308 lines
17 KiB
JSON
308 lines
17 KiB
JSON
{
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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"dataVersion": "5.2",
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"cveMetadata": {
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-65626",
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"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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"state": "PUBLISHED",
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"assignerShortName": "EEF",
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"dateReserved": "2026-07-22T13:55:59.401Z",
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"datePublished": "2026-10-26T19:53:05.620Z",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T19:43:05.115Z"
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},
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"containers": {
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"cna": {
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"affected": [
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{
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"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
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"cpes": [
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"cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"modules": [
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"jose_jwa_pkcs1"
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],
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"packageName": "jose",
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"packageURL": "pkg:hex/jose",
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"product": "jose",
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"programFiles": [
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"src/jwa/jose_jwa_pkcs1.erl"
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],
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"programRoutines": [
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{
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"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:decrypt_private/3"
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},
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{
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"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2"
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},
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{
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"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:eme_pkcs1_decode/2"
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},
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{
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"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:dp/2"
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}
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],
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"repo": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose",
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"vendor": "potatosalad",
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"versions": [
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{
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"lessThan": "1.11.13",
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "1.3.0",
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"versionType": "semver"
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
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"cpes": [
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"cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"modules": [
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"jose_jwa_pkcs1"
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],
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"packageName": "potatosalad/erlang-jose",
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"packageURL": "pkg:github/potatosalad/erlang-jose",
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"product": "jose",
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"programFiles": [
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"src/jwa/jose_jwa_pkcs1.erl"
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],
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"programRoutines": [
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{
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"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:decrypt_private/3"
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},
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{
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"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2"
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},
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{
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"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:eme_pkcs1_decode/2"
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},
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{
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"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:dp/2"
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}
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],
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"repo": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose",
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"vendor": "potatosalad",
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"versions": [
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{
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"lessThan": "0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d",
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8",
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"versionType": "git"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"configurations": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p>The vulnerable code path is only reached when jose performs RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption with its pure-Erlang fallback (the <code>jose_jwa_pkcs1</code> module) instead of the native OTP <code>public_key</code> implementation. This requires the crypto_fallback option to be enabled (<code>application:set_env(jose, crypto_fallback, true)</code>, or <code>JOSE.crypto_fallback(true)</code> in Elixir) and the OTP runtime not to provide native RSA1_5 decryption. When native OTP RSA support is selected, decryption does not go through <code>jose_jwa_pkcs1</code>.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "The vulnerable code path is only reached when jose performs RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption with its pure-Erlang fallback (the `jose_jwa_pkcs1` module) instead of the native OTP `public_key` implementation. This requires the crypto_fallback option to be enabled (`application:set_env(jose, crypto_fallback, true)`, or `JOSE.crypto_fallback(true)` in Elixir) and the OTP runtime not to provide native RSA1_5 decryption. When native OTP RSA support is selected, decryption does not go through `jose_jwa_pkcs1`."
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}
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],
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"value": "The vulnerable code path is only reached when jose performs RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption with its pure-Erlang fallback (the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module) instead of the native OTP public_key implementation. This requires the crypto_fallback option to be enabled (application:set_env(jose, crypto_fallback, true), or JOSE.crypto_fallback(true) in Elixir) and the OTP runtime not to provide native RSA1_5 decryption. When native OTP RSA support is selected, decryption does not go through jose_jwa_pkcs1."
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}
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],
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"cpeApplicability": [
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{
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"nodes": [
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{
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"cpeMatch": [
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{
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"versionEndExcluding": "1.11.13",
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"versionStartIncluding": "1.3.0",
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"vulnerable": true
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}
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],
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"negate": false,
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"operator": "OR"
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}
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],
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"operator": "AND"
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}
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],
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"credits": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "reporter",
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"value": "Peter Ullrich"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "remediation developer",
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"value": "Andrew Bennett"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "analyst",
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"value": "Jonatan Männchen / EEF"
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}
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],
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p>The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the <code>jose_jwa_pkcs1</code> module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. <code>eme_pkcs1_decode/2</code> returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid <code>PKCS#1</code> v1.5 padding (a leading <code>0x00 0x02</code>, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a <code>0x00</code> separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and <code>rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2</code> additionally returns <code>{error, {badsize, _}}</code> when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in <code>dp/2</code> is a raw, non-blinded <code>crypto:mod_pow/3</code>, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.</p>\n<p>An unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls <code>decrypt_private/3</code> with <code>rsa_pkcs1_padding</code>) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.</p>\n<p>This issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the `jose_jwa_pkcs1` module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. `eme_pkcs1_decode/2` returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid `PKCS#1` v1.5 padding (a leading `0x00 0x02`, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a `0x00` separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and `rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2` additionally returns `{error, {badsize, _}}` when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in `dp/2` is a raw, non-blinded `crypto:mod_pow/3`, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls `decrypt_private/3` with `rsa_pkcs1_padding`) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13."
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}
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],
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"value": "The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13."
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}
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],
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"impacts": [
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{
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"capecId": "CAPEC-463",
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "CAPEC-463 Padding Oracle Crypto Attack"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"metrics": [
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{
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"cvssV4_0": {
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"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"attackComplexity": "LOW",
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"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
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"attackVector": "LOCAL",
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"baseScore": 5.9,
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"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
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"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
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"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
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"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
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"userInteraction": "NONE",
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"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
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"version": "4.0",
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"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
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"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
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"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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},
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"format": "CVSS",
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"scenarios": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "GENERAL"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"problemTypes": [
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{
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"cweId": "CWE-203",
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"description": "CWE-203 Observable Discrepancy",
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "CWE"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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"shortName": "EEF",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T19:53:05.620Z"
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},
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"references": [
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{
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"tags": [
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"vendor-advisory",
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvr-f994-6j9j"
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},
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{
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"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-65626",
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"tags": [
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65626.html"
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},
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{
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"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-65626",
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"tags": [
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65626"
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},
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{
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"name": "Introducing commit 853c5d4 in potatosalad/erlang-jose",
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"tags": [
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8"
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},
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{
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"name": "Fix commit 0eac8ce in potatosalad/erlang-jose",
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"tags": [
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"patch"
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],
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"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d"
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}
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],
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"source": {
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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},
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"title": "Bleichenbacher padding oracle in RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in jose"
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},
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"adp": [
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{
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"metrics": [
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{
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"other": {
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"type": "ssvc",
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"content": {
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"id": "CVE-2026-65626",
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"role": "CISA Coordinator",
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"options": [
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{
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"Exploitation": "none"
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},
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{
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"Automatable": "no"
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},
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{
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"Technical Impact": "partial"
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}
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],
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"version": "2.0.3",
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"timestamp": "2026-11-02T18:37:15.733304Z"
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}
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}
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}
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],
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"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
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"shortName": "CISA-ADP",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T19:43:05.115Z"
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}
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}
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]
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}
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} |