265 lines
14 KiB
JSON
265 lines
14 KiB
JSON
{
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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"dataVersion": "5.2",
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"cveMetadata": {
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-75484",
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"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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"state": "PUBLISHED",
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"assignerShortName": "EEF",
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"dateReserved": "2026-08-18T10:30:01.764Z",
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"datePublished": "2026-08-20T21:11:27.523Z",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T19:52:42.954Z"
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},
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"containers": {
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"cna": {
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"affected": [
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{
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"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
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"cpes": [
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"cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"modules": [
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"'Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream'"
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],
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"packageName": "bandit",
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"packageURL": "pkg:hex/bandit",
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"product": "bandit",
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"programFiles": [
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"lib/bandit/http2/stream.ex"
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],
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"programRoutines": [
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{
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"name": "'Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream':read_headers/1"
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}
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],
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"repo": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit",
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"vendor": "mtrudel",
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"versions": [
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{
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"lessThan": "1.12.5",
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "1.4.0",
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"versionType": "semver"
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
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"cpes": [
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"cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"modules": [
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"'Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream'"
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],
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"packageName": "mtrudel/bandit",
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"packageURL": "pkg:github/mtrudel/bandit",
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"product": "bandit",
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"programFiles": [
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"lib/bandit/http2/stream.ex"
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],
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"programRoutines": [
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{
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"name": "'Elixir.Bandit.HTTP2.Stream':read_headers/1"
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}
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],
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"repo": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit",
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"vendor": "mtrudel",
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"versions": [
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{
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"lessThan": "d38cf046c9a3cae4d0f88001c2ceb4143f86366b",
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "fff06efe3be962b484bd4d3eb339372fda5a231f",
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"versionType": "git"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"cpeApplicability": [
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{
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"nodes": [
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{
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"cpeMatch": [
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{
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:mtrudel:bandit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"versionEndExcluding": "1.12.5",
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"versionStartIncluding": "1.4.0",
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"vulnerable": true
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}
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],
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"negate": false,
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"operator": "OR"
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}
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],
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"operator": "AND"
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}
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],
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"credits": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "remediation developer",
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"value": "Mat Trudel"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "coordinator",
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"value": "Jonatan Männchen / EEF"
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}
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],
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p>Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to smuggle CR, LF, or NUL characters into application-visible request headers via HTTP/2. <code>Bandit.HTTP2.Stream.read_headers/1</code> validates pseudo-header placement and uniqueness, header-name casing, connection-specific headers, the <code>te</code> value, and <code>content-length</code>, but never checks field <em>values</em>. Because HPACK carries arbitrary octets, a HEADERS block whose field values contain <code>\\r</code>, <code>\\n</code>, or <code>\\0</code> decodes without error and the values land in <code>conn.req_headers</code> unchanged. The HTTP/1 path already rejects the same octets; HTTP/2 did not.</p>\n<p>Bandit itself is not a sink for the injected bytes: its own logging uses fixed strings or <code>inspect</code>, and HTTP/2 response headers are HPACK-encoded and separately rejected by Plug's <code>put_resp_header</code>, so response splitting is not reachable through this path. The risk is entirely in how a downstream application consumes header values, such as appending one verbatim to a plain-text log or concatenating it into an upstream request. A related gap bundled in the same fix: only <code>:method</code>, <code>:scheme</code>, and <code>:path</code> were checked for at most one occurrence; a duplicate <code>:authority</code> pseudo-header was accepted, with the first instance silently winning as <code>conn.host</code> while a conflicting value remained visible to the application.</p>\n<p>This issue affects bandit: from 1.4.0 before 1.12.5.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to smuggle CR, LF, or NUL characters into application-visible request headers via HTTP/2. `Bandit.HTTP2.Stream.read_headers/1` validates pseudo-header placement and uniqueness, header-name casing, connection-specific headers, the `te` value, and `content-length`, but never checks field *values*. Because HPACK carries arbitrary octets, a HEADERS block whose field values contain `\\r`, `\\n`, or `\\0` decodes without error and the values land in `conn.req_headers` unchanged. The HTTP/1 path already rejects the same octets; HTTP/2 did not.\n\nBandit itself is not a sink for the injected bytes: its own logging uses fixed strings or `inspect`, and HTTP/2 response headers are HPACK-encoded and separately rejected by Plug's `put_resp_header`, so response splitting is not reachable through this path. The risk is entirely in how a downstream application consumes header values, such as appending one verbatim to a plain-text log or concatenating it into an upstream request. A related gap bundled in the same fix: only `:method`, `:scheme`, and `:path` were checked for at most one occurrence; a duplicate `:authority` pseudo-header was accepted, with the first instance silently winning as `conn.host` while a conflicting value remained visible to the application.\n\nThis issue affects bandit: from 1.4.0 before 1.12.5."
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}
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],
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"value": "Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to smuggle CR, LF, or NUL characters into application-visible request headers via HTTP/2. Bandit.HTTP2.Stream.read_headers/1 validates pseudo-header placement and uniqueness, header-name casing, connection-specific headers, the te value, and content-length, but never checks field values. Because HPACK carries arbitrary octets, a HEADERS block whose field values contain \\r, \\n, or \\0 decodes without error and the values land in conn.req_headers unchanged. The HTTP/1 path already rejects the same octets; HTTP/2 did not.\n\nBandit itself is not a sink for the injected bytes: its own logging uses fixed strings or inspect, and HTTP/2 response headers are HPACK-encoded and separately rejected by Plug's put_resp_header, so response splitting is not reachable through this path. The risk is entirely in how a downstream application consumes header values, such as appending one verbatim to a plain-text log or concatenating it into an upstream request. A related gap bundled in the same fix: only :method, :scheme, and :path were checked for at most one occurrence; a duplicate :authority pseudo-header was accepted, with the first instance silently winning as conn.host while a conflicting value remained visible to the application.\n\nThis issue affects bandit: from 1.4.0 before 1.12.5."
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}
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],
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"impacts": [
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{
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"capecId": "CAPEC-81",
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "CAPEC-81 Web Server Logs Tampering"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"metrics": [
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{
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"cvssV4_0": {
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"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"attackComplexity": "LOW",
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"attackRequirements": "NONE",
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
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"baseScore": 6.9,
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"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
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"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
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"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
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"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
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"userInteraction": "NONE",
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"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
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"version": "4.0",
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"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
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"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
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"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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},
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"format": "CVSS",
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"scenarios": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "GENERAL"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"problemTypes": [
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{
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"cweId": "CWE-93",
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"description": "CWE-93 Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection')",
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "CWE"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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"shortName": "EEF",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-08-20T21:11:27.523Z"
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},
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"references": [
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{
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"tags": [
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"vendor-advisory",
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/security/advisories/GHSA-x3gh-xhj4-3vq8"
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},
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{
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"tags": [
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-75484.html"
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},
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{
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"tags": [
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-75484"
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},
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{
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"tags": [
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"patch"
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],
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"url": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/commit/d38cf046c9a3cae4d0f88001c2ceb4143f86366b"
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}
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],
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"source": {
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"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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},
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"title": "HTTP/2 header field values containing CR, LF or NUL are passed to the application unvalidated in Bandit"
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},
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"adp": [
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{
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"references": [
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/security/advisories/GHSA-x3gh-xhj4-3vq8",
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"tags": [
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"exploit"
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]
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}
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],
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"metrics": [
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{
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"other": {
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"type": "ssvc",
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"content": {
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"timestamp": "2026-08-21T19:52:23.602062Z",
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"id": "CVE-2026-75484",
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"options": [
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{
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"Exploitation": "poc"
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},
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{
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"Automatable": "yes"
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},
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{
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"Technical Impact": "partial"
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}
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],
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"role": "CISA Coordinator",
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"version": "2.0.3"
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}
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}
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}
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],
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"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
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"shortName": "CISA-ADP",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T19:52:42.954Z"
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}
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}
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]
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}
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} |