369 lines
27 KiB
JSON
369 lines
27 KiB
JSON
{
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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"dataVersion": "5.2",
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"cveMetadata": {
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-82672",
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"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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"state": "PUBLISHED",
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"assignerShortName": "EEF",
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"dateReserved": "2026-09-17T05:30:01.748Z",
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"datePublished": "2026-09-19T17:00:31.648Z",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-09-21T18:30:02.604Z"
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},
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"containers": {
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"cna": {
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"affected": [
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{
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"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
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"cpes": [
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"cpe:2.3:a:elixir-mint:mint:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"modules": [
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"'Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse'",
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"'Elixir.Mint.HTTP1'"
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],
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"packageName": "mint",
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"packageURL": "pkg:hex/mint",
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"product": "mint",
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"programFiles": [
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"lib/mint/http1/parse.ex",
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"lib/mint/http1.ex"
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],
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"programRoutines": [
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{
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"name": "'Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse':chunk_size/1"
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},
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{
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"name": "'Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse':ignore_until_crlf/1"
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},
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{
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"name": "'Elixir.Mint.HTTP1':decode_body/5"
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}
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],
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"repo": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint",
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"vendor": "elixir-mint",
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"versions": [
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{
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"lessThan": "1.10.1",
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "0.1.0",
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"versionType": "semver"
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
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"cpes": [
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"cpe:2.3:a:elixir-mint:mint:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"modules": [
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"'Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse'",
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"'Elixir.Mint.HTTP1'"
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],
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"packageName": "elixir-mint/mint",
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"packageURL": "pkg:github/elixir-mint/mint",
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"product": "mint",
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"programFiles": [
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"lib/mint/http1/parse.ex",
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"lib/mint/http1.ex"
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],
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"programRoutines": [
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{
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"name": "'Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse':chunk_size/1"
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},
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{
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"name": "'Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse':ignore_until_crlf/1"
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},
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{
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"name": "'Elixir.Mint.HTTP1':decode_body/5"
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}
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],
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"repo": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint",
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"vendor": "elixir-mint",
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"versions": [
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{
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"lessThan": "c82377838dc6e275ef40bafa664fbcdf50270c60",
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "60089586ec7adc9fddb09f69a2f5919ba9ac7f33",
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"versionType": "git"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"configurations": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p>Exploitation requires a deployment topology in which an RFC-strict HTTP/1 intermediary (proxy, load balancer, or WAF) sits between the Mint client and the attacker-influenced origin, and HTTP/1 connections between the client and the intermediary are reused across requests (keep-alive with connection pooling). Mint clients that talk directly to an origin without an intermediary, or that do not reuse connections, are not exploitable for response-queue poisoning even if the vulnerable parsing behavior is present.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "Exploitation requires a deployment topology in which an RFC-strict HTTP/1 intermediary (proxy, load balancer, or WAF) sits between the Mint client and the attacker-influenced origin, and HTTP/1 connections between the client and the intermediary are reused across requests (keep-alive with connection pooling). Mint clients that talk directly to an origin without an intermediary, or that do not reuse connections, are not exploitable for response-queue poisoning even if the vulnerable parsing behavior is present."
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}
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],
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"value": "Exploitation requires a deployment topology in which an RFC-strict HTTP/1 intermediary (proxy, load balancer, or WAF) sits between the Mint client and the attacker-influenced origin, and HTTP/1 connections between the client and the intermediary are reused across requests (keep-alive with connection pooling). Mint clients that talk directly to an origin without an intermediary, or that do not reuse connections, are not exploitable for response-queue poisoning even if the vulnerable parsing behavior is present."
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}
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],
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"cpeApplicability": [
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{
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"nodes": [
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{
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"cpeMatch": [
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{
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:elixir-mint:mint:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"versionEndExcluding": "1.10.1",
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"versionStartIncluding": "0.1.0",
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"vulnerable": true
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}
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],
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"negate": false,
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"operator": "OR"
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}
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],
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"operator": "AND"
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}
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],
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"credits": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "finder",
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"value": "Eurico Nicacio"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "reporter",
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"value": "Eurico Nicacio"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "remediation developer",
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"value": "Eric Meadows-Jönsson"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "remediation reviewer",
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"value": "Andrea Leopardi"
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}
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],
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"dateAssigned": "2026-09-19T15:55:00.000Z",
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p>Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on a pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection.</p>\n<p><code>Mint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1</code> in <code>lib/mint/http1/parse.ex</code> stops at the first non-hexadecimal byte of a chunked response's chunk-size line and returns the remainder unexamined. <code>Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5</code> in <code>lib/mint/http1.ex</code> then discards every byte up to the CRLF with <code>Parse.ignore_until_crlf/1</code>, so the accepted grammar is a run of hex digits followed by arbitrary bytes, where RFC 9112 permits only a <code>;</code>-introduced chunk extension. Lines such as <code>5ZZZZZ</code> and <code>5 9</code> are accepted as chunk size 5, and <code>0ZZZZ</code> is accepted as the terminating chunk that ends the message body. An RFC-strict intermediary rejects such a line while Mint accepts it, so the two disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response ends.</p>\n<p>This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.10.1.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on a pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection.\n\n`Mint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1` in `lib/mint/http1/parse.ex` stops at the first non-hexadecimal byte of a chunked response's chunk-size line and returns the remainder unexamined. `Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5` in `lib/mint/http1.ex` then discards every byte up to the CRLF with `Parse.ignore_until_crlf/1`, so the accepted grammar is a run of hex digits followed by arbitrary bytes, where RFC 9112 permits only a `;`-introduced chunk extension. Lines such as `5ZZZZZ` and `5 9` are accepted as chunk size 5, and `0ZZZZ` is accepted as the terminating chunk that ends the message body. An RFC-strict intermediary rejects such a line while Mint accepts it, so the two disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response ends.\n\nThis issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.10.1."
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}
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],
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"value": "Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on a pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection.\n\nMint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1 in lib/mint/http1/parse.ex stops at the first non-hexadecimal byte of a chunked response's chunk-size line and returns the remainder unexamined. Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 in lib/mint/http1.ex then discards every byte up to the CRLF with Parse.ignore_until_crlf/1, so the accepted grammar is a run of hex digits followed by arbitrary bytes, where RFC 9112 permits only a ;-introduced chunk extension. Lines such as 5ZZZZZ and 5 9 are accepted as chunk size 5, and 0ZZZZ is accepted as the terminating chunk that ends the message body. An RFC-strict intermediary rejects such a line while Mint accepts it, so the two disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response ends.\n\nThis issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.10.1."
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}
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],
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"impacts": [
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{
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"capecId": "CAPEC-273",
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p>A malicious or attacker-influenced HTTP/1 origin behind an RFC-strict intermediary can make the intermediary and the Mint client disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response body ends. On a pooled keep-alive connection that disagreement lets bytes from one response be attributed to the next, poisoning the responses returned to unrelated requests that share the connection.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "A malicious or attacker-influenced HTTP/1 origin behind an RFC-strict intermediary can make the intermediary and the Mint client disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response body ends. On a pooled keep-alive connection that disagreement lets bytes from one response be attributed to the next, poisoning the responses returned to unrelated requests that share the connection."
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}
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],
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"value": "A malicious or attacker-influenced HTTP/1 origin behind an RFC-strict intermediary can make the intermediary and the Mint client disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response body ends. On a pooled keep-alive connection that disagreement lets bytes from one response be attributed to the next, poisoning the responses returned to unrelated requests that share the connection."
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"metrics": [
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{
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"cvssV4_0": {
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"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"attackComplexity": "LOW",
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"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
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"baseScore": 6.3,
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"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
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"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
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"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
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"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
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"userInteraction": "NONE",
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"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
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"version": "4.0",
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"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
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"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
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"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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},
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"format": "CVSS",
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"scenarios": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "GENERAL"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"problemTypes": [
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{
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"cweId": "CWE-444",
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"description": "CWE-444 Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')",
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "CWE"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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"shortName": "EEF",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-09-19T17:00:31.648Z"
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},
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"references": [
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{
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"name": "GitHub Advisory",
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"tags": [
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"related",
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"vendor-advisory"
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],
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"url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/security/advisories/GHSA-rj5m-69wp-cxq9"
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},
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{
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"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-82672",
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"tags": [
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82672.html"
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},
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{
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"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-82672",
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"tags": [
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82672"
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},
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{
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"name": "Introducing commit 6008958 in elixir-mint/mint",
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"tags": [
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/60089586ec7adc9fddb09f69a2f5919ba9ac7f33"
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},
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{
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"name": "Fix commit c823778 in elixir-mint/mint",
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"tags": [
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"patch"
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],
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"url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/c82377838dc6e275ef40bafa664fbcdf50270c60"
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}
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],
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"source": {
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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},
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"title": "Unvalidated chunk-size line tail in Mint HTTP/1 client enables response smuggling against strict intermediaries on pooled connections",
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"x_proofOfConcept": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<ol>\n<li>Start a loopback TCP server that serves one <code>HTTP/1.1 200 OK</code> response with <code>transfer-encoding: chunked</code> and controls the chunk-size line byte for byte.</li>\n<li>Connect with <code>Mint.HTTP1</code> (mint 1.10.0 from Hex), send a request and stream the response.</li>\n<li>Positive controls: chunk-size lines <code>+5</code>, <code>Z5</code> and <code>00000000000000005</code> are refused with <code>:invalid_chunk_size</code>, confirming the build carries the earlier chunk-size fixes.</li>\n<li>Baseline: <code>5</code> and <code>5;name=value</code> are accepted with body <code>hello</code>.</li>\n<li>Finding: <code>5ZZZZZ</code>, <code>5 anything at all</code>, <code>5<TAB>foo</code>, <code>5 9</code> and <code>5}~!</code> are each accepted as chunk size 5 with body <code>hello</code>.</li>\n<li>Terminator: <code>0ZZZZ</code> and <code>0 9</code> in place of the final <code>0</code> chunk are accepted and end the body.</li>\n<li>Contrast: <code>Content-Length: +5</code>, <code>Content-Length: 5ZZZ</code> and <code>Content-Length: 5 9</code> are refused with <code>:invalid_content_length_header</code> in the same run.</li>\n</ol>\n<p>The reporter ran this on Elixir 1.18 / OTP 27 and Elixir 1.18.4 / OTP 28 with identical results.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "1. Start a loopback TCP server that serves one `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` response with `transfer-encoding: chunked` and controls the chunk-size line byte for byte.\n2. Connect with `Mint.HTTP1` (mint 1.10.0 from Hex), send a request and stream the response.\n3. Positive controls: chunk-size lines `+5`, `Z5` and `00000000000000005` are refused with `:invalid_chunk_size`, confirming the build carries the earlier chunk-size fixes.\n4. Baseline: `5` and `5;name=value` are accepted with body `hello`.\n5. Finding: `5ZZZZZ`, `5 anything at all`, `5<TAB>foo`, `5 9` and `5}~!` are each accepted as chunk size 5 with body `hello`.\n6. Terminator: `0ZZZZ` and `0 9` in place of the final `0` chunk are accepted and end the body.\n7. Contrast: `Content-Length: +5`, `Content-Length: 5ZZZ` and `Content-Length: 5 9` are refused with `:invalid_content_length_header` in the same run.\n\nThe reporter ran this on Elixir 1.18 / OTP 27 and Elixir 1.18.4 / OTP 28 with identical results."
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}
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],
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"value": "* Start a loopback TCP server that serves one HTTP/1.1 200 OK response with transfer-encoding: chunked and controls the chunk-size line byte for byte.\n* Connect with Mint.HTTP1 (mint 1.10.0 from Hex), send a request and stream the response.\n* Positive controls: chunk-size lines +5, Z5 and 00000000000000005 are refused with :invalid_chunk_size, confirming the build carries the earlier chunk-size fixes.\n* Baseline: 5 and 5;name=value are accepted with body hello.\n* Finding: 5ZZZZZ, 5 anything at all, 5<TAB>foo, 5 9 and 5}~! are each accepted as chunk size 5 with body hello.\n* Terminator: 0ZZZZ and 0 9 in place of the final 0 chunk are accepted and end the body.\n* Contrast: Content-Length: +5, Content-Length: 5ZZZ and Content-Length: 5 9 are refused with :invalid_content_length_header in the same run.\n\nThe reporter ran this on Elixir 1.18 / OTP 27 and Elixir 1.18.4 / OTP 28 with identical results."
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}
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],
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"x_technicalAnalysis": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p><strong>1. Chunk-size parsing.</strong> <code>Mint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1</code> in <code>lib/mint/http1/parse.ex</code> folds leading hexadecimal digits into an accumulator through <code>parse_hex_prefix/3</code> and, on the first byte that is not a hex digit, returns <code>{:ok, size, rest}</code> with <code>rest</code> unexamined. The sign and digit-count checks added by earlier fixes constrain only the digits.</p>\n<p><strong>2. Tail skipping.</strong> The caller, <code>Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5</code> in <code>lib/mint/http1.ex</code>, hands <code>rest</code> to <code>Parse.ignore_until_crlf/1</code>, which advances over any byte until it finds CRLF. Nothing between the last hex digit and the CRLF is validated, so the accepted grammar is <code>1*HEXDIG *OCTET CRLF</code>, where RFC 9112 section 7.1 allows only an optional <code>;</code>-introduced <code>chunk-ext</code>. The same tolerance applies to the terminating zero-length chunk, which is the token that ends the message body.</p>\n<p><strong>3. Parser disagreement.</strong> The sibling <code>Content-Length</code> parser, <code>Mint.HTTP1.Parse.content_length_header/1</code>, trims trailing whitespace and requires the whole remaining value to be digits, rejecting anything else. An RFC-strict intermediary that rejects or reframes a chunk-size line with a non-extension tail, on a connection where Mint accepts it, yields a framing disagreement about chunk length and, through the terminating chunk, about where the message ends.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "**1. Chunk-size parsing.** `Mint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1` in `lib/mint/http1/parse.ex` folds leading hexadecimal digits into an accumulator through `parse_hex_prefix/3` and, on the first byte that is not a hex digit, returns `{:ok, size, rest}` with `rest` unexamined. The sign and digit-count checks added by earlier fixes constrain only the digits.\n\n**2. Tail skipping.** The caller, `Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5` in `lib/mint/http1.ex`, hands `rest` to `Parse.ignore_until_crlf/1`, which advances over any byte until it finds CRLF. Nothing between the last hex digit and the CRLF is validated, so the accepted grammar is `1*HEXDIG *OCTET CRLF`, where RFC 9112 section 7.1 allows only an optional `;`-introduced `chunk-ext`. The same tolerance applies to the terminating zero-length chunk, which is the token that ends the message body.\n\n**3. Parser disagreement.** The sibling `Content-Length` parser, `Mint.HTTP1.Parse.content_length_header/1`, trims trailing whitespace and requires the whole remaining value to be digits, rejecting anything else. An RFC-strict intermediary that rejects or reframes a chunk-size line with a non-extension tail, on a connection where Mint accepts it, yields a framing disagreement about chunk length and, through the terminating chunk, about where the message ends."
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}
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],
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"value": "1. Chunk-size parsing. Mint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1 in lib/mint/http1/parse.ex folds leading hexadecimal digits into an accumulator through parse_hex_prefix/3 and, on the first byte that is not a hex digit, returns {:ok, size, rest} with rest unexamined. The sign and digit-count checks added by earlier fixes constrain only the digits.\n\n2. Tail skipping. The caller, Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 in lib/mint/http1.ex, hands rest to Parse.ignore_until_crlf/1, which advances over any byte until it finds CRLF. Nothing between the last hex digit and the CRLF is validated, so the accepted grammar is 1*HEXDIG *OCTET CRLF, where RFC 9112 section 7.1 allows only an optional ;-introduced chunk-ext. The same tolerance applies to the terminating zero-length chunk, which is the token that ends the message body.\n\n3. Parser disagreement. The sibling Content-Length parser, Mint.HTTP1.Parse.content_length_header/1, trims trailing whitespace and requires the whole remaining value to be digits, rejecting anything else. An RFC-strict intermediary that rejects or reframes a chunk-size line with a non-extension tail, on a connection where Mint accepts it, yields a framing disagreement about chunk length and, through the terminating chunk, about where the message ends."
|
|
}
|
|
]
|
|
},
|
|
"adp": [
|
|
{
|
|
"references": [
|
|
{
|
|
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/security/advisories/GHSA-rj5m-69wp-cxq9",
|
|
"tags": [
|
|
"exploit"
|
|
]
|
|
}
|
|
],
|
|
"metrics": [
|
|
{
|
|
"other": {
|
|
"type": "ssvc",
|
|
"content": {
|
|
"timestamp": "2026-09-21T18:29:40.588404Z",
|
|
"id": "CVE-2026-82672",
|
|
"options": [
|
|
{
|
|
"Exploitation": "poc"
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"Automatable": "no"
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
"Technical Impact": "partial"
|
|
}
|
|
],
|
|
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
|
|
"version": "2.0.3"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
],
|
|
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
|
|
"providerMetadata": {
|
|
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
|
|
"shortName": "CISA-ADP",
|
|
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-21T18:30:02.604Z"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
]
|
|
}
|
|
} |