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vuln-osv/data/crates.io/RUSTSEC-2026-0530.json
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0530","published":"2026-09-03T12:00:00Z","modified":"2026-11-13T12:55:36.653610929Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-123596","GHSA-3r6v-f3jh-vvqm","RUSTSEC-2026-0539"],"summary":"Parent-side NSEC at a zone cut accepted as proof of nonexistence (hickory-proto)","details":"Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation accepted the NSEC record that a parent zone signs at a delegation as proof that names below the zone cut, or other types at the cut, do not exist. Such a record only proves that no DS record exists there (RFC 6840 section 4.1). Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could replay the parent's genuine signed records to get a denial for an existing name in the child zone accepted as secure.\n\nFrom 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"hickory-proto","ecosystem":"crates.io","purl":"pkg:cargo/hickory-proto"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.0.0-0"},{"fixed":"0.26.0-beta.1"}]}],"ecosystem_specific":{"affected_functions":null,"affects":{"arch":[],"functions":[],"os":[]}},"database_specific":{"categories":["privilege-escalation"],"cvss":null,"informational":null,"source":"https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0530.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://crates.io/crates/hickory-proto"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0530.html"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/2e3c829ea45000b1c409a64a03bd422618372471"}],"database_specific":{"license":"CC0-1.0"}}