vuln-osv update 2026-11-14T12:43:39Z

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Vulnerability Bot committed 2026-11-14 13:43:44 +01:00
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19930","published":"2026-11-14T07:16:19Z","modified":"2026-11-14T07:45:03.653203477Z","summary":"Malicious code in trezortranslate (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (da5f11fa30f28362c8394977403d7736c91c828ba295b3d175baa1c8539edf8b)\nInstalling the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.\n\n\nCampaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"trezortranslate","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/trezortranslate"},"versions":["0.0.0","1.0.0"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/trezortranslate/MAL-2026-19930.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/trezortranslate"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest/trezortranslate","import_time":"2026-11-14T07:36:35.972377594Z","modified_time":"2026-11-14T07:17:54.440288Z","sha256":"da5f11fa30f28362c8394977403d7736c91c828ba295b3d175baa1c8539edf8b","source":"kam193","versions":["0.0.0","1.0.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19932","published":"2026-11-14T09:53:39Z","modified":"2026-11-14T10:45:03.712039422Z","summary":"Malicious code in xrfdc (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (2d5669631a74637e570868f9350b0988d15885a2641f820cb91cc3ea22eecb55)\nInstalling the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.\n\n\nCampaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"xrfdc","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/xrfdc"},"versions":["0.0.0","2.0"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/xrfdc/MAL-2026-19932.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/xrfdc"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest/xrfdc","import_time":"2026-11-14T10:35:58.969032765Z","modified_time":"2026-11-14T09:53:39.290372Z","sha256":"2d5669631a74637e570868f9350b0988d15885a2641f820cb91cc3ea22eecb55","source":"kam193","versions":["0.0.0","2.0"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"PYSEC-2026-2946","published":"2026-07-13T14:36:52.273166Z","modified":"2026-11-05T20:00:03.986347158Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-56074","GHSA-ffp3-3562-8cv3"],"summary":"PraisonAI: Coarse-Grained Tool Approval Cache Bypasses Per-Invocation Consent for Shell Commands","details":"## Summary\n\nThe approval system in PraisonAI Agents caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments. Once a user approves `execute_command` for any command (e.g., `ls -la`), all subsequent `execute_command` calls in that execution context bypass the approval prompt entirely. Combined with `os.environ.copy()` passing all process environment variables to subprocesses, this allows an LLM agent (potentially via prompt injection) to silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials without further user consent.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `require_approval` decorator in `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/approval/__init__.py:176-178` checks approval status by tool name only:\n\n```python\n@wraps(func)\ndef wrapper(*args, **kwargs):\n if is_already_approved(tool_name): # line 177 — checks only tool_name\n return func(*args, **kwargs) # line 178 — bypasses ALL approval\n```\n\nThe `mark_approved` function in `registry.py:144-147` stores only the tool name string:\n\n```python\ndef mark_approved(self, tool_name: str) -> None:\n approved = self._approved_context.get(set())\n approved.add(tool_name) # stores \"execute_command\", not args\n self._approved_context.set(approved)\n```\n\nThe approval context is never cleared during agent execution — `clear_approved()` exists (`registry.py:152`) but is never called in the agent's tool execution path (`agent/tool_execution.py`).\n\nMeanwhile, the `ConsoleBackend` UI at `backends.py:95-96` misleads the user:\n\n```python\nreturn Confirm.ask(\n f\"Do you want to execute this {request.risk_level} risk tool?\",\n # \"this\" implies per-invocation approval\n)\n```\n\nThe UI displays the specific command arguments (lines 81-85), creating a reasonable expectation that the user is approving only that specific invocation.\n\nAdditionally, `shell_tools.py:77` passes the full process environment to every subprocess:\n\n```python\nprocess_env = os.environ.copy() # includes OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.\n```\n\nThere is no command filtering, blocklist, or environment variable sanitization in the shell tools module.\n\n## PoC\n\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents import Agent\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.shell_tools import execute_command\n\n# Step 1: Create agent with shell tool\nagent = Agent(\n name=\"worker\",\n instructions=\"You are a helpful assistant.\",\n tools=[execute_command]\n)\n\n# Step 2: Agent requests benign command — user sees Rich panel:\n# Function: execute_command\n# Risk Level: CRITICAL\n# Arguments:\n# command: ls -la\n# \"Do you want to execute this critical risk tool?\" [y/N]\n# User approves → mark_approved(\"execute_command\") is called\n\n# Step 3: All subsequent execute_command calls bypass approval silently:\n# execute_command(command=\"env\")\n# → returns ALL environment variables (OPENAI_API_KEY, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, etc.)\n# → NO approval prompt shown\n\n# Step 4: Targeted extraction also bypasses approval:\n# execute_command(command=\"printenv OPENAI_API_KEY\")\n# → returns the specific API key\n# → NO approval prompt shown\n\n# Verification: check the approval cache\nfrom praisonaiagents.approval import is_already_approved\n# After approving \"ls -la\":\n# is_already_approved(\"execute_command\") → True\n# Any execute_command call now returns immediately at __init__.py:177-178\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Secret exfiltration**: An LLM agent (or one subjected to prompt injection) can dump all process environment variables after a single benign command approval. Common secrets include `OPENAI_API_KEY`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `DATABASE_URL`, and any other credentials passed via environment.\n- **Misleading consent UI**: The console prompt displays specific arguments and uses language (\"this tool\") that implies per-invocation consent, but the system grants session-wide blanket approval.\n- **No expiration or scope**: The approval cache uses a `ContextVar` that persists for the entire agent execution context with no timeout, no command-count limit, and no clearing between tool calls.\n- **No environment filtering**: `os.environ.copy()` passes every environment variable to subprocesses without filtering sensitive patterns.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. **Per-invocation approval for critical tools** — store a hash of `(tool_name, arguments)` instead of just `tool_name`, or require re-approval for each invocation of critical-risk tools:\n\n```python\n# In registry.py — change mark_approved/is_already_approved:\nimport hashlib, json\n\ndef mark_approved(self, tool_name: str, arguments: dict = None) -> None:\n approved = self._approved_context.get(set(Line truncated
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"PYSEC-2026-2946","published":"2026-07-13T14:36:52.273166Z","modified":"2026-11-14T11:45:02.527039540Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-56074","GHSA-ffp3-3562-8cv3"],"summary":"PraisonAI: Coarse-Grained Tool Approval Cache Bypasses Per-Invocation Consent for Shell Commands","details":"## Summary\n\nThe approval system in PraisonAI Agents caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments. Once a user approves `execute_command` for any command (e.g., `ls -la`), all subsequent `execute_command` calls in that execution context bypass the approval prompt entirely. Combined with `os.environ.copy()` passing all process environment variables to subprocesses, this allows an LLM agent (potentially via prompt injection) to silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials without further user consent.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `require_approval` decorator in `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/approval/__init__.py:176-178` checks approval status by tool name only:\n\n```python\n@wraps(func)\ndef wrapper(*args, **kwargs):\n if is_already_approved(tool_name): # line 177 — checks only tool_name\n return func(*args, **kwargs) # line 178 — bypasses ALL approval\n```\n\nThe `mark_approved` function in `registry.py:144-147` stores only the tool name string:\n\n```python\ndef mark_approved(self, tool_name: str) -> None:\n approved = self._approved_context.get(set())\n approved.add(tool_name) # stores \"execute_command\", not args\n self._approved_context.set(approved)\n```\n\nThe approval context is never cleared during agent execution — `clear_approved()` exists (`registry.py:152`) but is never called in the agent's tool execution path (`agent/tool_execution.py`).\n\nMeanwhile, the `ConsoleBackend` UI at `backends.py:95-96` misleads the user:\n\n```python\nreturn Confirm.ask(\n f\"Do you want to execute this {request.risk_level} risk tool?\",\n # \"this\" implies per-invocation approval\n)\n```\n\nThe UI displays the specific command arguments (lines 81-85), creating a reasonable expectation that the user is approving only that specific invocation.\n\nAdditionally, `shell_tools.py:77` passes the full process environment to every subprocess:\n\n```python\nprocess_env = os.environ.copy() # includes OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.\n```\n\nThere is no command filtering, blocklist, or environment variable sanitization in the shell tools module.\n\n## PoC\n\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents import Agent\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.shell_tools import execute_command\n\n# Step 1: Create agent with shell tool\nagent = Agent(\n name=\"worker\",\n instructions=\"You are a helpful assistant.\",\n tools=[execute_command]\n)\n\n# Step 2: Agent requests benign command — user sees Rich panel:\n# Function: execute_command\n# Risk Level: CRITICAL\n# Arguments:\n# command: ls -la\n# \"Do you want to execute this critical risk tool?\" [y/N]\n# User approves → mark_approved(\"execute_command\") is called\n\n# Step 3: All subsequent execute_command calls bypass approval silently:\n# execute_command(command=\"env\")\n# → returns ALL environment variables (OPENAI_API_KEY, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, etc.)\n# → NO approval prompt shown\n\n# Step 4: Targeted extraction also bypasses approval:\n# execute_command(command=\"printenv OPENAI_API_KEY\")\n# → returns the specific API key\n# → NO approval prompt shown\n\n# Verification: check the approval cache\nfrom praisonaiagents.approval import is_already_approved\n# After approving \"ls -la\":\n# is_already_approved(\"execute_command\") → True\n# Any execute_command call now returns immediately at __init__.py:177-178\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Secret exfiltration**: An LLM agent (or one subjected to prompt injection) can dump all process environment variables after a single benign command approval. Common secrets include `OPENAI_API_KEY`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `DATABASE_URL`, and any other credentials passed via environment.\n- **Misleading consent UI**: The console prompt displays specific arguments and uses language (\"this tool\") that implies per-invocation consent, but the system grants session-wide blanket approval.\n- **No expiration or scope**: The approval cache uses a `ContextVar` that persists for the entire agent execution context with no timeout, no command-count limit, and no clearing between tool calls.\n- **No environment filtering**: `os.environ.copy()` passes every environment variable to subprocesses without filtering sensitive patterns.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. **Per-invocation approval for critical tools** — store a hash of `(tool_name, arguments)` instead of just `tool_name`, or require re-approval for each invocation of critical-risk tools:\n\n```python\n# In registry.py — change mark_approved/is_already_approved:\nimport hashlib, json\n\ndef mark_approved(self, tool_name: str, arguments: dict = None) -> None:\n approved = self._approved_context.get(set(Line truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"PYSEC-2026-4364","published":"2026-01-27T09:15:49.787Z","modified":"2026-11-14T10:00:02.402496646Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-24799"],"details":"Out-of-bounds Write, Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow') vulnerability in davisking dlib (dlib/external/zlib modules). This vulnerability is associated with program files inflate.C.\n\nThis issue affects dlib: before v19.24.9.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"dlib","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/dlib"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"19.24.9"}]}],"versions":["18.17.100","19.0.0","19.1.0","19.10.0","19.12.0","19.13.0","19.13.1","19.14.0","19.15.0","19.16.0","19.17.0","19.18.0","19.19.0","19.20.0","19.21.0","19.21.1","19.22.0","19.22.1","19.23.0","19.23.1","19.24.0","19.24.1","19.24.2","19.24.4","19.24.5","19.24.6","19.24.8","19.3.0","19.3.1","19.4.0","19.5.0","19.5.1","19.6.0","19.6.1","19.7.0","19.8.0","19.8.1","19.8.2","19.9.0"],"ecosystem_specific":{},"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/dlib/PYSEC-2026-4364.yaml"}}],"references":[{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/davisking/dlib/pull/3063"}],"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H"}]}