280 lines
14 KiB
JSON
280 lines
14 KiB
JSON
{
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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"dataVersion": "5.2",
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"cveMetadata": {
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-53425",
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"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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"state": "PUBLISHED",
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"assignerShortName": "EEF",
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"dateReserved": "2026-06-09T11:01:47.529Z",
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"datePublished": "2026-08-20T17:26:35.537Z",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T19:50:34.320Z"
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},
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"containers": {
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"cna": {
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"affected": [
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{
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"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
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"cpes": [
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"cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"modules": [
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"'Elixir.Samly.SPHandler'"
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],
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"packageName": "samly",
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"packageURL": "pkg:hex/samly",
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"product": "samly",
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"programFiles": [
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"lib/samly/sp_handler.ex"
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],
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"programRoutines": [
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{
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"name": "'Elixir.Samly.SPHandler':consume_signin_response/1"
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}
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],
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"repo": "https://github.com/dropbox/samly",
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"vendor": "dropbox",
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"versions": [
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{
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"lessThan": "*",
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "0.3.0",
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"versionType": "semver"
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
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"cpes": [
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"cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"modules": [
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"'Elixir.Samly.SPHandler'"
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],
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"packageName": "dropbox/samly",
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"packageURL": "pkg:github/dropbox/samly",
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"product": "samly",
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"programFiles": [
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"lib/samly/sp_handler.ex"
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],
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"programRoutines": [
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{
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"name": "'Elixir.Samly.SPHandler':consume_signin_response/1"
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}
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],
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"repo": "https://github.com/dropbox/samly",
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"vendor": "dropbox",
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"versions": [
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{
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"lessThan": "*",
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c",
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"versionType": "git"
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
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"cpes": [
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"cpe:2.3:a:handnot2:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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"modules": [
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"'Elixir.Samly.SPHandler'"
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],
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"packageName": "handnot2/samly",
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"packageURL": "pkg:github/handnot2/samly",
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"product": "samly",
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"programFiles": [
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"lib/samly/sp_handler.ex"
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],
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"programRoutines": [
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{
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"name": "'Elixir.Samly.SPHandler':consume_signin_response/1"
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}
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],
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"repo": "https://github.com/handnot2/samly",
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"vendor": "handnot2",
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"versions": [
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{
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"lessThan": "*",
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c",
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"versionType": "git"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"cpeApplicability": [
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{
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"nodes": [
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{
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"cpeMatch": [
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{
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"versionStartIncluding": "0.3.0",
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"vulnerable": true
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},
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{
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:handnot2:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"versionStartIncluding": "0.3.0",
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"vulnerable": true
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}
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],
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"negate": false,
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"operator": "OR"
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}
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],
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"operator": "AND"
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}
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],
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"credits": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "reporter",
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"value": "Mark Madsen"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "coordinator",
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"value": "Jonatan Männchen / EEF"
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}
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],
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/html",
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"value": "<p>Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.</p>\n<p><code>Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3</code> in <code>lib/samly/sp_handler.ex</code> validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the <code>RelayState</code> value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares <code>SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo</code> against the ID of the <code>AuthnRequest</code> the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose <code>InResponseTo</code> does not match a request it made. The underlying <code>esaml</code> library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects <code>InResponseTo</code>, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a <code>RelayState</code> matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.</p>\n<p>This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.</p>"
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},
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{
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"base64": false,
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"type": "text/markdown",
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"value": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.\n\n`Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3` in `lib/samly/sp_handler.ex` validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the `RelayState` value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares `SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo` against the ID of the `AuthnRequest` the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose `InResponseTo` does not match a request it made. The underlying `esaml` library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects `InResponseTo`, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a `RelayState` matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.\n\nThis issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward."
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}
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],
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"value": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.\n\nSamly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.\n\nThis issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward."
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}
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],
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"impacts": [
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{
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"capecId": "CAPEC-62",
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "CAPEC-62 Cross Site Request Forgery"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"metrics": [
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{
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"cvssV4_0": {
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"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"attackComplexity": "LOW",
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"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
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"baseScore": 7.6,
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"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
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"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
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"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
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"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
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"userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
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"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
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"version": "4.0",
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"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
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"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
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"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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},
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"format": "CVSS",
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"scenarios": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "GENERAL"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"problemTypes": [
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{
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"cweId": "CWE-345",
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"description": "CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity",
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "CWE"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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"shortName": "EEF",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-08-20T18:38:13.727Z"
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},
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"references": [
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{
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"tags": [
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"related",
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"third-party-advisory"
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],
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"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-53425.html"
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},
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{
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"tags": [
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"related"
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],
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"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-53425"
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}
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],
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"source": {
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"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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},
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"title": "Missing InResponseTo validation in Samly allows acceptance of unsolicited SAML responses"
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},
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"adp": [
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{
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"metrics": [
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{
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"other": {
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"type": "ssvc",
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"content": {
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"timestamp": "2026-08-21T19:50:24.245049Z",
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"id": "CVE-2026-53425",
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"options": [
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{
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"Exploitation": "none"
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},
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{
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"Automatable": "no"
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},
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{
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"Technical Impact": "total"
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}
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],
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"role": "CISA Coordinator",
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"version": "2.0.3"
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}
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}
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}
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],
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"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
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"shortName": "CISA-ADP",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T19:50:34.320Z"
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}
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}
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]
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}
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} |