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vuln-cve/data/2026/98xxx/CVE-2026-98281.json
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{
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"cveMetadata": {
"cveId": "CVE-2026-98281",
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.335Z",
"datePublished": "2026-10-06T08:45:40.719Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T09:16:52.791Z"
},
"containers": {
"cna": {
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T09:16:52.791Z"
},
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfutex: Also allocate private hash on vfork()\n\nAs Jann demonstrated, it is entirely feasible to access the mm through vfork().\nTherefore we need to allocate a private hash on vfork() as well as any other\nCLONE_VM user.\n\nSpecifically, it must be avoided to have (private) futex waiters before\nallocating the private hash."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"version": "3.1",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - The trigger is a local process calling vfork()/clone3(CLONE_VM|CLONE_VFORK) in kernel_clone()/copy_process(), where need_futex_hash_allocate_default() skipped the private hash, followed by futex() syscalls on the shared mm. No remote peer supplies any input.\nAC:L - The attacker owns every task involved: the vfork parent (killed through its TASK_KILLABLE wait_for_vfork_done, so its futex exit path runs on the shared mm) and the vfork child, which creates a thread to publish the first private hash. Both sides of the race are under attacker control, so it can be retried at will.\nPR:L - vfork, clone, futex(FUTEX_WAIT/LOCK_PI), robust lists and kill() all work for an ordinary unprivileged user with no capability checks. The hash allocation in futex_hash_allocate_default() has no privilege gate either.\nUI:N - The attacker's own processes create the shared-mm state and the futex operations. No other user has to do anything.\nS:U - The damaged objects are kernel futex state (mm->futex.phash, hash buckets, pi_state) inside the same kernel security authority. No guest/host or IOMMU boundary is crossed.\nC:H - __futex_pivot_hash() leaves waiters queued in the global hash when the private hash is first published, so later PI/requeue operations take a different bucket lock. Futex PI state handled under two different bucket locks is the classic futex use-after-free pattern, and the earlier bug from this same assumption was a KASAN use-after-free, so kernel memory disclosure is plausible.\nI:H - A freed pi_state or private-hash reference that the attacker can reallocate gives a kernel heap write primitive, as in earlier futex PI use-after-free exploits, so local privilege escalation is possible.\nA:H - Waiters stranded in the global hash miss every later wake that goes to the private bucket, which hangs the affected tasks. The pi_state/reference corruption from inconsistent bucket locking can cause a KASAN splat or kernel oops."
}
]
}
],
"affected": [
{
"product": "Linux",
"vendor": "Linux",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/fork.c"
],
"versions": [
{
"version": "1dcd36420af2da5bd59306dba9caf78e3d248b1d",
"lessThan": "5468a4855b63b30156a79e5248e01bf1a2c18dd7",
"status": "affected",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"version": "ee9dce44362b2d8132c32964656ab6dff7dfbc6a",
"lessThan": "eecbafa8cabbc4d1482f6a5e2acc25a8f934681b",
"status": "affected",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"version": "ee9dce44362b2d8132c32964656ab6dff7dfbc6a",
"lessThan": "b61b6f95d6722ddbbbd09e689fa41b55fd36f9a5",
"status": "affected",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"version": "974ac49a9a068b0591a59f65c63eb06579a13091",
"status": "affected",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"version": "6.18.33",
"lessThan": "6.18.54",
"status": "affected",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"version": "7.0.10",
"lessThan": "7.1",
"status": "affected",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"product": "Linux",
"vendor": "Linux",
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/fork.c"
],
"versions": [
{
"version": "7.1",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "7.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"version": "6.18.54",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"version": "7.2.8",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"version": "7.3",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"operator": "OR",
"negate": false,
"cpeMatch": [
{
"vulnerable": true,
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.18.33",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.54"
},
{
"vulnerable": true,
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2.8"
},
{
"vulnerable": true,
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3"
},
{
"vulnerable": true,
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.0.10"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5468a4855b63b30156a79e5248e01bf1a2c18dd7"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eecbafa8cabbc4d1482f6a5e2acc25a8f934681b"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b61b6f95d6722ddbbbd09e689fa41b55fd36f9a5"
}
],
"title": "futex: Also allocate private hash on vfork()",
"x_generator": {
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}