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vuln-cve/data/2026/82xxx/CVE-2026-82417.json
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{
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"cveMetadata": {
"cveId": "CVE-2026-82417",
"assignerOrgId": "7ffcee3d-2c14-4c3e-b844-86c6a321a158",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"assignerShortName": "harborist",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-28T23:08:00.460Z",
"datePublished": "2026-08-29T23:51:27.634Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-31T17:08:24.074Z"
},
"containers": {
"cna": {
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "7ffcee3d-2c14-4c3e-b844-86c6a321a158",
"shortName": "harborist",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T23:51:27.634Z"
},
"title": "qs.stringify throws TypeError on objects with a non-callable constructor.isBuffer property",
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"cweId": "CWE-248",
"description": "CWE-248 Uncaught Exception",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"cweId": "CWE-703",
"description": "CWE-703 Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"affected": [
{
"vendor": "ljharb",
"product": "qs",
"collectionURL": "https://npmjs.com/qs",
"packageName": "qs",
"repo": "https://github.com/ljharb/qs",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.2.5",
"lessThan": "6.16.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "### Summary\n\n\n\n`qs.stringify` throws a `TypeError` when it serializes an object whose own `constructor` property has a truthy, non-callable `isBuffer` member. `utils.isBuffer` duck-types buffers by calling `obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj)` after checking only that the property is truthy, so a value such as `{ constructor: { isBuffer: \"x\" } }` makes the call throw `TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function`.\n\n\n\n### Details\n\n\n\n`lib/stringify.js:127` calls `utils.isBuffer` on every non-primitive value it serializes. `utils.isBuffer` (`lib/utils.js:332`) reads `obj.constructor.isBuffer` and invokes it without verifying that it is a function. `constructor` and `isBuffer` are ordinary property names, so any object carrying them as own properties reaches the unchecked call.\n\n\n\nSuch an object can be built from untrusted input. `qs.parse(\"x[constructor][isBuffer]=y\", { plainObjects: true })` or `{ allowPrototypes: true }` keeps the `constructor` key as an own property (the default parse options drop it), and `JSON.parse(\"{\\\"a\\\":{\\\"constructor\\\":{\\\"isBuffer\\\":\\\"x\\\"}}}\")` produces the same shape with no qs option involved. Express 4 with its default `query parser` setting and body-parser with `extended: true` both call `qs.parse` with `allowPrototypes: true`, so on those stacks `req.query` and `req.body` can carry the shape directly.\n\n\n\n#### PoC\n\n\n\n```js\n\n\n\nvar qs = require(\"qs\");\n\n\n\nqs.stringify(qs.parse(\"x[constructor][isBuffer]=y\", { plainObjects: true }));\n\n\n\nqs.stringify(JSON.parse(\"{\\\"a\\\":{\\\"constructor\\\":{\\\"isBuffer\\\":\\\"x\\\"}}}\"));\n\n\n\n// TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function\n\n\n\n// at Object.isBuffer (lib/utils.js:332:78)\n\n\n\n// at stringify (lib/stringify.js:127:45)\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\n#### Fix\n\n\n\n`lib/utils.js`, applied in e83d321 on `main` and released as v6.16.0:\n\n\n\n```diff\n\n\n\n- return !!(obj.constructor && obj.constructor.isBuffer && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj));\n\n\n\n+ return !!(obj.constructor && typeof obj.constructor.isBuffer === \"function\" && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj));\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nReal `Buffer`, `safer-buffer`, and browserify `buffer` polyfill instances serialize exactly as before; only the throw is removed.\n\n\n\n### Affected versions\n\n\n\n`>=2.2.5 <6.16.0`, fixed in v6.16.0.\n\n\n\nThe unguarded duck-type was introduced in 3768a75 and first shipped in v2.2.5 (September 2014). v2.2.4 and earlier used `Buffer.isBuffer` and are not affected. Every release from v2.2.5 through v6.15.3 contains the unguarded call.\n\n\n\n### Impact\n\n\n\nAn unauthenticated request can make any code path that re-serializes attacker-influenced data with `qs.stringify` (for example, rebuilding a query string from `req.query` for a redirect or an upstream request, or serializing a parsed JSON body) throw synchronously. In a typical Node.js HTTP framework the throw is caught by the framework error boundary and the affected request returns a 500; the process survives and other requests are unaffected. Where the call runs outside an error boundary, such as an `async` Express 4 handler (where the throw becomes an unhandled promise rejection) or a background job, the process exits, so the impact in that case depends on the application error handling rather than on qs.",
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"value": "<p>### Summary</p><p>`qs.stringify` throws a `TypeError` when it serializes an object whose own `constructor` property has a truthy, non-callable `isBuffer` member. `utils.isBuffer` duck-types buffers by calling `obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj)` after checking only that the property is truthy, so a value such as `{ constructor: { isBuffer: \"x\" } }` makes the call throw `TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function`.</p><p>### Details</p><p>`lib/stringify.js:127` calls `utils.isBuffer` on every non-primitive value it serializes. `utils.isBuffer` (`lib/utils.js:332`) reads `obj.constructor.isBuffer` and invokes it without verifying that it is a function. `constructor` and `isBuffer` are ordinary property names, so any object carrying them as own properties reaches the unchecked call.</p><p>Such an object can be built from untrusted input. `qs.parse(\"x[constructor][isBuffer]=y\", { plainObjects: true })` or `{ allowPrototypes: true }` keeps the `constructor` key as an own property (the default parse options drop it), and `JSON.parse(\"{\\\"a\\\":{\\\"constructor\\\":{\\\"isBuffer\\\":\\\"x\\\"}}}\")` produces the same shape with no qs option involved. Express 4 with its default `query parser` setting and body-parser with `extended: true` both call `qs.parse` with `allowPrototypes: true`, so on those stacks `req.query` and `req.body` can carry the shape directly.</p><p>#### PoC</p><p>```js</p><p>var qs = require(\"qs\");</p><p>qs.stringify(qs.parse(\"x[constructor][isBuffer]=y\", { plainObjects: true }));</p><p>qs.stringify(JSON.parse(\"{\\\"a\\\":{\\\"constructor\\\":{\\\"isBuffer\\\":\\\"x\\\"}}}\"));</p><p>// TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function</p><p>// at Object.isBuffer (lib/utils.js:332:78)</p><p>// at stringify (lib/stringify.js:127:45)</p><p>```</p><p>#### Fix</p><p>`lib/utils.js`, applied in e83d321 on `main` and released as v6.16.0:</p><p>```diff</p><p>- return !!(obj.constructor &amp;&amp; obj.constructor.isBuffer &amp;&amp; obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj));</p><p>+ return !!(obj.constructor &amp;&amp; typeof obj.constructor.isBuffer === \"function\" &amp;&amp; obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj));</p><p>```</p><p>Real `Buffer`, `safer-buffer`, and browserify `buffer` polyfill instances serialize exactly as before; only the throw is removed.</p><p>### Affected versions</p><p>`&gt;=2.2.5 &lt;6.16.0`, fixed in v6.16.0.</p><p>The unguarded duck-type was introduced in 3768a75 and first shipped in v2.2.5 (September 2014). v2.2.4 and earlier used `Buffer.isBuffer` and are not affected. Every release from v2.2.5 through v6.15.3 contains the unguarded call.</p><p>### Impact</p><p>An unauthenticated request can make any code path that re-serializes attacker-influenced data with `qs.stringify` (for example, rebuilding a query string from `req.query` for a redirect or an upstream request, or serializing a parsed JSON body) throw synchronously. In a typical Node.js HTTP framework the throw is caught by the framework error boundary and the affected request returns a 500; the process survives and other requests are unaffected. Where the call runs outside an error boundary, such as an `async` Express 4 handler (where the throw becomes an unhandled promise rejection) or a background job, the process exits, so the impact in that case depends on the application error handling rather than on qs.</p>"
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/ljharb/qs/security/advisories/GHSA-4mjr-xmp4-gh2g",
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory"
]
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/ljharb/qs/commit/e83d321ffafb38cf210683ac31714fce6ce1c6c6",
"tags": [
"patch"
]
}
],
"metrics": [
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"format": "CVSS",
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"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
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"cvssV3_1": {
"version": "3.1",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L"
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"version": "4.0",
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"baseScore": 6.3,
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
}
],
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Pass a `filter` function to `qs.stringify` that drops values carrying an own `constructor` property; it runs before the `isBuffer` check. Alternatively, wrap `qs.stringify` calls on externally influenced objects in try/catch, and avoid `allowPrototypes: true` / `plainObjects: true` when parsed untrusted input is fed back into `qs.stringify`.",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p>Pass a `filter` function to `qs.stringify` that drops values carrying an own `constructor` property; it runs before the `isBuffer` check. Alternatively, wrap `qs.stringify` calls on externally influenced objects in try/catch, and avoid `allowPrototypes: true` / `plainObjects: true` when parsed untrusted input is fed back into `qs.stringify`.</p>"
}
]
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Upgrade to qs 6.16.0 or later.",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"type": "text/html",
"base64": false,
"value": "<p>Upgrade to qs 6.16.0 or later.</p>"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "waydeshi",
"type": "finder"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "ljharb",
"type": "remediation developer"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
}
},
"adp": [
{
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/ljharb/qs/security/advisories/GHSA-4mjr-xmp4-gh2g",
"tags": [
"exploit"
]
}
],
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{
"other": {
"type": "ssvc",
"content": {
"timestamp": "2026-08-31T17:07:54.823942Z",
"id": "CVE-2026-82417",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
}
],
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-31T17:08:24.074Z"
}
}
]
}
}