vuln-cve/data/2026/91xxx/CVE-2026-91012.json

{
    "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
    "dataVersion": "5.2",
    "cveMetadata": {
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-91012",
        "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
        "state": "PUBLISHED",
        "assignerShortName": "apache",
        "dateReserved": "2026-09-14T16:27:00.736Z",
        "datePublished": "2026-09-29T08:34:11.409Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-01T14:10:47.838Z"
    },
    "containers": {
        "cna": {
            "providerMetadata": {
                "orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
                "shortName": "apache",
                "dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T08:34:11.409Z"
            },
            "title": "Apache Karaf: Path Traversal in Config Service Allows Manager-to-Admin Privilege Escalation",
            "source": {
                "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
            },
            "affected": [
                {
                    "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
                    "product": "Apache Karaf",
                    "packageName": "org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "status": "affected",
                            "version": "0",
                            "lessThan": "4.4.12",
                            "versionType": "semver"
                        }
                    ],
                    "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
                }
            ],
            "descriptions": [
                {
                    "value": "org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties),\nwhich backs the \"config\" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file\nit writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that\nthe result stays inside ${karaf.etc}:\n\n  *  if the submitted property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry, that value is turned directly into a File (getCfgFileFromProperty), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to;\n  *  otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + \".cfg\")), so a PID containing \"..\" segments resolves outside ${karaf.etc}. createFactoryConfiguration() has the same issue via the factory PID/alias.\n\n\nBoth code paths are reachable by any caller holding the \"manager\" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg: \"update = manager\"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-controlled content to any file the Karaf process can write, including files the same ACL otherwise reserves to \"admin\" (etc/users.properties, etc/*.acl.*.cfg, etc/org.apache.karaf.management.cfg, and similar), allowing a manager-role user to grant themselves the admin role or otherwise take over the container.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nConfigMBeanImpl.install() and the config:install shell command already guarded the equivalent risk on their own code path with a finalname.contains(\"..\") string check, but that check does not stop absolute paths or symlink-based escapes, and it was never applied to ConfigRepositoryImpl.update() / createFactoryConfiguration() at all.",
                    "lang": "en",
                    "supportingMedia": [
                        {
                            "type": "text/html",
                            "base64": false,
                            "value": "<div><span>org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties)</span>,\nwhich backs the \"config\" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file\nit writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that\nthe result stays inside&nbsp;<code>${karaf.etc}</code>:</div><div><ul><li>if the submitted property map contains a&nbsp;<code>felix.fileinstall.filename</code>&nbsp;entry, that value is turned directly into a&nbsp;<code>File</code>&nbsp;(<code>getCfgFileFromProperty</code>), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to;</li><li>otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (<code>generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + \".cfg\")</code>), so a PID containing \"..\" segments resolves outside&nbsp;<code>${karaf.etc}</code>.&nbsp;<code>createFactoryConfiguration()</code>&nbsp;has the same issue via the factory PID/alias.</li></ul><div>Both code paths are reachable by any caller holding the \"manager\" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (<code>org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg:</code>&nbsp;\"<code>update = manager</code>\"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-controlled content to any file the Karaf process can write, including files the same ACL otherwise reserves to \"<code>admin</code>\" (<code>etc/users.properties</code>,&nbsp;<code>etc/*.acl.*.cfg</code>,&nbsp;<code>etc/org.apache.karaf.management.cfg</code>, and similar), allowing a manager-role user to grant themselves the admin role or otherwise take over the container.</div></div><div><br></div><div><span>ConfigMBeanImpl.install()</span>&nbsp;and the&nbsp;<code>config:install</code>&nbsp;shell command already guarded the equivalent risk on their own code path with a&nbsp;<code>finalname.contains(\"..\")</code>&nbsp;string check, but that check does not stop absolute paths or symlink-based escapes, and it was never applied to&nbsp;<code>ConfigRepositoryImpl.update()</code>&nbsp;/&nbsp;<code>createFactoryConfiguration()</code>&nbsp;at all.</div>"
                        }
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "references": [
                {
                    "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/op8trtz1qxkdwj2rjozhd9yt2yd6nhw4",
                    "tags": [
                        "vendor-advisory"
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "metrics": [
                {
                    "other": {
                        "type": "Textual description of severity",
                        "content": {
                            "text": "important"
                        }
                    },
                    "scenarios": [
                        {
                            "lang": "en",
                            "value": "GENERAL"
                        }
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "credits": [
                {
                    "lang": "en",
                    "value": "n0mi1k <nomilksec@gmail.com>",
                    "type": "reporter"
                }
            ],
            "x_generator": {
                "engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.3"
            }
        },
        "adp": [
            {
                "title": "CVE Program Container",
                "references": [
                    {
                        "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/8"
                    }
                ],
                "providerMetadata": {
                    "orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
                    "shortName": "CVE",
                    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T09:15:41.656Z"
                }
            },
            {
                "problemTypes": [
                    {
                        "descriptions": [
                            {
                                "type": "CWE",
                                "cweId": "CWE-22",
                                "lang": "en",
                                "description": "CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')"
                            }
                        ]
                    }
                ],
                "metrics": [
                    {
                        "cvssV3_1": {
                            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
                            "version": "3.1",
                            "baseScore": 9.8,
                            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
                            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
                            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
                            "userInteraction": "NONE",
                            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
                            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
                        }
                    },
                    {
                        "other": {
                            "type": "ssvc",
                            "content": {
                                "timestamp": "2026-10-01T14:10:12.183455Z",
                                "id": "CVE-2026-91012",
                                "options": [
                                    {
                                        "Exploitation": "none"
                                    },
                                    {
                                        "Automatable": "yes"
                                    },
                                    {
                                        "Technical Impact": "total"
                                    }
                                ],
                                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                                "version": "2.0.3"
                            }
                        }
                    }
                ],
                "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
                "providerMetadata": {
                    "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
                    "shortName": "CISA-ADP",
                    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-01T14:10:47.838Z"
                }
            }
        ]
    }
}