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vuln-cve/data/2026/71xxx/CVE-2026-71886.json
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{
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"cveMetadata": {
"cveId": "CVE-2026-71886",
"assignerOrgId": "91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"assignerShortName": "bcorg",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-08T00:06:06.982Z",
"datePublished": "2026-10-03T08:46:33.868Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-05T16:03:23.403Z"
},
"containers": {
"cna": {
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630",
"shortName": "bcorg",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-03T08:46:33.868Z"
},
"title": "OpenPGP certification accepted from a subkey without certification authority",
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"cweId": "CWE-863",
"description": "CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"cweId": "CWE-285",
"description": "CWE-285 Improper Authorization",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"affected": [
{
"vendor": "Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.",
"product": "BC-JAVA",
"platforms": [
"all"
],
"collectionURL": "https://www.bouncycastle.org/download/bouncy-castle-java/",
"packageName": "bcpg",
"repo": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java",
"packageURL": "pkg:maven/org.bouncycastle/bcpg-jdk18on",
"modules": [
"pg"
],
"programFiles": [
"OpenPGPCertificate"
],
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.81",
"lessThan": "1.86",
"versionType": "maven"
}
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.",
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"base64": false,
"value": "<p>In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.</p>"
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9071886",
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory"
]
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/f0d5c8535aeff3f34b7b6b6289ee78c2ea36a3fb",
"tags": [
"patch"
]
}
],
"metrics": [
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"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
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"cvssV4_0": {
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED",
"providerUrgency": "AMBER",
"version": "4.0",
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.2,
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber"
}
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Bhargava Shastry",
"type": "reporter"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bc release-notes template"
}
},
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"type": "ssvc",
"content": {
"timestamp": "2026-10-05T16:02:59.243532Z",
"id": "CVE-2026-71886",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
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{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
}
],
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-05T16:03:23.403Z"
}
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]
}
}