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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-8cgq-x343-p74c","published":"2026-11-16T22:22:13Z","modified":"2026-11-16T22:30:03.936821461Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-129301"],"summary":"mail-parser: One hostile attachment aborts `write_attachments()` and silently drops the rest of the batch","details":"### Impact\n\n`write_attachments()` called `_safe_attachment_filename()` and `write_sample()` inside its loop\nwith no guard, so a single crafted attachment raised out of the whole save. Every attachment\n**after** the malicious one was silently never written, with no error surfaced to a caller that\ncatches only `MailParserError`.\n\nThat is an evasion primitive as much as an availability bug: a sender puts one poisoned part\nfirst and the real payload second, and the payload never reaches the extraction directory that\na downstream scanner or sandbox reads — while it still reaches the recipient's mail client\nintact. The tool's output diverges from the bytes actually in the message, which is the same\nfailure mode as the filename-sanitizing bypass in\n[GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496](https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496).\n\nThree shapes were reachable, all from attacker-controlled MIME metadata:\n\n- **NUL smuggled through RFC 2231** — `filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bin` decodes to a NUL in the\n filename during parsing and raised `ValueError` out of the name check;\n- **overlong basename** — a filename longer than `NAME_MAX` (e.g. 300 characters) raised\n `OSError: File name too long` from `open()`, *after* creating a zero-byte stub on disk;\n- **undecodable payload** — a body that is not valid base64 raised `binascii.Error` (a\n `ValueError` subclass) from the decode performed inside the `open()` block.\n\n```python\nimport tempfile, mailparser\n\nraw = (\"Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=b\\r\\n\\r\\n\"\n \"--b\\r\\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\\r\\n\"\n \"Content-Disposition: attachment; filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bin\\r\\n\\r\\nxx\\r\\n\"\n \"--b\\r\\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\\r\\n\"\n \"Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=good.bin\\r\\n\\r\\nyy\\r\\n\"\n \"--b--\\r\\n\")\n\nmp = mailparser.parse_from_string(raw) # parse itself is fine; safe_filename is None\nmp.write_attachments(tempfile.mkdtemp())\n# 4.6.0 - 4.6.2 -> ValueError, and good.bin is never written\n# 4.6.3 -> logs \"Skipped attachment with invalid filename: 'evil\\x00.bin'\";\n# good.bin is written\n```\n\n`parse()` itself was never affected — it catches the `ValueError` — so only the write path was\nunguarded. The reject-paths that made this reachable were introduced with the filename\nsanitizing in 4.6.0 (PR #165).\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **4.6.3**. `write_attachments()` now logs and skips a single unusable attachment\ninstead of aborting the batch:\n\n- an invalid filename is caught and skipped;\n- overlong basenames are truncated to 240 UTF-8 bytes, preserving the extension, rather than\n reaching `open()`;\n- the base64 decode moved *before* `open()`, so a failure leaves no zero-byte stub, and it now\n repairs padding and alphabet errors the way mail clients do (matching `MIME::Base64` on 2008\n cases) — rejecting them let a sender append one character to make an attachment vanish from\n the extraction directory while it still reached the recipient;\n- `MailParserPathError` is deliberately **not** caught by the per-attachment handler: a\n containment failure is not a per-attachment problem, and path-containment checks now raise\n `MailParserPathError` instead of `ValueError` so the broader catch cannot swallow them.\n\nDeduplication was hardened in the same change: it reserves room for its own suffix marker\n(`write_sample()` sanitizes again, and the clamp there used to cut the marker back off,\ncollapsing distinct attachments onto one file), resumes from the last used suffix per stem\ninstead of rescanning from 1 (quadratic before — 16000 same-named attachments took 14 s, now\nmilliseconds), and folds case, because APFS, exFAT and SMB collapse `Invoice.pdf` and\n`invoice.pdf`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to 4.6.3. If you cannot upgrade, do not call `write_attachments()` on untrusted mail;\niterate `parser.attachments` yourself and write each attachment inside its own\n`try`/`except Exception`, skipping the ones whose `safe_filename` is `None`.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"mail-parser","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/mail-parser"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"4.6.0"},{"fixed":"4.6.3"}]}],"versions":["4.6.0","4.6.1","4.6.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-8cgq-x343-p74c/GHSA-8cgq-x343-p74c.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-8cgq-x343-p74c"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129301"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/pull/171"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/11b894a0b8b3f11055a99caff118206138d1daba"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/e1d9fe6778045d6e2c44406bc8822e3464c1097f"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/releases/tag/4.6.3"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-248","CWE-436"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-16T22:22:13Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-16T18:17:31Z","severity":"MODERATE"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L"}]}