194 lines
10 KiB
JSON
194 lines
10 KiB
JSON
{
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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"dataVersion": "5.2",
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"cveMetadata": {
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-17347",
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"assignerOrgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007",
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"state": "PUBLISHED",
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"assignerShortName": "PostgreSQL",
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"dateReserved": "2026-07-25T02:52:54.844Z",
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"datePublished": "2026-07-31T15:59:16.588Z",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-08-01T03:56:12.755Z"
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},
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"containers": {
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"cna": {
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007",
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"shortName": "PostgreSQL",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-07-31T15:59:16.588Z"
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},
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"title": "pgAdmin 4: OS command injection in MASTER_PASSWORD_HOOK via untrusted username substitution",
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"affected": [
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{
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"vendor": "pgadmin.org",
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"product": "pgAdmin 4",
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"repo": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4",
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"modules": [
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"Master Password Hook"
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],
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"programFiles": [
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"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/utils/master_password.py",
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"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/config.py"
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],
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"versions": [
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{
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "7.2",
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"lessThan": "9.17",
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"versionType": "custom"
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}
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
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}
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],
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "The MASTER_PASSWORD_HOOK setting, introduced in pgAdmin 4 7.2, lets an administrator configure an external command that returns a per-user encryption key, with %u in the configured string replaced by the current user's name. The previous implementation substituted the username directly into the command string and executed the result with subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True). Because the username can originate from an external authentication source (OAuth/OIDC claims, Kerberos, webserver auth) rather than a value pgAdmin fully controls, a username containing shell metacharacters (';', '$()', backticks, pipes, '&&', newlines) allowed an authenticated user to execute arbitrary commands as the pgAdmin service account in any deployment where the configured hook string uses %u.\n\nFix tokenises the trusted, administrator-configured hook string into an argument vector first (using shlex in POSIX-quoting mode, with backslash-escaping disabled so Windows-style paths are not mis-parsed), substitutes the untrusted username into the individual argv elements, and executes with shell=False. The username is therefore always confined to a single argv element; any shell metacharacters it contains are inert. Administrators whose MASTER_PASSWORD_HOOK previously relied on shell features (pipes, redirection, environment-variable expansion, globbing) within the hook string itself must move that logic into the invoked script, since it is no longer interpreted by a shell.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 7.2 before 9.17."
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10191",
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"tags": [
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"issue-tracking"
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]
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},
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/ea7e798aac27174d2bacee1d6e136bed76a95e23",
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"tags": [
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"patch"
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]
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},
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/e7a85767314e7b0fe0b35fe80b9c1af38f48dff6",
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"tags": [
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"patch"
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]
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}
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],
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"metrics": [
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{
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"format": "CVSS",
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"scenarios": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "Threat model (per reporter's submitted rating): an authenticated pgAdmin user whose username is sourced from an external identity provider (OAuth/OIDC, Kerberos, or webserver auth passed through to pgAdmin) in a deployment where MASTER_PASSWORD_HOOK's configured string contains %u. Attack Complexity is High because exploitation depends on this non-default configuration (hook enabled with %u, combined with an external-auth username source under attacker influence) rather than being reachable in a default deployment. Scope is Unchanged: the resulting command execution runs as the pgAdmin service account, which is the same security authority the web application process itself already runs under -- it is a consequence of pgAdmin's own process, not a boundary crossing into an unrelated authority. Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability are High because arbitrary command execution as that account can read, modify, or destroy anything the account can reach."
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}
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],
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"cvssV3_1": {
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"version": "3.1",
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
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"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
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"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
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"userInteraction": "NONE",
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"scope": "UNCHANGED",
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"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
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"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
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"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
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"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
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"baseScore": 7.5,
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"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
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}
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},
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{
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"format": "CVSS",
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"scenarios": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "Same reasoning as the CVSS 3.1 entry: authenticated low-privilege user with an externally-sourced username triggers arbitrary OS command execution as the pgAdmin service account, contingent on the non-default MASTER_PASSWORD_HOOK/%u configuration (AT:N here refers to no additional authentication target beyond the login itself; the configuration dependency is captured via AC:H in the 3.1 vector and is implicit in this scenario). VC:H/VI:H/VA:H for the service account's own reach; SC:N/SI:N/SA:N since that reach is the application's own process authority, not a distinct subsequent system."
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}
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],
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"cvssV4_0": {
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"version": "4.0",
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"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
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"baseScore": 7.7,
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"baseSeverity": "HIGH"
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}
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}
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],
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"problemTypes": [
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{
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"description": "CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')",
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"cweId": "CWE-78",
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"type": "CWE"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"description": "CWE-88 Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')",
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"cweId": "CWE-88",
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"type": "CWE"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"credits": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "Thiago Pereira (@B1gN0Se)",
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"type": "finder"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "Dave Page <page@pgadmin.org>",
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"type": "remediation developer"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "Ashesh Vashi <ashesh.vashi@enterprisedb.com>",
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"type": "remediation developer"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "Ashesh Vashi <ashesh.vashi@enterprisedb.com>",
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"type": "remediation reviewer"
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},
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "Kundan Sable <kundan.sable@enterprisedb.com>",
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"type": "remediation reviewer"
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}
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],
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"source": {
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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}
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},
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"adp": [
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{
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"metrics": [
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{
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"other": {
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"type": "ssvc",
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"content": {
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"timestamp": "2026-07-31T00:00:00+00:00",
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"options": [
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{
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"Exploitation": "none"
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},
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{
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"Automatable": "no"
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},
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{
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"Technical Impact": "total"
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}
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],
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"role": "CISA Coordinator",
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"version": "2.0.3",
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"id": "CVE-2026-17347"
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}
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}
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}
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],
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"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
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"shortName": "CISA-ADP",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-08-01T03:56:12.755Z"
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}
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}
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]
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}
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} |