Files
vuln-cve/data/2023/54xxx/CVE-2023-54060.json
T

138 lines
11 KiB
JSON

{
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"cveMetadata": {
"cveId": "CVE-2023-54060",
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"dateReserved": "2025-12-24T12:21:05.091Z",
"datePublished": "2025-12-24T12:23:07.276Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T09:16:49.139Z"
},
"containers": {
"cna": {
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T09:16:49.139Z"
},
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommufd: Set end correctly when doing batch carry\n\nEven though the test suite covers this it somehow became obscured that\nthis wasn't working.\n\nThe test iommufd_ioas.mock_domain.access_domain_destory would blow up\nrarely.\n\nend should be set to 1 because this just pushed an item, the carry, to the\npfns list.\n\nSometimes the test would blow up with:\n\n BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000\n #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n PGD 0 P4D 0\n Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP\n CPU: 5 PID: 584 Comm: iommufd Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-dirty #1236\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\n RIP: 0010:batch_unpin+0xa2/0x100 [iommufd]\n Code: 17 48 81 fe ff ff 07 00 77 70 48 8b 15 b7 be 97 e2 48 85 d2 74 14 48 8b 14 fa 48 85 d2 74 0b 40 0f b6 f6 48 c1 e6 04 48 01 f2 <48> 8b 3a 48 c1 e0 06 89 ca 48 89 de 48 83 e7 f0 48 01 c7 e8 96 dc\n RSP: 0018:ffffc90001677a58 EFLAGS: 00010246\n RAX: 00007f7e2646f000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001\n RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fefc4c8d RDI: 0000000000fefc4c\n RBP: ffffc90001677a80 R08: 0000000000000048 R09: 0000000000000200\n R10: 0000000000030b98 R11: ffffffff81f3bb40 R12: 0000000000000001\n R13: ffff888101f75800 R14: ffffc90001677ad0 R15: 00000000000001fe\n FS: 00007f9323679740(0000) GS:ffff8881ba540000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000105ede003 CR4: 00000000003706a0\n DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n Call Trace:\n <TASK>\n ? show_regs+0x5c/0x70\n ? __die+0x1f/0x60\n ? page_fault_oops+0x15d/0x440\n ? lock_release+0xbc/0x240\n ? exc_page_fault+0x4a4/0x970\n ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30\n ? batch_unpin+0xa2/0x100 [iommufd]\n ? batch_unpin+0xba/0x100 [iommufd]\n __iopt_area_unfill_domain+0x198/0x430 [iommufd]\n ? __mutex_lock+0x8c/0xb80\n ? __mutex_lock+0x6aa/0xb80\n ? xa_erase+0x28/0x30\n ? iopt_table_remove_domain+0x162/0x320 [iommufd]\n ? lock_release+0xbc/0x240\n iopt_area_unfill_domain+0xd/0x10 [iommufd]\n iopt_table_remove_domain+0x195/0x320 [iommufd]\n iommufd_hw_pagetable_destroy+0xb3/0x110 [iommufd]\n iommufd_object_destroy_user+0x8e/0xf0 [iommufd]\n iommufd_device_detach+0xc5/0x140 [iommufd]\n iommufd_selftest_destroy+0x1f/0x70 [iommufd]\n iommufd_object_destroy_user+0x8e/0xf0 [iommufd]\n iommufd_destroy+0x3a/0x50 [iommufd]\n iommufd_fops_ioctl+0xfb/0x170 [iommufd]\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x40d/0x9a0\n do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0"
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"version": "3.1",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - The vulnerable code is reached through ioctls on the /dev/iommu (or /dev/vfio/vfio compat) character device — IOMMU_IOAS_MAP/COPY/UNMAP and object destroy paths, as shown by the `__x64_sys_ioctl -> iommufd_fops_ioctl` call trace. No network or physical access is involved.\nAC:L - The attacker fully controls every precondition: hugepage-backed source memory for the contiguous PFN run, the overlapping area layout via IOMMU_IOAS_COPY, and the exact unmap offset that lands the hole/used boundary mid-run. Once the layout is arranged the `end=0` desynchronization and the resulting over-walk in batch_unpin() are deterministic; only the severity of the resulting garbage varies.\nPR:L - iommufd_fops_open() and the ioctl dispatcher perform no capability check whatsoever — access is gated only by permissions on /dev/iommu, which are routinely granted to unprivileged service accounts (qemu/libvirt for device passthrough, DPDK/SPDK users). An unprivileged local user with that device access can drive the entire path.\nUI:N - The full sequence — map, copy, attach, unmap/destroy — is performed by the attacker's own process with no victim action required.\nS:C - This breaks the invariant the code explicitly documents (\"For security we must not unpin something that is still DMA mapped\"): pages still mapped into a live IOMMU domain get their refcount dropped, so they can be freed and reallocated while an assigned device — programmed by a guest VM or by VFIO userspace — retains DMA access to them. That is an IOMMU/DMA boundary bypass reaching resources beyond iommufd's security authority.\nC:H - batch_unpin() walks past `end` with no bound check, reading adjacent kernel stack (the on-stack `u64 backup[32]` array) as PFNs, and the resulting refcount underflow frees pages that remain IOMMU-mapped and are then reallocated to arbitrary consumers — giving a device or attacker read access to reused kernel/user memory.\nI:H - The over-walk performs unpin_user_page_range_dirty_lock() and set_page_dirty on attacker-influenced wild struct page pointers, yielding an arbitrary refcount-decrement primitive plus premature page free (use-after-free) — a well-known route to heap grooming, arbitrary write and privilege escalation. The inflated index also drives iommu_unmap() over IOVA ranges beyond the intended area.\nA:H - The commit message documents a reproducible NULL pointer dereference oops in batch_unpin+0xa2 during iommufd_hw_pagetable_destroy, on a non-failable destroy path that holds pages->mutex, so the crash also wedges other iommufd users. Any use-after-free from the refcount underflow crashes the kernel as well."
}
]
}
],
"affected": [
{
"product": "Linux",
"vendor": "Linux",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/iommu/iommufd/pages.c"
],
"versions": [
{
"version": "f394576eb11dbcd3a740fa41e577b97f0720d26e",
"lessThan": "176f36a376c417b58d19f79edfce20db9317eaa2",
"status": "affected",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"version": "f394576eb11dbcd3a740fa41e577b97f0720d26e",
"lessThan": "b7c822fa6b7701b17e139f1c562fc24135880ed4",
"status": "affected",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"product": "Linux",
"vendor": "Linux",
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/iommu/iommufd/pages.c"
],
"versions": [
{
"version": "6.2",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "6.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"version": "6.4.8",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.4.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"version": "6.5",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"operator": "OR",
"negate": false,
"cpeMatch": [
{
"vulnerable": true,
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.2",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.4.8"
},
{
"vulnerable": true,
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.2",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.5"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/176f36a376c417b58d19f79edfce20db9317eaa2"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7c822fa6b7701b17e139f1c562fc24135880ed4"
}
],
"title": "iommufd: Set end correctly when doing batch carry",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
}
}