0.5.0","0.5.1","0.5.2","0.6.0","0.6.1","0.6.2","0.6.3","0.6.4","0.6.401","0.6.402","0.7.0","0.7.1","0.7.2","0.7.3","0.7.301","0.7.400","0.7.500","0.7.501","0.7.600rc0","0.7.600rc1","0.7.601rc0","0.7.602","0.7.602rc0","0.7.603","0.7.604","0.7.604rc0","0.7.604rc1","0.7.604rc2","0.7.700","1.0.0","1.0.0rc0","1.0.0rc1","1.0.0rc2","1.0.0rc3","1.0.100","1.0.101","1.0.200","1.0.300","1.0.301","1.0.400","1.0.401","1.0.500","1.0.501","1.0.502","1.0.503","1.0.504","1.0.505","1.0.506","1.1.0","1.1.0rc0","1.1.0rc1","1.1.101","1.1.200","1.1.201","1.1.202","1.1.300","1.1.300rc0","1.1.300rc1","1.1.300rc2","1.1.300rc3","1.1.300rc4","1.1.300rc5","1.1.301","1.1.302","1.1.303","1.1.304","1.1.305","1.1.306","1.1.400","1.1.400rc0","1.1.400rc1","1.1.401","1.1.402","1.1.403rc0","1.1.404","1.2.0","1.2.0rc0","1.3.0","1.3.0rc0","1.3.0rc1","1.3.1","1.3.2","2.0.0","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.0.3","2.0.4","2.0.5","2.0.6","2.0.601","2.0.602","2.0.603","2.0.dev0","2.0.dev1","2.0.dev2","2.0rc0","2.0rc1","2.1.0","2.1.1","2.1.2","2.2.0","2.2.1","2.3.0","2.4.0","2.4.0rc0","2.4.1","2.4.2","2.4.201","2.4.3","2.4.301","2.4.302","2.4.400","2.5.5","2.6.0","2.6.1","2.6.2","2.6.3","2.6.4","2.6.5","2.6.6","2.6.7","2.6.8","2.6.9","2.7.0","2.7.1","2.7.1.1","2.7.2","2.8.0","2.8.1","2.8.2","2.8.3","2.8.4","2.8.5","2.9.0","2.9.1","2.9.2","2.9.3"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/01/GHSA-gm79-2pvc-wc75/GHSA-gm79-2pvc-wc75.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22218"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/Chainlit/chainlit/pull/2737"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/Chainlit/chainlit/commit/ffc3cce648b343b933e10e85ee5805c7e02ab3bf"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/Chainlit/chainlit"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/Chainlit/chainlit/releases/tag/2.9.4"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gm79-2pvc-wc75"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/chainlit-arbitrary-file-read-via-project-element"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://www.zafran.io/resources/chainleak-critical-ai-framework-vulnerabilities-expose-data-enable-cloud-takeover"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-22","CWE-73"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-16T22:36:32Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-01-20T00:15:48Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"},{"type":"CVSS_V4","score":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-r7w7-vpq8-c5vv","published":"2026-11-16T22:11:08Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:15:05.620597997Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-129295"],"summary":"mail-parser is vulnerable to polynomial ReDoS in email header parsing","details":"### Summary\n\nTwo regular expressions used while parsing email headers backtrack\npolynomially on attacker-controlled input. Parsing a single small, well-formed\nemail can consume minutes to hours of CPU, denying service to any process that\nparses untrusted mail.\n\nBoth are reachable from an ordinary `parse_from_string()`, `parse_from_bytes()`\nor `parse_from_file()` call — no special API, option, or malformed structure is\nrequired by the victim.\n\n### Details\n\n**1. Address-header fallback regex (`src/mailparser/utils.py`)**\n\n`get_addresses()` falls back to `_ADDR_FALLBACK_RE` whenever\n`email.utils.getaddresses(strict=True)` yields no usable address. The\nalternative `([^<,]*?)\\s*<([^>]+)>` overlaps a lazy quantifier with an adjacent\n`\\s*` — a space matches both. Driven by `finditer`, which retries at every\noffset and rescans the remainder, matching degrades to **quadratic** on `<`\npadding and **cubic** on whitespace padding.\n\nThe fallback engages on the feature's own happy path, e.g.\n`From: alice@example.com <bob@example.com>`.\n\nMeasured (4.6.0, CPython 3.14, macOS arm64; reproduced identically on Linux and\non CPython 3.9, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13):\n\n| Padding | Parse time |\n| ---------------------- | ------------------ |\n| valid address + 750 sp | 0.38 s |\n| + 1500 sp | 2.97 s |\n| + 3000 sp | 23.4 s (×7.9/2×) |\n| + 6 KB sp | 185 s |\n| ~100 KB sp | hours |\n\nFully RFC 5322-compliant folded headers (all lines ≤ 71 octets) trigger the same\nblowup, so the input passes normal MTA and library checks. ~100 KB of headers is\nwithin Postfix's default `header_size_limit = 102400`.\n\nAll six address headers parsed by the library (`From`, `To`, `Cc`, `Bcc`,\n`Reply-To`, `Delivered-To`) are affected and their cost adds up linearly.\n\n**2. Received-header clause splitter (`src/mailparser/const.py`)**\n\n`parse_received()` splits on `_CLAUSE_SPLITTER`,\n`(?:^|\\s+)(from|by|via|with|id|for|envelope-from)\\s+`. Under `re.split` this\nbacktracks **quadratically** over any whitespace run that is not followed by a\nclause keyword. The pre-existing normalization collapsed only `[\\t\\n]`, so\nliteral spaces — including folded-header padding — reached the splitter intact.\n\nMeasured: 24 000 spaces in one `Received:` header → 22 s; ~100 KB → minutes.\n\n### Impact\n\nAvailability. A handful of small emails keeps every parsing worker of a mail\ngateway, ticketing system, quarantine UI, or archiving pipeline permanently\nbusy. No confidentiality or integrity impact.\n\nAnyone who parses email they did not author is affected — which is the library's\npurpose.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **4.6.1**.\n\n- The address fallback is now a linear scan: the header is split into\n comma-separated items (quote-aware, in Python), then each item is matched\n against a bounded angle-address `<([^<>\\s]+)>` with the display name derived\n in Python, falling back to a bare-email match. Each pattern has a single\n non-nested quantifier over a negated character class → O(n).\n 2000 padding spaces: `3.5 s → <0.01 s`. 256 KB padding: `hours → 0.087 s`.\n Output is preserved on every previously supported shape.\n- `parse_received()` collapses whitespace runs to a single space before\n splitting, so the splitter's `\\s+` only ever matches one character → O(n).\n The date is extracted from the raw header beforehand, so date formatting is\n unaffected. 24 000 spaces: `22 s → 0.003 s`; 200 000 spaces: `0.004 s`.\n\nRegression tests assert linear-time behaviour for both paths.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone within the library. Upgrade to `4.6.1`.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should cap total header size before\nparsing and enforce a wall-clock timeout around each parse.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"mail-parser","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/mail-parser"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"4.2.0"},{"fixed":"4.6.1"}]}],"versions":["4.2.0","4.2.1","4.3.0","4.4.0","4.5.0","4.6.0"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-r7w7-vpq8-c5vv/GHSA-r7w7-vpq8-c5vv.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-r7w7-vpq8-c5vv"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129295"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/pull/166"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/037293158cb291caa96635a54449243d32cd4d96"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/5Line truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-xhrq-2mqv-q8wx","published":"2026-11-16T22:20:32Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:30:03.934450453Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-129300"],"summary":"mail-parser: Uncaught `OverflowError` / `OSError` on an out-of-range `Received` date","details":"### Impact\n\nA `Received` header whose trailing date carries an out-of-range year, or a timezone offset\nlarge enough to push the timestamp past the int64 epoch range, raises an exception that is\n**outside the `MailParser*` hierarchy**. A caller that catches only mail-parser exceptions\ndoes not catch it, and the parse of the entire message is aborted — the same class of issue\nas [GHSA-24mq-4vc6-2prf](https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-24mq-4vc6-2prf),\nwhich this survives (it is not a duplicate; 24mq is fixed in 4.6.2 and this reproduces on 4.6.2).\n\nAll entry points are affected: `parse_from_string()`, `parse_from_bytes()`, `parse_from_file()`,\n`parse_from_file_obj()` and the `mail-parser` CLI. The header is fully attacker-controlled and\na single line is enough, so any pipeline that parses untrusted mail can be made to lose the\nmessage — and, if one worker handles a queue, to drop the batch.\n\n```python\nimport mailparser\n\nraw = (\"Received: from x ([1.2.3.4]) by mx.victim.com; \"\n \"Tue, 7 Mar 292277026596 14:29:24 +0000\\r\\n\\r\\nbody\\r\\n\")\nmailparser.parse_from_string(raw).mail_json\n# <= 4.6.2 -> OverflowError: signed integer is greater than maximum\n# 4.6.3 -> parses; the unusable hop date is reported as \"date_utc\": null\n```\n\n**Root cause.** `receiveds_format()` in `src/mailparser/utils.py` guarded the date conversion\nwith `except (TypeError, ValueError)`, but `convert_mail_date()` → `email.utils.mktime_tz()` →\n`calendar.timegm()` raises `OverflowError` for years whose epoch seconds overflow int64, and\n`datetime.fromtimestamp()` reports `EOVERFLOW` as `OSError` for a sufficiently large timezone\noffset. The `date` and `timezone` properties already wrapped the same conversion in\n`except Exception`; only the `Received` path was left open.\n\n**Affected range.** Introduced by the date-handling change in `ca2aa6a`, first released in\n3.7.0. Reproduced on PyPI 3.7.0, 3.8.0, 3.9.3, 4.0.0, 4.5.0, 4.6.0, 4.6.2 and on `master`\nbefore the fix (Python 3.14). 3.6.0 is not affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **4.6.3**. `receiveds_format()` now also catches `OverflowError` and `OSError` and\nrecords `date_utc = None` for that hop, so the rest of the message still parses:\n\n```python\ntry:\n j[\"date_utc\"], _ = convert_mail_date(i[\"date\"])\nexcept (TypeError, ValueError, OverflowError, OSError):\n j[\"date_utc\"] = None\n```\n\nA sweep of year magnitudes from 10^7 to 10^12 shows only `ValueError`, `OverflowError` and\n`OSError` are reachable on this path.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to 4.6.3. If you cannot upgrade, wrap every `parse_from_*` call in a bare\n`except Exception` rather than `except MailParserError`, and treat the message as unparsed.\n\n### References\n\n- Fix: https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/pull/171\n- Related: [GHSA-24mq-4vc6-2prf](https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-24mq-4vc6-2prf)","affected":[{"package":{"name":"mail-parser","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/mail-parser"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.7.0"},{"fixed":"4.6.3"}]}],"versions":["3.10.0","3.11.0","3.12.0","3.13.0","3.14.0","3.15.0","3.7.0","3.7.1","3.8.0","3.8.1","3.9.0","3.9.1","3.9.2","3.9.3","4.0.0","4.1.0","4.1.2","4.1.3","4.1.4","4.2.0","4.2.1","4.3.0","4.4.0","4.5.0","4.6.0","4.6.1","4.6.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-xhrq-2mqv-q8wx/GHSA-xhrq-2mqv-q8wx.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-xhrq-2mqv-q8wx"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129300"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/pull/171"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/d69f6f9b6ad0bf74d731b373bbdeabb462c32b26"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/e1d9fe6778045d6e2c44406bc8822e3464c1097f"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/releases/tag/4.6.3"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-248"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-16T22:20:32Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-16T18:17:30Z","severity":"MODERATE"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19247","published":"2026-11-13T17:50:00Z","modified":"2026-11-13T20:15:04.729966785Z","summary":"Malicious code in testing1345 (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (15bab830cd8343859ac220ef87e821719169a4e2ccb50da37032d97ef02c27dd)\nDuring installation, the package downloads and executes a script from a remote location. The server delivers different payload versions, some of them being benign, and others containing next-stage installation. The final payload is a RAT.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-testing1345\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n\n\n - rat\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"testing1345","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/testing1345"},"versions":["0.1.0"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/testing1345/MAL-2026-19247.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"EVIDENCE","url":"https://tria.ge/261113-wal5qset2s"},{"type":"EVIDENCE","url":"https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ce97b675a86bfff5e73e218e8d9d17458857d2328b1b55acd87f644001ca865f/detection"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/testing1345"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"domains":["helper-exe.vercel.app"],"urls":["https://helper-exe.vercel.app/hello.bat","https://file.garden/autlsl_4glu4x2U5/c_b8a1b1.zip","https://file.garden/autlsl_4glu4x2U5/m_7cf722","https://pomf2.lain.la/f/qj4sh0sj.png"]},"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/2026-11-testing1345/testing1345","import_time":"2026-11-13T18:12:41.089861858Z","modified_time":"2026-11-13T17:50:00.683461Z","sha256":"15bab830cd8343859ac220ef87e821719169a4e2ccb50da37032d97ef02c27dd","source":"kam193","versions":["0.1.0"]},{"id":"pypi/2026-11-testing1345/testing1345","import_time":"2026-11-13T20:11:32.350009888Z","modified_time":"2026-11-13T17:50:00.683461Z","sha256":"48d6feb6315919cb99e4b19a9f8342a8fd929affcb24f6e46b7c53224534461a","source":"kam193","versions":["0.1.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19247","published":"2026-11-13T17:50:00Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:45:04.611850887Z","summary":"Malicious code in testing1345 (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (89784543a54361ccd20f7d5986a3468bfb12998dfd283b6737f9d9b1ad8c4555)\nThe sdist's setup.py registers a custom build_py command that invokes testing1345.hello.fetch(), which downloads https://helper-exe.vercel.app/hello.bat to %TEMP% and executes it via cmd.exe. The bdist_wheel override additionally writes a site-packages.pth file (testing1345_boot.pth) containing 'import testing1345_boot'; that module calls the same fetch() on Windows at interpreter startup, repeating the download-and-run of hello.bat from the unpinned third-party Vercel host with no hash or signature verification. A temp-file marker gates the boot path to once per machine but is user-deletable. A separate vmcheck module reads DMI/SMBIOS strings and Hyper-V registry keys to classify the host as physical or virtual; it is exposed as a library API and not wired into the install/boot fetch path, but commonly accompanies dropper behavior.\n\n## Source: kam193 (15bab830cd8343859ac220ef87e821719169a4e2ccb50da37032d97ef02c27dd)\nDuring installation, the package downloads and executes a script from a remote location. The server delivers different payload versions, some of them being benign, and others containing next-stage installation. The final payload is a RAT.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-testing1345\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n\n\n - rat\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"testing1345","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/testing1345"},"versions":["0.1.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["testing1345-0.1.0.tar.gz"],"path":"setup.py","sha256":"c62c6261fcda3cf5ff29ed25c106dd026b84905926a0ab7e0c43b7f5a0f8d02a","tlsh":"768165b7c80217f2974261a1994bc3e68331e4335aa49564b8ee80650fdf0f345f71e9"},{"artifacts":["testing1345-0.1.0.tar.gz"],"path":"src/testing1345_boot.py","sha256":"3305693353cf72faad3755249374060b39fb90a4545bd33836b35c6253be9575","tlsh":"312142b2e60253b28712e1789a5193d9e339fc27ad999064f96cc0313fd617b81f13c4"},{"artifacts":["testing1345-0.1.0.tar.gz"],"path":"src/testing1345/vmcheck.py","sha256":"37665cc02be8864ea6426a2dfbf39f4d1ddbcc7c47f67a9eb3fa3d665eaed35a","tlsh":"91625187e5247ca2894780658c5bd182ab3134431e5034357afcc168bf6e95fa3bdbbe"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"testing1345-0.1.0.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"0ba4551c943d43b0c0c6370283a1373d571888eaee22fd8f9cdfc9fc1a5199ec","md5":"2e07958fcddffa03356957ca8cba29b0","sha256":"1b26617fd70b0507af87c0b99a556e8cefe807e8b2e8a147b7ad26e2dfe2f3ee"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/testing1345/MAL-2026-19247.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"EVIDENCE","url":"https://tria.ge/261113-wal5qset2s"},{"type":"EVIDENCE","url":"https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ce97b675a86bfff5e73e218e8d9d17458857d2328b1b55acd87f644001ca865f/detection"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/testing1345"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/testing1345/0.1.0/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"domains":["helper-exe.vercel.app"],"urls":["https://helper-exe.vercel.app/hello.bat","https://file.garden/autlsl_4glu4x2U5/c_b8a1b1.zip","https://file.garden/autlsl_4glu4x2U5/m_7cf722","https://pomf2.lain.la/f/qj4sh0sj.png"]},"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/2026-11-testing1345/testing1345","import_time":"2026-11-13T18:12:41.089861858Z","modified_time":"2026-11-13T17:50:00.683461Z","sha256":"15bab830cd8343859ac220ef87e821719169a4e2ccb50da37032d97ef02c27dd","source":"kam193","versions":["0.1.0"]},{"id":"pypi/2026-11-testing1345/testing1345","import_time":"2026-11-13T20:11:32.350009888Z","modified_time":"2026-11-13T17:50:00.683461Z","sha256":"48d6feb6315919cb99e4b19a9f8342a8fd929affcb24f6e46b7c53224534461a","source":"kam193","versions":["0.1.0"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022815","import_time":"2026-11-16T22:36:32.320966818Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T22:29:56Z","sha256":"89784543a54361ccd20f7d5986a3468bfb12998dfd283b6737f9d9b1ad8c4555","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["0.1.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19932","published":"2026-11-14T09:53:39Z","modified":"2026-11-14T10:45:03.712039422Z","summary":"Malicious code in xrfdc (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (2d5669631a74637e570868f9350b0988d15885a2641f820cb91cc3ea22eecb55)\nInstalling the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.\n\n\nCampaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"xrfdc","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/xrfdc"},"versions":["0.0.0","2.0"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/xrfdc/MAL-2026-19932.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/xrfdc"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest/xrfdc","import_time":"2026-11-14T10:35:58.969032765Z","modified_time":"2026-11-14T09:53:39.290372Z","sha256":"2d5669631a74637e570868f9350b0988d15885a2641f820cb91cc3ea22eecb55","source":"kam193","versions":["0.0.0","2.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19932","published":"2026-11-14T09:53:39Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:45:04.594296999Z","summary":"Malicious code in xrfdc (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (bd1b72077d7e588c9063bb0b5879e709f1627d929e9ddf815b6f89c8ec0c8cd5)\nThe sdist's setup.py defines a custom install command that, during `pip install`, collects the installer's hostname and resolved IP address and POSTs them as JSON to a hardcoded webhook.site collector URL (https://webhook.site/0fb8a38d-80f7-4134-8eb4-e5012b816090), silently swallowing any exceptions. Only an sdist is published, so a default `pip install xrfdc==2.0` runs setup.py on every supported platform. The package's own PKG-INFO describes it as a beacon-only proof-of-concept, and no legitimate functionality is shipped. webhook.site is an anonymous third-party request-collector, not infrastructure associated with any declared publisher, and the beacon executes unconditionally without disclosure or opt-out.\n\n## Source: kam193 (2d5669631a74637e570868f9350b0988d15885a2641f820cb91cc3ea22eecb55)\nInstalling the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.\n\n\nCampaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"xrfdc","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/xrfdc"},"versions":["0.0.0","2.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["xrfdc-2.0.tar.gz"],"path":"setup.py","sha256":"14673add7c80c587d7b8f3309faf50c07b39b4ed35507fe96990bcd638b9753b","tlsh":"ea111293ec727175fb8320d0486388653653fa0f6f02ec693cdc57540fae835d821659"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"xrfdc-2.0.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"2fff7748029c29b0207f23e5e7934468452908f7109b99395097ae19bc363891","md5":"4329dcf1898d2a95d19fc21581b2f333","sha256":"3f24f0ea01df14505fa62f1233204cd2144cd56652639708d72891715bd73f74"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/xrfdc/MAL-2026-19932.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/xrfdc"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/xrfdc/2.0/"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest/xrfdc","import_time":"2026-11-14T10:35:58.969032765Z","modified_time":"2026-11-14T09:53:39.290372Z","sha256":"2d5669631a74637e570868f9350b0988d15885a2641f820cb91cc3ea22eecb55","source":"kam193","versions":["0.0.0","2.0"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022817","import_time":"2026-11-16T22:36:32.437530163Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T22:31:07Z","sha256":"bd1b72077d7e588c9063bb0b5879e709f1627d929e9ddf815b6f89c8ec0c8cd5","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["2.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19935","published":"2026-11-14T17:18:32Z","modified":"2026-11-14T17:45:02.029783613Z","summary":"Malicious code in demo-pingtest-xyz (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (d2ce56d3cbce6034dcebd88520ffec19a094c0888b7e797f66c46bc69e8d2eac)\nInstalling the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.\n\n\nCampaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"demo-pingtest-xyz","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/demo-pingtest-xyz"},"versions":["0.0.1"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/demo-pingtest-xyz/MAL-2026-19935.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/demo-pingtest-xyz"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest/demo-pingtest-xyz","import_time":"2026-11-14T17:36:00.294248043Z","modified_time":"2026-11-14T17:18:32.378109Z","sha256":"d2ce56d3cbce6034dcebd88520ffec19a094c0888b7e797f66c46bc69e8d2eac","source":"kam193","versions":["0.0.1"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19935","published":"2026-11-14T17:18:32Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:45:04.608634789Z","summary":"Malicious code in demo-pingtest-xyz (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (ac5f1e73e5038ae7d26af2daaf68855c65aa60f1e0e25da5b0b4827332d6037c)\nThe sdist's setup.py executes a pingback routine at install time that collects installer identity and host details via subprocess calls to whoami, id, hostname, and cat /etc/hosts, together with the current working directory and a timestamp, and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded URL https://pingback.zsdsh.xyz/depconf/demo-pingtest-xyz/. The behavior runs automatically when the sdist is built on install (the package ships no wheel, so a default pip install builds the sdist on Linux glibc/musl, macOS arm64/x86_64, and Windows x86_64). The /depconf/ path and the package naming are consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon designed to identify internal build hosts that resolve this name from the public index.\n\n## Source: kam193 (d2ce56d3cbce6034dcebd88520ffec19a094c0888b7e797f66c46bc69e8d2eac)\nInstalling the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.\n\n\nCampaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"demo-pingtest-xyz","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/demo-pingtest-xyz"},"versions":["0.0.1"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["demo_pingtest_xyz-0.0.1.tar.gz"],"path":"setup.py","sha256":"60e66ce005be3628ed903235eeb7ca7531b08abd87c87809dbfdce1d4122a72d","tlsh":"b011009aab2556a1d3d768b8241046212bb1fe07d6127cb57cdc4f84af4f07f907193d"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"demo_pingtest_xyz-0.0.1.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"a5ed25323691e44a51e69c34a7ee63baa1f9142ec4e6afe9d188075067a13703","md5":"c1beca8fd3be3884d5d251890ab40b04","sha256":"e6c46ccecee3014aeae83336f4276ed38cc6817b49edf37f7e85ca9ba1d27037"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/demo-pingtest-xyz/MAL-2026-19935.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/demo-pingtest-xyz"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/demo-pingtest-xyz/0.0.1/"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest/demo-pingtest-xyz","import_time":"2026-11-14T17:36:00.294248043Z","modified_time":"2026-11-14T17:18:32.378109Z","sha256":"d2ce56d3cbce6034dcebd88520ffec19a094c0888b7e797f66c46bc69e8d2eac","source":"kam193","versions":["0.0.1"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022808","import_time":"2026-11-16T22:36:31.892082433Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T22:26:56Z","sha256":"ac5f1e73e5038ae7d26af2daaf68855c65aa60f1e0e25da5b0b4827332d6037c","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["0.0.1"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19936","published":"2026-11-14T17:17:37Z","modified":"2026-11-14T17:45:02.025211765Z","summary":"Malicious code in gateio-sdk (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (daf0fb9836af133a053a98dbd88106efeaccd310d038b52f596a53be0efc6f76)\nGeneric campaign for all (likely) research / pentests, where the amount or art of collected data raises questions about the privacy, security and ethical side.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: GENERIC-questionable-pentest\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - exfiltration-generic\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n\n\n - typosquatting\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"gateio-sdk","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/gateio-sdk"},"versions":["99.99.1","99.99.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/gateio-sdk/MAL-2026-19936.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/gateio-sdk"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/GENERIC-questionable-pentest/gateio-sdk","import_time":"2026-11-14T17:35:59.642394089Z","modified_time":"2026-11-14T17:17:59.00386Z","sha256":"daf0fb9836af133a053a98dbd88106efeaccd310d038b52f596a53be0efc6f76","source":"kam193","versions":["99.99.1","99.99.2"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19936","published":"2026-11-14T17:17:37Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:45:04.540098318Z","summary":"Malicious code in gateio-sdk (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (50316b5fa5e78f5b800a0294f70d4142efe6eaa87e65227b7786c6aaad67cd8a)\nsetup.py defines a pingback() function and invokes it unconditionally at module top-level, so it runs during `pip install` of the sdist. The function collects installer-side host and identity data (whoami, id/privileges, hostname, cwd, platform, timestamp), reads /etc/hosts, and dumps the installer's environment by reading /proc/self/environ on Linux or os.environ elsewhere (truncated to 3000 chars). The collected data is POSTed as JSON to the hardcoded author-controlled endpoint https://pingback.zsdsh.xyz/depconf/gateio-sdk/. Build and CI environments routinely hold cloud credentials, registry tokens, and auth material in environment variables, so this is a bulk credential sweep against the installer. The package is published under the name `gateio-sdk` at the abnormally high version 99.99.1, matching the dependency-confusion resolver-preference shape against a potentially-internal package name, and the package self-describes as a 'dependency confusion PoC' authored by `bytesnull44` — a label that does not change the harm inflicted on anyone who installs it.\n\n## Source: kam193 (daf0fb9836af133a053a98dbd88106efeaccd310d038b52f596a53be0efc6f76)\nGeneric campaign for all (likely) research / pentests, where the amount or art of collected data raises questions about the privacy, security and ethical side.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: GENERIC-questionable-pentest\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - exfiltration-generic\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n\n\n - typosquatting\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"gateio-sdk","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/gateio-sdk"},"versions":["99.99.1","99.99.2"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["gateio_sdk-99.99.1.tar.gz"],"path":"setup.py","sha256":"af8540bbd264b6ce5dd902e49913ff25c4ba9bca57815fa9731cdd067e18dd84","tlsh":"7f31270aab289572f3f741746491442d27b1fd17ef526cb839dc8ac0af4a07e4170abd"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"gateio_sdk-99.99.1.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"17d18e1d05b472355a4f6c27012508d6b1a4cf47e2cd7040e0d763748095f061","md5":"3198ec87b7117d2a627bc8ea2400a4ad","sha256":"4a68a82286990bbae4743f4e3fd3f7e525197c5d4e3b29087b5a5a34d817f392"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/gateio-sdk/MAL-2026-19936.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/gateio-sdk"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/gateio-sdk/99.99.1/"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/GENERIC-questionable-pentest/gateio-sdk","import_time":"2026-11-14T17:35:59.642394089Z","modified_time":"2026-11-14T17:17:59.00386Z","sha256":"daf0fb9836af133a053a98dbd88106efeaccd310d038b52f596a53be0efc6f76","source":"kam193","versions":["99.99.1","99.99.2"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022809","import_time":"2026-11-16T22:36:31.953123962Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T22:27:03Z","sha256":"50316b5fa5e78f5b800a0294f70d4142efe6eaa87e65227b7786c6aaad67cd8a","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["99.99.1"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19937","published":"2026-11-14T17:19:26Z","modified":"2026-11-14T17:45:02.026932941Z","summary":"Malicious code in gateio-ws (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (0f8978dc13690cab2fe33ad377e4c09bb1fa181ecd2fbba9fc1b2e7c17f8d70f)\nGeneric campaign for all (likely) research / pentests, where the amount or art of collected data raises questions about the privacy, security and ethical side.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: GENERIC-questionable-pentest\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - exfiltration-generic\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n\n\n - typosquatting\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"gateio-ws","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/gateio-ws"},"versions":["99.99.1","99.99.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/gateio-ws/MAL-2026-19937.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/gateio-ws"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/GENERIC-questionable-pentest/gateio-ws","import_time":"2026-11-14T17:35:59.647782569Z","modified_time":"2026-11-14T17:19:26.436071Z","sha256":"0f8978dc13690cab2fe33ad377e4c09bb1fa181ecd2fbba9fc1b2e7c17f8d70f","source":"kam193","versions":["99.99.1","99.99.2"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19937","published":"2026-11-14T17:19:26Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:45:04.581915985Z","summary":"Malicious code in gateio-ws (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (d69c1a6ef8056459c53ad1730c111c11a4e22384300f450f07eeb405af562324)\nsetup.py defines a pingback() routine that executes unconditionally at module top level during sdist build. On `pip install`, it collects the installer's username (whoami/id), hostname, current working directory, the contents of /etc/hosts, and a timestamp, then POSTs them as JSON to https://pingback.zsdsh.xyz/depconf/gateio-ws/. The destination host is unrelated to the gate.io ecosystem and the URL path segment `depconf` together with the implausibly high 99.99.1 version number are consistent with a dependency-confusion squat targeting an internal package name. No wheels are published, so a default `pip install gateio-ws` on every supported platform builds the sdist and triggers the beacon.\n\n## Source: kam193 (0f8978dc13690cab2fe33ad377e4c09bb1fa181ecd2fbba9fc1b2e7c17f8d70f)\nGeneric campaign for all (likely) research / pentests, where the amount or art of collected data raises questions about the privacy, security and ethical side.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: GENERIC-questionable-pentest\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - exfiltration-generic\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n\n\n - typosquatting\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"gateio-ws","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/gateio-ws"},"versions":["99.99.1","99.99.2"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["gateio_ws-99.99.1.tar.gz"],"path":"setup.py","sha256":"f245be6d8e3b93baa9ff22d0db635df7cf0d730bdbe0c51c4d9e85a0929b5768","tlsh":"2f11d08fab286661d2e750b4542045252ba1bd17d7016cb57c9c8f84af4f4bf903257d"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"gateio_ws-99.99.1.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"0ac0d133e431e3352cc9e1599b9e95073747b6ace38b11d5f2dbb84b7a96c05d","md5":"6518a98df161c3c8dc7e79a78a188901","sha256":"c1dac53dc805b43b350a33c6a588cc1719f8b370eb1e9539d661c1d361e72240"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/gateio-ws/MAL-2026-19937.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/gateio-ws"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/gateio-ws/99.99.1/"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/GENERIC-questionable-pentest/gateio-ws","import_time":"2026-11-14T17:35:59.647782569Z","modified_time":"2026-11-14T17:19:26.436071Z","sha256":"0f8978dc13690cab2fe33ad377e4c09bb1fa181ecd2fbba9fc1b2e7c17f8d70f","source":"kam193","versions":["99.99.1","99.99.2"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022811","import_time":"2026-11-16T22:36:32.09178494Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T22:27:18Z","sha256":"d69c1a6ef8056459c53ad1730c111c11a4e22384300f450f07eeb405af562324","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["99.99.1"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19942","published":"2026-11-15T08:33:20Z","modified":"2026-11-15T09:15:03.022459475Z","summary":"Malicious code in gatepay-sdk-python (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (9ea41e6fdee5681e8ec43463b12b4893e323c02cec35e358489fa98443154713)\nInstalling the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.\n\n\nCampaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"gatepay-sdk-python","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/gatepay-sdk-python"},"versions":["99.99.1"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/gatepay-sdk-python/MAL-2026-19942.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/gatepay-sdk-python"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest/gatepay-sdk-python","import_time":"2026-11-15T09:11:42.877340442Z","modified_time":"2026-11-15T08:33:20.128852Z","sha256":"9ea41e6fdee5681e8ec43463b12b4893e323c02cec35e358489fa98443154713","source":"kam193","versions":["99.99.1"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19942","published":"2026-11-15T08:33:20Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:45:04.548409655Z","summary":"Malicious code in gatepay-sdk-python (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (2d538d791bd87fe8c0058441c9acd724ceecbf5ab0ae3afb16f76a886bde3517)\nThe sdist's setup.py executes on `pip install` and performs a DNS lookup of a subdomain constructed from an MD5 hash of the installer's hostname under the attacker-controlled parent zone `gatepay-sdk-python.depconf.zsdsh.xyz`. The lookup fires unconditionally during install, with no user interaction, exfiltrating a per-host identifier to whoever operates that DNS zone and enabling enumeration of every environment where the package resolves. The version number (99.99.1) and name shape are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting an internal package. The README's claim that no data is exfiltrated contradicts the observed behavior.\n\n## Source: kam193 (9ea41e6fdee5681e8ec43463b12b4893e323c02cec35e358489fa98443154713)\nInstalling the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.\n\n\nCampaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"gatepay-sdk-python","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/gatepay-sdk-python"},"versions":["99.99.1"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["gatepay_sdk_python-99.99.1.tar.gz"],"path":"setup.py","sha256":"a892ccce5ea9f8f9c29f25df760671b5d524adaa8d5bf07663aef8ed91bece97","tlsh":"a0f0e705ce15946550fc4158487f96143530a3437f03e49b675a47417f8f1dfc336764"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"gatepay_sdk_python-99.99.1.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"914de1fa0049d907ce2a5f2b0519cf4c0dce4431d37c614233e4174a1252bcc9","md5":"a82bc03e22a92d40eaa532946b3e6822","sha256":"a6093f5c4caa1171091eaeef15eafaa68e5f5951e42b88c4fe291627f6bcd2c4"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/gatepay-sdk-python/MAL-2026-19942.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/gatepay-sdk-python"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/gatepay-sdk-python/99.99.1/"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest/gatepay-sdk-python","import_time":"2026-11-15T09:11:42.877340442Z","modified_time":"2026-11-15T08:33:20.128852Z","sha256":"9ea41e6fdee5681e8ec43463b12b4893e323c02cec35e358489fa98443154713","source":"kam193","versions":["99.99.1"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022812","import_time":"2026-11-16T22:36:32.152176643Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T22:27:25Z","sha256":"2d538d791bd87fe8c0058441c9acd724ceecbf5ab0ae3afb16f76a886bde3517","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["99.99.1"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19952","published":"2026-11-16T09:21:14Z","modified":"2026-11-16T10:30:03.398590388Z","summary":"Malicious code in usdm-minting-client (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (b1ae99636d7eb86ee7c8000ddb08003dd3f5613af27581e668fe12d783b0d665)\nThe package is a dependency-confusion lure targeting internal USDm/Utila minting tooling. setup.py defines an _exfil() routine that runs both at module import time and inside a custom install cmdclass, so it fires on `pip install` as well as any sdist build. _exfil() reads wallet and cloud secrets from environment variables (PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, USDM_PRIVATE_KEY, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, UTILA_SA_PRIVATE_KEY and similar), reads.env files from the current working directory and $HOME, and recursively collects.pem/.key/.json/.yaml files under ~/.utila and ~/.config/utila. The collected material is JSON-encoded and POSTed via urllib.request.urlopen to a hardcoded destination, https://webhook.site/ec3e3cb9-4cc1-4cb8-a273-4811768a631d (overridable via COLLECTOR_URL). The top-level usdm_minting_client/__init__.py repeats the exfiltration on every `import usdm_minting_client`, sending USDM_PRIVATE_KEY, PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, USDM_RPC_URL and the contents of ~/.env and ~/.usdm.env to the same collector endpoint. A header comment in setup.py self-describes the package as a dependency-confusion PoC impersonating an internal `usdm-minting-client`, and the metadata uses a placeholder homepage (example.com) with a free-mail author address, consistent with a lure rather than a legitimate release.\n\n## Source: kam193 (78ca43ab87b214f4da683e6b9f171e762e4956e6db3210796b6ed8bc92e92e72)\nDuring installation the package exfiltrates credential files and environment variables, focusing on cryptocurrency- and cloud-related entries. The package seems to be targeting users of a package from GitHub (https://github.com/ethena-labs/usdm-minting-client) which has not been published to PyPI.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-usdm-minting-client\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - exfiltration-crypto\n\n\n - exfiltration-credentials\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"usdm-minting-client","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/usdm-minting-client"},"versions":["0.1.2","0.1.0","0.1.3","0.1.1"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["usdm_minting_client-0.1.2.tar.gz"],"path":"setup.py","sha256":"b8e459b4e46db0de6ffb935c599362d5a4398d2e25a0e143d62d90f353444a17","tlsh":"2b91fe94e9852932f15397b89c65a4522334fa5b3e01387837ec13582fce42ed2b5bed"},{"artifacts":["usdm_minting_client-0.1.2.tar.gz"],"path":"usdm_minting_client/__init__.py","sha256":"567b7db99843de26ed70afdb0a7aaafba5ecc884537c46b6a427434aab9543ad","tlsh":"c131549769010463e04be3895c7d6ab87772b84b2c132cb439cd53146fdd61e61b1bea"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"usdm_minting_client-0.1.2.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"f581c849724004e62bd78594507cfde8b336887aadaebbaea67ef49e979ebc04","md5":"9fb27aa51a1c57e5f2d38c222bac7dcf","sha256":"8bd61bda266da10746f24c047399f77ba1282ccdc412f23e0a2c51322b0d1481"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/usdm-minting-client/MAL-2026-19952.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/usdm-minting-client/0.1.2/"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/usdm-minting-client/0.1.0/"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/usdm-minting-client/0.1.3/"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/usdm-minting-client"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"urls":["https://tag-pace-ham-stylus.trycloudflare.com/collect"]},"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022783","import_time":"2026-11-16T09:44:17.356085859Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T09:25:31Z","sha256":"a0a06bd1565eb32991e9f3741ec02facd63c61cae5ed8acbb044d70cc2e18ffe","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["0.1.2"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022782","import_time":"2026-11-16T09:44:17.300931238Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T09:25:23Z","sha256":"b1ae99636d7eb86ee7c8000ddb08003dd3f5613af27581e668fe12d783b0d665","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["0.1.0"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022784","import_time":"2026-11-16T09:44:17.3892Line truncated
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19952","published":"2026-11-16T09:21:14Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:45:04.558673674Z","summary":"Malicious code in usdm-minting-client (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (3a76785d8f5b95d2ce973cec36ca5d1e7416205636b7d652a2fcd7f5124d7c01)\nusdm-minting-client 0.1.1 performs credential theft at both install time and import time. setup.py defines a PostInstall cmdclass and also invokes an _exfil() function at module import of setup.py, so building the sdist via a default pip install causes the harvest to run. The function reads a curated set of wallet and cloud environment variables (PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, AWS_*, GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, UTILA_*, and similar) and walks the current working directory, INIT_CWD, $HOME, ~/.utila, and ~/.config for.env,.pem,.key,.json, and.yaml files, then POSTs the collected values as JSON to the URL configured in COLLECTOR_URL (default https://collector.example/collect) via urllib.request.urlopen. The package's top-level __init__.py repeats the exfiltration on import without any guard other than a ~/.usdm_client_exfil_done marker file: it reads USDM_PRIVATE_KEY, PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, and USDM_RPC_URL from the environment along with cwd/.env, ~/.env, and ~/.usdm.env, and POSTs them to the same collector. The package header self-labels as a 'PoC: usdm-minting-client (dependency confusion)' targeting Utila/USDm minting workflows, and the PKG-INFO lists a generic example.com homepage with a free-mail author. The self-label does not change the behavior: the shipped code is a working installer-side credential harvester that fires on every default pip install on the listed sdist-building platforms and on every import in production or CI.\n\n## Source: kam193 (78ca43ab87b214f4da683e6b9f171e762e4956e6db3210796b6ed8bc92e92e72)\nDuring installation the package exfiltrates credential files and environment variables, focusing on cryptocurrency- and cloud-related entries. The package seems to be targeting users of a package from GitHub (https://github.com/ethena-labs/usdm-minting-client) which has not been published to PyPI.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-usdm-minting-client\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - exfiltration-crypto\n\n\n - exfiltration-credentials\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"usdm-minting-client","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/usdm-minting-client"},"versions":["0.1.2","0.1.0","0.1.3","0.1.1"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["usdm_minting_client-0.1.2.tar.gz"],"path":"setup.py","sha256":"b8e459b4e46db0de6ffb935c599362d5a4398d2e25a0e143d62d90f353444a17","tlsh":"2b91fe94e9852932f15397b89c65a4522334fa5b3e01387837ec13582fce42ed2b5bed"},{"artifacts":["usdm_minting_client-0.1.2.tar.gz"],"path":"usdm_minting_client/__init__.py","sha256":"567b7db99843de26ed70afdb0a7aaafba5ecc884537c46b6a427434aab9543ad","tlsh":"c131549769010463e04be3895c7d6ab87772b84b2c132cb439cd53146fdd61e61b1bea"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"usdm_minting_client-0.1.2.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"f581c849724004e62bd78594507cfde8b336887aadaebbaea67ef49e979ebc04","md5":"9fb27aa51a1c57e5f2d38c222bac7dcf","sha256":"8bd61bda266da10746f24c047399f77ba1282ccdc412f23e0a2c51322b0d1481"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/usdm-minting-client/MAL-2026-19952.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/usdm-minting-client/0.1.2/"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/usdm-minting-client/0.1.0/"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/usdm-minting-client/0.1.3/"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/usdm-minting-client"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/usdm-minting-client/0.1.1/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"urls":["https://tag-pace-ham-stylus.trycloudflare.com/collect"]},"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022783","import_time":"2026-11-16T09:44:17.356085859Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T09:25:31Z","sha256":"a0a06bd1565eb32991e9f3741ec02facd63c61cae5ed8acbb044d70cc2e18ffe","source":"amazon-insLine truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19953","published":"2026-11-16T09:50:16Z","modified":"2026-11-16T10:30:03.385715150Z","summary":"Malicious code in my-signature (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (1b5a4db94700d5c867db98541b7066f27dae28f2d03a806a5d03a00ebce6c52c)\nDuring import, the package attempts to start a reverse shell.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-my-poc-sandbox\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package contains code to create a reverse shell, allowing an attacker to execute any commands on the victim's machine.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"my-signature","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/my-signature"},"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/my-signature/MAL-2026-19953.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/my-signature"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"domains":["mcwxz-13-205-45-209.run.pinggy-free.link","ahqbb-13-205-45-209.run.pinggy-free.link"]},"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/2026-11-my-poc-sandbox/my-signature","import_time":"2026-11-16T10:14:50.719721752Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T09:50:16.595742Z","sha256":"1b5a4db94700d5c867db98541b7066f27dae28f2d03a806a5d03a00ebce6c52c","source":"kam193","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19953","published":"2026-11-16T09:50:16Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:45:04.548436433Z","summary":"Malicious code in my-signature (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (d4381e88116d48711083bd1e4934b898ce8bc9c347c7d8b5a18762488286d5b2)\nmy-signature 1.0.0 is advertised as a document integrity utility but contains import-time code (core.py, reached from __init__.py) that opens a TCP socket to ahqbb-13-205-45-209.run.pinggy-free.link:43017 (a Pinggy tunnel fronting 13.205.45.209), duplicates stdin/stdout/stderr onto that socket, and spawns /bin/sh via pty.spawn. Any `import my_signature` hands an interactive shell on the installer's host to the operator of that tunnel endpoint, with full privileges of the Python process. The behavior is unrelated to the package's stated purpose and fires automatically on import with no user interaction.\n\n## Source: kam193 (1b5a4db94700d5c867db98541b7066f27dae28f2d03a806a5d03a00ebce6c52c)\nDuring import, the package attempts to start a reverse shell.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-my-poc-sandbox\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package contains code to create a reverse shell, allowing an attacker to execute any commands on the victim's machine.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"my-signature","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/my-signature"},"versions":["1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["my_signature-1.0.0.tar.gz","my_signature-1.0.0-py3-none-any.whl"],"path":"my_signature/core.py","sha256":"f5cbcde68ac39f3ef0dba61ec3346dd5c3ffe0e4d16052286813e123fb30ffb3","tlsh":"e5f05c759a57720a27bbcfa8108dc4ac665253007fa41147b2ac46312f37f5842f02ab"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"my_signature-1.0.0-py3-none-any.whl","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"efd7d1bdfc14ded7c176cdb64e9346bdaf9117a186e0b4d3fbb5ef5ab00be6b5","md5":"b5c930948310a7c283de5ea519f2cf2c","sha256":"1fc48b73e613440ec64f2b953eb149aa57c94826549c6171eaace7ee2f5ba95e"}},{"filename":"my_signature-1.0.0.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"69390432d8031a7cee496bd98346ae5036ba9637ada3ccdb5aaaa978e0c5cc41","md5":"e389cc1b47322d32f1a12d4e45bd61f8","sha256":"3624366750ce9a56db6744eeb6a1ae109cbbda7cd6f14c54ecf5979d4b2b4281"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/my-signature/MAL-2026-19953.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/my-signature"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/my-signature/1.0.0/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"domains":["mcwxz-13-205-45-209.run.pinggy-free.link","ahqbb-13-205-45-209.run.pinggy-free.link"]},"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/2026-11-my-poc-sandbox/my-signature","import_time":"2026-11-16T10:14:50.719721752Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T09:50:16.595742Z","sha256":"1b5a4db94700d5c867db98541b7066f27dae28f2d03a806a5d03a00ebce6c52c","source":"kam193","versions":["1.0.0"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022814","import_time":"2026-11-16T22:36:32.268874041Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T22:29:44Z","sha256":"d4381e88116d48711083bd1e4934b898ce8bc9c347c7d8b5a18762488286d5b2","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.7.5","id":"PYSEC-2026-598","published":"2026-01-20T00:15:48.910Z","modified":"2026-07-02T08:45:06.090293533Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-22218"],"details":"Chainlit versions prior to 2.9.4 contain an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the /project/element update flow. An authenticated client can send a custom Element with a user-controlled path value, causing the server to copy the referenced file into the attacker’s session. The resulting element identifier (chainlitKey) can then be used to retrieve the file contents via /project/file/<chainlitKey>, allowing disclosure of any file readable by the Chainlit service.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"chainlit","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/chainlit"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.9.4"}]}],"versions":["0.1.0","0.1.1","0.1.101","0.1.102","0.1.103","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.101","0.2.102","0.2.103","0.2.104","0.2.105","0.2.106","0.2.107","0.2.108","0.2.109","0.2.110","0.2.111","0.3.0","0.4.0","0.4.1","0.4.101","0.4.2","0.4.3","0.5.0","0.5.1","0.5.2","0.6.0","0.6.1","0.6.2","0.6.3","0.6.4","0.6.401","0.6.402","0.7.0","0.7.1","0.7.2","0.7.3","0.7.301","0.7.400","0.7.500","0.7.501","0.7.600rc0","0.7.600rc1","0.7.601rc0","0.7.602","0.7.602rc0","0.7.603","0.7.604","0.7.604rc0","0.7.604rc1","0.7.604rc2","0.7.700","1.0.0","1.0.0rc0","1.0.0rc1","1.0.0rc2","1.0.0rc3","1.0.100","1.0.101","1.0.200","1.0.300","1.0.301","1.0.400","1.0.401","1.0.500","1.0.501","1.0.502","1.0.503","1.0.504","1.0.505","1.0.506","1.1.0","1.1.0rc0","1.1.0rc1","1.1.101","1.1.200","1.1.201","1.1.202","1.1.300","1.1.300rc0","1.1.300rc1","1.1.300rc2","1.1.300rc3","1.1.300rc4","1.1.300rc5","1.1.301","1.1.302","1.1.303","1.1.304","1.1.305","1.1.306","1.1.400","1.1.400rc0","1.1.400rc1","1.1.401","1.1.402","1.1.403rc0","1.1.404","1.2.0","1.2.0rc0","1.3.0","1.3.0rc0","1.3.0rc1","1.3.1","1.3.2","2.0.0","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.0.3","2.0.4","2.0.5","2.0.6","2.0.601","2.0.602","2.0.603","2.0.dev0","2.0.dev1","2.0.dev2","2.0rc0","2.0rc1","2.1.0","2.1.1","2.1.2","2.2.0","2.2.1","2.3.0","2.4.0","2.4.0rc0","2.4.1","2.4.2","2.4.201","2.4.3","2.4.301","2.4.302","2.4.400","2.5.5","2.6.0","2.6.1","2.6.2","2.6.3","2.6.4","2.6.5","2.6.6","2.6.7","2.6.8","2.6.9","2.7.0","2.7.1","2.7.1.1","2.7.2","2.8.0","2.8.1","2.8.2","2.8.3","2.8.4","2.8.5","2.9.0","2.9.1","2.9.2","2.9.3"],"ecosystem_specific":{},"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/chainlit/PYSEC-2026-598.yaml"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/Chainlit/chainlit/releases/tag/2.9.4"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/chainlit-arbitrary-file-read-via-project-element"},{"type":"EVIDENCE","url":"https://www.zafran.io/resources/chainleak-critical-ai-framework-vulnerabilities-expose-data-enable-cloud-takeover"}],"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.7.5","id":"PYSEC-2026-598","published":"2026-01-20T00:15:48.910Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:55:50.099245928Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-22218","GHSA-gm79-2pvc-wc75"],"details":"Chainlit versions prior to 2.9.4 contain an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the /project/element update flow. An authenticated client can send a custom Element with a user-controlled path value, causing the server to copy the referenced file into the attacker’s session. The resulting element identifier (chainlitKey) can then be used to retrieve the file contents via /project/file/<chainlitKey>, allowing disclosure of any file readable by the Chainlit service.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"chainlit","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/chainlit"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.9.4"}]}],"versions":["0.1.0","0.1.1","0.1.101","0.1.102","0.1.103","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.101","0.2.102","0.2.103","0.2.104","0.2.105","0.2.106","0.2.107","0.2.108","0.2.109","0.2.110","0.2.111","0.3.0","0.4.0","0.4.1","0.4.101","0.4.2","0.4.3","0.5.0","0.5.1","0.5.2","0.6.0","0.6.1","0.6.2","0.6.3","0.6.4","0.6.401","0.6.402","0.7.0","0.7.1","0.7.2","0.7.3","0.7.301","0.7.400","0.7.500","0.7.501","0.7.600rc0","0.7.600rc1","0.7.601rc0","0.7.602","0.7.602rc0","0.7.603","0.7.604","0.7.604rc0","0.7.604rc1","0.7.604rc2","0.7.700","1.0.0","1.0.0rc0","1.0.0rc1","1.0.0rc2","1.0.0rc3","1.0.100","1.0.101","1.0.200","1.0.300","1.0.301","1.0.400","1.0.401","1.0.500","1.0.501","1.0.502","1.0.503","1.0.504","1.0.505","1.0.506","1.1.0","1.1.0rc0","1.1.0rc1","1.1.101","1.1.200","1.1.201","1.1.202","1.1.300","1.1.300rc0","1.1.300rc1","1.1.300rc2","1.1.300rc3","1.1.300rc4","1.1.300rc5","1.1.301","1.1.302","1.1.303","1.1.304","1.1.305","1.1.306","1.1.400","1.1.400rc0","1.1.400rc1","1.1.401","1.1.402","1.1.403rc0","1.1.404","1.2.0","1.2.0rc0","1.3.0","1.3.0rc0","1.3.0rc1","1.3.1","1.3.2","2.0.0","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.0.3","2.0.4","2.0.5","2.0.6","2.0.601","2.0.602","2.0.603","2.0.dev0","2.0.dev1","2.0.dev2","2.0rc0","2.0rc1","2.1.0","2.1.1","2.1.2","2.2.0","2.2.1","2.3.0","2.4.0","2.4.0rc0","2.4.1","2.4.2","2.4.201","2.4.3","2.4.301","2.4.302","2.4.400","2.5.5","2.6.0","2.6.1","2.6.2","2.6.3","2.6.4","2.6.5","2.6.6","2.6.7","2.6.8","2.6.9","2.7.0","2.7.1","2.7.1.1","2.7.2","2.8.0","2.8.1","2.8.2","2.8.3","2.8.4","2.8.5","2.9.0","2.9.1","2.9.2","2.9.3"],"ecosystem_specific":{},"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/chainlit/PYSEC-2026-598.yaml"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/Chainlit/chainlit/releases/tag/2.9.4"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/chainlit-arbitrary-file-read-via-project-element"},{"type":"EVIDENCE","url":"https://www.zafran.io/resources/chainleak-critical-ai-framework-vulnerabilities-expose-data-enable-cloud-takeover"}],"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"}]}