Files
vuln-osv/data/Go/GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr.json
T

1 line
7.3 KiB
JSON
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr","published":"2026-04-21T16:25:19Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:51:03.127944585Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-25542","GO-2026-5630"],"summary":"Tekton Pipelines has VerificationPolicy regex pattern bypass via substring matching","details":"hey guys,\n\ntriage contract\nthis is a first-screen summary; deterministic proof is in the proof bundle (canonical.log/control.log/witness.txt).\n\nsummary\ntrusted resources verification policies match a resource source string (`refSource.URI`) against `spec.resources[].pattern` using `regexp.MatchString`. in go, `regexp.MatchString` reports a match if the pattern matches anywhere in the string, so common unanchored patterns (including examples in tekton documentation) can be bypassed by attacker-controlled source strings that contain the trusted pattern as a substring. this can cause an unintended policy match and change which verification mode/keys apply.\n\npins\n- repo: https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline\n- commit: 0133513db03dadb3cb08801d6b0330badcb63830\n- callsite: pkg/trustedresources/verify.go:118-137 (getMatchedPolicies)\n\nseverity\nMEDIUM (provisional CVSS 5.3–6.5) (signing request tampering)\n\nrepro (canonical)\n- command: unzip -q -o poc.zip -d poc && cd poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001 && make canonical\n- expected: cap not reached; canonical does not emit the vulnerability markers.\n- actual: cap reached; canonical emits the vulnerability markers.\n- canonical markers (mandatory): [CALLSITE\\_HIT] + [PROOF\\_MARKER]\n\nnegative control\n- command: unzip -q -o poc.zip -d poc && cd poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001 && make control\n- expected: cap not reached under the same harness; control emits the control marker and does not emit the vulnerability markers.\n- control markers (mandatory): [CALLSITE\\_HIT] + [NC\\_MARKER]\n\nfix\nconsider making matching safe-by-default by requiring full-string matches (or validating patterns and documenting substring semantics clearly). one option is to anchor patterns before matching (e.g., wrap `pattern` as `^(?:pattern)$` when not already anchored), or to provide a separate field for exact match vs regex match.\nfix accepted when: under the same harness, canonical still hits [CALLSITE\\_HIT] but does not emit [PROOF\\_MARKER].\n\nproof bundle pointers\n- bundle: poc.zip\n- bundle convention: zip extracts under a single top-level folder (poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001/) to avoid collisions\n- contains: canonical.log, control.log, witness.txt\n- extracted paths: after extraction, see ./poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001/canonical.log, ./poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001/control.log, ./poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001/witness.txt\n- verify: compare shasum -a 256 for canonical.log/control.log/fix.patch/test source against witness.txt\n- supported-mode note: if your supported integration uses verified https app-links/universal links only, provide the supported tag/branch and we can retest on that pin.\n\n[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24833926/poc.zip)\n\n---\n\nimpact\nan attacker can craft a trusted resources source string that embeds a trusted substring and still matches an unanchored verificationpolicy `spec.resources[].pattern`, even if the policy is intended to constrain matches to a specific trusted source. this occurs because `regexp.MatchString` succeeds on substring matches, so patterns like `https://github.com/tektoncd/catalog.git` match attacker-controlled sources such as `https://evil.com/?x=https://github.com/tektoncd/catalog.git`.\n\naffected: deployments using trusted resources verification with unanchored verificationpolicy patterns, where an attacker can influence the `refSource.URI` value used for policy matching.\n\nnot affected: deployments that anchor all patterns (`^...$`) or otherwise enforce full-string matching; deployments where attackers cannot influence `refSource.URI`.\n\nsteps to reproduce\n```bash\nunzip -q -o poc.zip -d /tmp/poc-tekton-regex-001\ncd /tmp/poc-tekton-regex-001/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001\nbash ./run.sh canonical | tee /tmp/tekton-regex-001-canonical.log\nbash ./run.sh control | tee /tmp/tekton-regex-001-control.log\ngrep -n '\\\\[PROOF_MARKER\\\\]' /tmp/tekton-regex-001-canonical.log && grep -n '\\\\[NC_MARKER\\\\]' /tmp/tekton-regex-001-control.log && ! grep -n '\\\\[PROOF_MARKER\\\\]' /tmp/tekton-regex-001-control.log\n```\n\nsuggested patch options:\n- make matching safe-by-default by anchoring patterns before matching (or by validating and rejecting unanchored patterns).\n- document the substring semantics explicitly and update documentation examples to include anchors.\n\nworkarounds\nanchor verificationpolicy resource patterns so they must match the full source string. example:\n\n- `^https://github.com/tektoncd/catalog\\\\.git$`\n\nbest,\noleh","affected":[{"package":{"name":"github.com/tektoncd/pipeline","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.43.0"},{"fixed":"1.0.2"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr/GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr.json"}},{"package":{"name":"github.com/tektoncd/pipeline","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"1.2.0"},{"fixed":"1.3.4"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr/GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr.json"}},{"package":{"name":"github.com/tektoncd/pipeline","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"1.4.0"},{"fixed":"1.6.2"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr/GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr.json"}},{"package":{"name":"github.com/tektoncd/pipeline","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"1.7.0"},{"fixed":"1.9.3"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr/GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr.json"}},{"package":{"name":"github.com/tektoncd/pipeline","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"1.10.0"},{"fixed":"1.11.1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr/GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/security/advisories/GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25542"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/commit/2c398711e6e9e232180508f0648425a8ea34dc9e"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/commit/b8905600322aa86327baae0a7c04d6cf1207362a"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/releases/tag/v1.11.0"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-185"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-04-21T16:25:19Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-04-21T17:16:24Z","severity":"MODERATE"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"}]}