293 lines
14 KiB
JSON
293 lines
14 KiB
JSON
{
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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"dataVersion": "5.2",
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"cveMetadata": {
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-81853",
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"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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"state": "PUBLISHED",
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"assignerShortName": "EEF",
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"dateReserved": "2026-08-30T23:15:02.371Z",
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"datePublished": "2026-08-31T02:31:29.547Z",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-08-31T15:58:40.226Z"
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},
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"containers": {
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"cna": {
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"affected": [
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{
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"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
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"cpes": [
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"cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_admin:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"modules": [
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"'Elixir.AshAdmin.Helpers'"
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],
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"packageName": "ash_admin",
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"packageURL": "pkg:hex/ash_admin",
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"product": "ash_admin",
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"programFiles": [
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"lib/ash_admin/helpers.ex"
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],
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"programRoutines": [
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{
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"name": "'Elixir.AshAdmin.Helpers':decode_primary_key/2"
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}
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],
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"repo": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_admin",
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"vendor": "ash-project",
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"versions": [
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{
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"lessThan": "1.3.1",
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "0.1.0",
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"versionType": "semver"
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
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"cpes": [
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"cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_admin:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"modules": [
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"'Elixir.AshAdmin.Helpers'"
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],
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"packageName": "ash-project/ash_admin",
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"packageURL": "pkg:github/ash-project/ash_admin",
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"product": "ash_admin",
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"programFiles": [
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"lib/ash_admin/helpers.ex"
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],
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"programRoutines": [
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{
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"name": "'Elixir.AshAdmin.Helpers':decode_primary_key/2"
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}
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],
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"repo": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_admin",
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"vendor": "ash-project",
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"versions": [
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{
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"lessThan": "3c3e905d47f1155dcc1ca3fb347348b05a66065a",
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "98b03baa8422b94dd13e305bf08b8ee3f7232c7b",
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"versionType": "git"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"configurations": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p>The resource has a composite primary key, and the deployment relies on AshAdmin's authorization (a custom actor plug and policies) so that reading otherwise-restricted attribute values crosses a boundary.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "The resource has a composite primary key, and the deployment relies on AshAdmin's authorization (a custom actor plug and policies) so that reading otherwise-restricted attribute values crosses a boundary."
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}
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],
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"value": "The resource has a composite primary key, and the deployment relies on AshAdmin's authorization (a custom actor plug and policies) so that reading otherwise-restricted attribute values crosses a boundary."
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}
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],
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"cpeApplicability": [
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{
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"nodes": [
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{
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"cpeMatch": [
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{
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_admin:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"versionEndExcluding": "1.3.1",
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"versionStartIncluding": "0.1.0",
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"vulnerable": true
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}
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],
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"negate": false,
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"operator": "OR"
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}
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],
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"operator": "AND"
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}
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],
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"credits": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "finder",
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"value": "Peter Ullrich"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "reporter",
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"value": "Peter Ullrich"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "remediation developer",
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"value": "Zach Daniel / Ash Project"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "coordinator",
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"value": "Jonatan Männchen / EEF"
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}
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],
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p>Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.</p>\n<p><code>AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2</code> decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and <code>:safe</code> still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode <code>%{api_token: \"guess\"}</code> and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; <code>Map.to_list/1</code> also accepts structs, yielding a bogus <code>__struct__</code> key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.</p>\n<p>This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.\n\n`AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2` decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and `:safe` still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode `%{api_token: \"guess\"}` and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; `Map.to_list/1` also accepts structs, yielding a bogus `__struct__` key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.\n\nThis issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1."
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}
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],
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"value": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.\n\nAshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: \"guess\"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.\n\nThis issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1."
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}
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],
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"impacts": [
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{
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"capecId": "CAPEC-77",
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "CAPEC-77 Manipulating User-Controlled Variables"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"metrics": [
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{
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"cvssV4_0": {
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"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"attackComplexity": "LOW",
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"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
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"baseScore": 2.3,
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"baseSeverity": "LOW",
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"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
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"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
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"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
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"userInteraction": "NONE",
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"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
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"version": "4.0",
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"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
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"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
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"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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},
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"format": "CVSS",
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"scenarios": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "GENERAL"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"problemTypes": [
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{
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"cweId": "CWE-639",
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"description": "CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key",
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "CWE"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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"shortName": "EEF",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-08-31T02:31:29.547Z"
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},
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"references": [
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{
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"tags": [
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"vendor-advisory",
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_admin/security/advisories/GHSA-jxr8-hpv2-qp38"
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},
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{
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"tags": [
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-81853.html"
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},
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{
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"tags": [
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-81853"
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},
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{
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"tags": [
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"patch"
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],
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"url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_admin/commit/3c3e905d47f1155dcc1ca3fb347348b05a66065a"
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}
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],
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"source": {
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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},
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"title": "AshAdmin composite primary key decoding accepts arbitrary fields, enabling a secret-attribute oracle"
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},
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"adp": [
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{
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"references": [
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash_admin/security/advisories/GHSA-jxr8-hpv2-qp38",
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"tags": [
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"exploit"
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]
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}
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],
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"metrics": [
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{
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"other": {
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"type": "ssvc",
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"content": {
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"timestamp": "2026-08-31T15:57:41.689629Z",
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"id": "CVE-2026-81853",
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"options": [
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{
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"Exploitation": "poc"
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},
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{
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"Automatable": "no"
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},
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{
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"Technical Impact": "partial"
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}
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],
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"role": "CISA Coordinator",
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"version": "2.0.3"
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}
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}
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}
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],
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"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
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"shortName": "CISA-ADP",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-08-31T15:58:40.226Z"
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}
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}
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]
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}
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} |