From 7682963d011acd953ea0a88787f1ffb2a0d3c861 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vulnerability Bot Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 04:34:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] CVE sync 2026-11-17T03:34:16Z --- data/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107901.json | 108 ++++++++ data/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107902.json | 108 ++++++++ data/2026/125xxx/CVE-2026-125275.json | 382 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ data/2026/18xxx/CVE-2026-18909.json | 6 +- data/delta.json | 18 +- data/deltaLog.json | 76 +++-- state/sync.json | 6 +- 7 files changed, 664 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) create mode 100644 data/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107901.json create mode 100644 data/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107902.json create mode 100644 data/2026/125xxx/CVE-2026-125275.json diff --git a/data/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107901.json b/data/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107901.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..45a7ed61d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107901.json @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +{ + "dataType": "CVE_RECORD", + "dataVersion": "5.2", + "cveMetadata": { + "cveId": "CVE-2026-107901", + "assignerOrgId": "ede6fdc4-6654-4307-a26d-3331c018e2ce", + "state": "PUBLISHED", + "assignerShortName": "jpcert", + "dateReserved": "2026-10-09T04:40:01.710Z", + "datePublished": "2026-11-17T03:13:08.845Z", + "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T03:13:08.845Z" + }, + "containers": { + "cna": { + "affected": [ + { + "vendor": "FUJI ELECTRIC CO., LTD. / Hakko Electronics Co., Ltd.", + "product": "TELLUS", + "defaultStatus": "unaffected", + "versions": [ + { + "version": "0", + "status": "affected", + "versionType": "semver", + "lessThanOrEqual": "5.0.5.0" + } + ] + }, + { + "vendor": "FUJI ELECTRIC CO., LTD. / Hakko Electronics Co., Ltd.", + "product": "TELLUS Lite", + "defaultStatus": "unaffected", + "versions": [ + { + "version": "0", + "status": "affected", + "versionType": "semver", + "lessThanOrEqual": "5.0.5.0" + } + ] + } + ], + "descriptions": [ + { + "lang": "en", + "value": "TELLUS and TELLUS Lite provided by FUJI ELECTRIC CO., LTD. contain an out-of-bounds read vulnerability. Opening a specially crafted V9 file may lead to information exposure or arbitrary code execution on the affected product." + } + ], + "problemTypes": [ + { + "descriptions": [ + { + "description": "Out-of-bounds Read", + "lang": "en-US", + "cweId": "CWE-125", + "type": "CWE" + } + ] + } + ], + "references": [ + { + "url": "https://felib.fujielectric.co.jp/en/M10010/M20060/document_detail/2b7226a3-28e2-4148-8ce3-d4867c767827?region=en-glb" + }, + { + "url": "https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU97628215/" + } + ], + "metrics": [ + { + "format": "CVSS", + "scenarios": [ + { + "lang": "en-US", + "value": "GENERAL" + } + ], + "cvssV3_1": { + "version": "3.1", + "baseSeverity": "HIGH", + "baseScore": 7.1, + "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H" + } + }, + { + "format": "CVSS", + "scenarios": [ + { + "lang": "en-US", + "value": "GENERAL" + } + ], + "cvssV4_0": { + "version": "4.0", + "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", + "baseScore": 6.8, + "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N" + } + } + ], + "providerMetadata": { + "orgId": "ede6fdc4-6654-4307-a26d-3331c018e2ce", + "shortName": "jpcert", + "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T03:13:08.845Z" + } + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107902.json b/data/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107902.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cfb4527040 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107902.json @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +{ + "dataType": "CVE_RECORD", + "dataVersion": "5.2", + "cveMetadata": { + "cveId": "CVE-2026-107902", + "assignerOrgId": "ede6fdc4-6654-4307-a26d-3331c018e2ce", + "state": "PUBLISHED", + "assignerShortName": "jpcert", + "dateReserved": "2026-10-09T04:40:01.710Z", + "datePublished": "2026-11-17T03:13:20.443Z", + "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T03:13:20.443Z" + }, + "containers": { + "cna": { + "affected": [ + { + "vendor": "FUJI ELECTRIC CO., LTD. / Hakko Electronics Co., Ltd.", + "product": "TELLUS", + "defaultStatus": "unaffected", + "versions": [ + { + "version": "0", + "status": "affected", + "versionType": "semver", + "lessThanOrEqual": "5.0.5.0" + } + ] + }, + { + "vendor": "FUJI ELECTRIC CO., LTD. / Hakko Electronics Co., Ltd.", + "product": "TELLUS Lite", + "defaultStatus": "unaffected", + "versions": [ + { + "version": "0", + "status": "affected", + "versionType": "semver", + "lessThanOrEqual": "5.0.5.0" + } + ] + } + ], + "descriptions": [ + { + "lang": "en", + "value": "TELLUS and TELLUS Lite provided by FUJI ELECTRIC CO., LTD. contain a use after free vulnerability. Opening a specially crafted V9 file may lead to information exposure or arbitrary code execution on the affected product." + } + ], + "problemTypes": [ + { + "descriptions": [ + { + "description": "Use after free", + "lang": "en-US", + "cweId": "CWE-416", + "type": "CWE" + } + ] + } + ], + "references": [ + { + "url": "https://felib.fujielectric.co.jp/en/M10010/M20060/document_detail/2b7226a3-28e2-4148-8ce3-d4867c767827?region=en-glb" + }, + { + "url": "https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU97628215/" + } + ], + "metrics": [ + { + "format": "CVSS", + "scenarios": [ + { + "lang": "en-US", + "value": "GENERAL" + } + ], + "cvssV3_1": { + "version": "3.1", + "baseSeverity": "HIGH", + "baseScore": 7.8, + "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H" + } + }, + { + "format": "CVSS", + "scenarios": [ + { + "lang": "en-US", + "value": "GENERAL" + } + ], + "cvssV4_0": { + "version": "4.0", + "baseSeverity": "HIGH", + "baseScore": 8.4, + "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N" + } + } + ], + "providerMetadata": { + "orgId": "ede6fdc4-6654-4307-a26d-3331c018e2ce", + "shortName": "jpcert", + "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T03:13:20.443Z" + } + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/2026/125xxx/CVE-2026-125275.json b/data/2026/125xxx/CVE-2026-125275.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..687e6a5838 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/2026/125xxx/CVE-2026-125275.json @@ -0,0 +1,382 @@ +{ + "dataType": "CVE_RECORD", + "dataVersion": "5.2", + "cveMetadata": { + "cveId": "CVE-2026-125275", + "assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", + "state": "PUBLISHED", + "assignerShortName": "EEF", + "dateReserved": "2026-11-11T12:24:30.285Z", + "datePublished": "2026-11-17T02:54:23.810Z", + "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T02:54:23.810Z" + }, + "containers": { + "cna": { + "affected": [ + { + "collectionURL": "https://ghcr.io", + "cpes": [ + "cpe:2.3:a:nerves-hub:nerves_hub_web:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*" + ], + "defaultStatus": "unaffected", + "modules": [ + "'Elixir.NervesHub.SSL'", + "'Elixir.NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification'" + ], + "packageName": "nerves-hub", + "packageURL": "pkg:oci/nerves-hub?repository_url=ghcr.io%2Fnerves-hub", + "product": "nerves_hub_web", + "programFiles": [ + "lib/nerves_hub/ssl.ex", + "lib/nerves_hub/device_link/peer_verification.ex" + ], + "programRoutines": [ + { + "name": "'Elixir.NervesHub.SSL':decide/2" + }, + { + "name": "'Elixir.NervesHub.SSL':verify_fun/3" + }, + { + "name": "'Elixir.NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification':verify_fun/3" + } + ], + "vendor": "nerves-hub", + "versions": [ + { + "lessThan": "2.5.4", + "status": "affected", + "version": "1.0.0", + "versionType": "other" + } + ] + }, + { + "cpes": [ + "cpe:2.3:a:nerves-hub:nerves_hub_web:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*" + ], + "defaultStatus": "unaffected", + "modules": [ + "'Elixir.NervesHub.SSL'", + "'Elixir.NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification'" + ], + "packageName": "nerves_hub", + "packageURL": "pkg:otp/nerves_hub?repository_url=https:%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fnerves-hub%2Fnerves_hub_web&vcs_url=git%20https:%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fnerves-hub%2Fnerves_hub_web.git", + "product": "nerves_hub_web", + "programFiles": [ + "lib/nerves_hub/ssl.ex", + "lib/nerves_hub/device_link/peer_verification.ex" + ], + "programRoutines": [ + { + "name": "'Elixir.NervesHub.SSL':decide/2" + }, + { + "name": "'Elixir.NervesHub.SSL':verify_fun/3" + }, + { + "name": "'Elixir.NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification':verify_fun/3" + } + ], + "repo": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web", + "vendor": "nerves-hub", + "versions": [ + { + "lessThan": "2.5.4", + "status": "affected", + "version": "1.0.0", + "versionType": "semver" + } + ] + }, + { + "collectionURL": "https://github.com", + "cpes": [ + "cpe:2.3:a:nerves-hub:nerves_hub_web:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*" + ], + "defaultStatus": "unaffected", + "modules": [ + "'Elixir.NervesHub.SSL'", + "'Elixir.NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification'" + ], + "packageName": "nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web", + "packageURL": "pkg:github/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web", + "product": "nerves_hub_web", + "programFiles": [ + "lib/nerves_hub/ssl.ex", + "lib/nerves_hub/device_link/peer_verification.ex" + ], + "programRoutines": [ + { + "name": "'Elixir.NervesHub.SSL':decide/2" + }, + { + "name": "'Elixir.NervesHub.SSL':verify_fun/3" + }, + { + "name": "'Elixir.NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification':verify_fun/3" + } + ], + "repo": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web", + "vendor": "nerves-hub", + "versions": [ + { + "lessThan": "064e78cc189dd9b87748746f44179632a52ddf58", + "status": "affected", + "version": "a49fb8875f3aab40062881028ef4e406d985aaa9", + "versionType": "git" + } + ] + } + ], + "configurations": [ + { + "lang": "en", + "supportingMedia": [ + { + "base64": false, + "type": "text/html", + "value": "

The certificate chain must end at a root in the device endpoint's trust store. With DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE unset, which is the default from 2.0.0, the trust store holds the public roots from CAStore. With DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE set to a bundle that holds a root which signs device certificates, any certificate from that root whose CA is not registered is sufficient, including the certificate of a deleted device.

\n

The retry in Erlang/OTP ssl was confirmed on Erlang/OTP 28.3, 29.0 and 29.1. Earlier releases were not checked.

" + }, + { + "base64": false, + "type": "text/markdown", + "value": "The certificate chain must end at a root in the device endpoint's trust store. With `DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE` unset, which is the default from 2.0.0, the trust store holds the public roots from CAStore. With `DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE` set to a bundle that holds a root which signs device certificates, any certificate from that root whose CA is not registered is sufficient, including the certificate of a deleted device.\n\nThe retry in Erlang/OTP `ssl` was confirmed on Erlang/OTP 28.3, 29.0 and 29.1. Earlier releases were not checked." + } + ], + "value": "The certificate chain must end at a root in the device endpoint's trust store. With DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE unset, which is the default from 2.0.0, the trust store holds the public roots from CAStore. With DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE set to a bundle that holds a root which signs device certificates, any certificate from that root whose CA is not registered is sufficient, including the certificate of a deleted device.\n\nThe retry in Erlang/OTP ssl was confirmed on Erlang/OTP 28.3, 29.0 and 29.1. Earlier releases were not checked." + } + ], + "cpeApplicability": [ + { + "nodes": [ + { + "cpeMatch": [ + { + "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:nerves-hub:nerves_hub_web:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", + "versionEndExcluding": "2.5.4", + "versionStartIncluding": "1.0.0", + "vulnerable": true + } + ], + "negate": false, + "operator": "OR" + } + ], + "operator": "AND" + } + ], + "credits": [ + { + "lang": "en", + "type": "finder", + "value": "deasthamgp" + }, + { + "lang": "en", + "type": "reporter", + "value": "deasthamgp" + }, + { + "lang": "en", + "type": "remediation developer", + "value": "Josh Kalderimis" + }, + { + "lang": "en", + "type": "coordinator", + "value": "Jonatan Männchen / EEF" + } + ], + "dateAssigned": "2026-11-16T02:22:38.000Z", + "descriptions": [ + { + "lang": "en", + "supportingMedia": [ + { + "base64": false, + "type": "text/html", + "value": "

Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknown_ca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.

\n

The device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once.

\n

This issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4.

" + }, + { + "base64": false, + "type": "text/markdown", + "value": "Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, `NervesHub.SSL.decide/2` refuses it with the reason `:unknown_ca`. Erlang/OTP `ssl` reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.\n\nThe device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless `DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE` is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once.\n\nThis issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4." + } + ], + "value": "Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknown_ca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.\n\nThe device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once.\n\nThis issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4." + } + ], + "impacts": [ + { + "capecId": "CAPEC-227", + "descriptions": [ + { + "lang": "en", + "supportingMedia": [ + { + "base64": false, + "type": "text/html", + "value": "

An unauthenticated client can leave a handshake process on a device node running and querying the database after it disconnects. Each further connection adds another such process, and they stop only when the node restarts. Devices and users of the instance lose service while the nodes and the database are saturated.

" + }, + { + "base64": false, + "type": "text/markdown", + "value": "An unauthenticated client can leave a handshake process on a device node running and querying the database after it disconnects. Each further connection adds another such process, and they stop only when the node restarts. Devices and users of the instance lose service while the nodes and the database are saturated." + } + ], + "value": "An unauthenticated client can leave a handshake process on a device node running and querying the database after it disconnects. Each further connection adds another such process, and they stop only when the node restarts. Devices and users of the instance lose service while the nodes and the database are saturated." + } + ] + } + ], + "metrics": [ + { + "cvssV4_0": { + "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", + "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", + "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", + "attackComplexity": "LOW", + "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", + "attackVector": "NETWORK", + "baseScore": 8.2, + "baseSeverity": "HIGH", + "privilegesRequired": "NONE", + "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", + "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", + "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", + "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", + "userInteraction": "NONE", + "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", + "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N", + "version": "4.0", + "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH", + "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", + "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", + "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED" + }, + "format": "CVSS", + "scenarios": [ + { + "lang": "en", + "value": "GENERAL" + } + ] + } + ], + "problemTypes": [ + { + "descriptions": [ + { + "cweId": "CWE-835", + "description": "CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition", + "lang": "en", + "type": "CWE" + } + ] + } + ], + "providerMetadata": { + "orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", + "shortName": "EEF", + "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T02:54:23.810Z" + }, + "references": [ + { + "name": "A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever", + "tags": [ + "vendor-advisory", + "related" + ], + "url": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/security/advisories/GHSA-8j48-4mg5-7v6v" + }, + { + "name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-125275", + "tags": [ + "related" + ], + "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-125275.html" + }, + { + "name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-125275", + "tags": [ + "related" + ], + "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-125275" + }, + { + "name": "Introducing commit a49fb88 in nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web", + "tags": [ + "related" + ], + "url": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/a49fb8875f3aab40062881028ef4e406d985aaa9" + }, + { + "name": "Fix commit 064e78c in nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web", + "tags": [ + "patch" + ], + "url": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/064e78cc189dd9b87748746f44179632a52ddf58" + } + ], + "source": { + "discovery": "UNKNOWN" + }, + "title": "A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever", + "workarounds": [ + { + "lang": "en", + "supportingMedia": [ + { + "base64": false, + "type": "text/html", + "value": "

Set DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE to a bundle that holds no public root and no root that signs device certificates, for example a file with one self-signed certificate made for this purpose. A certificate from an unregistered CA is then refused once and the handshake ends. Devices whose certificate or CA is registered in NervesHub continue to connect.

\n

Restarting a node ends the handshakes that are already stuck on it.

" + }, + { + "base64": false, + "type": "text/markdown", + "value": "Set `DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE` to a bundle that holds no public root and no root that signs device certificates, for example a file with one self-signed certificate made for this purpose. A certificate from an unregistered CA is then refused once and the handshake ends. Devices whose certificate or CA is registered in NervesHub continue to connect.\n\nRestarting a node ends the handshakes that are already stuck on it." + } + ], + "value": "Set DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE to a bundle that holds no public root and no root that signs device certificates, for example a file with one self-signed certificate made for this purpose. A certificate from an unregistered CA is then refused once and the handshake ends. Devices whose certificate or CA is registered in NervesHub continue to connect.\n\nRestarting a node ends the handshakes that are already stuck on it." + } + ], + "x_proofOfConcept": [ + { + "lang": "en", + "supportingMedia": [ + { + "base64": false, + "type": "text/html", + "value": "
    \n
  1. Make a self-signed root and a client certificate signed by it, directly or through an intermediate that the client sends. Do not register either CA in NervesHub.
  2. \n
  3. Run a device endpoint whose trust store holds that root, by adding it to the DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE bundle. Against the default trust store, a client certificate from a public CA replaces steps 1 and 2.
  4. \n
  5. Open one TLS connection to the device endpoint with that certificate, then disconnect.
  6. \n
  7. The handshake process on the server keeps running. The nerves_hub.ssl.fail telemetry event with reason unknown_ca and the database queries repeat until the node restarts.
  8. \n
" + }, + { + "base64": false, + "type": "text/markdown", + "value": "1. Make a self-signed root and a client certificate signed by it, directly or through an intermediate that the client sends. Do not register either CA in NervesHub.\n2. Run a device endpoint whose trust store holds that root, by adding it to the `DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE` bundle. Against the default trust store, a client certificate from a public CA replaces steps 1 and 2.\n3. Open one TLS connection to the device endpoint with that certificate, then disconnect.\n4. The handshake process on the server keeps running. The `nerves_hub.ssl.fail` telemetry event with reason `unknown_ca` and the database queries repeat until the node restarts." + } + ], + "value": "* Make a self-signed root and a client certificate signed by it, directly or through an intermediate that the client sends. Do not register either CA in NervesHub.\n* Run a device endpoint whose trust store holds that root, by adding it to the DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE bundle. Against the default trust store, a client certificate from a public CA replaces steps 1 and 2.\n* Open one TLS connection to the device endpoint with that certificate, then disconnect.\n* The handshake process on the server keeps running. The nerves_hub.ssl.fail telemetry event with reason unknown_ca and the database queries repeat until the node restarts." + } + ], + "x_technicalAnalysis": [ + { + "lang": "en", + "supportingMedia": [ + { + "base64": false, + "type": "text/html", + "value": "

1. Refusal reason. The device endpoint gives ssl the verify function NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification.verify_fun/3, which asks NervesHub.SSL.decide/2. For a :valid_peer event on a certificate that is not on file, decide/2 tries to register the certificate. check_known_ca/1 in lib/nerves_hub/ssl.ex looks for the signer among the registered CAs and returns :unknown_ca when it finds none. do_verify/2 passes that to ssl as {:fail, :unknown_ca}.

\n

2. Retry in ssl. unknown_ca is also the reason Erlang/OTP uses for a path with no trust anchor. In ssl_handshake:path_validate/11, a {bad_cert, unknown_ca} result makes ssl look for a cross-signed alternative root and validate again. Unlike the root_cert_expired branch, this branch does not add the root it tried to the list of roots to skip.

\n

3. Loop. When the chain ends at a self-signed root in the trust store, ssl finds the same root, calls the verify function again, and receives unknown_ca again. The recursion is a tail call, so the process does not grow or crash. It does not return to its mailbox, so it sees neither the handshake timeout nor the closed socket. Each pass runs the database queries of the registration checks.

" + }, + { + "base64": false, + "type": "text/markdown", + "value": "**1. Refusal reason.** The device endpoint gives `ssl` the verify function `NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification.verify_fun/3`, which asks `NervesHub.SSL.decide/2`. For a `:valid_peer` event on a certificate that is not on file, `decide/2` tries to register the certificate. `check_known_ca/1` in `lib/nerves_hub/ssl.ex` looks for the signer among the registered CAs and returns `:unknown_ca` when it finds none. `do_verify/2` passes that to `ssl` as `{:fail, :unknown_ca}`.\n\n**2. Retry in `ssl`.** `unknown_ca` is also the reason Erlang/OTP uses for a path with no trust anchor. In `ssl_handshake:path_validate/11`, a `{bad_cert, unknown_ca}` result makes `ssl` look for a cross-signed alternative root and validate again. Unlike the `root_cert_expired` branch, this branch does not add the root it tried to the list of roots to skip.\n\n**3. Loop.** When the chain ends at a self-signed root in the trust store, `ssl` finds the same root, calls the verify function again, and receives `unknown_ca` again. The recursion is a tail call, so the process does not grow or crash. It does not return to its mailbox, so it sees neither the handshake timeout nor the closed socket. Each pass runs the database queries of the registration checks." + } + ], + "value": "1. Refusal reason. The device endpoint gives ssl the verify function NervesHub.DeviceLink.PeerVerification.verify_fun/3, which asks NervesHub.SSL.decide/2. For a :valid_peer event on a certificate that is not on file, decide/2 tries to register the certificate. check_known_ca/1 in lib/nerves_hub/ssl.ex looks for the signer among the registered CAs and returns :unknown_ca when it finds none. do_verify/2 passes that to ssl as {:fail, :unknown_ca}.\n\n2. Retry in ssl. unknown_ca is also the reason Erlang/OTP uses for a path with no trust anchor. In ssl_handshake:path_validate/11, a {bad_cert, unknown_ca} result makes ssl look for a cross-signed alternative root and validate again. Unlike the root_cert_expired branch, this branch does not add the root it tried to the list of roots to skip.\n\n3. Loop. When the chain ends at a self-signed root in the trust store, ssl finds the same root, calls the verify function again, and receives unknown_ca again. The recursion is a tail call, so the process does not grow or crash. It does not return to its mailbox, so it sees neither the handshake timeout nor the closed socket. Each pass runs the database queries of the registration checks." + } + ] + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/2026/18xxx/CVE-2026-18909.json b/data/2026/18xxx/CVE-2026-18909.json index 666da3155e..0afcb2ae86 100644 --- a/data/2026/18xxx/CVE-2026-18909.json +++ b/data/2026/18xxx/CVE-2026-18909.json @@ -8,14 +8,14 @@ "assignerShortName": "ELAN", "dateReserved": "2026-08-05T05:41:07.711Z", "datePublished": "2026-08-06T03:46:00.081Z", - "dateUpdated": "2026-08-06T14:19:21.022Z" + "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T02:32:33.061Z" }, "containers": { "cna": { "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "36106deb-8e95-420b-a0a0-e70af5d245df", "shortName": "ELAN", - "dateUpdated": "2026-08-06T03:46:00.081Z" + "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T02:32:33.061Z" }, "problemTypes": [ { @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ ], "references": [ { - "url": "https://www.emc.com.tw/emc/tw/vulnerability-disclosure-policy" + "url": "https://www.emc.com.tw/upload/F2E/Vulnerability%20Report/Vulnerability%20Report_ELAN%20KMDF%20Driver_20260806.pdf" } ], "metrics": [ diff --git a/data/delta.json b/data/delta.json index aa3e89d8cb..5e7a220011 100644 --- a/data/delta.json +++ b/data/delta.json @@ -1,12 +1,18 @@ { - "fetchTime": "2026-11-17T02:02:02.140Z", - "numberOfChanges": 1, + "fetchTime": "2026-11-17T03:14:57.382Z", + "numberOfChanges": 2, "new": [ { - "cveId": "CVE-2026-12487", - "cveOrgLink": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-12487", - "githubLink": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/12xxx/CVE-2026-12487.json", - "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T02:00:25.389Z" + "cveId": "CVE-2026-107901", + "cveOrgLink": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-107901", + "githubLink": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107901.json", + "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T03:13:08.845Z" + }, + { + "cveId": "CVE-2026-107902", + "cveOrgLink": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-107902", + "githubLink": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107902.json", + "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T03:13:20.443Z" } ], "updated": [], diff --git a/data/deltaLog.json b/data/deltaLog.json index 8a809eb6b6..0916af4355 100644 --- a/data/deltaLog.json +++ b/data/deltaLog.json @@ -1,4 +1,52 @@ [ + { + "fetchTime": "2026-11-17T03:14:57.382Z", + "numberOfChanges": 2, + "new": [ + { + "cveId": "CVE-2026-107901", + "cveOrgLink": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-107901", + "githubLink": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107901.json", + "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T03:13:08.845Z" + }, + { + "cveId": "CVE-2026-107902", + "cveOrgLink": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-107902", + "githubLink": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107902.json", + "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T03:13:20.443Z" + } + ], + "updated": [], + "error": [] + }, + { + "fetchTime": "2026-11-17T02:59:53.387Z", + "numberOfChanges": 1, + "new": [ + { + "cveId": "CVE-2026-125275", + "cveOrgLink": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-125275", + "githubLink": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/125xxx/CVE-2026-125275.json", + "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T02:54:23.810Z" + } + ], + "updated": [], + "error": [] + }, + { + "fetchTime": "2026-11-17T02:36:42.267Z", + "numberOfChanges": 1, + "new": [], + "updated": [ + { + "cveId": "CVE-2026-18909", + "cveOrgLink": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-18909", + "githubLink": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/18xxx/CVE-2026-18909.json", + "dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T02:32:33.061Z" + } + ], + "error": [] + }, { "fetchTime": "2026-11-17T02:02:02.140Z", "numberOfChanges": 1, @@ -647311,33 +647359,5 @@ ], "updated": [], "error": [] - }, - { - "fetchTime": "2026-10-18T02:52:58.941Z", - "numberOfChanges": 1, - "new": [ - { - "cveId": "CVE-2026-111869", - "cveOrgLink": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-111869", - "githubLink": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/111xxx/CVE-2026-111869.json", - "dateUpdated": "2026-10-18T02:45:15.572Z" - } - ], - "updated": [], - "error": [] - }, - { - "fetchTime": "2026-10-18T02:42:04.106Z", - "numberOfChanges": 1, - "new": [], - "updated": [ - { - "cveId": "CVE-2026-16337", - "cveOrgLink": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-16337", - "githubLink": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/16xxx/CVE-2026-16337.json", - "dateUpdated": "2026-10-18T02:38:14.709Z" - } - ], - "error": [] } ] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/state/sync.json b/state/sync.json index bbefcd6123..526ae6f8b1 100644 --- a/state/sync.json +++ b/state/sync.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "source": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5.git", - "upstream_commit": "db052586429bf6f81f813844c5c82d2f16a5cbb7", + "upstream_commit": "da88fb3f5df466c27c6f272feb8264fa50ce0fd2", "since_year": 2017, - "records": 333131, - "synced_at_utc": "2026-11-17T02:27:31.493086+00:00" + "records": 333134, + "synced_at_utc": "2026-11-17T03:27:51.128041+00:00" }