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vuln-cve/data/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48100.json
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{
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"cveMetadata": {
"cveId": "CVE-2026-48100",
"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"dateReserved": "2026-05-20T18:40:45.835Z",
"datePublished": "2026-09-28T16:43:06.401Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-28T17:27:18.467Z"
},
"containers": {
"cna": {
"title": "Payy: agg_agg trailing message slots are unconstrained and allow forged burn messages",
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-349",
"lang": "en",
"description": "CWE-349: Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 8.7,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0"
}
}
],
"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/polybase/payy/security/advisories/GHSA-fhxc-63vg-9gwr",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/polybase/payy/security/advisories/GHSA-fhxc-63vg-9gwr"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"vendor": "polybase",
"product": "payy",
"versions": [
{
"version": "< 1.3.0",
"status": "affected"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"shortName": "GitHub_M",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-28T16:43:06.401Z"
},
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Payy is an Ethereum L2 zk-rollup for privacy preserving and regulatory compliant transactions. Prior to version 1.3.0, agg_agg forwards the compacted message stream from its inner proofs into a public messages: [Field; 1000] array, but it never checks that the unused tail of the outer array is zero. A registered prover can build a valid agg_final proof for an approved rollup block while inserting an extra burn message after the real messages. RollupV1.verifyRollup() then parses that public input as a normal burn and transfers USDC from the rollup contract to the attacker. This is a severe circuit soundness failure: the proof system accepts a public statement whose messages array is not fully derived from the verified inner proofs. On the current deployment, verifyRollup() is restricted to the existing allowlisted prover, so a fresh public caller cannot submit the invalid proof directly. That gate limits who can reach L1 today; it does not make the circuit statement sound. The issue becomes permissionless under the prover model described in the Payy whitepaper. Section 3.3.2 states: \"To join as a prover, the prover is required to submit a small stake\", and Section 3.3.1 states that if a prover fails to submit, \"other nodes can submit the block proof instead.\" In that model, an attacker only needs to become a registered prover and use public validator approval data for an already approved block. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0."
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-fhxc-63vg-9gwr",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
}
},
"adp": [
{
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/polybase/payy/security/advisories/GHSA-fhxc-63vg-9gwr",
"tags": [
"exploit"
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"type": "ssvc",
"content": {
"timestamp": "2026-09-28T17:20:42.562536Z",
"id": "CVE-2026-48100",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
}
],
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-28T17:27:18.467Z"
}
}
]
}
}