416 lines
22 KiB
JSON
416 lines
22 KiB
JSON
{
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"value": "<p>For the <code>ssl</code> application, OCSP stapling must be enabled by setting the <code>stapling</code> option to <code>staple</code> in the TLS client options. OCSP stapling is not enabled by default.</p>\n<p>Applications calling <code>public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5</code> directly are unconditionally affected when that function is used.</p>"
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"value": "For the `ssl` application, OCSP stapling must be enabled by setting the `stapling` option to `staple` in the TLS client options. OCSP stapling is not enabled by default.\n\nApplications calling `public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5` directly are unconditionally affected when that function is used."
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"value": "For the ssl application, OCSP stapling must be enabled by setting the stapling option to staple in the TLS client options. OCSP stapling is not enabled by default.\n\nApplications calling public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 directly are unconditionally affected when that function is used."
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"credits": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "remediation developer",
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"value": "Jakub Witczak"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"type": "remediation reviewer",
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"value": "Ingela Anderton Andin"
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"value": "<p>Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP <code>public_key</code> (<code>pubkey_ocsp</code> module) allows forged OCSP responses signed with an expired responder certificate to be accepted as valid.</p>\n<p>OCSP response verification in <code>pubkey_ocsp:verify_response/5</code> and <code>pubkey_ocsp:is_authorized_responder/3</code> in <code>lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ocsp.erl</code> does not check the validity period (<code>notBefore</code>/<code>notAfter</code>) of the OCSP responder certificate. An attacker who has obtained the private key of an expired CA-designated OCSP responder certificate can forge OCSP responses that Erlang/OTP accepts as valid.</p>\n<p>This affects TLS clients using OCSP stapling via the <code>ssl</code> application: a malicious or compromised server can present a revoked TLS certificate together with a forged OCSP response signed by an expired responder key, and the client will accept the revoked certificate as valid. It also affects applications calling <code>public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5</code> directly, where the impact depends on the use case — server-side client certificate validation using this API may allow authentication bypass with a revoked client certificate.</p>\n<p>This issue affects OTP from OTP 27.0 before OTP 27.3.4.12, OTP 28.5.0.1, and OTP 29.0.1, corresponding to public_key from 1.16 before 1.17.1.3, 1.20.3.1, and 1.21.1.</p>"
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"value": "Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP `public_key` (`pubkey_ocsp` module) allows forged OCSP responses signed with an expired responder certificate to be accepted as valid.\n\nOCSP response verification in `pubkey_ocsp:verify_response/5` and `pubkey_ocsp:is_authorized_responder/3` in `lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ocsp.erl` does not check the validity period (`notBefore`/`notAfter`) of the OCSP responder certificate. An attacker who has obtained the private key of an expired CA-designated OCSP responder certificate can forge OCSP responses that Erlang/OTP accepts as valid.\n\nThis affects TLS clients using OCSP stapling via the `ssl` application: a malicious or compromised server can present a revoked TLS certificate together with a forged OCSP response signed by an expired responder key, and the client will accept the revoked certificate as valid. It also affects applications calling `public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5` directly, where the impact depends on the use case — server-side client certificate validation using this API may allow authentication bypass with a revoked client certificate.\n\nThis issue affects OTP from OTP 27.0 before OTP 27.3.4.12, OTP 28.5.0.1, and OTP 29.0.1, corresponding to public_key from 1.16 before 1.17.1.3, 1.20.3.1, and 1.21.1."
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"capecId": "CAPEC-475",
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"lang": "en",
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"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
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"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
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"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
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},
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"format": "CVSS",
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "GENERAL"
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"cweId": "CWE-295",
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"description": "CWE-295 Improper Certificate Validation",
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"type": "CWE"
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}
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"descriptions": [
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"cweId": "CWE-672",
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"description": "CWE-672 Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release",
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},
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"references": [
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{
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"name": "OCSP Responder Certificate Accepted After Expiry in public_key",
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"url": "https://github.com/erlang/otp/security/advisories/GHSA-cjxj-wj6x-3fff"
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"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-42791.html"
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"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-42791",
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"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-42791"
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"name": "Fix commit b3870e0 in erlang/otp",
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"url": "https://github.com/erlang/otp/commit/b3870e02405c709a872b01ba6086065620cdfe76"
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"discovery": "INTERNAL"
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"value": "* For TLS clients using the ssl application, disable OCSP stapling by setting {stapling, no_staple} in the client options, or switch to CRL-based revocation checking with {crl_check, true}.\n* For applications calling public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 directly, validate the responder certificate's validity period in application code before calling the function."
|
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|
||
"id": "CVE-2026-42791",
|
||
"options": [
|
||
{
|
||
"Exploitation": "none"
|
||
},
|
||
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|
||
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|
||
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|
||
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|
||
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