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vuln-cve/data/2026/88xxx/CVE-2026-88255.json
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{
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"cveMetadata": {
"cveId": "CVE-2026-88255",
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-11T18:30:01.336Z",
"datePublished": "2026-09-16T08:24:40.446Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-16T14:49:57.782Z"
},
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo'"
],
"packageName": "mpp",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/mpp",
"product": "mpp",
"programFiles": [
"lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo':verify/2"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp",
"vendor": "ZenHive",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.16.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.2.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo'"
],
"packageName": "zenhive/mpp",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/zenhive/mpp",
"product": "mpp",
"programFiles": [
"lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo':verify/2"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp",
"vendor": "ZenHive",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "e12bd4a1cea2e97c2a01fc059c48e5594a7b4a43",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f8904666061fbab695874856d8fcd02c471dfe1b",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "<p>Reachable when <code>MPP.Methods.Tempo</code> broadcasts a <code>type=\"transaction\"</code> credential with a dedup store in place. From mpp 0.7.0 the dedup store is on by default (the app-started <code>MPP.Tempo.ConCacheStore</code>; opt out with <code>store: false</code>), so every default Tempo deployment from 0.7.0 before 0.16.2 is affected. Before 0.7.0 the default store was <code>nil</code>, which runs the library statelessly and provides no application-level replay protection at all, a documented property rather than part of this issue; those versions are affected only where a <code>\"store\"</code> was configured explicitly in <code>method_config</code>.</p>"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Reachable when `MPP.Methods.Tempo` broadcasts a `type=\"transaction\"` credential with a dedup store in place. From mpp 0.7.0 the dedup store is on by default (the app-started `MPP.Tempo.ConCacheStore`; opt out with `store: false`), so every default Tempo deployment from 0.7.0 before 0.16.2 is affected. Before 0.7.0 the default store was `nil`, which runs the library statelessly and provides no application-level replay protection at all, a documented property rather than part of this issue; those versions are affected only where a `\"store\"` was configured explicitly in `method_config`."
}
],
"value": "Reachable when MPP.Methods.Tempo broadcasts a type=\"transaction\" credential with a dedup store in place. From mpp 0.7.0 the dedup store is on by default (the app-started MPP.Tempo.ConCacheStore; opt out with store: false), so every default Tempo deployment from 0.7.0 before 0.16.2 is affected. Before 0.7.0 the default store was nil, which runs the library statelessly and provides no application-level replay protection at all, a documented property rather than part of this issue; those versions are affected only where a \"store\" was configured explicitly in method_config."
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.16.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "0.2.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "E.FU"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "E.FU"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Jonatan Männchen / EEF"
}
],
"dateAssigned": "2026-09-15T15:20:56.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "<p>Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to pass the Tempo duplicate-submission gate twice with one signed transaction.</p>\n<p><code>MPP.Methods.Tempo</code> reserves the pre-broadcast dedup slot on the caller-supplied hex in <code>reserve_hash_atomic/2</code>, keyed through <code>store_key/1</code> on <code>tx.raw</code> rather than on a canonical form of the transaction. The deserializer stores the caller's hex verbatim and accepts both recovery-id encodings, so one signed transaction submitted once with <code>v=27</code> and once with <code>v=0</code> yields two distinct reserve keys, and both pass the reserve and reach the broadcast path. The plug-level credential replay store is deliberately carved out for <code>tempo</code> in <code>lib/mpp/replay.ex</code>, leaving this reserve as the only gate, and the post-broadcast mark writes the canonical hash key that the raw-keyed reserve never reads.</p>\n<p>What the duplicate submission yields depends on the node: a nonce-reuse rejection fails closed, while a node that answers with the canonical hash for an already-known transaction returns a second valid <code>Payment-Receipt</code> for a single on-chain payment.</p>\n<p>This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.2.</p>"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to pass the Tempo duplicate-submission gate twice with one signed transaction.\n\n`MPP.Methods.Tempo` reserves the pre-broadcast dedup slot on the caller-supplied hex in `reserve_hash_atomic/2`, keyed through `store_key/1` on `tx.raw` rather than on a canonical form of the transaction. The deserializer stores the caller's hex verbatim and accepts both recovery-id encodings, so one signed transaction submitted once with `v=27` and once with `v=0` yields two distinct reserve keys, and both pass the reserve and reach the broadcast path. The plug-level credential replay store is deliberately carved out for `tempo` in `lib/mpp/replay.ex`, leaving this reserve as the only gate, and the post-broadcast mark writes the canonical hash key that the raw-keyed reserve never reads.\n\nWhat the duplicate submission yields depends on the node: a nonce-reuse rejection fails closed, while a node that answers with the canonical hash for an already-known transaction returns a second valid `Payment-Receipt` for a single on-chain payment.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.2."
}
],
"value": "Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to pass the Tempo duplicate-submission gate twice with one signed transaction.\n\nMPP.Methods.Tempo reserves the pre-broadcast dedup slot on the caller-supplied hex in reserve_hash_atomic/2, keyed through store_key/1 on tx.raw rather than on a canonical form of the transaction. The deserializer stores the caller's hex verbatim and accepts both recovery-id encodings, so one signed transaction submitted once with v=27 and once with v=0 yields two distinct reserve keys, and both pass the reserve and reach the broadcast path. The plug-level credential replay store is deliberately carved out for tempo in lib/mpp/replay.ex, leaving this reserve as the only gate, and the post-broadcast mark writes the canonical hash key that the raw-keyed reserve never reads.\n\nWhat the duplicate submission yields depends on the node: a nonce-reuse rejection fails closed, while a node that answers with the canonical hash for an already-known transaction returns a second valid Payment-Receipt for a single on-chain payment.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.2."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-267",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "<p>A client re-encodes the recovery id of a transaction it has already submitted and presents it again. The duplicate passes the only duplicate-submission gate the Tempo method has, and against a node that answers with the canonical hash for an already-known transaction the client is issued a second <code>Payment-Receipt</code> for one on-chain payment.</p>"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "A client re-encodes the recovery id of a transaction it has already submitted and presents it again. The duplicate passes the only duplicate-submission gate the Tempo method has, and against a node that answers with the canonical hash for an already-known transaction the client is issued a second `Payment-Receipt` for one on-chain payment."
}
],
"value": "A client re-encodes the recovery id of a transaction it has already submitted and presents it again. The duplicate passes the only duplicate-submission gate the Tempo method has, and against a node that answers with the canonical hash for an already-known transaction the client is issued a second Payment-Receipt for one on-chain payment."
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 6.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-1289",
"description": "CWE-1289 Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-16T08:24:40.446Z"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "GitHub Advisory",
"tags": [
"related",
"vendor-advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-8x7x-5j8g-8hcx"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-88255",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-88255.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-88255",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-88255"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit f890466 in ZenHive/mpp",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/f8904666061fbab695874856d8fcd02c471dfe1b"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit e12bd4a in ZenHive/mpp",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/e12bd4a1cea2e97c2a01fc059c48e5594a7b4a43"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "INTERNAL"
},
"title": "mpp Tempo keys its pre-broadcast dedup reserve on the caller-supplied transaction encoding, so a re-encoded signed transaction reserves a second slot"
},
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"type": "ssvc",
"content": {
"timestamp": "2026-09-16T14:49:50.266563Z",
"id": "CVE-2026-88255",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
}
],
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-16T14:49:57.782Z"
}
}
]
}
}