329 lines
20 KiB
JSON
329 lines
20 KiB
JSON
{
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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"dataVersion": "5.2",
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"cveMetadata": {
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-86688",
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"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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"state": "PUBLISHED",
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"assignerShortName": "EEF",
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"dateReserved": "2026-09-17T00:30:01.485Z",
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"datePublished": "2026-09-17T21:58:00.853Z",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-09-18T14:31:41.961Z"
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},
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"containers": {
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"cna": {
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"affected": [
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{
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"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
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"cpes": [
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"cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"packageName": "ash_authentication",
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"packageURL": "pkg:hex/ash_authentication",
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"product": "ash_authentication",
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"repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
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"vendor": "team-alembic",
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"versions": [
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{
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"lessThan": "4.15.0",
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "0.2.0",
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"versionType": "semver"
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},
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{
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"lessThan": "5.0.0-rc.14",
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "5.0.0-rc.0",
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"versionType": "semver"
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
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"cpes": [
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"cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"packageName": "team-alembic/ash_authentication",
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"packageURL": "pkg:github/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
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"product": "ash_authentication",
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"repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
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"vendor": "team-alembic",
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"versions": [
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{
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"changes": [
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{
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"at": "872db454405ecad4fcdabd9ff3d8755d1d6a69ae",
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"status": "unaffected"
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},
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{
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"at": "3e1d452cbf1564e87f5f97be882b66fe25af7cfa",
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"status": "unaffected"
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}
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],
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"lessThan": "*",
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "a939dde9b917c072cdf10c4b0913a9886a4b0231",
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"versionType": "git"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"configurations": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p>Exploitation for account takeover requires a server-side session store (ETS, Mnesia, Redis or a database), where the cookie carries a stable session identifier, and a position from which the attacker can plant that cookie in the victim's browser: cookie tossing from a sibling subdomain, an HTTP host without HSTS, or a shared or kiosk browser.</p>\n<p>Phoenix defaults to the signed cookie store, and neither package's installer changes it. Under that store the authenticated session lives in the re-signed cookie delivered only to the victim, so a planted pre-authentication copy does not become an authenticated session. Attacker-planted session contents, such as a <code>return_to</code> value, still survive into the authenticated session there.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "Exploitation for account takeover requires a server-side session store (ETS, Mnesia, Redis or a database), where the cookie carries a stable session identifier, and a position from which the attacker can plant that cookie in the victim's browser: cookie tossing from a sibling subdomain, an HTTP host without HSTS, or a shared or kiosk browser.\n\nPhoenix defaults to the signed cookie store, and neither package's installer changes it. Under that store the authenticated session lives in the re-signed cookie delivered only to the victim, so a planted pre-authentication copy does not become an authenticated session. Attacker-planted session contents, such as a `return_to` value, still survive into the authenticated session there."
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}
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],
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"value": "Exploitation for account takeover requires a server-side session store (ETS, Mnesia, Redis or a database), where the cookie carries a stable session identifier, and a position from which the attacker can plant that cookie in the victim's browser: cookie tossing from a sibling subdomain, an HTTP host without HSTS, or a shared or kiosk browser.\n\nPhoenix defaults to the signed cookie store, and neither package's installer changes it. Under that store the authenticated session lives in the re-signed cookie delivered only to the victim, so a planted pre-authentication copy does not become an authenticated session. Attacker-planted session contents, such as a return_to value, still survive into the authenticated session there."
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}
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],
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"cpeApplicability": [
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{
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"nodes": [
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{
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"cpeMatch": [
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{
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"versionEndExcluding": "4.15.0",
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"versionStartIncluding": "0.2.0",
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"vulnerable": true
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},
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{
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"versionEndExcluding": "5.0.0-rc.14",
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"versionStartIncluding": "5.0.0-rc.0",
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"vulnerable": true
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}
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],
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"negate": false,
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"operator": "OR"
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}
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],
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"operator": "AND"
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}
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],
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"credits": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "reporter",
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"value": "Peter Ullrich"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "remediation developer",
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"value": "James Harton"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "coordinator",
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"value": "Jonatan Männchen / EEF"
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}
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],
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"dateAssigned": "2026-09-17T05:24:11.000Z",
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p>Session Fixation vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a session identifier in a victim's browser to hold an authenticated session once that victim signs in.</p>\n<p><code>AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.store_in_session/2</code> writes the authenticated subject into the existing session with <code>Plug.Conn.put_session/3</code> and never calls <code>Plug.Conn.configure_session(renew: true)</code>, so the identifier the visitor arrived with carries into their authenticated session. Every authentication event reaches this one function: the default <code>success/4</code> injected by <code>AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Controller.__using__/1</code>, the <code>AuthController</code> emitted by <code>mix ash_authentication_phoenix.install</code>, and remember-me auto-login. <code>AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Plug.store_in_session/2</code> is a <code>defdelegate</code> to it. Logout does not close the window either, because <code>clear_session/2</code> ends with <code>Plug.Conn.clear_session/1</code>, which clears session contents but leaves the identifier intact, so a planted identifier survives a logout-then-login cycle.</p>\n<p>This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "Session Fixation vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a session identifier in a victim's browser to hold an authenticated session once that victim signs in.\n\n`AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.store_in_session/2` writes the authenticated subject into the existing session with `Plug.Conn.put_session/3` and never calls `Plug.Conn.configure_session(renew: true)`, so the identifier the visitor arrived with carries into their authenticated session. Every authentication event reaches this one function: the default `success/4` injected by `AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Controller.__using__/1`, the `AuthController` emitted by `mix ash_authentication_phoenix.install`, and remember-me auto-login. `AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Plug.store_in_session/2` is a `defdelegate` to it. Logout does not close the window either, because `clear_session/2` ends with `Plug.Conn.clear_session/1`, which clears session contents but leaves the identifier intact, so a planted identifier survives a logout-then-login cycle.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14."
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}
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],
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"value": "Session Fixation vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a session identifier in a victim's browser to hold an authenticated session once that victim signs in.\n\nAshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.store_in_session/2 writes the authenticated subject into the existing session with Plug.Conn.put_session/3 and never calls Plug.Conn.configure_session(renew: true), so the identifier the visitor arrived with carries into their authenticated session. Every authentication event reaches this one function: the default success/4 injected by AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Controller.__using__/1, the AuthController emitted by mix ash_authentication_phoenix.install, and remember-me auto-login. AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Plug.store_in_session/2 is a defdelegate to it. Logout does not close the window either, because clear_session/2 ends with Plug.Conn.clear_session/1, which clears session contents but leaves the identifier intact, so a planted identifier survives a logout-then-login cycle.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14."
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}
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],
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"impacts": [
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{
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"capecId": "CAPEC-61",
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p>An attacker holding a session identifier they planted before the victim signed in gains that victim's authenticated session, and with it full account takeover, in deployments using a server-side session store.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "An attacker holding a session identifier they planted before the victim signed in gains that victim's authenticated session, and with it full account takeover, in deployments using a server-side session store."
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}
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],
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"value": "An attacker holding a session identifier they planted before the victim signed in gains that victim's authenticated session, and with it full account takeover, in deployments using a server-side session store."
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"metrics": [
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{
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"cvssV4_0": {
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"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"attackComplexity": "LOW",
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"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
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"baseScore": 7.4,
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"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
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"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
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"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
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"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
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"userInteraction": "ACTIVE",
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"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
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"version": "4.0",
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"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
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"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
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"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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},
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"format": "CVSS",
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"scenarios": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "GENERAL"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"problemTypes": [
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{
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"cweId": "CWE-384",
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"description": "CWE-384 Session Fixation",
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "CWE"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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"shortName": "EEF",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T21:58:00.853Z"
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},
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"references": [
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{
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"name": "GitHub Advisory",
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"tags": [
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"related",
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"vendor-advisory"
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],
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"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-v577-944g-7h3x"
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},
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{
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"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-86688",
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"tags": [
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-86688.html"
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},
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{
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"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-86688",
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"tags": [
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-86688"
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},
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{
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"name": "Introducing commit a939dde in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
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"tags": [
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/a939dde9b917c072cdf10c4b0913a9886a4b0231"
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},
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{
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"name": "Fix commit 872db45 in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
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"tags": [
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"patch"
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],
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"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/872db454405ecad4fcdabd9ff3d8755d1d6a69ae"
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},
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{
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"name": "Fix commit 3e1d452 in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
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"tags": [
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"patch"
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],
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"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/3e1d452cbf1564e87f5f97be882b66fe25af7cfa"
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}
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],
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"source": {
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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},
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"title": "Session id is not renewed on authentication in ash_authentication, allowing session fixation",
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"workarounds": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p>Call <code>Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, renew: true)</code> in your own <code>success/4</code> before <code>store_in_session/2</code>. This is a one-line change in application code and closes the controller sign-in path, though not remember-me auto-login, which does not pass through application code.</p>\n<p>Add <code>Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, drop: true)</code> at sign-out so a planted identifier does not survive a logout-then-login cycle.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "Call `Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, renew: true)` in your own `success/4` before `store_in_session/2`. This is a one-line change in application code and closes the controller sign-in path, though not remember-me auto-login, which does not pass through application code.\n\nAdd `Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, drop: true)` at sign-out so a planted identifier does not survive a logout-then-login cycle."
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}
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],
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"value": "Call Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, renew: true) in your own success/4 before store_in_session/2. This is a one-line change in application code and closes the controller sign-in path, though not remember-me auto-login, which does not pass through application code.\n\nAdd Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, drop: true) at sign-out so a planted identifier does not survive a logout-then-login cycle."
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}
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]
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},
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"adp": [
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{
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"metrics": [
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{
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"other": {
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"type": "ssvc",
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"content": {
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"id": "CVE-2026-86688",
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"role": "CISA Coordinator",
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"options": [
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{
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"Exploitation": "none"
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},
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{
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"Automatable": "no"
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},
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{
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"Technical Impact": "total"
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}
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],
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"version": "2.0.3",
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"timestamp": "2026-09-18T14:24:09.606894Z"
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}
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}
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}
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],
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"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
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"shortName": "CISA-ADP",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-09-18T14:31:41.961Z"
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}
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}
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]
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}
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} |