179 lines
10 KiB
JSON
179 lines
10 KiB
JSON
{
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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"dataVersion": "5.2",
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"cveMetadata": {
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-14535",
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"assignerOrgId": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082",
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"state": "PUBLISHED",
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"assignerShortName": "BombadilSystems",
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"dateReserved": "2026-07-03T00:02:55.918Z",
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"datePublished": "2026-07-04T13:31:14.937Z",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-07-06T14:58:34.718Z"
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},
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"containers": {
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"cna": {
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082",
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"shortName": "BombadilSystems",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-07-04T13:31:14.937Z"
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},
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"title": "Fickling MLAllowlist analysis pass rendered inoperative by shared mutable state in AnalysisContext.shorten_code()",
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"datePublic": "2026-06-28T00:08:00.000Z",
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"problemTypes": [
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{
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"cweId": "CWE-693",
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"description": "CWE-693 Protection Mechanism Failure",
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"type": "CWE"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"impacts": [
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{
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "An attacker can craft a malicious pickle file that imports any standard library module not in fickling's UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist. Because the MLAllowlist check is silently skipped due to shared state pollution from UnsafeImportsML, fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. When used with fickling.load(), the payload is deserialized and arbitrary code executes in the victim's environment. This is distinct from denylist incompleteness (CWE-184) because the allowlist mechanism was specifically designed to catch imports that the denylist misses, and a code defect renders it entirely inoperative."
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"vendor": "trailofbits",
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"product": "fickling",
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"collectionURL": "https://pypi.org/project/fickling/",
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"packageName": "fickling",
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"versions": [
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{
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"status": "affected",
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"version": "0",
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"lessThanOrEqual": "0.1.11",
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"versionType": "custom"
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},
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{
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"status": "unaffected",
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"version": "0.1.12",
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"versionType": "custom"
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}
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],
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"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
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}
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],
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"descriptions": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports — it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes — UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist's deduplication logic.",
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"supportingMedia": [
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{
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"type": "text/html",
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"base64": false,
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"value": "<p>In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports — it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes — UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist's deduplication logic.</p>"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429",
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"name": "GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429"
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},
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/278",
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"name": "Fix PR #278 — Split shorten_code() formatting from dedup tracking, make MLAllowlist opt-in"
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},
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/41ce7cb01edd97072994039574a2301ebb3f463d",
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"name": "Fix commit 41ce7cb (squash merge of PR #278)"
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},
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/releases/tag/v0.1.12",
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"name": "Fickling v0.1.12 release"
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}
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],
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"metrics": [
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{
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"format": "CVSS",
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"scenarios": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "GENERAL"
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}
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],
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"cvssV3_1": {
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"version": "3.1",
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
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"attackComplexity": "LOW",
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"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
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"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
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"scope": "UNCHANGED",
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"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
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"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
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"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
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"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
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"baseScore": 8.8,
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"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
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}
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}
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],
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"credits": [
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{
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "Christopher Aziz (Bombadil Systems LLC)",
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"type": "finder"
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}
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],
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"source": {
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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},
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"x_generator": {
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"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.2"
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}
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},
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"adp": [
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{
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"references": [
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429",
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"tags": [
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"exploit"
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]
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}
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],
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"metrics": [
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{
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"other": {
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"type": "ssvc",
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"content": {
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"timestamp": "2026-07-06T14:58:30.612222Z",
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"id": "CVE-2026-14535",
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"options": [
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{
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"Exploitation": "poc"
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},
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{
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"Automatable": "no"
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},
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{
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"Technical Impact": "total"
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}
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],
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"role": "CISA Coordinator",
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"version": "2.0.3"
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}
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}
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}
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],
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"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
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"shortName": "CISA-ADP",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-07-06T14:58:34.718Z"
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}
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}
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]
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}
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} |